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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis explores the development of relations between the Jordanian Muslim 
Brotherhood and Jordanian regime from 1945 to 2010, in which a distinction is made 
between the pre- and post-1989 eras that demarked a significant shift from partnership 
to crisis. Utilising an historical approach, the first era is defined by both parties’ mutual 
pragmatism, establishing a unified understanding of the Palestinian issue, and what the 
nature of politics in Jordan would be. However, the post-1989 era is analysed within 
the context of the regime’s shift in interests from internal to external issues, 
subsequently changing its pragmatic discourse towards the Brotherhood and Islamic 
movements. This study suggests that the shift in the regime’s focus, teamed with the 
implementation of policies such as the ‘one vote system’ and the peace treaty with 
Israel, left a space for radical voices to rise within the Brotherhood. To understand if 
the Brotherhood is compatible to Jordan’s parliamentarian system, the research 
identifies circles of division within the Brotherhood between Hassan al-Banna and 
Sayyid Qutb’s ideologies in the wake of regional conflict and poor regime-Islamist 
relations. This bifurcation is exacerbated in Jordan, as seen with the opposing fronts of 
the Jordanian Brotherhood’s Shoura Council: Hawks of Palestinian origin vs. Doves of 
Jordanian origin, claiming a new division: the ‘new’ Hawks, or, the ‘Salafist 
Brotherhood’. Supported by exclusive personal interviews with Brotherhood leaders, 
this thesis argues that allowing Islamist movements’ limited political participation in 
Jordan is essential for the country’s stability and religious modernity as since the 2007 
boycott, increasing numbers of al-Bannaist Doves have converted into Qutbist Hawks. 
This has empowered the Hawks to demand fundamental reforms regarding the 
monarchy’s existence, initiating the Brotherhood’s final 2010 political boycott, and 
positioning the once-allied movement outside the political process and indefinitely 
removed from accountability.  
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 v 
The Muslim Brotherhood [al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn] was the first Islamic movement to 
enter Jordanian politics, working with King ᶜAbdallah I in the establishment of the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in 1946. The alliances that were built between the 
regime and the Brotherhood maintained the stability and continuation of Jordan as a 
kingdom that is both Hashemite and Islamic. Throughout the years these two parties 
have maintained a bittersweet relationship with dialogue at its core, however, since 
King ᶜAbdallah II’s coronation in 1999, the path of this relationship has entered into a 
crisis, with the new King ceasing all communication with the Brotherhood, resulting in 
the movement rejecting participation within the political process.  
Jordan emerged in the aftermath of the Arab Spring as the only remaining 
stable Arab country in the Levant. Wedged between conflict, its location means that 
regional strife often passes through the country in the form of various aftershocks, 
rendering it both a beacon of stability externally and ideologically conflicted internally. 
To the east of Jordan is Iraq, and in the north is Syria, both of which are involved in 
conflict, and to the west of the Jordan river lies the on-going Palestinian-Israeli 
conflict. Over time these conflicts, among others, have found their way into Jordan, 
making it a magnet for economic troubles, refugees, and ideologies that overspill, 
affecting other states. Therefore, Jordan became a platform from which ideologies 
grow and are exported into neighbouring countries but do not take root within Jordan 
itself. 
In that sense, Jordan does run the risk of descending into similar disturbances 
as its neighbours, however, the internal relationship between political and monarchic 
figures within the country has to some extent stabilised it, as seen with the alliance 
between the Muslim Brotherhood and the regime. This study presents a close analysis 
of Jordan’s internal dynamics in order to demonstrate the larger context of Islamic 
movements’ participation in modern state systems. Therefore, Jordan will be used as a 
model of how regime-Islamic movement relations can be both effective and destructive 
in different scenarios, and ultimately how political Islam has grown to the point of 
taking part in a regional uprising.  
 
 vi 
 
 
Figure 1 Map of Jordan 
The map has been sourced from Mapsofworld.com with due permission1 
 
The Arab Spring not only changed regimes, but also marked the emerging 
opportunity to change ideologies that rule the Arab world’s states’ systems, allowing a 
new wave of democracy to take place in the Middle East, as well as proposing Islamic 
movements as alternatives to regimes. 
The case of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood represents the long-lasting 
relationship of the Muslim Brotherhood in politics within a legitimate environment, in 
                                                
1 “Jordan Map”, Maps of the World, accessed on May 5, 2015, 
http://www.mapsofworld.com/jordan/. 
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contrast to other Arab Spring countries. By looking to the Jordanian Brotherhood case, 
its interaction with the regime and use of democracy within the democratic 
environment, we can understand how the Muslim Brotherhood works in a modern state 
domain. Furthermore, the Brotherhood’s political choices – whether in participation or 
boycotting the system and turning against democracy – will be clarified. 
This study presents a comprehensive analysis of the Muslim Brotherhood in 
Jordan, its political participation, and the dynamics of its activities and relationships 
within Jordan. Whilst this study presents one of the few comprehensive studies 
conducted in English, looking to the Brotherhood’s internal divisions regarding the 
application of political Islam in Jordan, in light of the Arab Spring, it also features 
translated interviews with Brotherhood leaders.  
As testament to the politically volatile environment of the Middle East today, 
one of these leaders has since been imprisoned, and another expelled from the 
movement due to their respective understandings of the regime. These interviews 
demark key points in history, at which point the future of the Brotherhood experienced 
a notable shift towards a new understanding of political Islam. Furthermore, they were 
conducted on the cusp of great changes within the Brotherhood, and thus the study 
presents a unique understanding of clashes internally with the Muslim Brotherhood 
and externally with the regime. Therefore, this study attempts to fill a gap in 
understanding the Brotherhood’s participation in politics, which will contribute to a 
wider understanding of the Arab Spring’s consequences for political Islam. 
The Brotherhood in Jordan has based its ideology on Islamic reform, as 
indicated by Raḥīl al-Gharāybah, previous leader of the ‘Doves’ wing of the Jordanian 
Muslim Brotherhood, defining the Muslim Brotherhood as: 
 
A social movement, which emerges inside communities, aiming to serve them. 
Therefore, the movement’s priority is firstly to society, and secondly to political work 
[…] They are revitalisers of the society, and aim to mobilise people to make them able 
to lead themselves and gain their own rights. Therefore, serving the society is not for 
the interest of the Muslim Brotherhood – in contrast, the Brotherhood will overlook 
their interests for the interests of the community.2 
 
This notion that the Brotherhood is composing social reform derives from the 
                                                
2 Interview with Raḥīl al-Gharāybah, August 24, 2012, Amman, Jordan. 
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ideology of Hassan al-Banna, the Egyptian Brotherhood’s founder. He advocated that 
Islamic values be slowly introduced into society, creating manageable changes in 
citizens’ attitudes toward Islam before these values reach the state level. The leader of 
the ‘Hawks’ wing, Zakī bin Arshīd, adds that, “The Islamic movement is ideological, 
political, and idealistic due to its Islamic ruling. Its aims are the improvement and 
peaceful change of society through social work”.3 The model of change begins with 
small communities in order to create success stories before they flourish into larger 
communities, cities, and eventually the whole country. Al-Gharāybah furthers this 
with: 
 
We would like to change systematic values in the community, because values are the 
borders of culture and [the Brotherhood] participates in raising the level of awareness 
to make society a coherent fabric. This goes together with the economic change in 
which the Brotherhood can support the situation of poverty, unemployment, and 
production.4 
 
The understanding between the Muslim Brotherhood and King ᶜAbdallah I and 
King Hussein regarding how the state should be ruled, how Islamic values should be 
implemented, and how the Palestinian issue should be addressed, was reason for this 
relationship to flourish, ensuring unified goals in the midst of regional turmoil.  
However, when King ᶜAbdallah II came to power, the Brotherhood had to 
compromise with its gradual change as the new regime typically expressed different 
goals. Therefore, this is a study of alliances and crises between the Jordanian regime 
and the Brotherhood, demonstrating that the two rely on one another for legitimacy and 
their own stability. 
The concept of the ‘regime’ in this study is an umbrella term for the monarchy, 
its rules, and those who fervently follow it. This latter group consists of officials 
appointed by the King such as the prime minister, government, parliament, security 
departments, and royalist civilians who support the monarchy’s existence, as they 
believe this will ensure their own survival. Furthermore, businessmen also link 
themselves to the monarchy to protect their capital under the King’s rule. This group, 
consisting mostly of Jordanian and tribal descendants, work as the King’s camarilla, 
                                                
3 Interview with Zakī bin Arshīd, August 31, 2012, Amman, Jordan. 
4 Interview with Raḥīl al-Gharāybah, August 24, 2012, Amman, Jordan. 
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and are rewarded for their loyalty with a larger presence in high governmental 
positions. Indeed, the monarchy can be separated from the regime, but the regime is 
inseparable from the monarchy. And so, when the Muslim Brotherhood deals with the 
regime, they are dealing with this royal cabal throughout parliament, government, and 
in the Jordanian streets.  
Currently, however, the Brotherhood has declared its permanent boycott of 
elections, which makes Jordan risk disturbance due to the loss of the Brotherhood’s 
compatibility with Jordan’s democratic and parliamentarian system, ending the era of 
alliances with the regime since the establishment of the country and the Muslim 
Brotherhood in 1945/6. 
These alliances during Jordan’s history enabled them to move past challenging 
situations and to eliminate any emerging opposition to the regime from different 
ideological sources, such as the Leftists, Nationalists, and the Fedayeen that also 
opposed the Brotherhood. This meant that their threats united them, and they 
pragmatically allied to fight others.  
However, King ᶜAbdallah II’s mission to eliminate the Brotherhood, shutting 
down any avenue for communication, in contrast with the previous King’s policies of 
dialogue and alliance, caused the Brotherhood to push for the latest boycott in 2010. 
This clash is due to the absence of mutual opposition, the growing power of the 
Jordanian Brotherhood, and lack of communication, which left no space for both 
parties to work independently without opposing the other. In this situation a new wing 
has formed within the movement, turning against the regime, and external from the 
accountability of the political system. If sustained, this may eventually cause a growing 
revolutionary rhetoric, causing similar confrontations between the Brotherhood and 
regime as seen in neighbouring countries during the Arab Spring.  
This poses the main question of this study: ‘Is the Jordanian Muslim 
Brotherhood compatible with Jordan’s modern political system?’ 
The study contextualises this question by looking to the Brotherhood’s 
historical experience as an association before 1989, and its participation as a political 
party in the parliamentary elections post-1989. In doing so, it traces the stances and 
transformations within the movement from participation to boycott, from modernity to 
radicalism, and from a positive to a negative actor towards Jordan’s parliamentarian 
system.  
In order to answer this question and understand the unique relationship with 
 x 
the regime, the study comprises five chapters in its main body, tracing the 
Brotherhood’s timeline from early participation in politics to their final boycott.  
Chapter One, ‘The Establishment’, poses the sub-question ‘How did the 
regime and Brotherhood’s relationship evolve?’, highlighting the Brotherhood’s 
national role after Jordan’s 1946 independence, and the merger between the 
Brotherhood’s Jordanian and Palestinian branches to present the vital role of the 
Palestinian issue in the movement since its establishment. 
In the second chapter, ‘A Group not a Party: the Marriage of Convenience’, the 
study asks ‘How did the Brotherhood enter politics, and what were the conditions of 
their early participation?’ This chapter looks to the nature of the Brotherhood’s 
alliances with the Leftists and Nationalists, and sudden change of direction, favouring 
the regime. It will also trace the Brotherhood’s role in Jordan’s wars with Israel, the 
Civil War of 1970-1971, and the Brotherhood’s use of violence during this period. 
The third chapter, ‘The Fusion of the Muslim Brotherhood: The Crisis from 
Within’, proposes the question of ‘What were the reasons for the crisis with the 
regime, and how did the Brotherhood decide on its first boycott?’ To do this, the re-
establishment of political life in 1989 is analysed, specifically in regards to the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s role in the government. This will help us understand the Brotherhood’s 
usage of boycotting as a strategy to pressurise the government for political changes  
Chapter Four, ‘From Boycott to Participation,’ asks ‘What were the reasons for 
the Muslim Brotherhood returning to political participation?’, tackling the 
Brotherhood’s internal divisions and changes of leadership between 1998 and 2003, 
and the influence on the pragmatism of the movement therein. 
In contrast, Chapter Five, ‘Participation to Boycott: Radicalisation’ deals with 
the question ‘How did the rise of other Islamic movements, such as the Salafists, 
impact the Brotherhood?’, within the context of growing jihadism and Hamas’ success 
in 2006. This chapter also looks to the Brotherhood’s participation in a supposedly 
defrauded election, and its impact on their decision to boycott the political process in 
2010 indefinitely. 
Answering these five sub-questions provides reasoning for the Brotherhood’s 
participation and boycott. Through these questions the study identifies the 
compatibility of the Brotherhood with the democratic Jordanian system, and further 
predicting how the movement would manage power in Jordan if it were to obtain it.  
 Tracing the history of the movement and its guiding ideologies, juxtaposed 
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with personal interviews of current and ex-members, a multi-criteria perspective is 
gained, in which the overall findings imply an emerging direction for the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Jordan, with unprecedented fundamental internal divisions. 
 
Literature Review: Political Islam and the Modern State 
 
The emergence of the modern state system can be traced back to the early 17th and 18th 
century European experiences. The English revolution of 1688 and the French 
revolution of 1799 both pushed for state reformation, in which the state would become 
an entity representative of the people, rather than the traditional system of a king 
supported by God. This system would emphasise the role of the parliaments in the state 
as legislature, citizenship, and equality, accountable by law. Therefore, these events 
marked the beginning of the establishment of a national modern state built on man-
made laws, separating the church and state. Max Weber says that the modern state: 
 
Possesses an administrative and legal order subject to change by legislation, to which 
the organised activities of the administrative staff, which are also controlled by 
regulation, are orientated. This system of orders claims binding authority not only over 
members of the state, the citizens, most of whom have obtained membership by birth, 
but also to a very large extent over all actions taking place in the area of its 
jurisdiction.5  
 
Therefore, the modern state retains sole legitimacy of the use of violence, and 
equally applies its laws on all citizens. These revolutions were a tool for reformatting 
the state beliefs and ideologies of the population. In the same strain, the Arab Spring 
revolutions brought back the controversial question of political Islam’s adaptability 
with the modern state era, since political Islam proposed itself as an alternative to 
failing regimes. Therefore two arguments arise, whether political Islam is compatible 
or incompatible with the modern state system.  
Incompatibility 
 
                                                
5 Max Weber, Guenther Roth, and Claus Wittich, Economy and Society: An Outline of 
Interpretive Sociology, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978) 56. 
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Samuel P. Huntington’s Clash of Civilisations,6 states that political Islam is 
incompatible with the modern state era. He divides the world into eight civilisations 
under the premise that culture is the only determinant of civilisational divide, warning 
that the most probable struggle in this era would be between Western and Islamic 
civilisation. Bernard Lewis furthered this argument in What went wrong? The Clash 
between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East,7 where he compares political Islam’s 
confrontation with the West in the 21st century to their confrontation in the Dark Ages. 
Here he suggests that contrarily during Europe’s Dark Ages, Islam was a religion that 
supported the development of modernity and the concept of a civil state in contrast to 
the West, which, as led by Christianity, descended into obscurity. Lewis then 
emphasises the idea that with the failure of the Ottoman Empire, and without a central 
government for Islam to organise a political system, political Islam failed to create 
peace with the West, or with the new countries that were established upon the 
collapsed empire, thus making political Islam a reason for the failure. 
Ultimately, both Huntington and Lewis understand the cultural and religious 
differences of Islam and the West as naturally positioning Islam as an adversary, 
making the chance of conflict higher, particularly based on religious disparities. 
Furthermore, both authors consider political Islam as incompatible with a modern state 
because it does not separate between ‘church and state’, and democracy does not exist 
within Islamic scripture. Thus they argue that Islam is unable to build the modern 
democratic state that is required for survival in the new world era; rather political 
Islam’s aim to build a theocratic state would be the reason for a continuation of 
aggression with the West, and the failure in development of Islamic countries that 
would use political Islam in power.  
Huntington and Lewis reach their conclusions because the essence of political 
Islam is in the establishment of the caliphate and the application of Shariᶜah law, 
which would then be the foundation of the Islamic state. In this sense, political Islam is 
theocratic at its core, as its goals are to make God the only ruler of the state, with his 
rules enforced by interpretations of scripture and subsequent teachings of Islam.  
Alternatively, the civil state calls for the application of a democratic system, 
and the equality between citizens, and legislature passed through parliament 
                                                
6 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, (New 
York: Simon & Schuster 1996) 20-24. 
7 Bernard Lewis, What Went Wrong?: Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002). 
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accordingly. As US President Abraham Lincoln argued, democracy is a “government 
of people by the people for the people”;8 which fundamentally contradicts political 
Islam, as God and his Shariᶜah – not the people – rule the Islamic state.  
The interpretation that the Islamic state is theocratic is found in the concept of 
al-Hākimīyah [The Principle of Divine Governance], which was elaborated by the 
Bengali Islamist philosopher Abu-'l-Aʻlā Mawdūdī. Al-Hākimīyah posits that God can 
be the only ruler and source of legislation and governance in the Islamic state, as 
an: “Whoever does not judge by what God has revealed-then it is those who are 
disbelievers,”9 which indicates that deviating from God’s path is un-Islamic. Therefore, 
Mawdūdī suggests that by giving power to the people, and allowing them the ability to 
legislate laws, is to allow man to sit on God’s thrown.10  
Similarly, the famous Egyptian Islamist philosopher and Muslim Brother 
Sayyid Qutb emphasises that following God’s rules is the only way to rule Islamically. 
He says, “God, not humans, must rule. God is the source of all powers, including 
politics. Virtue, not freedom, is the best human value, therefore it must be the law of 
God [Shariᶜah], not human-made laws that rules any society”.11  
Therefore, according to al-Hākimīyah, political Islam is incompatible with 
democracy, something that is explained by the Egyptian intellectual Rifāʻah al-Ṭahṭāwī 
in this manner: “this is because the rule of freedom and democracy consists of 
imparting justice and right to the people and the nation’s participation in determining 
its destiny.”12  
The argument that Islam is incompatible with democracy essentially comes 
from the contradiction between God’s rules and people’s rules – i.e., between 
manmade legislation and God’s legislation. Ultimately, however, this is to say that 
those who interpret God’s rules are the ones who make the Islamic state theocratic. 
However, it is debated as to what extent applying Shariᶜah makes the state theocratic, 
                                                
8 President Abraham Lincoln, The Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863), in: Abraham Lincoln 
and William E. Gienapp, This Fiery Trial: The Speeches and Writings of Abraham Lincoln, 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2002) 184. 
9 The Qur'ān: English Meanings and Notes by Ṣaḥeeḥ International, (London: al-Muntada al-
Islami Trust, 2012) 5:45 
10 Abu-'l-Aʻlā al-Mawdūdī, Islām al-Madanīyah al-Hadīthah [Islam and the Modern State], 
(Riyadh: Dār Ṭuwayq lil-Nashr wa-al-Tawzīʻ, 1982) 28-29. 
11 Quoted in: Kāmil Najjār, al-Dawlah al-Islāmīyah bayna al-Naẓarīyah wa-al-Taṭbīq [The 
Islamic State between Theory and Application], (Tripoli: Tālah lil-Ṭibāʻah wa-al-Nashr, 2007) 
8. 
12 Quoted in: David Garnham, and Mark A. Tessler, Democracy, War, and Peace in the Middle 
East, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1995) 119. 
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and how applicable political Islam is to democracy. 
 
Compatibility 
 
Conversely, John Esposito’s collective work13 emphasises the compatibility of political 
Islam to the modern state system as Islam is continuously in transition. He argues that 
any future development in understanding democracy and the parliamentary system will 
be due to the reformist ᶜUlamāᵓ in Islam who continuously propose new 
understandings and readings of scripture and teachings. 
Esposito highlights the experience of the 19th century reformists, namely Jamāl 
al-Dīn al-Afghānī, Muḥammad ʻAbduh, and Rashīd Riḍā, who helped renew the 
religion by reactivating the concept of Ijtihād [diligence/independent reasoning]. This 
asserts the right for individuals to analyse the Qurᵓan and the Sunnah independently 
from scholars’ understandings, opening the door for all kinds of reinterpretations of 
Islam in the face of modern politics. The introduction of individual adaptability has 
made political Islam pragmatic, and applicable to every situation as the texts are no 
longer fixed, but transient. 
Furthermore, Olivier Roy claims in The Failure of Political Islam14 that 
political Islam is not the problem; rather it is the crises that the Islamic states already 
experience. He argues that since the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the modern Islamic 
state has fallen into a cultural, political, and economic crisis under military, monarchic, 
and authoritarian regimes. In response to the failure to build economic and cultural 
stability, which further divided Muslims, the revival of political Islam was used as a 
tool for reforming and rebuilding the modern state by looking to previous experiences 
of Muslims’ unity and modernity, which happened to be within the Islamic caliphate, 
since secular and authoritarian states did not present viable alternatives.  
However, these authoritarian regimes would not allow a space to apply 
political Islam, therefore we do not have a modern example for the political 
establishment of Islam; conversely, these regimes utilise political Islam to empower 
their ruling, such as Iran and Saudi Arabia. Therefore, the failure of political Islam can 
be thought of in regards to the regimes, not political Islam.  
                                                
13 John L. Esposito, The Future of Islam, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010); John L. 
Esposito, Voices of Resurgent Islam, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983). 
14 Olivier Roy, The Failure of Political Islam, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 
1994). 
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 The argument that the Islamic state is modern and civil is based on the 
assertion that Islam has organised and allowed legal systems through treaties to 
organise civilians, rather than just relying on Shariᶜah. The Islamic lawyer and scholar, 
Muḥammad Salīm ʻAwwa,̄ argues in his book Fī al-Niẓām al-Siyāsī lil-Dawlah al-
Islāmīyah [In the Political System of the Islamic State]15 that Islam is a fully civil state, 
and that it has been constitutional since its establishment before the West had even 
established the concept of the modern state system. Here he refers to the first treaty in 
Islam, the ‘al-Madina treaty’ of 623 BC,16 as the first constitution of Islam, which 
organised the relationship between all groups in al-Madina, whether Muslims 
themselves, or Muslims and non-Muslims, granting equality and justice, and equal 
rights to practice religion. This united all religions and tribes together against any 
threat al-Madina faced. 
ʻAwwā furthers this claim by arguing that during the Prophet’s time the rulers 
of the Islamic state were not chosen based on al-Hākimīyah or religious qualifications, 
but rather their vocational experience in leadership positions. ʻAwwā uses the example 
of the appointment of Khālid bin al-Walīd and ʻAmr bin al-ʻĀṣṣ as leaders for the 
Islamic armies despite being newly converted to Islam, which demonstrates the priority 
of success over religiosity. This claim of Islam as a civil state, constitutional and 
competent, over religiosity, found legal ground with Sāmir Māzin Qubbaj, who argues 
that the laws within the caliphate were Islamic despite being man-made. This is seen 
with the 1877 Ottoman Majallat al-Aḥkām al-ʻAdlīyah [Meccelles/Civil code],17 which 
was the first document of laws applicable to all Islamic states and territories that fell 
under Ottoman power. This document was enacted to unite the Islamic judiciary since 
judges around the Islamic state, from different sects and backgrounds, were making 
different judgements. Therefore, this constitution united Islam under a civil code that 
engendered equality and justice according to Shariᶜah law. 
Therein, ʻAwwā and Qubbaj are against the argument that Islam is a theocratic 
state, rejecting any man-made laws, stating that it was built under civil laws that use 
Shariᶜah as a source – but not the sole reference – for the state. This interpretation for 
                                                
15 Muḥammad Salīm ʻAwwā, Fī al-Niẓām al-Siyāsī lil-Dawlah al-Islāmīyah [In the Political 
System of Islamic State] (Cairo: al-Maktab al-Miṣrī al-Ḥadīth, 1983). 
16 Michael Lecker, The "Constitution of Medina": Muḥammad's First Legal Document, 
(Princeton, NJ: Darwin Press, 2004). 
17 Sāmir Māzin Qubbaj, Majallat al-Aḥkām al-ʻAdlīyah: Maṣādiruhā wa-Atharuhā fī Qawānīn 
al-Sharq al-Islāmī, [Mecelle: Its Sources and Impact on Eastern Islamic Laws], (Amman: Dār 
al-Fatḥ lil-Dirāsāt wa-al-Nashr, 2008). 
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the format of Islamic legislation is built on a former generation of Islamic scholars, 
such as Rashīd Riḍā, who said, “all issues in the Islamic state must be derived from a 
constitution that relies on the Qurᵓan, Sunnah, and the al-Khulafā ̓ al-Rāshidūn [the 
first four ‘rightly guided’ caliphs after the Prophet]”.18 This means that the Islamic 
state relies on Islam as a source for the constitution but not a full constitution alone. 
This therefore permits human laws, and the introduction of other experiences from the 
world’s constitutions and laws, and allows Islam to work within a modern state system. 
However, the modern, independent states, after the collapse of the Ottoman 
Empire, began to create their own laws, constitutions, and parliamentary systems 
copying the European model when creating a modern state, as often Europeans drew 
these mandates. The theocrats saw this as a replacement for Shariᶜah, leading some, 
such as Issam al-Barqawi, a Jordanian Salafist scholar, to call democracy a religion of 
its own, and its followers and those who apply the parliamentary system, Kuffār.19 
Others, such as the Egyptian theologian Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī,20 and the 
intellectual leader of the Tunisian Ennahda Movement, Rāshid al-Ghannūshī,21 look to 
the parliament as synonymous with Islam’s Shoura concept of mutual consultation, 
asserting the right to engage in politics by entering the parliament through elections. 
They see a greater value for Islam and Muslims in participating and adapting the 
democratic system, rather than rejecting it. Using scriptural texts, such as verses from 
the Qurᵓan, they demonstrate the justifications and compatibility of Islam to the 
Shoura, as seen with: “And those who have responded to their Lord and established 
prayer and whose affair is [determined by] consultation among themselves…”22 and 
“…so pardon them and ask for forgiveness for them and consult them in the 
matter…”23 Thus, they draw their interpretation of Islam as a comprehensive system 
for all aspects of life including politics, which they believe cannot be separated from 
Islam, as well as Shariᶜah, which is vital for the application of Islam.  
                                                
18 In: Mohamed Elhachmi Hamdi, “The Limits of the Western Model,” Journal of Democracy 
7.2 (1996): 81-85. 
19 Issam al-Barqawi, “Al-Dīmuqrāṭīyah Dīn” [Democracy is a Religion], Tawhed, 2013, 
Accessed June 3, 2014, https://archive.org/details/Democracy_201307; see Appendix 1: 
Glossary . 
20Yūsuf ᶜAbdallah Al-Qarḍāwī, al-Dīn wa-al-Siyāsah: Taʼṣīl wa-Radd Shubuhāt [Religion and 
Politics: Origins and Answering Suspicions], (Cairo: Dār al-Shurūq, 2007). 
21 Rāshid Ghannūshī, al-Dīmuqrāṭīyah wa-Ḥuqūq al-Insān fī al-Islām [Democracy and Human 
Rights in Islam], (Beirut: al-Dār al-ʻArabīyah lil-ʻUlūm Nāshirūn, 2012). 
22 The Qur'ān, 42:38. 
23 Ibid., 3:159. 
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Within their encouragement of the adaptability to democracy, they thought that 
a Muslim lawmaker, elected by the people, would not issue a law to restrict or harm 
Islam. Rather, they would use their background of Islamic teaching to protect Islam, 
and issue laws more compatible with it. Al-Qaraḍāwī went further by administering a 
Fatwa [obligation]24 to Muslims to protect Islam and to prove its civility.25 Those who 
argue Islam’s compatibility with democracy balance the goals of political Islam in 
creating the caliphate and the application of Shariᶜah with modern states, by accepting 
parliamentary systems and the man-made laws of the parliament. This insinuates that 
democracy might be a tool for Islamic movements to gain power, whilst still 
recognising that they could revert to theocracy once established. 
 In contrast to others, such as Syrian Brotherhood scholar, Saʻīd Hawwá, the 
Shoura is not seen as identical to democracy, but in fact a total antithesis, as Hawwá 
denotes in his book Jund Allāh [Soldiers of God]: 
 
Democracy is a Greek term which signifies sovereignty of the people, the people being 
the source of legitimacy; it is the people who legislate and rule. As for the Shura, it 
denotes consultation [by the ruler] with a person or persons with regard to the 
interpretation of a certain point of Islamic law. In Islam, the people do not govern 
themselves by laws they make on their own, as in democracy; rather the people are 
governed by a regime and a set of laws imposed by God, which they cannot change or 
modify in any case.26   
 
Like most Islamic movements today, the Muslim Brotherhood maintains its 
goal of applying Shariᶜah law and building a caliphate. However, Brotherhood 
members fall into internal disagreements regarding what the state should look like, and 
whether democracy is the best route to achieving this goal. 
 
                                                
24 Fatwa: Scholarly opinion on a matter of Islamic law. See Appendix 1: Glossary. 
25 “Ittiḥād al-ʻUlamāʼ: al-Mushārakah fī al-Intikhābāt Farīḍah” [Scholars Union: Participation in 
Election is an Obligation], Al-Arab, November 11, 2011, accessed on December 2, 2014 
http://m.alarab.qa/story/158461 
26 Saʻīd Hawwá, Jund Allāh [Soldier of God], (Cairo: Dār al-Salām lil-Ṭibāʻah wa-al-Nashr wa-
al-Tawzīʻ, 1993) in: David Garnham and Mark A. Tessler, Democracy, War, and Peace in the 
Middle East, (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1995), 122. 
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The Muslim Brotherhood 
 
The Brotherhood accepts democracy as a tool in creating Islamic change, following the 
example of the movement’s founder, al-Banna, who entered politics to demonstrate its 
importance in implementing Shariᶜah. When preaching this political participation to 
the movement, al-Banna said: 
 
We took the step to enter this field [parliament election] sincerely and innocently. We 
have nothing motivating us but love, goodness, our concern for the public’s interests, 
vigilance in protecting our holy Daᶜwah, and our desire to declare the message of 
Islamic reform from this official platform [parliament] as soon as possible.27   
 
 With these words he embodied political participation within the movement 
and made parliament the only platform on which the Muslim Brotherhood could 
initiate gradual change, making democracy an essential tool for the movement. This 
was applied within the movement in the form of its internal structure, the Shoura 
Council, and the internal elections that choose its leadership and representatives, 
making the Brotherhood a model for Islamic movements embodying models of 
democracy internally, and participating within a modern state system.  
 However, the movement still engenders reasons to push for a theocratic state. 
Al-Banna declared in an article: 
 
We [the Muslim Brotherhood] are at war against every leader (president) or a leader of 
a political party, or entity, which does not work for the solidarity of Islam, and does 
not march in the way to bring Islamic rule and Islamic glory. We will declare it as a 
fight. No peace in it, and no negotiations with it, until God opens between us and 
between our people with righteousness and he is the best opener.28 
 
 It could be argued based on this statement that the Muslim Brotherhood is in 
a continuous struggle to bring Islam back to society, and is prepared to use violence to 
meet that goal. Furthermore, Sayyid Qutb’s assertion of the al-Hākimīyah concept left 
                                                
27 Hassan al-Banna“Risālat al-Intikhābāt” [The Election Letter], Dakahlia Ikhwan, Accessed 
May 7, 2014, http://dakahliaikhwan.net/viewarticle.php?id=6103 
28 Hasan al-Banna, Mud̲akkirāt ad-Daʻwa wa-ʼD-dāʻīya [The Memories of Daʻwa and the 
Proselytiser]. (Cairo: az-Zahrāʼ al-Iʻlām al-ʻArabī, 1990), 146-147. 
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a portion of the Brotherhood with the belief that democracy and parliament are not 
replacements for God’s rule. These contradictions give rise to the question: What 
would the Brotherhood do if they came to power? Would they continue to accept the 
civil state system and democracy, or are democracy and parliament stepping-stones to 
the conquest of power, at which point they would revert to the theocratic system? 
 This study brings forth an understanding of the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
political participation using the Jordanian branch as a model for the application of the 
movement’s ideologies, and the division the Brotherhood experiences regarding the 
issue of participation within the Jordanian political system. This study builds on 
political Islam studies with the example of the Jordanian Brotherhood’s interaction 
within the parliamentary system, which helped to understand how other Brotherhood 
branches and other Islamic movements would act if they came to power 
democratically.  
 
Methodology 
 
This research presents the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood as a case study to understand 
their process of participation in, and compatibility with, the Jordanian parliamentary 
system. With close attention to the movement, its driving beliefs and internal 
structures, its practical application of political Islam will be highlighted with deep 
analysis of the Brotherhood’s ideology behind establishing an Islamic society.  
By delineating organisational changes such as the Brotherhood’s 
transformation from a modern to a politically estranged movement, and its core 
ideology, strategies, and structure, the study presents detailed observations of how 
these factors affected the movement’s adaptation into the Jordanian political 
environment. With close analysis, the study will also look to how these factors allowed 
the Brotherhood to develop a dynamic relationship with the regime. 
This study does not follow a particular model of analysis, however, it 
standardises a chronological timeline with which it is possible to locate the exact 
points of change in the Brotherhood and regime’s relationship. Therein, an analysis of 
pre-and post-1989 events will be used as an historical approach to contextualise and 
investigate the Brotherhood in Jordan and its decline in regime-relations. 
This approach also allows an illumination of how political struggles in Jordan 
have emerged, developed, and changed relationships between different political actors. 
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The main purpose of this is to define the actors’ interests, and the structure of power 
within the Brotherhood, and with the regime. Furthermore, by looking past the 
Brotherhood and regime’s differences, and critically analysing them as part of the same 
system, it is possible to demonstrate their co-dependence, which is crucial to 
understanding their relationship. 
Therefore, this study uses primary sources split into four distinct categories. 
Firstly, historical documents and memoirs of key political players during Jordan’s 
creation, secondly ideological literature that founded the Brotherhood, followed by 
contemporary Brotherhood literature, and finally personal interviews with Brotherhood 
members conducted by the researcher. These fundamental sources are then contrasted 
against contemporary secondary sources that map Jordan’s history and the 
development of political Islam, presenting a comprehensive and thorough analysis of 
the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood as it stands today. 
Primary Sources 
 
• Historical Texts 
 
Utilising an historical approach to assemble a new perspective of the Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan’s key events during its early history, the study uses two key 
memoirs spanning the 1930s to 1960s. Sir John Bagot Glubb, also known as Glubb 
Pasha, who led the Arab legion between 1939 and 1959, documented his experiences 
in Soldier with the Arabs.29 This memoir provides a detailed account of key 
developments, such as Jordan’s independence from the British mandate in 1946. 
 Furthermore, Charles Hepburn Johnson, a British ambassador to Jordan from 
1956 to 1959, assumed Glubb Pasha’s role in chronicling Jordan in the memoir, The 
Brink of Jordan.30 This text minutely documents events as they unfurled, such as the 
coup attempt in 1957, and the Leftist-Brotherhood clash, which remains undocumented 
elsewhere. Johnson recorded the daily developments of these events with exclusive 
insight and almost literary description.  
 
• Ideological Histories 
 
                                                
29 John Bagot Glubb, A Soldier with the Arabs, (New York: Harper, 1957). 
30 Charles Johnston, The Brink of Jordan, (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1972). 
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In a similar strain, the respective literature of Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb are 
presented as the primary sources and historical foundations for the Brotherhood’s 
ideology as it stands today. By founding the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Hassan al-
Banna is a key figure in the introduction of Islam as a political force. His efforts to 
reform the religion and society appear particularly in Majmūᶜat Rasāᵓil al-Imām al-
Shahīd Ḥasan al-Bannā [The Collection of the Messages of the Martyr Imam Hassan 
al-Banna],31 a collection of letters responding to the main issues facing Islam in the 
1960s as he saw them. These messages and letters are a clarification of the 
Brotherhood’s commitment to the Daᶜwah [proselytisation] as a path for the movement 
to create Islamic change societally, and the pragmatism the movement must foster 
therein, primarily by participating in politics. It also outlines the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s efforts in creating an Islamic Ummah [Nation]. 
Al-Banna includes letters intending to shape society with his understanding 
of Islam, referencing elections, education, and jihad [struggle] as ways for the 
il will be revisited at every stage of this study as al-Banna’s main methodology reflects 
how the Brotherhood system works today. 
Furthermore, the ideological development of the Muslim Brotherhood can 
also be seen in the literature of Sayyid Qutb. As an ᶜālim  [Islamic Scholar] who 
facilitated a violent understanding of political Islam, his two books, al-Taṣwīr al-
Fannī fī al-Qurᵓan [The Artistic Articulation in the Quran],32 and Maʻālim fī al-Tarīq 
[Milestones]33 present the Brotherhood’s ideological divergence from al-Banna’s 
teachings. 
 
• The General Muslim Brotherhood 
 
Presenting recent analyses and accounts of al-Banna and Qutb’s texts, the literature of 
Muslim Brotherhood members is used. Whilst these texts serve clear agendas for (and 
sometimes against) the Brotherhood, this study draws from these biases and disparate 
understandings of the movement’s purposes to reveal the emerging divisions within the 
                                                
31 Hasan al-Banna, Majmūᶜat Rasāᵓil al-Imām al-Shahīd Ḥasan al-Bannā [The Collection of the 
Messages of the Martyr Imam Hassan al-Banna], (Beirut: Dār al-Andalus, 1965). 
32 Sayyid Quṭb, al-Taṣwīr al-Fannī fī al-Qurᵓan [The Artistic Articulation of the Verses of the 
Qurᵓan], (Cairo: Dār al-Shurüq lil-Nashr wa-al-Tawzīʻ, 1987). 
33 Sayyid Qutb, Maʻālim fī al-Tarīq [Milestones], (Cairo: Dār al-Shurūq, 1991). 
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movement. Furthermore, these texts are useful as they delve into the Brotherhood’s 
founding histories and ideologies, presenting compelling contrasts with secondary 
sources that have the same objectives, but employ different angles.   
In regards to al-Banna, the founding father of the movement, Yūsuf al-
Qaraḍāwī,34 ʻAbd al-Raḥmān al-Naqīb, Sayyid Dasūqī Ḥasan, and ʻAdnān abū ʻĀmir,35 
present interpretations of al-Banna’s letters and messages to fit current events that 
effect the Brotherhood’s political struggle, highlighting his leading concepts such as 
democracy, and electoral participation. Through their analyses, these authors determine 
how the Brotherhood must function according to al-Banna, and the end-goal of the 
Islamic state.  
Further, the study looks to interpretations of Sayyid Qutb’s methodology and 
its impact on violence and radicalism, as seen with the work of John Calvert’s Sayyid 
Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islamism,36 which shows the influence of Qutb in 
contemporary Islamist terrorism. This secondary source is pitted against Brotherhood 
members’ literatures that present Qutb as having a peaceful manner, arguing that his 
tendency towards violent speech was related to personal strife. This is demonstrated in 
Muḥammad Ghaḍbān’s Sayyid Qutb Didda al-ʻUnf [Sayyid Qutb Against Violence], 
which defends Qutb by suggesting that his Fatwas were reactions to the growing 
nationalism and materialism resultant of the Soviet and US conflict.37  
The study also builds a comparison between the two founders of the 
movement’s ideology with the aid of Minhaj al-Taghyīr ʻinda al-Shahīdayn Ḥasan al-
Bannā wa Sayyid Quṭb [The Approach to Change according to the Two Martyrs 
Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb]. In this text, ʻAbd al-Qādir abū Fāris discusses the 
origins of Qutb and al-Banna’s thinking, and their impact on the application of political 
Islam in the modern state system.38 
To present the Egyptian Brotherhood’s history and context, further memoirs 
                                                
34 Yūsuf ᶜAbdallah al-Qarḍāwī, Al-Tarbiyaẗ al-Siyāsiyyaẗ ʻinda al-Imām Ḥasan al-Bannā [The 
Political Education of Hassan al-Banna], (Cairo: Maktabaẗ Wahbaẗ, 2008). 
35 ʻAdnān Abū ʻĀmir, Mal⁻amiḥ al-Fikr al-Siyāsī ʻinda al-Imām Ḥasan al-Bannā [The 
Features of Political Thought of Hassan al-Banna], (Giza: Markaz al-Iʻlām al-ʻArabī, 2008). 
36 John Calvert, Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islamism, (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2010).   
37 Munīr Muḥammad Ghaḍbān, Sayyid Qutb Didda al-ʻunf [Sayyid Qutb: Against Violence], 
(Beirut: Dār al-Salām lil-Ṭibāʻah wa-al-Nashr wa-al-Tawzīʻ, 2010). 
38 Muḥammad ʻAbd al-Qādir Abū Fāris, Minhaj al-Taghyīr ʻinda al-Shahīdayn Ḥasan al-
Bannā wa-Sayyid Quṭb [Changed Approach of Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb], (Amman: 
Dār ʻAmmār, 1997). 
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Abbās Ḥasan Sīsī,39 Maḥmūd ʻAbd al-Ḥalīm,40 and Ṣalāḥ Shādī,41 whose 
documentation of events the Brotherhood experienced reveal the internal dialogues and 
actions of the movement. For instance, these texts disclose previously unknown 
accounts of the Brotherhood’s use of violence against Nasser, its participation in the 
wars against Israel, and the application of al-Banna and Qutb’s ideologies within the 
movement both when they were active, and posthumously. 
 
• The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood 
 
Honing in on the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood members themselves, their differing 
ideologies and beliefs regarding the application of political Islam in Jordan through the 
parliamentary system, further primary sources comprise discussions of Jordanian 
Brothers through memoirs and records such as Bassām Amūsh’s, Maḥaṭṭāt fī Tārīkh 
Jamāʻat al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn fī al-Urdunn [Stations in the History of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Jordan].42 This text is of great importance as the author is an ex-
member and offers criticism to the movement’s stances and actions from an insider’s 
perspective. Compounded with leaving the Brotherhood on bad terms, Amūsh is also 
of Jordanian origin, meaning he tends to side with the regime. This dynamic presents a 
unique perspective into the Brotherhood’s inner workings, with the text presenting a 
collection of interviews Amūsh conducted with Jordanian members and the political 
leadership, specific observations, letters, speeches, and other vital information that has 
not previously been recorded. For instance, he provides description and insight into the 
Shuyūkh bases,43 and includes his correspondence with the Brotherhood in the 
aftermath of Jordan’s Wadi Arabah peace treaty with Israel.  
Similarly, current Brotherhood member, Muḥammad ʻAbd al-Qādir abū 
Fāris, wrote Manhaj al-Harakah al-Islāmīyah fī al-Taghyīr [The Methodology of the 
                                                
39 ᶜAbbās Ḥasan Sīsī, Fī Qāfilat al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn [In the Convoy of the Muslim 
Brotherhood], (Alexandria: Dār Ṭabᶜat al-Ikhwn al-Muslimīn, 2003). 
40 Maḥmūd ʻAbd al-Ḥalīm al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn, Aḥdāth Sanaʻat al-Tārīkh: Ruʼyah min al-
Dākhil [The Muslim Brotherhood, Events that Made History: A Vision from the Inside], (Dār 
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41 Ṣalāḥ Shādī, Ṣafaḥāt min al-Tārīkh: Haṣād al-ʻumr [Pages of Bitter Harvest], (Kuwait: 
Sharikat al-Shuʻāʻ, 2006). 
42 Bassām ʻAlī Salāmah Amūsh, Maḥaṭṭāt fī Tārīkh Jamāʻat al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn fī al-Urdun 
[Stations in the History of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan], (Amman: al-Akādīmīyūn lil-
Nashr wa-al-Tawzīʻ, 2008).  
43 Shaykh: singular of Shuyūkh, which in the Jordanian accent refers to leadership of religious 
background. Al-Shuyūkh resistance bases were formed in Jordan during the 1967 war. 
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Islamic Movement in Making Change], which presents a general history of the 
purposes of the Brotherhood’s call. The Brotherhood recommends this text to all new 
members, signifying its relevance to internal structures.44 Abū Fāris’ literature, 
including Ṣafaḥāt min al-Tārīkh al-Siyāsī lil-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn fī al-Urdunn [Pages 
from the Political History of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan], outlines the 
Brotherhood’s framework. Here he demarks the main principles of the Brotherhood, 
and denotes its goals. Furthermore, in these texts he states that Jordan is part of the 
ah. This means that he wants Jordan to be a theocratic state. However, he does suggest 
that Jordan is not the best-suited place to build the Islamic state, but rather it should be 
thought of as an Islamic base to begin the Brotherhood’s gradual changes that will 
allow the creation of the Islamic state, thus making Jordan part of the Islamic Ummah. 
Therefore, despite the Jordanian movement holding from within aspects of theocratic 
understandings for the state, it does mean that the movement wishes to apply these 
understandings in Jordan. In Ṣafaḥāt min al-Tārīkh al-Siyāsī [Pages from the Political 
History], abū Fāris affirms that Jordan is part of the Muslim Brotherhood’s global 
organisation, and their main focus is the Palestinian case, for which they must prepare 
and provide all the financial and spiritual elements necessary to liberate Palestine.45 
Therefore, the framework that abū Fāris sets out resists the argument of whether Jordan 
is a theocratic or civil state, since it is a platform for the movement and not the centre 
of its goals and makes the main purpose of the movement in Jordan to make the 
country a stage for supporting Palestine. This means that their understanding of the 
movement is as a regional tool rather than a national, Jordanian movement.  
His text, which focuses on gradual Islamic change, favours al-Banna’s 
example of political participation, and al-Qaraḍāwī’s fatwas in upholding politics as a 
means for social change rather than to just obtain power. However, in accordance with 
his understanding of a theocratic state, he still acknowledges Qutb’s teachings, which 
indicates the movement is trying to balance both ideologies, even if al-Banna’s 
founding principles are still momentous. This means that there may be a dilemma of 
which scholar to follow if they came to power – the theocratic or the civil state leader.  
Beside abū Fāris’ writings, the Jordanian Brotherhood’s literature is very 
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much concerned with Islamic history, Fiqh [Jurisprudence], and interpretations of Qutb 
and al-Banna, rather than the Jordanian movement itself or its politics. However, due 
to their political positions, some members, such Isḥāq Aḥmad Farḥān, have felt the 
need to express the movement’s stances on political matters, as seen in the two 
volumes of Mawāqif wa-Ārāʼ Siyāsīyyah fī Qaḍāyā ʻArabīyah wa-Islāmīyyah 
[Political Positions and Opinions on Arabic and Islamic Issues].46 Similarly, the 
Brotherhood’s former parliamentarian, Hamzah Manṣūr, recorded all of his speeches 
and letters to the government in a study entitled Kalimāt wa-Mawāqif [Words and 
Stands],47 to document the period of his leadership in the Muslim Brotherhood 
parliamentary block between 1993 and 1997. 
As is the case with primary sources, the texts are unreliable. This can be seen 
particularly with Bassām Amūsh’s Maḥaṭṭāt, which is fragmented, lacking 
chronological order, complete interviews, and strays from any possible sub-headed 
theme. It is therefore the reader’s job to fill in the gaps and complete the work, which 
is only possible through accurate comparisons with secondary sources. It is also 
important to remember that some authors-cum-activists, such as Amūsh, are acting 
independently of the Brotherhood, or even against it, while others, such as Mansour, 
try to justify key decisions from the Brotherhood’s perspective solely. Comparing 
these literatures with secondary sources presents a fuller picture and the reasons 
beyond how or why the Brotherhood has taken its particular stances towards the 
regime. Therefore, in the essence of reaching clarity and accuracy, the researcher has 
checked the Brotherhood’s statements and communiqués at the Ummah Centre for 
Strategic Studies in Jordan, where original documents are archived.48 
 
Secondary Sources 
 
The secondary sources of this study look to historical works such as Philip Robins’ The 
                                                
46 Isḥāq Aḥmad Farḥān, Mawāqif wa-ārāʼ Siyāsīyah fī Qaḍāyā ʻArabīyah wa-Islāmīyah 
[Attitudes and Political Views: on National, Arabic and Islamic Issues], (Amman: Dār al-
Furqān, 1997). 
47 Ḥamzah Manṣūr, Kalimāt wa-Mawāqif [Words and Attitudes], (Amman: Dār al-Furqān, 
1998).  
48 The Ummah Centre for Strategic Studies, which is run by the Muslim Brotherhood leadership 
in Jordan, conducts studies related to election results. The official website is: 
http://www.alummacenter.net/. 
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History of Jordan,49 which presents an insight into the foundations of the country, 
highlighting King Hussein’s experiences and stances. The study also uses Shmuel 
Bar’s, The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, which provides a retrospective historical 
account of the movement’s establishment from the creation of Transjordan in 1921 
focusing primarily on the Brotherhood’s political participation.50 Bar follows political 
events that the Brotherhood experienced during its establishment with little attention to 
later events such as the Civil War of 1970, and the 1989 riots. Therefore, despite the 
importance of Bar’s analysis of the early stages of the movement, his book does not 
provide an overall picture of the Brotherhood’s role in internal events that had a 
valuable influence on the democratisation of Jordan, such as the participation of the 
Brotherhood within politics. Ultimately, however, the book is limited to pre-1997 
events, which obviously precede the Brotherhood’s boycott of elections. Since this is a 
pivotal point for the Brotherhood’s development of stances and alliances, further 
reading is required to gain understanding of the Brotherhood as it stands today. 
Therefore the work of Bar and Robins will be compared to the work of Glubb Pasha 
and Charles Johnson whose memoirs require secondary readings to provide wider 
understanding of the creation of the country and birth of the Jordanian Muslim 
Brotherhood. 
 Building on the works of Robins and Bar, Muḥammad Sulaymān abū Rummān 
provides additional analysis in his book, al-Ḥall al-Islāmī fī al-Urdunn [The Islamic 
Solution in Jordan].51 This text uses 1989 as a focal point of the democratisation of 
Jordan, and the involvement of the Muslim Brotherhood in parliament. This therefore 
brings analyses of more contemporary practices of the Brotherhood, in contrast to Bar 
and Robins.  
In his books, abū Rummān argues that the Brotherhood is not a central 
Islamic movement in Jordan, and it is in the process of changing regarding its 
popularity, which was combined with the loss of seats in the last parliamentary 
elections that the Brotherhood joined. He attributes this diminishing popularity to the 
continuous clash with the government and the increasing division between members of 
                                                
49 Philip J. Robins, A History of Jordan, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
50 Shmuel Bar, The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, (Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern 
and African Studies, 1998). 
51 Muḥammad Sulaymān abū Rummān, Ḥasan Maḥmūd Abū Hanīyah, Mays Nawāyisah, and 
Firās Khayr Allāh, al-Ḥall al-Islāmī fī al-Urdun: al-Islāmīyūn wa-al-Dawlah wa-Rihānāt al-
Dīmuqrāṭīyah wa-al-Amn [The Islamic Solution In Jordan: the Islamist, State and The 
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the movement that led to the loss of credibility in the streets. The importance of abū 
Rummān’s work comes from placing the Muslim Brotherhood on the map of Jordanian 
Islamic political movements, and distinguishing them from the Salafist movement in 
Jordan.52  
 However, due to this limited exploration into the Brotherhood’s political 
development in Jordan, Beverley Milton-Edward’s Jordan and the Hashemite 
Legacy,53 is used to gleam further understanding of the relationship between the 
Brotherhood and the Jordanian regime, and Jordan’s application of the parliamentarian 
system. Milton-Edwards has written extensively on political Islam and contemporary 
world politics, paying particular attention to the Brotherhood’s adaptation to different 
environments, particularly in Jordan. Milton-Edwards and abū Rummān are compared 
to the work of the Muslim Brotherhood to draw opposing arguments for the reasons of 
the Muslim Brotherhood’s political actions. 
Furthermore, this study looks to the work of Quintan Wiktorowicz, who uses 
a social theory approach to understand the movement. In The Management of Islamic 
Activism: Salafism, the Muslim Brotherhood, and State Power in Jordan,54 
Wiktorowicz analyses the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafists in Jordan from a 
social and organisational perspective, whilst trying to compare the two. He delineates 
the organisational growth of the movement by analysing the application of the 
Brotherhood’s ideology in Jordan, as seen with its voluntary work and charity system. 
He also discusses the state’s regulations placed upon mosques and fatwas to limit its 
movements directly prohibiting the Brotherhood’s and other Islamists movements’ 
activities.  
Wiktorowicz argues that the state encouraged the organisational growth of 
the Muslim Brotherhood as a ‘formal’ social movement complying with, and operating 
under, the rules of the regime. Therefore, arguing that the state forbids strong 
movements from challenging the regime by keeping those such as the Brotherhood 
                                                
52 Muḥammad Sulaymān Abū Rummān, Jordanian Salafism: A Strategies for the “Islamization 
of Society” and an Ambiguous Relationship with the Sate, (Amman: Friedrich Ebert Sitftung, 
2010); Muḥammad Sulaymān abū Rummān, Anā Salafī [I am Salafist], (Amman: Friedrich 
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53 Beverley Milton-Edwards and Peter Hinchcliffe, Jordan: Hashemite Legacy, (London 
Routledge, 2003). 
54 Quintan Wiktorowicz, The Management of Islamic Activism: Salafis, the Muslim 
Brotherhood, and State Power in Jordan, (New York: State University of New York Press, 
2001); Quintan Wiktorowicz, Islamic Activism a Social Movement Theory Approach, 
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active within what he calls the “management of the collective action”.55  
Wiktorowicz’s analysis, in contrast with abū Rummān and Bar, reliably 
accounts for the social and charitable wing of the movement, providing data of the 
Brotherhood’s social affects, such as the numbers of government/Brotherhood imams 
and preachers, and the amount of zakat [obligatory charity] distributed annually. 
However, he does not analyse the relationships that may affect this data, such as the 
Brotherhood and government’s, making his research dependent on further socio-
political studies. Yet, despite avoiding the issue of the Brotherhood’s political 
involvement, Wiktorowicz’s study is important in understanding the growth of 
Islamism in Jordan, and the rise of the Brotherhood’s social power. 
Ultimately, by using an historical approach of pre- and post-1989 events, and 
mixing interviews with analysis of primary and key secondary sources, the study 
objectively considers the work of the Muslim Brotherhood itself and historical 
memoirs written in Jordan’s early period, in light of contemporary works. Therefore, 
this research contributes to political Islam studies, providing the Jordanian Muslim 
Brotherhood as a case study for the application of political Islam within the modern 
state, through the parliamentary system.  
The study explores the relationship between the Jordanian regime and the 
Jordanian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood from 1946 to 2010. This era witnessed 
world-changing events such as the Cold War, with the Middle East being an arena of 
extensive regional conflicts, and Jordan living under the reign of four Hashemite kings. 
Both the regime and the Brotherhood survived these often tumultuous times while 
other countries in the region, and other parties in Jordan itself, did not fare as well. 
Without reaping benefits from a mutually legitimising relationship, the two may not 
have survived independently.  
This suggestion is tested and authenticated throughout this research by 
analysing ideological or radical disagreements between the two that have had 
significant effects on both the country’s and the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood’s 
stability. It is the dynamics of this unique relationship that this thesis explores with 
discussion of the Brotherhood’s history, its various reasons for transformation, and 
finally the role it plays in contemporary politics.  
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Interviews 
 
In order to analyse both the primary and secondary sources, and in order to create a 
complete understanding of the historical construction of the Jordanian Muslim 
Brotherhood and its dynamic relationship with the regime, the researcher has used both 
quantitative and qualitative data in his research. However, the study is routed in 
qualitative epistemological research due to the Brotherhood’s nature, and the necessity 
of meeting them in person to obtain information pertaining to their decisions, who 
makes them, and how the movement is run. Therefore, in addition to office-based 
analysis of the aforementioned literatures, the study required field-based research in 
Jordan.  
After obtaining ethical clearance from the University of East Anglia, the 
researcher visited the Higher Education Ministry in Jordan and obtained clearance to 
conduct field work in Jordan. Following this, the researcher visited a number of key 
Brotherhood sites in Amman, Jordan’s capital city, including the Jordanian 
Brotherhood’s headquarters in Abdali, and Jabhat al-ʻAmal al-Islāmīl [The Islamic 
Action Front / IAF] in Shmasani, in addition to visits to the Islamic Hospital, the 
Social Centre, and to the Ummah Centre for Research in al-Weibdeh, which is an 
institution linked to the Brotherhood.  
Although the researcher has met many Brotherhood members and leaders 
during this study, particularly at the Brotherhood’s headquarter and the branch in 
Madaba city, three personal interviews became pivotal to the study’s research, 
eliminating the need for other superfluous Brotherhood interviews. These three high-
quality interviews were conducted with Zakī bin Arshīd, Raḥīl al-Gharāybah, and 
Ibrahim al-Mashūkhī, and bring the study from the historical and history texts of al-
Banna and Qutb, into the present, demonstrating the importance of the Brotherhood’s 
interactions with the regime and political Islam today. 
Arshīd, who was head of the Brotherhood’s political wing when the 
interview was conducted, and was later made Deputy Supervisor of the movement, 
leads the Hawks wing of the movement, and plays an essential role in both the 
Brotherhood and this study. His statements present insight into the hows and whys of 
the movement’s decisions and stances, whether in political participation, or boycott, 
particularly regarding issues such as the peace treaty with Israel. A further dimension 
was later added to this interview as soon after the interview was conducted, Arshīd was 
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arrested and imprisoned due to statements regarding Jordan and neighbouring 
countries. The interview’s value increased significantly following these events, and 
provides an indisputable relevancy to the Brotherhood and Jordan’s internal politics in 
the present day.  
The second interview is with al-Gharāybah, a member of the Brotherhood’s 
Maktab al-Tanfīdhī [Executive Bureau], former head of the Ummah Centre of 
Research, and who is considered a leader of the Doves branch, thus opposing Arshīd’s 
Hawks. This interview is vital as it gives insight to the Doves and their reasons for 
prioritising participation over boycott and keeping the Muslim Brotherhood on the path 
of a national agenda, in contrast to the Hawks. The al-Gharāybah interview reflects the 
dilemmas within the Brotherhood regarding national and political identity, and is 
therefore key in understanding the internal discourse of the Brotherhood.  Furthermore, 
his insights into the social wing of the movement clarify the social structure of the 
movement, and how individuals become members or even leaders. With this inside 
information, the researcher was able to detail the movement’s growth structurally and 
politically, feeding the research objective in understanding the Brotherhood and its 
relations with the regime in a national and regional context.  
The final interview is with al-Mashūkhī, a former Muslim Brotherhood 
parliamentarian who plays an important role in historical events within the movement 
regarding the Syrian Brotherhood, and Jordan’s 1970 Civil War. Over the past decade, 
al-Mashūkhī has gained a larger role within the movement due to the conflicting 
ideology between the Hawks and Doves, presenting a third way for the movement. The 
al-Mashūkhī interview is vital to support these claims, with his statements used to 
build a picture of the development of this internal division and the actions that caused a 
new wing to form. Al-Mashūkhī’s interview is vital for the fabric and detailing of this 
study, as it reveals previously undisclosed information pertaining to his imprisonment 
and altercations with the regime. This interview not only clarifies the development of a 
new wing, but it also gives a detailed account of the specific reasons for the divergence 
politically and ideologically within the Brotherhood, which inform the findings of this 
research and empower its argument.  
As mentioned, the researcher interviewed other Brotherhood personalities, 
such as Jamīl Abū Bakr, the speaker of the movement, and Nabīl Kūfaḥī, a former 
Brotherhood parliamentarian. However, due to the events that the Brotherhood 
experienced in the period of this study, from 2010 – 2015, the Brotherhood were 
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cautious, and conservative in their statements. Therefore, Jamīl Abū Bakr withdrew 
from the interviews after rearranging them several times, whilst others apologised and 
cancelled on the day of the interview, such as Kūfaḥī. However, the focus on the three 
key interviews derives from them being leaders of the three wings the study sought to 
identify, and due to the importance of these personalities politically, socially, and 
historically. The quality and specificity of these interviews eclipsed the others, and 
were used extensively for this reason.  
The interview questions were uniform in structure and idea across all three 
interviews, however the researcher allowed flexibility for the interviewee to open the 
doors for other questions, or to suggest different issues related to the study. Some 
interviewees used this as a chance to impose themselves and forward questions to 
themselves in order to make propagandist statements, however the researcher was 
prepared for this and decided what was compatible or not to the study, and would 
return the interviewee to the original question if necessary.   
Furthermore, despite the uniformity of these questions, the researcher altered 
the theme of the questions according to each leader’s position and experience. For 
example, Arshīd was asked more specific questions regarding the peace treaty with 
Israel, whilst it was more appropriate to ask al-Gharāybah questions regarding division 
and leadership within the Brotherhood, and questions regarding specific historical 
events and the Brotherhood’s relations with other Islamic movements were more suited 
to al-Mashūkhī.  
Because the Brotherhood is highly organised and beaurocratically structured, 
consent for the interviews had to come from the movement first, before contacting 
individual members. Therefore, the interviewees’ agreement to participate in the 
research was on the condition of firstly making an appointment with the Brotherhood’s 
headquarters and providing a paper from the university and an explanation of the 
research. Once granted permission to interview the members of the movement, the 
researcher was provided with contact details for the leaders’ offices so the researcher 
could directly contact them and arrange phone calls, meetings, and finally the 
interviews, based on the interviewees’ availability. Naturally, all interviews were 
conducted on a voluntary basis without obligation. 
Before all interviews, the researcher presented a letter from the university to 
prove his credentials, in addition to the consent letter stating the purpose of the 
interview and a statement that the research was being conducted for a Ph.D. program in 
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the School of Political Science and International Studies at the University of East 
Anglia, and was purely academic in nature. The statement also included that the 
interviewee was free to participate in the interview, or leave it at any time. 
All interviews took place in the offices of the interviewees, except al-
Mashūkhī, who requested the interview to take place in his house. Following Jordan’s 
culture, the researcher was treated as a guest and therefore accepted offerings of hot 
and cold beverages during the interviews, however no gifts were offered or received.  
As the researcher comes from the same culture, he understands the details of 
how to behave and treat his interviewees, such as not crossing legs whilst speaking, 
and how to politely frame questions. The researcher also met representatives from the 
Sisterhood branches of the Brotherhood, and therefore followed Islamic customs of not 
initiating handshakes, and ensuring all venues were in public places and the interviews 
remained professional. The researcher was also required to consider dress code for 
religious and cultural purposes, and ensured appropriate attire during all interviews.  
Although the researcher agreed with most interviewees that they would be 
recorded, some members, such as Arshīd, preferred the researcher to take notes, whilst 
al-Mashūkhī only permitted a recording once he had gained trust with the researcher. 
All interviews were conducted in Arabic, and were translated into English prior to their 
use within the study.  
 These three actors are key to determining the internal divisions within the 
Brotherhood, and present different driving ideologies that have split the movement. It 
is through these interviews that exclusive insight is gained into the movement, as 
personal interviews with Brotherhood members in English and academic writing are 
rare. Along with their contribution to the study of the Brotherhood, these interviews 
have allowed the researcher to determine the emerging three-way divide, which is 
elemental to the research’s findings. 
In handling contentious questions and subjects, such as those of religion or 
politics, the researcher did not mention his personal views, but rather posed the 
questions in attribution to authors of relevant books or journals, journalists, and even 
the researcher’s own writing, in order to deflect the possibility of personal 
disagreements. Throughout the field work, the researcher was in contact with his 
supervisor and course director, who were made aware of the difficulties the researcher 
faced in securing the interviews, and the actual interview processes.  
In regards to the regime, the researcher was satisfied with the books and 
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literature written Jordan’s present and previous royalty. However, there is also a 
recognised difficulty in reaching the royal family for academic research, who clearly 
present their perspective via comprehensive websites that are used extensively 
throughout this study. Therefore, the researcher used all information available to him, 
and used his primary sources to present the opinion of the movement in relation to pre-
existing royal literature, presenting a perspective and statements that are entirely 
unique and original.  
Obtaining information directly from the decision-makers of the Brotherhood 
is, in itself, far more valuable than from a filtered and peer-reviewed book. The 
interviews allowed the researcher to focus on the question of his study and obtain 
direct answers to specific questions that books cannot fulfil. Furthermore, implicit 
understandings were garnered from the locations of various Brotherhood sites, and 
inflections of tone during the interviews, providing the researcher with a 
comprehensive insight into many previously undisclosed attitudes of the Brotherhood 
leadership. 
 
Ending the Study in 2010 
	
In 2010 the Jordanian regime and the Jordanian Brotherhood experienced a milestone 
in their relationship and individual politics’. It was the year that the Brotherhood 
declared the end of its political participation, and the Jordanian regime was thrown into 
the Arab Spring phenomena. It was the year that the Brotherhood took its grievances to 
the streets, rallying citizens against the Jordanian regime, and therefore, to understand 
its participation in the Arab Spring, the study must end before the event actually 
occurred, and more importantly, this keystone year of 2010 must be fully understood.   
As this study deals with the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood’s political 
survival, it is only natural that the study leads up to the 2010 boycott as a climax to this 
study. The 2010 election is a vital turning point, representing the last participation of 
the Brotherhood in Jordanian politics. This thesis argues that this election was the 
reason for the Brotherhood’s final boycott. Therefore, the study looks to the 
Brotherhood’s last experience as an active participant in Jordanian politics, uncovers 
its reasons for the final boycott, and analyses its internal dilemmas regarding relations 
with the regime, thus providing understanding for why the movement continues to 
maintain this stance, and the effects it can/does have on Jordanian society. In 
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understanding these key issues, we can understand the conditions in which the 
Brotherhood could return to politics, the effect if it does not, and how the regime 
should respond to this development. 
Furthermore, the 2010 election created a platform for a further division within 
the Jordanian Brotherhood, which lays the foundations for the argument of this thesis 
that the Brotherhood has furthered its division within the Hawks to create a new 
Hawks group that does not recognise political participation at all. This makes 2010 an 
essential year for predicting the Brotherhood’s next steps in and after the Arab Spring.  
Using 2010 as a natural end point before Jordan and the Muslim Brotherhood 
entered a new and unpredictable Arab Spring age, the researcher is able to historically 
analyse each step of the Brotherhood’s political participation in Jordan, and how it 
resulted in a crisis with the regime in 2010. Ultimately, it is only through historical 
context that it is possible to make informed analyses and predictions of the 
Brotherhood’s current and future actions, and as 2010 marks the peak of a crisis 
between the Brotherhood and regime, it is most representative of this study, which is 
based on Jordanian Brotherhood and regime relations.  
 
 
 
 
Chapter  One   The Establishment of the 
Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan  
 2 
This chapter deals with the historical background of the Muslim Brotherhood from its 
emergence in Egypt, to its subsequent expansion throughout other Middle Eastern 
countries, resulting in its establishment in Jordan. The formation of the Jordanian 
Brotherhood is discussed in light of the transformation of the Emirate of Transjordan 
into the sovereign State of Jordan. 
 The timeline of this chapter follows the establishment of the Emirate of Jordan, 
and then observes the ideology of the Brotherhood by exploring the experiences of al-
Banna and Qutb. Finally, it presents an insight to the early involvement of the 
Brotherhood in Jordan, its engagement in the 1948 war, and the merger with the 
Palestinian branch. These milestones internally define the position of the Brotherhood 
within the country and its relationship with the regime, and regionally in terms of the 
divergence from Egyptian patterns and the issue of Palestine.  
 
 
1.0 Transjordan and King ᶜAbdallah I 
 
Transjordan was politically established in the event of the Syrian Kingdom’s downfall 
in 1918.1 By April 25, 1920, the San Remo Conference was held to distribute French 
control over Syria and Lebanon,2 and British rule over Jordan and Iraq, in application 
of the secret Sykes-Picot agreement of May 16, 1916.3 During this time there was a 
lack of unified political power in Transjordan, and in the absence of a central 
government, individual governments were established in different locations such as 
Ajloun, as led by Rāshid Khuzāʻī, Jerash, led by Muḥammad Maghribī, Dayr Yūsuf, 
by Kulayb al-Sharīdah, and Karak, led by Ṣāliḥ Rafīfān al-Majālī.4 On October 21, 
1920, Husayn bin ᶜAli, the Sharif [Protector] of sacred sites in Mecca sent his son, 
Emir ᶜAbdallah, to Transjordan to use the territory as a base from which to fight the 
French.  
 Once there, however, the Emir made it his mission to use Jordan as a platform 
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that could extend into territories already under British and French control, thus 
liberating the Levant from foreign control.5 He also planned to unite the disparate 
Transjordan with one government. This objective was met when Emir ᶜAbdallah 
entered into negotiations with Winston Churchill on March 27, 1921, resulting in the 
establishment of the Transjordanian government under the Emir’s jurisdiction.6 
Therefore, Transjordan’s first government, led by Rashīd Ṭalīʻ, was established on 
April 11, 1921, with the right to full administrative independence and support by 
British aid.7  
 Furthermore, on May 25, 1923, Britain recognised the sovereignty of the 
Emirate of Transjordan, and by February 20, 1928, a constitution was enacted stating 
that Britain would relinquish its legislative and executive powers to Emir ᶜAbdallah, 
but retained the right to keep military troops in the Transjordan territory.8 Transjordan 
remained under British control until 1946, when a treaty enabling self-determination 
was signed, delineating the borders of Transjordan with its neighbouring countries of 
Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Syria.9 
 The newly established Transjordan faced economic difficulties due to the lack 
of natural resources and infrastructure. The country was completely reliant on foreign 
aid from Britain, and then after its independence, from the US and Gulf states.10 
Besides economic problems, the country faced the problem of defining its own 
identity. From the very beginning, Transjordan was not a nation-state,11 which meant 
that it needed to construct an identity. Emir ᶜAbdallah’s desire to create a unified 
country was challenged by its ethnically diverse population, among which 
representatives of Bedouin tribes, Circassians, Turks, Kurds, Armenians, Chechens, 
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and Palestinians could be distinguished. In order to mould these diverse groups 
together, ᶜAbdallah had to construct a national identity embodying all the differences to 
unite them in national patriotism.12  
 However, not all ethnic groups in Jordan accepted the authority of Emir 
ᶜAbdallah, particularly those in the north, who saw the downfall of Syria correspond 
with Syrians’ obtaining power in Jordan, thus creating a fear of a central government 
run by Syrians at the expense of the individual governments. This was demonstrated in 
the riots of Irbid city in 1921, followed by the Adwan Rebellion in 1923, which 
violently rejected the exaggerated role of foreign actors in government, and the new 
leader’s application of the British mandate.13 
 Notwithstanding these complications, Emir ᶜAbdallah managed to create a 
semblance of a territorial identity by 1946 when Transjordan received full 
independence and was recognised as a sovereign Kingdom with a central government. 
However, it should be stated that ᶜAbdallah, who became King upon independence, 
could not create a homogeneous Jordanian society with territorial identity alone; he 
also used Islam and the Muslim Brotherhood to achieve his objectives.  
 King ᶜAbdallah I created the image of an Islamic leader by appearing at 
prayers, performing the pilgrimage, and introducing verses and notions of the Qurᵓan 
in his speeches. In addition, his being an outsider from Mecca gave him the advantage 
of not having any attachment to tribal or ethnic affiliations in Jordan. However, there 
were three main elements that helped realise ᶜAbdallah’s nation-building plan. Firstly, 
the King belonged to the Hashemite family, who traced their origin from the Prophet 
Muḥammad, thus presenting a clear religious communality between himself and the 
predominantly Sunni population. Secondly, King ᶜAbdallah I succeeded in creating the 
cultural image of a pure pastoral Arab as the basis of Jordanian identity. Thirdly, the 
King received popular support due to his role in the Arab Revolt of 1916, which was 
defined in Islamic terms due to its initiation in Mecca by his father. However, it was 
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Series, vol. 43, Issue 1, (2003) 88-101. 
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also considered by Arab nationalists to have been the moment of liberation from the 
Ottomans, thus enriching the King’s legitimacy to lead a nascent Kingdom.14  
 These elements used by the first King of Jordan to create a nation-state 
constructed the Jordanian identity in both religious and political terms. The religious 
orientation encouraged Islamic political groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, to 
voice strong support for the King and his nation-building plan, honouring the 
Hashemite family. The Brotherhood found fertile soil in Jordan to distribute the 
ideology of Hasan al-Banna (the Egyptian founder of the Brotherhood). The Jordanian 
regime consisted of elements that would encourage the evolution and expansion of 
political Islam, and was considered by the Brotherhood to be a place where the Islamic 
state could be established. Against this backdrop, the Muslim Brotherhood’s branch in 
Jordan was established. Furthermore, the Brotherhood played an important role in the 
public acceptance of King ᶜAbdallah’s Islamic identity, legitimising his authority and 
power over the country. Therefore, political Islam became the essence of Jordanian 
political history since the establishment of Jordan as we know it today, and was 
represented in two dimensions; both as King ᶜAbdallah I’s use of his religious 
background, and as the activity of the Brotherhood to gain wider acceptance and 
legitimacy. In order to understand the further development of the Muslim Brotherhood 
in Jordan, which would soon shape regional politics, it is first necessary to examine the 
history of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and its ideological foundations.  
 
 
1.1 Hassan al-Banna  
 
Dear brothers, you are not a welfare organisation, nor a political party, nor a local 
association with strictly limited aims. Rather you are a new spirit making its way into 
the heart of this nation – reviving it with the Qurᵓan; a new light dawning, dispelling 
the darkness of materialism through the knowledge of God; a resounding voice rising 
high, echoing the message of the Apostle (PBUH). In truth and without being 
excessive, you should feel that you are the bearers of a burden the rest of mankind has 
shrugged off. If someone asks you: "To what are you calling?" Say: "We are calling 
you to Islam, which was brought by Muhammad (PBUH): Government is part of it, 
                                                
14 Yoav Alon, State, Tribe, and Mandate in Transjordan, 1918-1946, (Oxford: University of 
Oxford, 2000). 
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freedom is a religious obligation." If someone should say to you: "This is politics!" 
Say: This is Islam, and we do not recognise such divisions.15 
 
 In this speech al-Banna introduced the Brotherhood and the nature of its work, 
demarking a fundamental understanding of the Muslim Brotherhood’s ethos that is still 
debated today. Born in a rural town near Cairo, al-Banna received a predominantly 
religious education, for which he attended a Hafasi Sufi school, guided by Sheikh ᶜAbd 
al-Wahhab al-Ḥasafī, and Sheikh al-Tarīqah al-Hasafiyya al-Shādhilīyah.16 In 1923, al-
Banna moved to Cairo where he attended the Dar al-ᶜUlum institute for higher 
education. In his four years in the capital, al-Banna established a network with various 
Islamic organisations, becoming associated with Jamᶜīyat Makārim al-Akhlāq [The 
Islamic Society for Nobility of Islamic Morals].17 During this time, he met Rashīd 
Riḍā,18 and Muḥibb al-Dīn Khaṭīb,19 the owners of the Dar al-Salfiyyah publishing 
house and its al-Fateh [The Opening] journal, where al-Banna published his first 
article, al-Daᶜwah ilā Allāh [The Call for God].20 
 The social transformation of Islam in Egypt during the 1920s was caused by 
the fall of the Ottoman Empire, which had been a religious reference for the Islamic 
world, giving rise to increasingly secularist theology.21 Thus ensued an intensified 
process by Islamic scholars, such as Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī, Muhammad ᶜAbduh, and 
Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā, 22 to restore Islamic society in Egypt before new expeditions 
                                                
15 Hassan al-Banna, Majmūᶜat Rasāᵓil al-Iimām al-Shahīd Ḥasan al-Bannā [The Collection of 
the Messages of the Martyr Imam Hasan al-Banna], (Beirut: Dār al-Andalus, 1965), 122; 
Charles Wendell, “Five Tracts of Hassan al-Bannāʾ (1906-1949): A Selection from the 
Majmūʿat Rasāʾil al-Imām al-Shahīd Ḥasan Bannā”, Journal of the American Oriental Society, 
Vol. 102, No. (1982), 3. 
16 See Appendix 1: Glossary. 
17 “Ya-Ayyuhā al-ʻālam Hādhā huwa Hasan al-Banna” [O World, This is Hassan al-Banna], 
Ikhwan Press, 2010, accessed December 2, 2014, http://goo.gl/mSeMTb  
18 See Appendix 1: Glossary. 
19 Muḥibb al-Dīn Khaṭīb (1886-1969) was an author and journalist. Through his travels to 
Yemen and Syria, his early popularity began in his contributions to the al-Muʼayyad journal, 
warning against Christian preaching and its influence on Islam; Muḥammad ʻAbd al-Raḥmān 
Burj, Muḥibb al-Dīn al-Khaṭīb wa-Dawruhu fī al-Harakah al-ʻArabīyah 1906-1920 [Muḥibb 
al-Dīn al-Khaṭīb and His Role in the Arabic Movements 1906-1920], (Cairo: al-Hayʼah al-
Miṣrīyah al-ʻĀmmah lil-Kitāb, 1990). 
20 Gudrun Krämer, Hasan al-Banna: Makers of the Muslim World, (Oxford: One world 
Publications, 2010), 1-17; Johannes J. G. Jansen, Hasan al-Bannâ's Earliest Pamphlet, Die Welt 
des Islams, New Series, Bd. 32, Nr. 2 (1992), 254-258.  
21 D. Jung and W. Piccoli, Turkey at the Crossroads: Ottoman Legacies and a Greater Middle 
East, (New York: Zed Books, 2001), 28-59.  
22 See Appendix 1: Glossary. 
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of colonisation could further harm the region. These scholars mixed their religious 
education with political events, making them ᶜUlamāᵓ – a specific kind of reformist – 
as seen with aforementioned scholars, who emerged as leaders of this movement.23 
These reformists advocated Islam as the tool with which to fight colonisation and unite 
the Ummah [Islamic Nation],24 offering a theoretical framework to restore Islam after 
the caliphate had begun to disintegrate, asserting Islam’s adaptability to modernity, and 
its importance in uniting the Arab world against British colonialists.25  
 The reformists’ call was immediately mirrored in a gathering of Muslim youth, 
who adopted the charitable, cultural, and sporting activities of the Jamʻīyat al-Shubbān 
al-Masīḥīyīn [The Young Christian Assembly], in response to what was considered a 
European threat to Muslim identity. This gathering was formalised in 1927 as the 
Jamʻīyat al-Shubbān al-Muslimīn [Assembly of Muslim Youth], by Muḥibb al-Dīn 
Khaṭīb, who soon invited al-Banna to join.26 
 After graduating in 1928, al-Banna became a primary school teacher in the city 
of Ismaïlia, the main residence of the British military in Egypt operating in the Suez 
Canal, leading him into the heart of British rule, which enforced Westernised lifestyle, 
secularism, and the decline of traditional Islamic norms.27 This direct confrontation, 
combined with his religious education and with the Assembly of Muslim Youth, 
caused al-Banna to found the Jamāʻat al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn [The Muslim 
Brotherhood Association] in Ismaïlia in 1928, which began as a school teaching the 
Qurᵓan.28 
 Al-Banna was influenced heavily by the collapse of the caliphate, and believed 
in the need to re-introduce Islam into modern politics in demonstration of its 
                                                
23 Zidane Mériboute, Islam's Fateful Path: the Critical Choices Facing Modern Muslims, 
(London: I.B. Tauris, 2009), 119-163. 
24 See Appendix 1: Glossary for the three ‘Reformists’. 
25 ᶜAbd al-Wahhab al-Misri, and Fathi Tariki, al-Hadāthah wa-mā Baᶜda al-Hadāthah 
[Modernity and What Comes After], (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 2003), 8-30. 
26 Jamʻīyat al-Shubbān al-Muslimīn [Assembly of Muslim Youth] was located in Ramsīs Street, 
Cairo, in the same building in which al-Banna was assassinated; Maḥmūd Muḥammad Shākir, 
and ʻĀdil Sulaymān Jamāl, Jamharat Maqālāt al-Ustādh Maḥmūd Muḥammad Shākir 
[Collection of Articles of Maḥmūd Muḥammad Shākir], (Cairo: Maktabat al-Khānjī bi-al-
Qāhirah, 2003), 773-774; Johannes J. G. Jansen, “Hasan al-Banna's Earliest Pamphlet”, Die 
Welt des Islams, New Series, Bd. 32, Nr. 2 (1992), 254-258. 
27 Krämer, Hasan al-Banna: Makers of the Muslim World, 1-17.  
28 ʻAbd al-Raḥmān al-Naqīb, Sayyid Dasūqī Ḥassan, al-Fikr al-Tarbawī wa-al-Haḍā ʻinda 
Ḥasan al-Bannā [The Educational and Civilisation Theology for the Imam Hassan al-Banna]. 
(Cairo: Markaz al-Iʻlām al-ʻArabī, 2008), 8-12; Brynjar Lia, The Society of the Muslim Brothers 
in Egypt: The Rise of an Islamic Mass Movement, 1928-1942, (Reading, the UK: Ithaca Press, 
1998). 
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adaptability. To illustrate the necessity of leadership and politics in Islam, he used the 
image of the meeting of the Prophet’s Companions to choose the first caliph 
[successor] of the Prophet before he was even buried. For al-Banna, the Islamic state’s 
constitution is Shariᶜah and its legislations only derive from the Qurᵓan, the Sunnah, 
and the political legacy of the caliphate [Islamic ruling system] state of the Prophet’s 
Companions. He further believed that the Islamic state should be built on three main 
principles: justice, freedom and jihad.29  
 This new association gained rapid success due to its societal approach, which 
differed from previous reformists who only addressed elites in their writings. Instead, 
al-Banna and his followers were keen to establish direct communications with the 
general public,30 and applied the traditional Islamic social structure upon the 
movement’s activities, building networks through mosques, Islamic social 
organisations, charitable associations, and local unions. The Brotherhood’s success 
was due to its affinity with the everyman, presented in simple language that appealed 
to the masses with its religious and traditional values. 
 Therefore, in 1933, within five years of the Brotherhood’s establishment, a 
journal entitled Jarīdat al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn [The Muslim Brotherhood Journal] was 
launched, publishing weekly.31 This was part of al-Banna’s first step towards Daᶜwah 
[Proselytisation], as he outlined in “Risālat al-Muᵓtamar al-Khāmis” [The Fifth 
Conference Letter on ‘Gradual Change’]: 
 
The gradual change depends on education with clear steps in the Muslim Brotherhood 
path. Therefore, they believe that every Daᶜwah has three steps. The step of induction, 
publicity, and preaching the idea to reach people from all levels; then, the 
configuration stage, recruiting and mobilising members; after all this, the executive 
stage, which includes work and production. Most of the time these steps happen 
simultaneously due to the strong connection between them. Therefore the al-Dāʻī 
[preacher] calls for the message of Islam, and at the same time, educates people on 
                                                
29 Al-Banna, Majmūᶜat Rasāᵓil al-IImām al-Shahīd Ḥasan al-Bannā [The Collection of the 
Messages of the Martyr Imam Hasan al-Banna], 213-225; Yūsuf ᶜAbdallah al-Qarḍāwī, al-
Tarbiyah al-Siyāsīyahʻinda al-Imām Ḥasan al-Bannā [The Political Education of Hassan al-
Banna], (Cairo: Maktabaẗ Wahbaẗ, 2008) 17. 
30 Maḥmūd Jāmiᶜ, Waᶜaraftu al-Ikhwān [And I knew the Brotherhood], al-Sayyidah Zaynab, 
(Cairo: Dār al-Tawzīᶜ wa-al-Nashr al-Islāmīyyah, 2004), 11-27.  
31 ᶜAbbās Ḥasan Sīsī, Fī Qāfilat al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn [In the Convoy of the Muslim 
Brotherhood], (Alexandria: Dār Ṭabᶜat al-Ikhwn al-Muslimīn, 2003), 48. 
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Islam. By that he will be executing the application of Islam.32 
 
 This indicates the Brotherhood was following a clearly outlined methodology 
in its formation and path of Daᶜwah. Accordingly, the number of supporters for the 
Brotherhood’s ideology continued to grow, both in membership and in geographical 
coverage. This can be illustrated by the number of journals the group was publishing: 
in 1933-34, 44 weekly editions of Jarīdat al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn were published;33 
followed by 16 editions of al-Nadhīr [The Warner] in 1934;34 12 volumes of the al-
Khulūd [The Immortality] journal in 1938;35 and again in 1938, a small student journal 
called al-Mujtma’a [The Society].36  
 In response to the Brotherhood’s unprecedented popularity, al-Banna moved to 
the configuration stage of his plan, transferring the movement’s headquarters to Cairo 
in 1932. On August 19, 1993, he established the first Shoura Council for the Muslim 
Brotherhood, which adopted the first regulations and internal system.37 By the end of 
the 1930s the Muslim Brotherhood had transformed from a small Islamic association 
into a movement with three hundred branches across Egypt.38 The Brotherhood’s shift 
into politics came shortly after in the wake of King Farouk’s ascension to the throne on 
May 6, 1936, which coincided with the beginning of the Arab Revolt in Palestine. In 
proclamation of his support of Palestine, and in keeping with his second stage, al-
                                                
32 Hassan al-Banna, “Risālat al-Muᵓtamar al-Khāmis” [The Fifth Conference Letter on ‘Gradual 
Change’], Ikhwan Wiki, January 1, 2003, 89, accessed December 2 2014, http://goo.gl/l7q4TA.  
33 Jarīdat al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn [The Muslim Brotherhood Journal], issued between (February 
23, 1933 – April 11, 1935), 44 Edition, Digital copy in Ikhwan wiki, 2011, accessed December 
2, 2014, http://goo.gl/Ddrcsu 
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copy in Ikhwan wiki, 2011, accessed December 2, 2014, http://goo.gl/fPnyYC 
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Edition, Digital Copy in Ikhwan wiki, 2011, accessed December 2, 2014, http://goo.gl/krUXG1 
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in Ikhwan wiki, 2011, accessed on December 2, 2014, http://goo.gl/25YqdU; Al-Mujtma’a [The 
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37 Digital copies of the documents and decisions of the first Shoura Council, regarding its logos, 
the organisation of the movement and Guidance Council memberships in: Jawharī Ṭanṭāwī, 
Jarīdat al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn [The Muslim Brotherhood Journal], (Cairo: Ṭanṭāwī Jawharī, 
1933), 6-20. Also in; "ʻAdad Khāṣṣ  bi- Ijtimāʻ Majlis al-Shūrá” [Special Edition for the Shoura 
Council Meeting], Jarīdat al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn [The Muslim Brotherhood Journal], ed. 1 
vol. 27, (1933), 8-19 in Ikhwan Wiki, 2011, accessed December 2, 2014, http://goo.gl/E78SY5 
38 Richard P. Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers, (London: Oxford University Press, 
1989. Reprint 1993), 12-13; “Tārīkh al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn fī Miṣr” [The History of the 
Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt] Ikwanweb Web, accessed December 2, 2014, 2-3, 
http://www.ikhwanweb.com/uploads/trans/CMFF64MWQS9DWAA.pdf  
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Banna wrote in al-Nadhīr in 1937:  
 
It is not enough to listen to the demands of the Palestinians for self-determination and 
the courage to achieve ... promises, but [we] must convene a meeting of leaders to 
recognise the rights of the Mujahideen ... This conference is heading towards unity and 
progress ... O Muslims, do not waste a minute without preparation for liberation, and 
then you will be able to choose the battle field instead of being sheep... O Muslims, 
you need strength and unity, which is the first step to achieve power.39 
 
 Al-Banna therefore linked the Brotherhood’s entrance into politics with the 
Palestinian issue, using political speeches, initiating special prayers, collecting funds, 
and protesting in solidarity with the Intifada, all of which extended the Brotherhood’s 
popularity past Egypt’s borders and across the entire region. In 1936, King Farouk 
appointed ᶜAli Mahir Pasha as Prime Minister, and following the remarkable 
popularity of the Brotherhood during the Intifada, Mahir contacted the Brotherhood, as 
well as the Wafd Party,40 requesting that they demonstrate their loyalty to the new king 
by participating in the coming elections.41 Al-Banna, however, refused the Prime 
Minister’s request, citing the Brotherhood’s organisational infancy as reason to not 
participate.42 Unofficially, however, the Brotherhood’s decision was also due to the 
belief that it was not the Brotherhood’s purpose to reinforce the monarchy. 
 Yet fourteen years after the Brotherhood’s establishment, in 1942, al-Banna 
decided that he had established a level of organisational structure and public 
mobilisation sufficient to enter public politics.43 Some Brotherhood members have 
                                                
39 Hassan al-Banna, “Khuṭwatna al-Thāniyah” [Our Second Step], al-Nadhīr Journal, October 
4, 1937, in Ikhwan Wiki, accessed December 2, 2014, http://goo.gl/eB6T3A; Ṣalāḥ Muḥsin, 
Dirāsa :al-Īmām Ḥasan al-Bannā wal-Qaḍīyah al-Filasṭīnīyah [Study: Imam Hassan al-Banna 
and the Palestinian Cause], Al-Zaytouna Center for Studies & Consolations, 2013, accessed 
December 2, 2014, http://www.alzaytouna.net/permalink/8610.html 
40 See Appendix 1: Glossary. 
41 Muḥammad ʻUṣfūr, “Hukūm Muḥāyidah Darūrah Intikhābīyah” [Neutral Government Urgent 
Need and Popular Demand], Al-Ahram - International Edition, October 16, 2011, accessed 
December 2, 2014,  
 http://digital.ahram.org.eg/Policy.aspx?Serial=674247. 
42 Sīsī, Fī Qāfilat al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn [In the Convoy of the Muslim Brotherhood], 69; 
Maḥmūd Jāmiᶜ, Waᶜaraftu al-Ikhwān, [And I knew the Brotherhood], al-Sayyidah Zaynab, 
(Cairo: Dār al-Tawzīᶜ wa al-Nashr al-Islāmīyyah, 2004), 11-27. 
43 Maḥmūd ʻAbd al-Ḥalīm al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn, Aḥdāth Sanaʻat al-Tārīkh: Ruʼyah min al-
Dākhil [The Muslim Brotherhood, Events that Made History: A Vision from the Inside], (Dār 
al-Daʻwah, 2004), Vol. 1, 312-341; Krämer, Hasan al-Banna, 32-34; Lia, The Society of the 
Muslim Brothers in Egypt: The Rise of an Islamic Mass Movement 1928-1942, 60- 66; Mitchell, 
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estimated that in 1944 the Brotherhood had a total of half a million active members, 
with a far larger sum of sympathisers.44 Although this may be exaggerated, it does 
reflect the fast growth of the movement in Egypt during this time. Therefore, the 
Brotherhood entered the third step in al-Banna’s plan of reform, the ‘activities stage’, 
which he substantiated as actively engaging in politics as a means to implement the 
gradual Islamic reform.  
 However, formal applications for Brotherhood membership were not 
implemented until the fifth Brotherhood conference, when the movement established 
the Nizam Asasi [Basic Regulation] of 1945. Accordingly, the Brotherhood began 
developing internal regulations, including special requirements for membership, and 
specific duties and responsibilities for members, allowing members to participate in 
politics.45 Al-Banna then issued a “Risālat al-Intikhābāt” [Election Letter],46 declaring 
that he would personally participate in politics to be a model of political participation 
for the Brotherhood thereafter. By 1950, the Egyptian Brotherhood had a new statute, a 
strong internal system, leadership, as well as the Firqat al-Jawwālah [the Traveller 
Troop (unit for education and training)], al-Jihāz al-Khāsṣ [Private Militia], and al-
Akhawāt al-Muslimāt [The Muslim Sisterhood].47  
 The real ideological achievement of al-Banna was, however, not just his 
political opposition to colonialism, and his participation in parliamentarian elections, 
but also the theoretical background he provided the Muslim Brotherhood with through 
his letters, which elaborated upon his activities and opinions, becoming historical 
                                                                                                                             
The Society of the Muslim Brothers, 12-13.  
44 “Muslim Brotherhood,” Discover The Network, accessed December 2, 2014, 
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     46 Hassan al-Banna, “Risālat al-Intikhābāt” [Election Letter], Dakahlia Ikhwan, accessed 
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references and guidance for the Brotherhood. Unlike preceding reformists, al-Banna 
attempted to generalise the meaning of Islam, making it available for a wider array of 
applications. While the reformists were searching for ways to update basic theories of 
Islam, al-Banna created a link between Shariᶜah and politics in order to transform the 
Brotherhood into an Islamic political movement once he had fully achieved stage two 
in his plan.48 Therefore, al-Banna’s educational and organisational vision transformed 
Islam from a religion into an active political ideology, producing the basic elements for 
the political engagement of the Muslim Brotherhood thereafter.49 
 The historical, political, and social transformation witnessed in Egypt and 
other Arab and Islamic countries during this time, such as the fall of the caliphate, 
colonisation in the region, and the issue of Palestine, played an important part in the 
formation of al-Banna’s political ideology. These events caused him to consider new 
problematic concepts such as democracy, rule of law, social and political reforms, and 
the concept of political plurality within the context of the Islamic state.50 In writings, 
such as “Risālat Niẓam al-Hikam” [The Rolling System Letter],51 he considered the 
division of powers, the right to vote, and parliamentarian elections, in a methodology 
more flexible than the ᶜUlamāᵓ of the period who considered these concepts ‘Western’. 
This dispute of Islam’s adaptability still presents a mode of disagreement among 
Islamists today, however, al-Banna succinctly placed Islam as a political ideology fit 
for his method of reform. His supporting slogan declared that Islam is both a religion 
and a state: “Islam for Muslims is incomplete until it carries a political vision to its 
Ummah first ... Each Islamic movement and assembly should put the interest of 
Ummah politics as the first priority in its agenda, otherwise it cannot call itself Islamic 
and needs to re-understand Islam.”52 
 Therefore, al-Banna claimed politics to be an essential part of Islam and that 
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every Muslim should have an opinion on political Islamic affairs.53 According to al-
Banna, the legacy of the Islamic state should be based on a well-developed political 
system. This system is essential for the executive stage in al-Banna’s previous three 
point plan for the Brotherhood, and can be summarised in a further four points, 
beginning with the assurance of a unified authority, as al-Banna refused any kind of 
separation between civil authority and religious authority. This was followed by the 
acceptance of the parliamentarian system to uphold and guarantee the responsibility of 
the ruler towards the people, in addition to the unity of the Ummah and the respect of 
human rights. Thirdly, the existence of political opposition, as long as this opposition 
does not have any aim of assuming authority or power, and finally, building a caliphate 
system gradually, making it the final political goal for the Islamic movements.54  
 Al-Banna’s concept for the Islamic state was different from former ᶜUlamāᵓ, 
who used Islam for their reasoning either as motivation for jihad against colonisation, 
or for the renewal of Islam. The emphasis was shifted from Islam as religion only, to 
the embodiment of an economic, educational, political, and social system, which 
should be protected within the framework of the state.55 He suggested that when these 
conditions of participation merged within in the Islamic world, the caliphate would be 
possible on an international scale by firstly creating fully independent Islamic 
governments in all Islamic countries; establishing full cooperation and unity through 
treaties and alliances; founding a League of the Islamic Nations; and finally choosing a 
caliph for all Muslims.56 
  
 
1.1.1 From Diplomacy to Arms (1941 - 1949) 
 
After the Second World War, Egyptian political parties such as the Muslim 
Brotherhood, al-Ḥizb al-Shuyūʻī al-Miṣrī [The Egyptian Communist Party], the Wafd 
                                                
53 Al-Qarḍāwī, al-Tarbiyah al-Siyāsīyahʻinda al-Imām Ḥasan al-Bannā [The Political 
Education of Hassan al-Banna], 7-132. 
54 Abū ʻĀmir, Mal⁻amiḥ al-Fikr al-Siyāsī ʻinda al-Imām Ḥasan al-Bannā [The Features of 
Political Thought of Hassan Al-Banna], 22-50. 
55 Al-Qarḍāwī, al-Tarbiyah al-Siyāsīyahʻinda al-Imām Ḥasan al-Bannā [The Political 
Education of Hassan al-Banna], 13; Ann Black E., Esmaeili Hossein, Hosen Nadirsyah, 
Modern Perspectives on Islamic Law, (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013), 52. 
56 Muḥammad ʻAbd al-Qādir Abū Fāris, Al-Fiqh al-Siyāsī ʻinda al-Imām al-Shahīd Ḥasan al-
Bannā [The Political Theology of the Martyer Imam Hasan al-Banna]. Egypt: Ṭanṭā: Dār al-
Bashīr lil-Thaqāfah wa-al-ʻUlūm, 1999, 25-29. 
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Party, and Misr al-Fatah [The Young Egypt Party], began using violence to assert 
themselves as political powers.57  However, the Brotherhood formalised this resistance 
further by establishing al-Jihāz al-Khāṣṣ [Private Militia].58  
 In February 1948, two members of the Brotherhood’s al-Jihāz al-Khāṣṣ were 
arrested in connection with the assassination of Judge Ahmad al-Khazindār,59 who had 
sentenced some Brotherhood members guilty of throwing bombs at British soldiers 
October 17, 1947,60 and had also been involved in a case in which the Brotherhood was 
connected to the bombing of Cinema Metro in 1947. The majority of Brotherhood 
members condemned the assassination of the judge, and al-Banna considered the act to 
be against Islam and the Brotherhood’s values.61 However, no expulsion or punishment 
for the militia leaders followed.  
 In fact, following the al-Khazindār assassination, the Brotherhood increased its 
activities, taking an active part in resistance movements, especially in Palestine, which 
had experienced a sudden growth of Jewish settlements during Egypt’s Martial Law, 
exerting further pressure on the recently militarised movement. The United Nations 
(UN) made a decision to partition Palestine on November 29, 1947,62 and on December 
15, 1947 the Brotherhood initiated protests in Cairo against the British protectorate.63 
However, when Israel declared its independence as a state on May 14, 1948, following 
its success in the war and the withdrawal of the British military from Egypt, al-Jihāz 
al-Khāṣṣ launched a series of attacks on private residences and businesses in Cairo’s 
Jewish blocks, between June 20, and September 28, 1948.64 
 On December 28, 1948, the call for voluntary fighters in Palestine was 
announced, resulting in Brotherhood members organising a base for a voluntary army 
led by Ahmad ᶜAbd al-ᶜAziz under the umbrella of the Arab League, in the war against 
the nascent state of Israel. The Egyptian Brotherhood established two bases in 
February 1948, in al-ʻArīsh (north Sinai), and Bureij (Gaza). Each base was estimated 
                                                
57 Ibid., 63-66; James P. Jankowski, Redefining the Egyptian Nation, 1930-1945, Vol. 2, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 21, 135. 
58 ʻAbd al-Ḥalīm, al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn, Aḥdāth Sanaʻat al-Tārīkh: Ruʼyah min al-Dākhil 
[The Muslim Brotherhood, Events that Made History: A Vision from the Inside], 162-170. 
59 Sīsī, Fī Qāfilat al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn [In the Convoy of the Muslim Brotherhood], 202. 
60 Ibid, 133-134. 
61 Shādī, Ṣafaḥāt min al-Tārīkh: Haṣād al-ʻUmr [Pages of Bitter Harvest], 57-60; 69-104.  
62 “Resolution 181 (II). Future Government of Palestine.” November 29, 1947. Accessed 
December 8, 2012. http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/0/7f0af2bd897689b785256c330061d253 
63 Sīsī, Fī Qāfilat al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn [In the Convoy of the Muslim Brotherhood], 202. 
64 Jāmiᶜ, Waᶜaraftu al-Ikhwān [And I knew the Brotherhood], 63-64. 
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to accommodate two hundred members under the leadership of Yousef Talᶜat. Another 
unit of the Brotherhood, led by Mahmuud ᶜAbduh, went to the Syrian base with the 
intention of meeting other volunteers from all around the Arab World.65 
 Furthermore, the Brotherhood’s militia was accused of blowing up the appeal 
court on January 13, 1949.66 Due to these actions, and the sum of weapons in their 
possession, Prime Minster Maḥmūd Fahmī al-Nuqrāshī declared the ban of the 
Brotherhood on December 8, 1948, prohibiting it from practicing any more societal or 
political work in Egypt.67 Twenty days later, ᶜAbduh al-Majid Ahmad, a Brotherhood 
member, shot al-Nuqrāshī in front of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.68 Al-Banna 
denounced the assassins in a famous speech, describing them as being ‘neither 
Muslims nor Brothers’,69 and pointing out that terror is not accepted in Islam.70 The 
statement publically demonstrated that al-Banna had lost control over the movement 
and the activity of al-Jihāz al-Khāṣṣ, compromising his plans for reform. However, it 
could also be understood that this message may have been issued to protect the rest of 
the movement. Either way, on Feburary 12, 1949, al-Banna was scheduled to begin 
negotiations with a government representative who did not arrive, and whilst waiting, 
three people attacked and killed the Brotherhood leader.71  
 In the last stage of the movement’s organisational establishment, from 1942 to 
1952, the Brotherhood committed numerous mistakes due to the failure of al-Banna’s 
third executive step. This failure may have been due to the Brotherhood fighting with 
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Nashr, 2001), 501-53. 
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Interview with al-Muṣawwer Journal], Majallat al-Muṣawwer, January 1, 1982, vol. 2989; In: 
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http://goo.gl/LeljeH 
70 Sīsī, Fī Qāfilat al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn [In the Convoy of the Muslim Brotherhood], 202. 
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the regime, and in their war in Palestine, working against itself and its plan of gradual 
reform, prioritising violence over social engagement, and assassinating important 
public figures.  
  
 
1.2  Sayyid Qutb and the Division of the Brotherhood (1950-1966) 
 
With the death of al-Banna just passed, the 1950s realised a new era for the outlawed 
Muslim Brotherhood, in which chaos was ensuing without a leader. Sayyid Qutb soon 
became thought of as an Islamic mentor to the Brotherhood members, respected due to 
his literature, and providing direction for the floundering movement.  
 After graduating from the same college as al-Banna in 1933, Qutb began his 
career as a teacher in the Ministry of Public Instruction, and after 1939 was appointed 
in the Ministry of Education where he worked for 18 years.72 During this period Qutb 
was known for his literary contributions, and in 1939, wrote a series of articles in the 
journal al-Muqtaṭaf [The Extract], called al-Taṣwīr al-Fannī fī al-Qur#an [The Artistic 
Articulation of the Verses of the Qurᵓan].73 These articles were published in the 
following year as a book. While his articles were written in an objective style, his book 
demonstrates more passion for the Qurᵓanic verses and their meaning. This was the 
first sign of a shift in Qutb’s comprehension of Islamic theology, presenting him with 
an immediate following. He was mainly influenced by the activities of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Palestine, and the Suez, where they resisted British forces in the 
1940s.74 
 Qutb was influenced by a wide array of ideologies, borrowing concepts from 
each and re-shaping them into an Islamic context, as seen with his adaptation of 
socialism’s social justice and equality. Furthermore, Qutb built his Islam on brand new 
concepts of a state and society. For example, in Maʻrakat al-Islām wa-r-Raʼsmālīya 
[The Battle of Islam and Capitalism], he said: 
 
                                                
72 Ṣalāḥ ʻAbd al-Fattāḥ Khālidī, Sayyid Quṭb: min al-Milād ilá al-Istishhād, [Sayyid Qutb: 
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Qurᵓan], (Cairo: Dār al-Shurüq lil-Nashr wa-al-Tawzīʻ, 1987); Ṣalāḥ ʻAbd al-Fattāḥ Khālidī, 
Naẓarīyat al-Taṣwīr al-Fannī ʻind Sayyid Quṭb [The Artistic Articulation for Sayyid Qutb], 
(Amman: Dār al-Furqān, 1983) 9-11.  
74 Ṣalāḥ ʻAbd al-Fattāḥ Khālidī Sayyid Quṭb al-Shahīd al-Hayy [Sayyid Qutb Living Martyr], 
(Amman,: Maktabat al-ʼAqṣá, 1981), 11-30. 
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Islam must rule to provide mankind with a complete society based on its values. 
Humanity might find its dream in socialism, but socialism blurs humanity when it is 
limited to aliments. Socialism tries but its materialistic nature has forbidden humanity 
from soul and freedom … Islam must rule because it is the only positive doctrine that 
is formed from the complete mix of Christianity and socialism together, achieving all 
their goals, and adding balance, symmetry, and moderation.75 
 
 Al-Banna’s main pillar of belief for the transformation of the Brotherhood into 
a political association was embodied in his slogan that Islam is “religion and state, 
Quᵓran and sword”.76 Qutb demonstrated his compatibility with al-Banna’s school of 
thinking, declaring in his book al-ᶜAdalah al-Ijtimaᶜiyyah fī al-Islām [Social Justice in 
Islam] that Islam is not a faith only, but also a social system combining religion and 
state, calling for the liberation of Muslims.77 Based on this understanding, and his 
compatibility with the Muslim Brotherhood and its understanding of Islam, he joined 
the movement as the editor-in-chief of the Brotherhood’s weekly Jarīdat al-Ikhwān al-
Muslimīn.  
 The popularity of Social Justice in Islam impacted the Free Army Officer, 
Gamal Abdel Nasser, and other officers,78 who requested Qutb’s participation in a coup 
against King Farouk.79 The Brotherhood became involved in Nasser’s revolution on 
July 23, 1952,80 and as a result, the Egyptian army was successful in executing a ‘white 
coup’, wherein it took control and forced the King to step down. Following this 
success, Qutb was appointed Counsellor of the Revolution Council,81 and when the 
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Revolution Council dissolved all political parties in Egypt, the Brotherhood remained 
operational based on the idea that it was a movement, not a party, in recompense for its 
support of Nasser.82  
 Later, a disagreement between the Muslim Brotherhood and the revolutionary 
regime ensued, and the Brotherhood was accused of attempting to assassinate Nasser in 
Alexendaria.83 Qutb and the Brotherhood’s leadership were imprisoned in 1953 
although the perpetrators of this assassination attempt remain unclear. Despite the 
accusation, the Egyptian Brotherhood still rejects claims that they were behind this 
attempt. One explanation could be that the event was framed to present Nasser as a 
hero, and denounce the Brotherhood, as Nasser wanted to eradicate the remaining 
political actor that could compete with his regime. On the other hand, during al-
Banna’s leadership the movement had shown examples of vigilante violence, and 
therefore this may have been a repetition of such events. Ultimately, however, the 
movement was banned for the second time in its short history.84 
 However, the Brotherhood continued to exist in a form of gatherings at Zainab 
al-Ghazali’s house.85 The gatherings formed a cell consisting of former intellectual 
members, and some members of al-Jihāz al-Khāṣṣ, all of who were inspired by Qutb’s 
literature, which he sent from prison. Due to this intellectual guidance, Qutb was 
proclaimed the Brotherhood’s leader and mentor from within the prison. In 1964, due 
to the mediation of the President of Iraq, ᶜAbd al-Salam ᶜAref, Sayyid Qutb was 
released from prison. The same year his famous text Maᶜalim al-Tariq [Milestones on 
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the Road] was published.86  
 In Qutb’s Milestones, his three essential messages constituted al-Hākimīyah 
[The Principle of Divine Governance],87 al-Jāhilīyah, [Era of ignorance before 
Islam],88 and al-ᶜUsbah al-Muᵓaminah [The True Band of Believers].89 In Milestones, 
Qutb argues that that Muslims were living under a secular system, in which Islam is 
not fully implemented, nor is God’s Shariᶜah (al-Hākimīyah),90 to the extent that 
Muslims are not living by God’s rules, but in a state of al-Jāhilīyah due to non-Islamic 
regimes ruling Muslims.91 Therefore, he argues that there is a need to restore the 
society, building upon Islamic rules through al-ᶜUṣbah al-Muʼminah – a gathering of 
true Muslims whose main duty is to deliver the message of Islam again to the people, 
returning them to their faith. In Milestones, Qutb created this image of al-ᶜUṣbah 
vanguard Muslims, raised from the beginning within Islam, who would become the 
starting point for a true Islamic state.92 
 Qutb’s al-Jāhilīyah concept drove some to understand that he was promoting 
Takfīr [infidel ideology] by suggesting that al-ᶜUṣbah was the only true Muslim group 
while the rest of society was Kāfir [infidel],93 or living in al-Jāhilīyah status.94 Not all 
of Qutb’s followers believed so strongly in Takfīr, as some understood his notion of al-
Jāhilīyah as an exaggerated example of modern society, and hyperbolic of the lack of 
applied Islamic rules. However, Qutb believed that once a strong network of ‘new’ 
Muslims had been established, they would apply authority through Islamic Shari$ah 
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rules. The extreme understanding to this theory was that Qutb’s al-$Uṣbah would 
introduce a virgin Islam, giving rise to a new sect within Islam.95 
 In 1965, eight months after being released, Qutb was imprisoned again, along 
with Zainab al-Ghazali’s group, and members close to him who had been influenced 
by his preaching. The government accused Qutb’s group of again planning to 
assassinate Nasser, and attack strategically selected locations. This time, Qutb was 
sentenced to death. Despite being offered amnesty in exchange for an apology, Qutb 
declined and was executed in 1966, thereby further expanding his iconic status within 
the Brotherhood as a martyr.96    
 At the time, Qutb’s ideology was more influential than that of any other 
Islamic scholar or writer. After his execution, he effectively became the ideological 
father of radical Islam. Qutb’s personality and teaching influenced the Brotherhood in 
every sense, and his opposition to Nasser represented the clash between pan-Islamism 
and pan-Arabism felt between Brothers and nationalists across the Arab world, and 
throughout history. 
 
 
1.2.1 Emerging Divisions: The Brotherhood after Qutb 
 
Once Qutb’s al-Jāhilīyah theory became a tool for Takfīr, the Brotherhood began 
questioning whether violence was applicable within Islam. By encouraging Muslims to 
judge each other on their faith and forcing the application of Shariᶜah, a gateway was 
opened for further violent understandings of Islam.97 This was unlike al-Banna’s 
ideology, which viewed society from the perspective that God judges Muslims alone, 
and social reform as vital, slowly enforcing Islamic values to achieve the Islamic state. 
Yet Qutb called for society’s restructuring based on Islam’s core rules. Therefore, 
although Qutb and al-Banna concede on the importance of Islam becoming a religious 
state, their paths markedly diverge regarding its application. Due to this ideological 
contrast, members had to personally establish whether they were with Qutb or al-
Banna. In the failure of these two paths to meet, two wings were created within the 
Brotherhood: Qutbist ‘Hawks’ and al-Bannaist ‘Doves’. 
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 The Brotherhood’s al-Murshid al-ʻāmm [Supreme Guide] attempted to return 
al-Bannaist thought to the movement by supervising a group whose main mission was 
to redefine Takfīr, based on the Qurᵓan and Sunnah only. The group wrote Duʻāh lā 
Quḍāh [Preachers not Judges],98 which states that the theory of al-Jāhilīyah is not 
Qurᵓanic and that it was not mentioned in the Sunnah. Preachers not Judges’ key 
points were to confirm the commitment of the Muslim Brotherhood to the Sunnah sect, 
which proclaims that anyone who says ‘al-Shahādatayn’ [the phrase, ‘There is no God 
but God and Muḥammad is his Prophet’] is Muslim, that nobody should judge the 
truthfulness of people’s intentions, and that Muslims are not to be labelled ‘infidels’ 
due to their actions. The book also declares that committing sins does not make people 
Kāfir, and does not give legitimacy to accusations that they have moved from Islam to 
al-Jāhilīyah.99  
 The book is an attempt to return to the core of al-Banna’s ideology, which is 
found in his letters and speeches, calling for the modernity and adaptability of Islam 
within the state, rather than dissecting individuals’ faith. Although the book does not 
refer to Qutb in name, it tries to separate the Muslim Brotherhood from his ideology. 
Al-Huḍaybī’s efforts contributed to the Brotherhood’s two conflicting branches, which 
are still witnessed today. The book may have been a strategy for the Brotherhood’s 
survival, as it presented al-Huḍaybī as a new leader after the death of al-Banna and 
Qutb, and was a chance for the Brotherhood to move towards something more 
sustainable. Furthermore, al-Huḍaybī’s continuation of the Brotherhood can be seen as 
a reflection of al-Banna’s denouncement of the al-Jihāz al-Khāṣṣ, in which al-Huḍaybī 
was denouncing Qutb also as “not Muslim and not Brotherhood”. 
 The two books embody the two diverging opinions of political Islam, but the 
Brotherhood integrated the differences of these two books into the movement, with an 
internal divide of the Hawks, Qutb’s front, and Doves, al-Huḍaybī and al-Banna’s 
front. 
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http://www.daawa.net/display/arabic/lectures/detailecture.aspx?lecid=12 
99 Huḍaybī, Duʻāh lā Quḍāh: Abḥāth fī al-ʻaqīdah al-Islāmīyah wa-Manhaj al-Daʻwah ilá Allāh 
[Preachers Not Judges: Researches in the Islamic Belief and the Methodology of Dawah to 
Allah], 16-57. 
 22 
 
1.3 The Establishment of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan 
 
Al-Banna envisioned a universal Islamic movement that would transcend Egypt’s, and 
even the region’s, boundaries, as established in the Nizam Asasi [Basic Regulation] of 
1945, in which he states that the Muslim Brotherhood’s “perspective towards Islam 
works in every time and place”.100 Therefore, the Brotherhood’s expansion into the 
Levant was part of al-Banna’s transnational project to unite all Muslims in order to 
create the Ummah. Accordingly, al-Banna was seen to recruit Islamic personalities 
within the Levant in order for them to transport his ideas and advocate them across the 
area. This strategy was successfully completed by 1945 when he had established a 
branch in every capital in the Levant.  
 As part of this plan, the Brotherhood participated in its first external event – al-
Muʼtamar al-Islāmī al-Awwal [The First Islamic Conference], held in Jerusalem on 
December 18, 1931. The main purpose of this conference was to organise the 
protection of Holy Sites against Jewish settlers. The conference presented the first 
opportunity for the Brotherhood to build a network among Islamic personalities of the 
Muslim world, specifically those from the Levant, such as Muṣṭafá al-Sibāʻī, and ᶜAbd 
al-Laṭīf abū Qūrah.  
 Networking with influential leaders saw the movement’s first step towards the 
transnational goal when an Islamic group called Jamʻīyat al-Makārim [Assembly of 
Generosity] was established in Jerusalem in 1942, with Islamic affiliation towards the 
Brotherhood. This was followed in Syria, when Shabab Muḥammad [The Youth of 
Muḥammad], led by Muṣṭafá al-Sibāʻī, linked itself to the Brotherhood before 
changing their name in 1944 to the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. Following the 
establishment of the Syrian Brotherhood, and due to the importance of Palestine within 
īd Ramaḍān, on November 19, 1945 to establish the official branch of the Brotherhood 
in Jerusalem, which was extended later with branches in Lydda, Jaffa, and Haifa.101 
                                                
100 Jamʻīyat al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn, Qānūn al-Niẓām al-Asāsī li-Hayʼat al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn 
al-ʻāmmah: (2 Shawwāl Sanat 1364 H-8 Sibtambir Sanat 1945). al-Lāʼiḥah al-Dākhilīyah al-
ʻāmmah lil-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn (2 Ṣafar Sanat 1371 H-2 Nūfimbir sanat 1951) [Statutes of the 
General Law of the Muslim Brotherhood (2 Shawwal 1364 H-8 September, 1945). General 
Rules of Procedure of the Muslim Brotherhood (2 Safar 1371 AH -2 November 1951)], (Cairo: 
Dār al-Anṣār); Dasūq, Lawāʼiḥ wa-Qawānīn al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn min al-Taʼsīs hHattá al-
Intishār 1930-2009 [Regulations and Laws of the Muslim Brotherhood from the Establishment 
Until Popularity 1930-2009]. 
101 Bar, The Muslim Brotherhood, 11-12. 
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 The history of the Jordanian Brotherhood stems from direct communication 
with al-Banna after a salesman, ᶜAbd al-Laṭīf abū Qūrah, moved to Egypt to embark on 
his religious education and met al-Banna, by whom he was significantly influenced by. 
Consequently, after moving back to Jordan he began preaching al-Banna's Brotherhood 
ideology.102 However, it was not until a visit by Abd al-Ḥakīm ʻĀbidīn (the General 
Secretary of Egyptian Brotherhood), to Jordan in 1945 that the movement’s association 
was established in Amman. ᶜAbd al-Laṭīf abū Qūrah created the Majlis Idari 
[Administrative Council] of the Brotherhood, consisting of eight persons including 
himself: ʻAbd al-Raḥmān Khalīfah, Aḥmad al-Khaṭīb, Yūsuf Barqāwī, Shaykh Jamīl 
Barqāwī, Mamdūḥ al- Ṣarāyirah, Mufliḥ al-Sa‘d, and Muslim al-Nābulusī. This group 
aimed to create a charitable association according to al-Banna’s model, and begin the 
induction step of his reform plan in Jordan. Abū Qūrah was elected as the first 
Marāqib al-ʻĀmm [General Supervisor] of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood.103 The 
movement’s main achievement during this early stage was the establishment of the 
Islamic Educational College in 1946, which was the first unit in the configuration 
stage, and ensured infrastructure for future Brotherhood generations.104  
 However, when the 1948 Arab-Israeli war took place, the Brotherhood both 
east and west of the River Jordan unified in support of the Arab armies. The 
Palestinian Brotherhood established a base in Beersheba, and the Jordanian 
Brotherhood settled in ʻAyn Kārim, west of Jerusalem. The Jordanian troop was 
renamed Ubayda under the command of abū Qūrah and consisted of 120 Brothers. On 
April 14, 1948, the two Brotherhood branches merged in Bethlehem,105 but later, as a 
result of the Arab Armies’ defeat, Jordanian troops were forced to retreat to Amman.106 
Nevertheless, the Jordanian army was able to protect the West bank and consequently, 
newly appointed King ᶜAbdallah I declared unity between the two banks of the 
                                                
102 ʻAwnī Jaddūʻ ʻUbaydī, Ṣafaḥāt min Hayāt al-Ḥājj ʻAbd al-Laṭīf abū Qūrah Muʼassis 
Jamāʻat al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn fī al-Urdun [Pages of the Life of Haj ʻAbd al-Laṭīf abū Qūrah, 
Founder of Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan], (Amman: Markaz Dirāsāt wa-Abḥāth al-ʻAmal al-
Islāmī, 1992), 10-62. 
103 Ibrāhīm Gharāyibah, Jamāʻat al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn fī al-Urdun, 1946-1996 [The Muslim 
Brotherhood in Jordan 1946/1996] (Amman: Markaz al-Urdun al-Jadīd lil-Dirāsāt, 1997), 15-
50. 
104 “Nubdhah ʻan Jamʻīyat al-Thaqāfah al-Islāmīyah” [About the Islamic Culture Assembly], 
Islamic Educational Collage, accessed December 2, 2014, http://goo.gl/On848Z 
105 Hajrasi al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn wal-Qaḍīyah al-Filasṭīnīyah [Muslim Brotherhood and the 
Palestinian Cause], 46-51. 
Sulaymān Mūsá, Ayyām lā Tunsá: al-Urdun fī Harb 1948, [Memorable Days: Jordan in the 
1948 War], (Amman: Yuṭlabu min Maktabat al-Muḥtasib, 1982), 217-381. 
106 Bar, The Muslim Brotherhood, 11.  
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Jordanian river, as well as the establishment of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.107, 
Discussing Egypt’s poor effort in an interview with Zakarīyā Luṭfī, King Hussein 
addressed the Brotherhood as a key player in their attack:  
 
Can you tell me where [the Egyptian Army] fought? Excuse me, I mean Farouk’s army 
in 1948. You’ve entered Gaza, the Arabic city which has not a single Jewish person in 
it, then you entered Ashkelon until the Jewish took it from you without a fight, and you 
made from your black hyena army [metaphor for cowardice] a legendary army, when 
you did not enter a single battle, and did not win any confrontation, and if not for the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s activities near Hebron and Bethlehem, the record of Farouk in 
Palestine would not honor him much.108 
 
 This statement by the King acknowledges the significance of the 
Brotherhood’s participation across the Levant in the 1948 war, as they had entered 
battles such as Kfar Darom (Gaza), in which a total of 58 Brothers died by May 13, 
1948.109 Soon after the Arab defeat, the two Brotherhood branches were merged under 
the general supervision of abū Qūrah.  
 The context of this merger cannot be removed from the context of defeat. The 
two branches were in the early stages of development, particularly the Palestinian 
branch, which was too weak to oppose the enemy alone after the defeat. Secondly, 
Jordan had acquired a new status of guardianship of the West Bank, implying a feeling 
of unity between the two banks and giving them cause to believe that there should be 
just one unified branch.110 
                                                
107 This conference was held in Jericho on December 1, 1948. Out of seven, four resolutions 
Abdallah I was declared a King over two banks of the Jordanian reviver. On the session of first 
parliament to represent both banks convened on April 24, 1950, the unity was proclaimed; 
Robins, A History of Jordan, 70-74; United nation accepted the Unity, “The Constituent 
Assembly First Knesset 1949-1951, Annexation of the West Bank by the Hashemite Kingdom 
of Jordan,” Jerusalem Center of Public Affairs, Sitting 135, May 3, 1950, accessed December 2, 
2014, http://www.jcpa.org/art/knesset6.htm; “The Ambassador of the United States (Douglas) 
the Secretary of the State,” 684.A.85/6-250: Telegram, London, June 2, 1950 – 8 p.m., Secret.   
108 ʻAbd-al-ʻAẓīm Muḥammad Ibrāhīm Ramaḍān, Muḏakkirāt as-Siyāsīyīn wa-'z-zuʻamāʼ fī-
Miṣr 1881-1981 [The Diaries of the Politicians and Leaders In Egypt 1881-1981], (Beirut: al-
Waṭan al-ʻArabīArabirabī, 304. 
109 Hajrasi al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn wal-Qaḍīyah al-Filasṭīnīyah, Hạqāʼiq al-Tārīkh [Muslim 
Brotherhood and the Palestinian Cause Historical Facts], 56. 
110 “The Ambassador of the United States (Douglas) the Secretary of the State,” 684.A.85/6-
250: Telegram, London, June 2, 1950 – 8 p.m., Secret, in “United States Department of State / 
Foreign relations of the United States,” 1950. The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, 921, 
accessed December 2, 2014, 
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 Due to the hostile situation in the aftermath of the assassination of al-Nuqrāshī, 
the Egyptian Brotherhood was banned on 1948.111 In response, abū Qūrah endeavoured 
to establish a stronger branch in Jordan and Palestine under the reign of King 
ᶜAbdallah I, of whom they were in full cooperation with, making Jordan a refuge for 
the outlawed Egyptian Brotherhood.112 
 At this stage in the history of the Jordanian Brotherhood, the movement and 
regime enjoyed close cooperation based on mutual interests including the liberation of 
Palestine. To reach this end, the regime sought for the extension of Jordan by 
expanding its territories to the West Bank, as per the Jericho Conference of December 
1, 1948.113 The Brotherhood saw this as testament to the regime’s commitment to the 
Palestinian issue, thus strengthening their bond. Furthermore, the movement perceived 
this as the first stage of the unification of the Ummah, which is part of their guiding 
ideology. 
 Soon, however, the political stability was challenged as King ᶜAbdallah I was 
assassinated on July 20, 1951 while attending prayer in the al-Aqsa mosque of 
Jerusalem. The reasons for his death are ambiguous, however, it is interpreted that it 
may have been due to his attempts to enter peace negotiations with Israel.114 Further, 
Sir John Baggot Glubb (Glubb Pasha), leader of the Arab Legion, noted that there was 
an atmosphere of peace after the 1948 war, but “if Jordan attempted to make peace, the 
other Arab countries would turn on her”.115  This argument is strengthened by the fact 
that five days prior to the King’s assassination, Riyāḍ al-Ṣulḥ, a former prime minister 
                                                                                                                             
http://images.library.wisc.edu/FRUS/EFacs/1950v05/reference/frus.frus1950v05.i0011.pdf; 
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Issue: 4, (2000), accessed December 2, 2014, http://www.historytoday.com/richard-
cavendish/jordan-formally-annexes-west-bank; Ammon Cohen, Political Parties in the West 
Bank under the Jordanian Regime 1949-1967, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982), 144-
194; Bar, The Muslim Brotherhood, 12-14. 
111 Saud al-Mawlá, Filasṭīn bayna al-Ikhwān wa-Fateh [Palestine between the Brotherhood and 
Fatah], Institute of Palestnian Studies, Vol 39, (2013), 138-171: http://www.palestine-
studies.org/files/pdf/mdf/11562.pdf 
112 Abū Zāyidah, Jihād al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn fī Filasṭīn Hattá ʻām 1970  [Struggle of the 
Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine until 1970], 7-42; “The Muslim Brotherhood in the Arab 
World and Islamic Communities in Western Europe,” The Meir Amit Intelligence and 
Terrorism Information’s Centre [ITIC's], January 2012, 1-64, accessed December 2, 2014, 
http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/data/pdf/PDF_11_049_2.pdf 
113 Joseph Nevo, King Abdullah and Palestine: A Territorial Ambition, (New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 1966), 129-132. 
114 Avi Shlaim, Lion of Jordan: The Life of King Hussein in War and Peace, (New York: Alfred 
A. Knopf, 2007), 46; Ian J.  Bickerton, and Carla L. Klausner, A Concise History of the Arab-
Israeli Conflict, (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2002), 161-170. 
115 John Bagot, A Soldier with the Arabs, (New York: Harper, 1957), 341.  
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of Lebanon who was considering similar negotiations, was also assassinated in 
Amman. Ten people were accused of the assassination of the King, including 
ᶜAbdallah al-Tall, the Military Governor of Jerusalem, and Musa al-Husseini, a close 
relative of the Mufti of Palestine.   
 From the beginning of the establishment of the Hashemite Kingdom, common 
enemies, such as the UK and Israel, united citizens both sides of the River Jordan. 
However, their unification was enriched by the cooperation between the Islamists and 
the King, who proclaimed to share an Islamic identity, and a mutual understanding of 
the necessity of Palestine’s liberation. Therefore, the two banks were unified by 
something larger than just a leader or political institution for decision-making. Rather, 
all Jordanian identities were brought towards a national identity, which became based 
on the religious fusion of the regime and Brotherhood.116  
 Furthermore, the confrontation between Qutb and Nasser affected the 
Brotherhood in Jordan, pushing the Brotherhood closer to the Jordanian regime due to 
the sharp contrast of Nasser’s pan-Arabic ideology against the Islamic Jordanian 
monarchy. Therefore, the Qutb-Nasser confrontation became the main symbol in 
Jordan for the confrontation of the Brotherhood and the Leftist / Nationalists, who 
were following the pan-Arab path that had been developing parallel to the 
Brotherhood’s path. Inevitably, this led to a clash of pan-Islamism and pan-Arabism, 
exacerbated by the state’s support of the Muslim Brotherhood. Due to their relative 
freedom in Jordan, the movement sought to further al-Banna’s third executive stage by 
entering politics to continue the path of protecting Palestine and implementing gradual 
reform. 
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Chapter  Two  A Group Not a Party: The 
Marriage of Convenience 
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During King Hussein’s rule, Jordan saw the transformation of the Brotherhood from a 
socio-religious movement into a political actor. The movement’s influence was shown 
in the 1956 elections, which, by integrating political actors into the political process, 
were intended to repair Jordan’s stability after being damaged by the Baghdad Pact 
riots. The movement succeeded in restoring stability within the context of political 
pragmatism; the Brotherhood developed an uneasy alliance with the regime through 
the mutual need for legitimacy. The Brotherhood’s role in the 1967 Six Day War and 
the Civil War of 1970 presented internal dilemmas for the movement in regards to the 
Palestinian identity. However, the Brotherhood tactfully overcame this issue through a 
display of diplomacy towards the regime, which, in contrast to the Brotherhood’s 
experiences in Syria, Iran, and Egypt, joined forces to unify and solidify Jordan, whilst 
enjoying the benefits and legitimacy gained therein.  
 However, despite this mutually beneficial relationship engendered after the 
1956 election, indications of future conflict began to surface, revealing that the 
Brotherhood and regime’s tenuous relationship relied on mutual benefits rather than an 
ideological cohesion.  
 Therefore, this chapter’s timeline traces how the movement transformed from 
one that only preached for Islam, into a valid political actor within the Jordanian 
parliament. A key factor in legitimising the movement lay in its ‘alliance building’ 
stage, which is when Jordan saw the Brotherhood side with the Leftists and 
Nationalists against the regime’s policies, only to later transfer its alliances towards the 
regime. This period is key in revealing the Brotherhood’s pragmatism and ability to 
sway public opinion – a gravitas that would fully realise itself in the Brotherhood’s 
early political establishment. Whether with the Leftists and Nationalists, the regime, or 
the Fedayeen, the Brotherhood’s alliances had major effects on the structure of the 
movement itself, but arguably also, the structure of the country’s politics.  
 
2.0  Becoming a National Political Actor (1949 – 1954) 
 
In 1952, the new King Talal1 declared a new Jordanian Constitution to uphold and 
protect the unification of Jordan and Palestine, granting Palestinians the right to 
                                                
1 King Talal took the thrown after the assassination of his father, King ᶜAbdallah I, in 
Jerusalem. He ruled Jordan from July 20, 1951, until August 11, 1952, before being forced to 
abdicate the thrown to his son, King Hussein, for health reasons. The Constitution of 1952 is his 
biggest achievement.  
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participate in politics.2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 The new constitution was considered to be a step towards democratisatising 
Jordan. It stated that Jordan is an independent state, part of the Arab nation, and that its 
governmental system is parliamentary, with a hereditary monarchy. The constitution 
declared the separation of powers (executive, legislative, and judiciary) and established 
the Audit Bureau to supervise the state’s expenses and organise Jordanian rights and 
duties, creating a new parliamentarian life in Jordan. 
 In 1953, during the course of establishing the constitution and unification, the 
Brotherhood joined al-Muʼtamar al-Islāmī al-ʻĀmm [The General Islamic Conference] 
in Jerusalem. Participating representatives included Sayyid Qutb, Mustafa al-Siba'i, the 
founder of the Syrian Brotherhood, Maᶜrouf al-Dawalibi, former Syrian Prime Minster, 
                                                
2 Mayy ʻAbd al-Fattāḥ Ṭubayshāt, Waḥdat Diffatay al-Urdun 1948-1951 [The Unity of Jordan’s 
Two Banks 1948-1951], (Phd Dissertation: Yarmuk University, 2001).  
Image 1: The Map of Palestine and Jordan Post-1948 
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al-Fuḍayl al-Wartalānī, founder of the Algerian Brotherhood, al-Bashīr al-Ibrāhīmī, 
along with many other world leading political and Islamic scholars from Arab countries. This 
assembly was formed to discuss how to deal with religious sites, such as the Dome of 
the Rock and al-Aqsa, which were in Jordanian custody after the 1948 war. 
 However, the main call of the conference was to create awareness for the 
Palestinian issue in Islamic countries, sharing Jerusalem’s threat of Israeli settlements, 
and calling for the rejection of all peace processes or treaties dealing with Israel. Those 
attempts were opposing pre-existing agreements on Arab-Israeli relations, including 
the call to launch peace treaties with Israel under the 1949 Armistice agreement,3 and 
King ᶜAbdallah I facilitating peace with Israel4 through external encouragement to 
accept the United Nations’ resolution 181 from 1947 that would divide Palestine.5 
With the participation of sixty Brotherhood members ranging from Egypt to Iraq, the 
conference was the first attempt by the Jordanian Brotherhood to challenge the 
regime’s authority.6 The main decisions adopted at the conference were that:  
 
• Jordan was recognised as a part of the Islamic world 
• Shari$ah was reinstated as the ultimate demand of the Muslim Brotherhood  
• The question of Palestine was acknowledged as an Islamic issue; therefore, 
general mobilisation was needed to liberate it.7  
 
                                                
3 “The General Armistice Agreement between the Hashemite Jordan Kingdom and Israel. UN 
Doc S/1302/Rev.1 3 April 1949,” Security Council, April 13, 1949, accessed December 12, 
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4  Avi Shlaim, Lion of Jordan: The Life of King Hussein in War and Peace, (New York: Alfred 
A. Knopf, 2007) 46; Bickerton, Ian J., and Carla L. Klausner, A Concise History of the Arab-
Israeli Conflict, (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2002) 161-170; “The Assentation of 
King Abdullah,” Palestine Fact, 2013, accessed December 12, 2014, 
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5 “Resolution 181 (II). Future Government of Palestine” United Nations, General Assembly, 
November 27, 1947, accessed December 8, 2014, 
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6 ʻAwnī Jaddūʻ ʻUbaydī, Ṣafaḥāt min ḥayāt al-Ḥājj ʻAbd al-Laṭīf Abū Qūrah Muʼassis Jamāʻat 
al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn fī al-Urdun [Pages of the Life of Haj ʻAbd al-Laṭīf Abū Qūrah Founder 
of Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan], (Amman: Markaz Dirāsāt wa-Abḥāth al-ʻAmal al-Islāmī, 
1992) 125-126. 
7 Shmuel Bar, The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, (Tel Aviv: The Moshe Dayan Centre for 
Middle Eastern and African Studies, 1998), 20-25; Ghāzī Sāmarrāʼī, “al- Muʼtamar al-Islāmī fi 
al-Quds, 1953” [The Islamic Conference in Jerusalem, 1953], Al Raeed, Vol. 82, October 13, 
2012, accessed December 2, 2014, http://www.alraeed.net/raeedmag/preview.php?id=3605; “al-
Muʼtamar al-Islāmī al-ʻĀmm” [The General Islamic Conference], Jerusalem Conference 
Website, accessed December 12, 2013, http://goo.gl/OfmMgX.  
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 The conference was an important event for the Muslim Brotherhood as it was 
the first time for the highest leaders of the movement from all around the Islamic world 
to meet in one place, and emphasised the Palestine issue as paramount to Brotherhood 
ideology. As a result of the conference, three committees were conceived to raise 
awareness of the Palestine issue, led respectively by Amjad al-Zahawi, Muḥammad 
Mahmud al-Sawwaf, and ᶜAli al-Tantawi. By request of the conference, they travelled 
around the Islamic world, mainly to non-Arab countries such as Pakistan, Indonesia, 
and India, in order to preach the Palestinian issue, generating support from these 
external Muslim communities. In doing so, the Brotherhood created awareness not 
only for Palestine but also for itself.8 Therefore, the Brotherhood itself transcended 
regional boundaries to become recognised among these other Islamic countries as a 
transnational movement.  
 On July 20, 1951, Jordan entered a stage of instability caused by the death of 
King ᶜAbdallah I,9 followed by the abdication of his successor, King Talal, in favour of 
his son, the young Crown Prince Hussein in August 1952.10 Furthermore, in the second 
half of the 1950s, the East Bank of Jordan began to receive waves of refugees from the 
West Bank after the unification. The population’s increase in non-Jordanian 
descendants was thought to be a threat to the royalty and young King Hussein, who 
needed the political groups’ and tribes’ loyalty to prove the Hashemite monarchy after 
this Palestinian influx. However, during this time the Jordanian and Palestinian 
Brotherhoods were merging, defending religious and political values, proving its 
ability to mobilise and organise supporters during the 1948 war, and further solidified 
by the General Islamic Conference with the support the movement gained from the 
prominent politicians and scholars therein. The conference’s effects proved ever more 
relevant afterwards, once the issue of Palestine had been established as a point of 
identification for the regime and Brotherhood, potentially splitting the Brotherhood’s 
loyalty between the regime and Palestine.  
                                                
8 Ghāzī, “al- Muʼtamar al-Islāmī fi al-Quds, 1953” [The Islamic Conference in Jerusalem, 
1953]. 
9 King Hussein, “King Abdullah bin al Hussein,” accessed December 12, 2014, 
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 By the 1950s, the Muslim Brotherhood had established organisational and 
ideological consistency. The Jordanian branch shadowed the Egyptian mother 
movement in its internal structure, and Muḥammad ᶜAbd al-Rahman Khalīfah was 
appointed as al-Murāqib al-ᶜāmm [General Supervisor] of the movement. At this time, 
the Brotherhood’s general concern was managing the Palestinian refugee camps by 
providing charity and building schools, such as the al-Barr school in the ʻAqabat Jaber 
Refugee Camp, in 1956.11 The Jordanian Brotherhood also established its first 
magazine, al-Kifāḥ al-Islami [The Islamic Struggle] on August 9, 1954, edited by 
Yūsuf al-ʻAẓm.12 These developments empowered the Brotherhood and its 
involvement in Jordanian society. 
 However, in October 1953, Jordan and Israel violated the Armistice 
agreement.13 The Israeli army, led by (then) Major Ariel Sharon, attacked the Qibya 
village, northwest of Ramallah in the West Bank, which, after the unification, was 
situated on Jordanian territory. The attack, which left 69 Palestinians dead, was a 
reprisal of the Palestinian Fedayeen14 killing a woman and her two children in Yehud 
Village, east of Tel Aviv.15 In response, the Muslim Brotherhood organised a mass 
protest, the first of its kind in Jordan’s history,16 with protesters demonstrating against 
the Israeli occupation and Western imperialism. This protest was the first major 
political act of the Jordanian Brotherhood, and shifted the way the Brotherhood was 
perceived by the regime, transforming it from a religious force to a political one.17 
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 The issue of Palestine became the main issue in the relationship between the 
regime and the Brotherhood after the General Islamic Conference and the Qibya event. 
Their relations deteriorated further since the regime, in an attempt to honour its side of 
the Armistice agreement with Israel,18 did not address the attack with political action. 
Through this, the mutual trust established between the Brotherhood and regime in the 
time of King ᶜAbdallah I was undermined, and demands for the government to define 
its official stance on the Palestinian case were raised.  
 A year later, the Egyptian Brotherhood faced deteriorating relations with the 
Free Officers’ movement in Egypt. Under the accusation that the Egyptian 
Brotherhood had tried to assassinate the president, Gamal Abdel Nasser, the movement 
was banned in 1954, as stated in Chapter One.19 The Jordanian Brotherhood recognised 
the possibility of the Egypt scenario repeating in Jordan. Therefore, in order to protect 
itself and support their Brothers in Egypt, the Jordanian Brotherhood participated in a 
public conference devoted to the Egyptian Brotherhood, held in Damascus, March 
1954. In this official gathering, the General Supervisor, Khalīfah, stated that 
revolutions might break out in some Arab countries as a result of repression. He also 
criticised the pro-Western policies of some countries, referring specifically to Jordan.20 
Furthermore, the Syrian General Supervisor, Mustafa al-Sibaᶜi, made an even stronger 
statement, criticising the Anglo-Jordanian treaty21 and the Jordanian army who refused 
to arm refugees to fight on the borders with Israel during the clash.22 
 The Qibya event could have led to another conflict between Palestine and 
Israel, and was therefore the new King Hussein’s first test, creating a focal point for his 
relations with the Brotherhood. In defence of the British Army’s non-intervention, Sir 
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John Baggot Glubb (Glubb Pasha)23 wrote that it was impossible to protect the whole 
country: “there is half a million refugees … and a border nearly 100 miles long”, thus 
they could not monitor all the borders and the movement of the Palestinians.24 
However, to diffuse the tensions of anti-British sentiment in Jordan, King Hussein 
dismissed British officers, such as the Brigadier Teal Ashton of the West Bank.25  
 Within the context of a pre-arranged protest against alcohol consumption at 
Deir Alla agricultural project in June 1954, the Brotherhood took the opportunity to 
express their disapproval of the King and British army’s treatment of the Qibya event. 
In addition to their call to close the agricultural project, they raised the slogan, ‘Down 
with Glubb Pasha,’26 calling for the intensification of the Jordanian army’s 
Arabisation.27 
 The government was forced to acknowledge the Brotherhood in this matter, 
but rather than succumb to their demands, Prime Minister Tawfik abū al-Huda instead 
did not allow the movement to hold a second Islamic conference in Jordan, following 
the Damascene one earlier that year. In July 1954, Ḥasan Huḍaybī, the second 
Supreme Guide, visited Jordan to campaign for solidarity with the Egyptian 
Brotherhood against Nasser’s aggression, however the conference had to be held again 
in Damascus instead.  
 Furthermore, abū al-Huda's cabinet took another step in challenging the 
Brotherhood when a warrant was issued to imprison leader Khalīfah during his trip to 
Syria.28 The government's main objective was to change the structure of the movement 
before it became more conservative. The Brotherhood had no choice but to acquiesce, 
replacing Khalīfah with the less politically conservative General Supervisor, in order to 
avoid the arrest of members, as seen in Egypt. With a new leadership, a considerable 
shift in the Executive Bureau’s attitude towards the regime was witnessed, with the 
Brotherhood’s new leadership showing a new loyalty for the regime. 
 However, soon after the arrest warrant for Khalīfah was cancelled due to the 
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intervention of the Iraqi Brotherhood's leader, Muḥammad Maḥmūd Ṣawwāf, and the 
i, who persuaded the King to grant Khalīfah the right to return to Jordan.29 The series 
of actions taken by the Jordanian regime were meant not only to smother the Muslim 
Brotherhood, but also to strengthen the regime’s control over the country, as the 
growing popularity of political parties was seen as a threat to the young King, who had 
just turned 21.  
 The situation in Jordan was no different from the political situation elsewhere 
in the region. The growing popularity of Nasser's pan-Arabism and new regional 
agreements, such as the Anglo-Egyptian agreement of July 1954, impacted on regional 
politics. This treaty, which ended 73 years of British military presence in Egyptian 
territory,30 was followed by the Baghdad Pact:31 the alliance between the United 
Kingdom and regional participants established in 1955 to resist Communist influence 
in the Middle East.32 These regional events led to increasingly conservative internal 
policies within Jordan. The reformist path was introduced by King Talal and followed 
by King Hussein through the 1952 constitution,33 which states that Jordan’s system of 
government is parliamentary with a hereditary monarchy. This allowed political parties 
including the Brotherhood to enter politics, but was, however, soon after replaced by 
the enforcement of security procedures, adopted in response to the military coup in 
Egypt, Nasserism, and the growing power of political parties within the country.  
 
 
2.0.1 Ḥizb al-Taḥrīr 
 
Whilst establishing its political backbone, the Jordanian Brotherhood tried to 
distinguish itself from other Islamist groups and theologies, such as Hizb Al-Taḥrīr 
[The Liberation Party],34 which was established in 1953 by Sheikh Taki al-Din al-
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Nabhani, who had close relations with the Muslim Brotherhood.35 The Brotherhood 
and al-Nabhani’s organisation coincided ideologically regarding the centrality of the 
Palestinian case, and the importance of establishing an Islamic state. However, al-
Banna and al-Nabhani disagreed on the best way to create an Islamic state. Al-
Nabhani’s methodology consisted of three stages:  
 
• The formation of underground activist groups and the mobilisation of 
supporters 
• Muslims take over the regime 
• Apply Islamic laws and rules, or Islamisation.36 
 
 The Taḥrīr Party called this a ‘winning strategy’ under which they would 
successfully establish an Islamic caliphate. As outlined, the strategy relies on creating 
loyal followers in the army – due to the soldiers’ ability to initiate a coup – and change 
state policy in order to ensure the return of the caliphate. Though most of the party 
leaders were either from Jordan or Palestine, the movement affirmed that Jordan is 
neither very suitable to apply the caliphate on itself, nor a suitable base for establishing 
it in other states.37 This suggests that the party was looking for a more Islamic country 
with a stronger army and position among Islamic countries such as Saudi Arabia, 
Syria, or Egypt to implement their plan.   
 In 1952, al-Nabhani’s group appealed to be legally recognised as a political 
party. This request was rejected on account of the group’s undisguised opposition of 
the ruling system and its strict religious ideology, which could have created tension 
among Jordanians.38 
 Despite Brotherhood ideology being founded on al-Banna’s theory of gradual 
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change, the Taḥrīr Party attracted some Qutbists in the beginning of its establishment. 
However, the Taḥrīr Party’s extreme understanding of change, which lacked a 
theoretical foundation and scholarly implementation of societal and Islamic change, 
caused the Brotherhood to distance itself. At the same time, the Brotherhood’s ideas 
were beginning to develop at the hands of Qutb’s powerful literature in the 1950s such 
as Social Justice in Islam,39 al-Mustaqbal li-Hāthā al-Dīn [The Future of this 
Religion],40 and The Battle of Islam and Capitalism.41 This meant the Taḥrīr party 
adopted Qutb’s ideas as a theoretical framework to establish their plan of change rather 
than building a theoretical framework for itself, which differentiated the party from the 
Brotherhood.  
 
 
2.0.2  The Baghdad Pact 
 
In the 1950s the Middle East experienced a wave of divisions between the Soviet-led 
East and US-led West. Egypt participated in the 1955 Bandung Conference in 
Indonesia, held by the so-called ‘non-aligned’ states of Asia and Africa, most of which 
were newly independent of their former colonial authorities.42 However, Egypt 
reoriented the balance of the Middle East’s non-aligned states when it signed an arms 
trade agreement with Czechoslovakia in the same year worth $250 million.43 Nasser’s 
decision to buy weapons from the Eastern bloc was due to the Tripartite Agreement of 
1950 disallowing the sale of weapons to Egypt, which could be used in the Arab-Israeli 
conflict.44 The strengthening of the Soviets in the Middle East directly threatened the 
Western bloc’s influence and its enforced balance between Arabs and Israelis, and as a 
consequence, the UK established the Central Treaty Organisation, commonly known as 
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the ‘The Baghdad Pact’, in 1955 with alliances in Middle Eastern countries such as 
Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey, to prevent Soviet expansion in the Middle East. 
Jordan found itself pressured by the UK to join the Baghdad Pact.45 
 Jordanian officials declared their intention to join the Pact, despite it being 
unpopular among Jordanians,46 and the King appointed abū al-Huda, Saʻīd al-Mufti 
and Haza’a al-Majali as Prime Ministers between May 1954 and December 1955, to 
endorse the Baghdad Pact, however, they resigned within days or months due to 
Jordanian citizens’ rejection of their intentions.47  
 With a lack of representation, protesters had taken to the streets, setting fire to 
ministries and the American Center of Culture, leading al-Majali to call on the 
Jordanian army to intervene,48 which resulted in two hundred injured protesters, 
leaving ten dead.49 In order to calm tensions, the King appointed Ibrahim Hashem as 
Prime Minister solely to organise elections, offering the protesters a chance for 
representation.50 Hashem accordingly ensured in his governmental statement that his 
government had no right to intervene in politics or the signing of treaties, however, this 
had little effect and when he decided to delay the election of 1956 riots broke out again 
and the King replaced him with Samir al-Rifaᶜi. 
 However, due to the continuous anger in the streets, al-Mufti, followed by 
Hashem, returned to Cabinet to supervise the 1956 election process, ensuring that the 
election would take place, and the signing of the Baghdad Pact would not. The riots 
against the Baghdad Pact were unprecedented in Jordan’s history, and the confusion in 
dealing with them led to the formulation of seven of the shortest governments in 
Jordan’s history, between May 4, 1955, and October 28, 1956. 
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Prime Minster Beginning End Duration 
Tawfik abū al-Huda  May 4, 1954 May 29, 1955 25 days  
Saʻīd al-Mufti May 30, 1955 Dec 14, 1955 6 months, 14 days 
Haza’a al-Majali Dec 15, 1955 Dec 20, 1955 5 days 
Ibrahim Hashem Dec 21, 1955 Jan 7, 1956 17 days 
Samir al-Rifaᶜi Jan 8, 1956  May 21, 1956 4 months, 13 days  
Saʻīd al-Mufti May 22, 1956 Jun 30, 1956 8 days 
Ibrahim Hashem Jul, 1, 1956 Oct 28, 1956 3 months, 27 days 
Table 1: Duration of Seven Jordanian Governments, 1954 – 195651  
 
 The changes in the country led the Brotherhood to change the way they 
perceived the regime and their existing alliances with the monarchy since its 
establishment. The movement decided to join the Nationalists and Leftists’ block. The 
Leftists comprises,52 al-Ḥizb al-Waṭanī al-Ishtirākī [The National Socialist Party], al-
Ḥizb al-Shuyūʻi al-Urdunnī / al-Jabhah al-Waṭanīyah [Communist Party / National 
ath Party], in protest of the Baghdad Pact.53  
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 However, joining the Baghdad Pact was considered a betrayal against Arab 
nationalism for the Leftists, Nationalists, and the Brotherhood, as it provided the West 
with a stronger role in the region. Further, due to Nasser (the main advocate of 
Arabism) refusing to sign the Pact, and his cooperation with the Soviet Union instead 
of the West, the Brotherhood’s alliance with the Leftist and Nationalist parties can be 
argued to be the first instance of the Brotherhood prioritising national goals over their 
religious objectives. This collaboration between the Brotherhood and Leftists in Jordan 
intensified when they adopted the same agenda against Westernisation. Protests against 
the Baghdad Pact turned into riots against Western institutions in general, as seen with 
attacks on the American Quaker project in ‘Ayn Dibbin,54 and the Christian Baptist 
Hospital in ‘Ajlun on January 9 and 12, 1956.55 
  Under these conditions, the King informed British representatives that joining 
the Pact had become impossible due to disturbances in the country. This decision was 
not easy, as opposing the Pact meant the possibility of losing financial aid from the 
British Government.56  
 With the rise of Nasserist popularity, followed by the Nationalists, the regime 
and the Brotherhood united forces. Again, the movement was considered loyal to the 
regime’s powers, recommencing their previous alliance with King ᶜAbdallah I. 
Therefore, when preparing for the 1956 parliamentary elections, the government 
introduced new legislative guidance for the national Islamic institutions that included 
instructions on how to express support to the royalty during the Friday prayers. New 
legislation was used to forbid Islamic preaching of any kind inside mosques without 
governmental license stating who was teaching and what kind of teaching was going to 
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take place. According to this law, using mosques for political agitation could be 
punished by fines or imprisonment if without a licence.57 This new legislation became 
the government’s foundation for breaking down the Taḥrīr Party, as the government 
would not permit the party to a licence.58  
 Excluding the Taḥrīr Party members’ individual participation in elections, the 
party as a whole was not permitted the legal political legitimacy by the government to 
join the election or Friday preaching, unlike the Brotherhood, who believed in the 
regime’s legitimacy, and approved of the state’s degree of recognition for Islam, which 
held the possibility for further Islamisation. Although the Brotherhood represented an 
opposition to the regime at grass-roots levels, as seen in their solidarity with the 
banned Egyptian Brotherhood and their participation in the Baghdad Pact riots, the 
movement was ultimately seen as a loyal opposition, identifying that their criticisms, in 
contrast to the Taḥrīr Party, centred around the regime’s relations with the West, not 
the regime or its powers. Therefore, as its relation with the regime improved, the 
Brotherhood distanced itself further from the Taḥrīr Party. 
 The Taḥrīr Party did not believe in the regime’s legitimacy, or its will to apply 
Islam in politics, and considered Jordan to be un-Islamic. Due to this opposition, new 
legislation was introduced leading to the dismissal of the party and arrest of its 
members, with its leader al-Nabhani voluntarily exiled to Lebanon in preparation for 
the 1956 elections.59 Abolishing the Taḥrīr Party could be considered a strategic step 
to repair relations between the government and the Brotherhood, as after it was 
dismantled, the Brotherhood remained the only Islamic movement in the 1956 election, 
thus empowering its campaign.   
 At this stage, the Muslim Brotherhood successfully mobilised civilians to 
protest, proving its ability to practice politics in a new capacity. Furthermore, its ability 
to cooperate with other political parties was shown in its coordination with the Leftists 
to serve their national goal of minimising Westernisation in Jordan, as seen through 
opposition to the Baghdad Pact. This also proved that the movement’s religious and 
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national agendas may not necessarily contradict one another and that the moderate 
position of the organisation’s political goals in an Islamic state was possible to adopt 
and apply. The Brotherhood made it possible to cooperate with the Jordanian regime 
and was able to participate in the 1956 elections. 
 The period between April 1955 and October 1956 presents pragmatic, political 
developments for the Muslim Brotherhood, moving their alliance with the Leftist and 
Nationalist parties to the regime, which they had renewed common interests with. 
Their participation in politics was not only seen in the form of protest, but also in their 
being an important actor in the regime vs. Leftist dilemma. In contrast to the Taḥrīr 
Party, they adopted a moderate discourse, accepting the state’s application of Islam and 
the regime’s authority over the country, making them a tool for the regime against the 
Leftists. However, this proximity to the regime did not mean that the Brotherhood was 
in full acceptance of King Hussein’s monarchy. Abū Fāris described this, saying: 
 
The stance that the movement takes may meet with some of the regime’s stance, 
however they should know that this closeness does not mean recognition and loyalty 
come without adequate application of Islam, because loyalty is a matter of belief, 
given only to God and His messengers.60 
 
 Therefore, the Muslim Brotherhood’s pragmatism comes from their 
development in adapting within Jordanian society, both in their belief and their 
mission. Therein, they successfully positioned themselves within the regime, adapting 
their ideology to the regime.  
 
 
2.1 Participation in Elections (1956)  
Although King Hussein agreed with the UK that Jordan would allow elections as part 
of a democratic process in return for the British Army’s departure from Jordan,61 he 
also thought that establishing parliamentarian life would put an end to the Baghdad 
Pact riots, and bring back the Leftists and Muslim Brotherhood, who had participated 
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in the riots, and thus stabilise the country.  
 In the 1956 election, Jordan saw the emergence of Leftist and Nationalist 
parties, Islamic parties, and pro-regime parties including the conservative right-wing, 
Ḥizb al-Ummah [The Nation Party] and al-Ḥizb al-ʻArabī al-Dustūrī [The Arab 
Constitutional Party].62 
 The Brotherhood entered the election with five candidates, four of which 
represented the East Bank and only one candidate for the West Bank. The 
Brotherhood’s manifesto included the cancellation of the Anglo-Jordanian treaty; the 
acceptance of financial aid from Arab states rather than the UK; the resistance of 
conciliation, settlements, and creating individual solutions to protect Palestine; and the 
enhancement of Jordan's military while continuing the Arabisation process.63 
 With a similar agenda, the Leftists, as led by the National Socialist Party, 
entered the elections demanding the replacement of British subsidy with Arab aid; the 
termination of the Anglo-Jordanian treaty; the recognition of Israel as an illegal state; 
the establishment of diplomatic relations with Communist states; and an extension to 
women’s political rights.64  
 Being permitted to participate in the election meant that the Brotherhood 
would also enter into political life. However, in facing this opportunity, the movement 
found itself with several internal dilemmas, such as questioning its role in society – 
whether it was advocating Islam by building hospitals, schools and other social 
institutions through the association’s charity work – or, if it was an initiative for 
reforming the society. Choosing the latter as a priority, its main goal is to re-establish 
society on Islamic terms and Qurᵓanic teachings. Therefore, the Jordanian Brotherhood 
considered the parliamentary elections a tool for launching social reforms and applying 
Islamic rules. In other words, it was a chance to implement an Islamic social order 
across Islamic lands, as per al-Banna’s ideology. 
 Secondly, the question of participation divided the Jordanian Brotherhood into 
two ideological groups: followers of al-Banna and followers of Qutb. Al-Banna 
acknowledged the urgent need for the Brotherhood, who risked being outlawed, to take 
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part in the election in his “Risālat al-Intikhābāt” [Election Letter], reasoning that 
parliament was a “lung that [would] allow the Brotherhood to breathe.”65 The group 
also referred to the decision declared at the Muslim Brotherhood’s sixth conference in 
1941, in which the Guidance Council granted permission to participate in the national 
election, in order to implement their goals.66  
 In “Risālat al-Intikhābāt,” al-Banna presents a framework for the 
Brotherhood’s participation, however, in the letter he reminds the reader that in the two 
times that the Brotherhood participated in previous Egyptian elections, it entered with 
just two and six candidates, demonstrating that the purpose of participation was not 
political dominion, but rather inclusion and reassurance that it was spreading the 
Brotherhood’s Islamic agenda gradually. This presented an ethical approach, which 
was a more desirable path for members of the Brotherhood. Therefore, the al-Bannaist 
group in Jordan prioritised political participation within the political system based on 
the founder’s teachings.  
 However, the Brotherhood was also influenced by Qutb ideology, which 
regarded Jordan as an unviable and illegitimate entity, whose only redeeming political 
value was its potential as a base for the struggle against Israel.67 This led many 
representatives of the Qutb group to favour non-participation in these elections, 
arguing that Jordan was not a model in which to apply Islamic rules.68  
 Perhaps the best example of Qutb’s opinion on elections is in his book, Li-
Mādhā Aʻdamūnī [Why they Executed Me], where he commented on an election by 
saying: 
 
Establishing Islamic ruling in any country will not come by these methods [elections] 
and it will not happen but by a slow and long-term approach, targeting the base, not 
the summit [of involvement], and starts from re-planting the religion.69 
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 The difference between al-Banna and Qutb is that al-Banna presents elections 
as an essential way to create Islamic change, bringing Islam to the political system 
gently and proving the role of the Brotherhood. He looks to the possibility of working 
from the top down, changing the leadership as well as working at a grass-roots level. 
However, as outlined above, Qutb rejects the idea of elections, stating that change 
would be established from the ground up, reinstalling people’s faith as a foundation of 
such change.  
 This clash has appeared in the leadership of the movement since 1954, leading 
the Qutbist leader, abū Qura to resign in favour of the al-Bannaist leader, Khalīfah, 
who became the new General Supervisor. Abū Qura’s opinion that the parliamentarian 
path of the organisation was a farce and that such participation would not lead to the 
application of Shariᶜah, considering the share of seats the Brotherhood might win. 
However, this argument failed in the face of al-Banna’s group, who led the Jordanian 
Brotherhood into the elections.70 
 Additionally, there was influence from the Taḥrīr Party, which decided to join 
the elections as independent candidates after being banned as a whole in 1956. The 
Taḥrīr Party’s involvement could have reduced the Brotherhood’s Islamic presence, 
since the two parties shared the same religious background, and the Brotherhood did 
not want the Taḥrīr Party to increase its popularity at their expense. The Brotherhood 
decided to enter the elections as independent candidates and not as a political party 
opposing the Taḥrīr and Leftist parties, taking a progressive step towards political life. 
 Therefore, on October 21, 1956, Jordan witnessed its first elections where 
multiple parties were able to join, rather than independent candidates only. One 
hundred and forty four candidates participated in the elections to compete for 40 seats, 
with 74 candidates belonging to political parties, and 70 independent candidates. The 
ath Party: one, and Independent: five) and the Brotherhood gained four seats out of the 
five candidates who participated. 
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Party East Bank 
Candidates 
West Bank 
Candidates 
Seats won 
Ummah 
- - 0 
National Front 3 6 3 
National Socialist Party 7 8 11 
Independents 38 32 11 
Arab Constitutional Party 10 4 8 
Muslim Brotherhood 4 1 4 
ath Party 6 9 2 
Liberal Party  - - 1 
Total 68 60 40 
Table 2: Allocation of Seats in 1956 Elections71 
 
 According to the Constitution, the party who wins the elections is granted the 
right to appoint the Prime Minister, however, no party or block gained a majority that 
would allow it to do so. Therefore, the National Socialist Party nominated its leader, 
Sulaymān al-Nābulusī, for Prime Minster as they received the biggest share of seats, 
despite losing in his district. 
 Al-Nābulusī appointed eleven ministries, seven representing the National 
Socialist Party: Abd al-Halim al-Nimr, Anwar al-Khatib, Shafik Irshaidat, Naeem abd 
al-Hadi, Salah Toukan, Salah Maʻshar, and himself. The Baᶜath Party was represented 
by ᶜAbdallah Rimawi along with three other independents: Șāliḥ al-Majali, Daoud 
Samʻān and ʻAbd al-Qādir al-Ṣāliḥ.72 
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 When al-Nābulusī was appointed Prime Minister, the Brotherhood found itself 
with a new dilemma: the new Prime Minister’s affiliations with the neighbouring 
countries ruled by Nationalists that were counted on the Soviet Bloc, such as Syria, 
ath Party and some independents opposing the Baghdad Pact were favoured by the 
Brotherhood, but not in terms of their relations with Nasser due to his clash with the 
Brotherhood in Egypt.73 Therefore, the decision was made in parliament to oppose al-
Nābulusī’s Leftist government, in fear he would follow Nasser’s steps against the 
Brotherhood in Jordan. To gain support, al-Nābulusī offered the Brothers the 
opportunity to enter his government, but this was declined.74  
 The parliament’s main achievement in 1956 was the cancelation of the Anglo-
Jordanian Treaty, which was a united goal for all political groups.75 Following the 
cancelation of the treaty, the differences between the Brotherhood and the Leftists 
widened. For example, in the three days the government dedicated to celebrating the 
end of this treaty (March 14 - 16), clashes occurred between the Leftists and the 
Brotherhood, in which gunfire was exchanged after the Leftists raised pictures of 
Nasser, and many were wounded.76  
 Despite the Brotherhood accepting some socialist values, there is still a 
significant disagreement of how they view the state, whether in a secularist or Islamic 
context. Leftists and Nationalists want to see Jordan as a secular socialist state, while 
the Brotherhood sees Jordan as a future Islamic state. Therefore, despite their 
commonalities in the 1950s, the two movements still conflict over the others’ 
understanding of religion in state reform. The Leftists issued the logo, ‘Socialism is the 
Solution’ for political reform and the Muslim Brotherhood responded by raising the 
logo, ‘al-Islam huwa al-Hall’ [Islam is the Solution].77  
 Jordan promptly saw a clash escalate between the King and the new 
government regarding Soviet influence in the country. The King issued a letter on 
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February 2, 1957 to the Prime Minister, denouncing Communism in Jordan. The King 
further expressed his concerns regarding the Soviet’s infiltration of government staff: 
 
The Present Cold War between the two world blocs has brought to our country certain 
principles and imperialism, which is about to die in the Arab East, will be replaced by 
a new kind of imperialism… No gap must be left to allow the propaganda of 
communism to ruin our country… We hope that you and your colleagues, the 
ministers, will adopt an attitude which ensures the interests of this county and stops the 
propaganda and agitation of those who want to infiltrate through to the ranks of the 
citizens.78 
 
 The King’s alarm over communism was related to his fear of Leftist and 
Nationalist ‘traitors’ within the government, such as Minister of Justice and Education, 
Shafiq Rusheidat, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, ᶜAbullah Rimawi, and the 
Chief of Staff, Ali abū Nuwar who had assumed Glubb Pasha’s role after he was 
dismissed, and had once been “a close friend” of King Hussein.79 Furthermore, King 
Hussein was alerted to the possibility of these personalities’ loyalty being 
compromised by external players,80 and was reaching a defensive stage where he felt 
his monarch was threatened in the face of al-Nābulusī’s growing confidence and 
alliances with the Soviets and Egypt, especially without the British mediation brought 
by Glubb Pasha. The King’s growing caution stressed the al-Nābulusī’ government 
and in response, Nationalist and Leftist parties united their powers in parliament to 
pass a decision on April 3 that pushed for the establishment of diplomatic relations 
with Russia.81 The King took no step to over-rule their decision,82 rather adopting a 
“waiting game”.83 
 The al-Nābulusī government later provided the King with a list of rejected 
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personnel on April 7, including the Director-General of Security.84 Three days later the 
King dissolved the government. At this point, the Brotherhood furthered its support for 
the regime against the Leftists by supporting Ḥusayn Fakhri al-Khalidī as a Prime 
Minster along with the Arab Constitutional Party and the independent tribal 
parliamentarians, making the Brotherhood closer to the right-wing loyalists.85  
 Using the conflict between al-Nābulusī and the King in the stress of the 
environment, the army General, Ali abū Nuwar, made a coup attempt on April 13 
through a Zarqa unit, led by those calling themselves ‘Free Army Officers,’86 and 
drawing close similarities to Nasser's coup in Egypt.87, The Free Officers believed in 
Nasser's idea of the United Arab Republic (U.A.R.) and with this in mind, it was stated 
that Jordan must become a republic to be able to unite with the other Arab countries. 
However, the situation was diffused when the King intervened after seeing that his 
fears were being realised, regaining control and sending the dissenters to trial. King 
Hussein recounts the event in his biography with: 
 
We had reached a stage when many officers and politicians did not really know where 
they were going. Some were genuinely nationalist but felt that Jordan was too small to 
stand-alone. Some decided to offer themselves to other Arab states, which in fact 
means offering their services, in most instances, to communism. Thus, our once 
efficient Army began to deteriorate. Soon it was composed of differing factions, each 
with its own political beliefs.88 
 
 However, al-Nābulusī was not associated officially with the situation, and to 
diminish the idea that the Communists had had a footing in government, or had 
conspired to make a coup, the ex-Prime Minister was reassigned within days in the 
new Ḥusayn Fakhri al-Khalidī government as Minister of Foreign Affairs.89 The 
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arrangement lasted for little over a week, from April 15 to 23, continuing the pattern of 
unstable and short Jordanian governments during this time.90 
 On April 24, 1957, protests in support of the Leftists took place in Amman.91 
Feeling threatened by the continued popularity for al-Nābulusī, and the possibility of 
the protests turning into riots in the West Bank where the Leftists convened, the King 
resigned al-Khalidī and appointed Ibrahim Hashem. The new Prime Minister did not 
ease the stress in the streets, however, which led the King to impose emergency law 
and an immediate curfew on April 25, dissolving parliament and banning all political 
parties.  
 The Leftist parties met in Nablus on the West Bank to oppose the King’s 
decision. A letter was sent reminding him that the King reigns but does not rule. Leftist 
leaders addressed the King with their demand for him to respect the constitution, which 
states that the prime minister is to be appointed by the winning party.  
 The event of April 24, 1957 is very similar to the 1955 Baghdad Pact riots, 
when Communists led the streets against imperialism. However, the support of the 
Brotherhood in the Baghdad Pact guaranteed a wider acceptance for Communists and 
both were able to avoid Jordan from participating in that treaty and moved the country 
towards democratisation, launching the 1956 election. However, the alliances map 
changed in Jordan after the Muslim Brotherhood resumed relations with the regime. 
Therefore, the Brotherhood armed its followers in the West Bank to face the Leftists 
and to help the regime enforce control over the area, helping the security forces in 
searching for Communists. Reinforced by the Brotherhood’s active support, the King’s 
power over the two banks was demonstrated, and effectively made the Brotherhood a 
vital limb of the Jordanian regime.92 
 Abū Fāris expressed fear from the Leftists by saying that the Free Officer 
movement was gaining support from the Egyptian regime, cautioning that if they came 
to power they would follow Nasser’s steps in fighting the Muslim Brotherhood.93 
Therefore, the Brotherhood had a cause to serve the King’s interests over the 
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Leftists’.94 In the latter half of the fifties the two trends of the Muslim Brotherhood – 
al-Bannaist and Qutbist – began to appear ever more distinct, however, to avoid the on-
going problems with the Brotherhood regionally, as seen with Nasser banning the 
Egyptian Brotherhood, the two wings of the Jordanian Brotherhood united. Fear of the 
Leftists monopolising the Palestinian resistance caused both wings of the Brotherhood 
to favour the regime, especially due to past ties with King ᶜAbdallah I, and mutual 
participation in the 1948 war. 
 Therefore, at this stage the movement was moving as one front with a unified 
decision, however, the support demonstrated for the regime was not for the regime 
only, but was rather built on past loyalty, which presented an in-road for the 
Brotherhood’s prerequisite to balance Palestinian support, which ensures their 
existence in Jordan. Furthermore, in the same year, 1956, when the Brotherhood was 
taking place in the Jordanian parliament, the mother movement in Egypt was being 
suppressed by the Nasser regime. This inalienable fact cannot be overlooked when 
observing the Jordanian Brotherhood and Jordanian Leftists/Nationalists’ dynamic, as 
it demonstrates the Brotherhood’s vulnerability to Leftist and Nationalist agendas, 
which did not hide its support for Nasser and pan-Arabist ideology at the expense of 
the Brotherhood movement.  
 Despite these clashes, the al-Nābulusī government could be considered the 
most progressive period in the history of Jordan due to his impact on democratisation 
and willingness to cooperate with the parliament in order to adopt new legislation. 
New laws passed under this government included those regarding Political Parties, 
Publication, Preaching and Guidance, Municipality, plus Bedouin supervision 
guidelines, and amendments to the Defence Act and Electoral Law.95 In addition he 
insisted on the cancellation of the Anglo-Jordanian treaty and managed to attract 
financial assistance from Arab countries including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Syria, as 
alternatives to British aid.96  
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 Additionally, the Arab Solidarity Agreement was signed in 1957 to strengthen 
regional cooperation.97 After the failure of the coup attempt, the majority of the 
Leftists were imprisoned. The King also changed the constitution without any 
parliamentarian approval or supervision to end the first democratic experience in the 
country. Furthermore, the King rewarded the Brotherhood by allowing it to continue 
operating in the country despite the ban of political parties in 1957, on the basis that 
they were considered a religious entity and not a political one.98 The Brotherhood, 
therefore, continued to act as an ideological, but generally loyal, opposition to the 
regime.99 
 In this period, the Muslim Brotherhood was keen to build an educational basis 
for the movement, which comes from their belief in the importance of education. 
Therefore, the Brotherhood’s first social activities began by building the Islamic 
Scientific College in 1947, along with many schools and colleges around the country. 
They also established the pillar of their social welfare system, the Jamʻīyat al-Markaz 
al-Islāmī [Islamic Centre Society], in 1963, along with the Islamic Hospital and other 
medical centres, in addition to mosques. Thus, the 1950s and 1960s reflected the 
introduction of the Muslim Brotherhood to Jordanian society and its growth in 
popularity.100 
 
 
2.2  Palestinian Forces and the 1967 War  
 
The question of Palestine in Jordan was raised again in the 1960s as their largest 
representatives and advocates, Leftists and Nationalists, were now isolated from the 
Jordanian political scene. Primary Jordanian political actors supported the regime’s 
security measures under the Emergency Law and the Muslim Brotherhood became the 
only group allowed to participate in politics after the prohibition of political parties in 
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1957. The problem of Palestine remained a pivotal issue in Jordanian politics, 
especially once the West Bank was considered part of Jordanian territory and its 
residents held Jordanian citizenship following unification. 
 Furthermore, the Palestinian issue was strengthened by Nasser’s call for the 
Arab League Summit to be held in Cairo in 1964. The main objectives of the 
conference were to elaborate upon common principles for Arab countries regarding 
Israel and to discuss the issue of water distribution in the region.101 However, the 
Palestinian question became a sticking point for this gathering. Nasser defended the 
idea that Palestine should be represented as a separate entity, which corresponded with 
his general approach towards pan-Arabism and his support of liberation movements. 
However, Jordan, after the unification, remained the sole representative of the West 
Bank.102 This quandary was especially problematic for the Jordanian Brotherhood, 
whose leadership was caught between Palestinian liberation and the Brotherhood 
benefiting from Jordanian Government support. Nevertheless, the Arab league made a 
decision to authorise the establishment of the Palestinian entity and appointed Ahmad 
al-Shukeiri to initiate contacts between Palestinians and other Arab countries.103 
 At the outset of the Summit, the Jordanian authority was forced to declare its 
position on Palestine. Even though King Hussein defended the idea that the West Bank 
must be controlled by Jordan to avoid Israeli occupation that would threaten the 
security of the whole region, he was forced to surrender to al-Shukeiri and Nasser.104 
As a result, the Jordanian army withdrew from the territory and the Jordanian authority 
repealed tax collection from the West Bank’s inhabitants to make way for the 
Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO). Inspired by the Nasser initiative to 
coordinate Palestinian actions against Zionism, the PLO became more influential in the 
Palestinian territories that Jordan had relinquished.105 King Hussein, in order to show 
his consent with Nasser and the Arab League, took part in the opening of the 
Palestinian National Council Conference on June 2, 1964 resulting in the declaration of 
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the PLO charter.106 
 The Jordanian Brotherhood debated their involvement in the fight for influence 
over Palestine. On the one hand, as argued by Raḥīl al-Gharāybah, “the Brotherhood 
perceived Palestine as one of its core ideological stands: the unity between Jordan and 
Palestine was considered to be the first step towards unification of the Ummah.”107  
 On the other hand, Muslim Brotherhood leaders did not want to lose the 
privileges gained from the regime, seen especially after supporting it against the 
Leftists. The position of the Brotherhood in this issue was also challenged by the 
members of Palestinian descent, for whom a Palestinian entity was seen as a more 
desirable outcome than the citizenship they had been granted in Jordan. The Jordanian 
Brotherhood, represented by Ali Hawamdeh, participated in the discussions with Qutb 
in Cairo. Qutb proposed that the Brotherhood should not join forces with Fateh in the 
PLO. He said, “It’s not for [the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood] or for our current 
time”.108 Even though the PLO was partially formed by Brotherhood members such as 
Khalil al-Wazir and Slah Kahlaf, who participated in the Brotherhood troops’ war in 
1948, the organisation was considered nationalistic with political standpoints, and not 
religious like the Muslim Brotherhood. Therefore, from the very beginning 
Brotherhood members were cautious in their participation in these public debates.109 
 Al-Wazir and Slah Kahlaf are also leaders of the Fateh movement, which was 
established on January 1, 1965 as a political party, though it has existed as political 
movement since 1959 when Yasser Arafat and al-Wazir began publishing the 
newspaper “Filasṭīnunā” [Our Palestine].110 This new group represented an alternative 
approach to the Palestinian issue, succeeding in prioritising a nationalist standpoint 
over other ideological, religious, or tribal considerations. The unification of 
Palestinians and the liberation of the Palestinian people were stated as its main 
objectives.  
 However, these considerations did not prevent the Brotherhood from 
recognising and supporting the PLO in 1964, and its first chairman, Ahmad al-
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Shukeiri, becoming the leading representative of the Palestinians.111 Nevertheless, 
when al-Shukeiri chose the Leftists over the Brotherhood in the executive committee 
of the PLO, its relations with the Brotherhood disintegrated.112 
 Due to demonstrations that broke out in Jordan as a consequence of Nasser’s 
execution of Qutb and other Brotherhood leaders in Egypt on August 29, 1966,113 the 
King welcomed the Egyptian and Syrian Brotherhood who were exiled by their 
regimes, reversing any possible improvements of relations between Jordan and 
Egypt.114 As a counterbalance, the Jordanian Brotherhood participated again in the 
1967 elections to show good intentions and good relations with the regime. However, 
three Brotherhood representatives were elected out of forty seats, and General 
Supervisor ᶜAbd al-Rahman Khalīfah lost his seat.115 It was ironic that the Brotherhood 
did not gain an advantage in this election in the absence of Leftist and Nationalist 
competition. In fact, their gaining three seats from forty was one seat less than the 1956 
election against the Leftist parties. It was the rise of Fateh in Jordan that diminished 
the Brotherhood’s popularity, as they assumed Palestinian representation, which had 
been the main source of the Brotherhood’s vote. This fall in Brotherhood popularity 
was the first sign that a new organisation was taking place in Jordan, filling the void of 
the Nationalists and Leftists.  
 In June 1967, when Egypt, Syria, and Jordan were engaged in war with Israel, 
the Brotherhood did not have the same freedom to participate in military events as it 
did in the 1948 war. The beginning of 1967 showed sporadic clashes of artillery 
between the Israeli and Syrian armies and Israelis and Palestinians infiltrating each 
other’s territories for minor attacks. However, on April 7, Israel shot down six Syrian 
aircrafts, escalating the conflict into war.116 This led the Israeli army to intervene in 
Jordan, which was later deplored by the UN Security Council. Israel continued to carry 
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out a pre-emptive air force attack against Egypt. Within six days, Israel won the war 
seizing control over the Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank, East Jerusalem 
and the Golan Heights.117 
 
 
Image 2: Map of the Levant, Pre and Post 1967 War118  
 
 The Jordanian Brotherhood entered the war through the PLO under Fateh 
leadership, having established four bases to engage in the conflict. Three Brotherhood 
al-Shuyūkh resistance bases were formed in Jordan during the war, fighting side-by-
side with the Fateh bases. One of the main brigades representing the Brotherhood in 
this war was Bayt al-Maqdis led by ᶜAbdallah ᶜAzzām, and camped in the village 
Rufaydah, Jordan.119, This base became known after the battle of al-Ḥizām al-Akhḍar 
[The Green Belt] in al-Ghor [the Jordan Valley].120 In describing the nature of the al-
Shuyūkh bases al-Mashūkhī said: 
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My position within al-Shuyūkh was Management Unit Officer. The name al-Shuyūkh 
is a term we were given by the villagers and the inhabitants of the areas around the 
bases [Jordan Valley], and comes from the word Shaykh [leadership of religious 
background].121 We received this name due to the nature of the Brotherhood in these 
bases, whose members are committed religiously and ethically. We treat them well and 
we don’t steal from them in contrast to the Fedayeen.122 
 
 Similarly the Egyptian Brotherhood participation was limited in the 1967 war 
in providing support to the Sinai Egyptian Bedouin due to the measures implemented 
by the Egyptian army to prevent the Brotherhood from taking part in any other form of 
activities in the desert, except their support to the PLO. Therefore, although they did 
not take direct action in the war, they participated ideologically and financially by 
supporting the army and Bedouins.  
 Due to the creation of Fateh, the Brotherhood was side-lined, making way for 
a Palestinian entity to represent Palestinian nationality, rather than the Brotherhood’s 
more universal representation of religious and societal matters. In the 1948 war there 
was no official Palestinian representation, therefore the Brotherhood, and individuals 
working under the Brotherhood’s wing, represented the Palestinian struggle in this 
war. Their effort included recruiting volunteers and mobilising civilians. Therefore, in 
1967, Nasser gave support and recognition for Fateh, Nationalist, and liberation 
movements. The recognition of Fateh created for Palestinians the choice of not only 
Islamists, but also Nationalists, who were supported by the Nasser regime and other 
Arab states, unlike the Islamist groups who were being discredited throughout the Arab 
world. This meant that the Brotherhood found itself disregarded and fighting side-by-
side with the Fedayeen to assume even a minimal role within al-Shuyūkh bases.  
 
 
2.2.1  The Brotherhood and the National Identity Dilemma (Black September) 
 
From the beginning of the 1967 war, the activity of Fateh was considered related to the 
Muslim Brotherhood, with Arafat himself participating in the Brotherhood militia 
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attacks against British troops in the Suez Canal in 1951.123 In addition, many 
representatives of the Muslim Brotherhood cooperated with Fateh. Along them were 
ᶜAbdallah Muṭawwiʻ (founding member of the Kuwaiti Brotherhood), ʻUmar Bahāʼ al-
Dīn Amīrī (leader of Syrian Brotherhood), Issam al-Attar (General Supervisor of 
Syrian Brotherhood), Izz al-Din Ibrahim (representing the Egyptian Brotherhood, also 
founder of the Libyan Brotherhood), and Tawfīq Shāwī (leader of the Egyptian 
branch).124  
 After 1967, the Muslim Brotherhood agreed with Fateh to keep the al-Shuyūkh 
bases operating in Jordan in order to continue military attacks on Israel.125 According 
to Isḥāq Aḥmad Farḥān (leader of one of the three Brotherhood bases)126 the meeting 
between the Muslim Brotherhood and Fateh to discuss the situation of Jordan after the 
1967 war took place at Qindīl Shākir’s house.127 At this meeting, the necessity of jihad 
was stressed by Saad al-Din al-Zmaili and Khalil Ibrahim al-Wazir, the cofounder of 
Fateh.128 The two organisations agreed that Jordan was weak and that Jordanian forces 
were not able to engage in war with Israel again. Therefore, they considered the al-
Shuyūkh bases essential to continue their resistance. In this context, ‘bases’ began to be 
thought of as a hub of militant activists, recruiting and mobilising volunteers. The 
agreement between Arafat and the Brotherhood resulted in the establishment of 
Brotherhood al-Shuyūkh bases neighbouring the Fedayeen bases. The two 
organisations shared responsibilities: Arafat provided weapons and provisions, while 
the Muslim Brotherhood, through the members of its Kuwaiti branch such as ᶜAbdallah 
Muṭawwiʻ, were responsible for financing the bases and paying salaries to the 
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Fedayeen.129 
 The Fedayeen, which originally means ‘one who sacrifices himself’ or 
‘martyr’,130 are groups of paramilitary Palestinians, consisting of armed militias or 
guerrillas representing different ideologies from nationalism to pan-Arabism. These 
groups formed as a consequence of the defeat of the Arab army during the war. The 
majority of the Fedayeen were refugees from Gaza and the West Bank, who fled 
Palestinian territories during Egypt and Jordan’s control. They were also enriched by 
the participation of politically active refugees from Lebanon.131 
 After the Brotherhood-Fateh agreement, a total of five bases in Azraq, Jerash, 
Irbid, and Zarqa were formed (Bayt al-Maqdis, Gaza, al-Mughair, al-Khalīl and Ala’l). 
Three Egyptian trainers who fled to Jordan after Nasser’s attack on the Brotherhood 
(Ṣalāḥ Ḥasan, Ibrāhīm Hasan, and ʻAbd al-ʻAzīz Ali) supervised the bases; around 250 
to 300 Brothers were trained at that time before their presence was reinforced with the 
addition of another two bases on the borders with Palestine.132 Brotherhoods from 
Jordan, Syria, Egypt, and Sudan formed these bases.133 
 The Brotherhood and the Fedayeen bases were active after the 1967 war across 
the borders between Jordan and Israel, trying to create minor damages inside the Israeli 
territory. The violation of the Fedayeen by crossing the borders led the Israeli army to 
infiltrate Jordan on March 20, 1967 reaching the village of Karameh, north of the King 
Hussein Bridge (Allenby Bridge). With air force raids, Israel launched attacks on 
Jordanian Brotherhood and Fedayeen bases where military means were limited to 
armament for artillery duels and small-scale incursions, which obliged the military 
forces of Jordan to intervene, escalating the war.134 Although the Israeli army faced the 
Fedayeen before the Jordanian military forces could interfere, the eventual presence of 
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the national military resulted in Israel’s gradual withdrawal. 
 The battle of Karameh is considered to be part of the ‘Thousand Days War’, 
which began in July 1967 after the clash between Egyptian and Israeli armies on the 
eastern bank of the Suez Canal, which broke the cease-fire that had been established 
after the previous war, in June 1967. The war did not cease until the ‘Rogers Plan’ was 
signed in Egypt and Jordan to ensure the ceasefire of all parties involved.135 This plan 
was named after the US Secretary of State, William P. Rogers,136 and was signed on 
December 9, 1969 to stop the Fedayeen attacking Israel from the Jordan Valley, in 
exchange for Israel stopping the War of Attrition in December 1970.137  
 Each party claimed victory over the other. For Jordan victory was claimed due 
to its ability to protect its land from infiltration. Israel on the other hand claimed 
victory because it successfully pushed the Fedayeen into Jordan, and away from the 
borders. However, the Palestinians claimed victory firstly because the Fedayeen 
proved its military presence and ability to fight separately from Arabs, achieving what 
they could not in the 1948 and 1967 wars. Secondly, their claim of success gave them 
popularity, which extended throughout Arab countries, creating the belief that an 
independent Palestinian resistance was the solution, which empowered the Fedayeen to 
reclaim the Palestinian issue from Arab custody, becoming sole representative of the 
Palestinian people.138 Alternatively, the Jordanian Brotherhood argued that there was 
victory due to their Islamic involvement, compared to previous wars when secular 
armies, led by secular regimes, lost.139 This made the Karameh battle essential for the 
growth of the Fedayeen and the Brotherhood. 
 The joint effort of the regime and PLO caused the King to welcome the 
Fedayeen into Jordan, claiming that “we are all Fedayeen,”140 which gave the 
                                                
135 “9 Statement by Secretary of State Rogers 1969, The War of Attrition and Cease Fire,” 
Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, December 9, Volumes 1-2: 1947-1974, accessed December 
2, 2014, http://goo.gl/tAffBD. 
136 Boaz Vanetik, Zaki Shalom, and Guy Solomon, The Nixon Administration and the Middle 
East Peace Process, 1969-1973 from the Rogers Plan to the Outbreak of the Yom Kippur War, 
(Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2013). 
137 David A. Korn, “US-Soviet Negotiations of 1969 and the Rogers Plan,” Middle East 
Journal, vol. 44, no.1, 1990, 37-50. 
138 “al-Ḥusayn ibn Ṭalāl” [Hussien bin Talal], al-Rai, September 20, 2008, accessed December 
2, 2014, http://www.alraimedia.com/Alrai/Resources/PdfPages/AlRAI/10673/P55.pdf. 
139Abū ʻAmr, Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza: Muslim Brotherhood and 
Islamic Jihad, 12-151. 
140 Bahjat Abū Gharbīyah, Min Mudhakkirāt al-Munāḍil Bahjat Abū Gharbīyah: Min al-
Nakbah ilá al-Intifāḍah, [From the Memoirs the Fighter Bahjat Abū Gharbīyah: from Nakbah 
to Intifada] 1949-2000, (Beirut: al-Muʼassasah al-ʻArabīyah lil-Dirāsāt wa-al-Nashr, 2004), 
61 
 
movement recognition and a home for its activities. Soon after, an agreement was 
signed between the King and the Fedayeen to clarify and organise the relationship 
between the state of Jordan and armed fighters within the country. The agreement 
consisted of seven points:  
 
1. Members of these organisations were forbidden to walk around cities armed 
and in uniform; 
2. They were forbidden to stop and search civilian vehicles; 
3. They were forbidden to compete with the Jordanian Army for recruits; 
4. They were required to carry Jordanian identity papers; 
5. Their vehicles were required to bear Jordanian license plates; 
6. Crimes committed by members of the Palestinian organisations were to be 
investigated by the Jordanian authorities; 
7. Disputes between the Palestinian organisations and the government were to be 
settled by a joint council of representatives of the King and of the PLO.141 
 
 Within two years, the Fedayeen power expanded throughout the country. 133 
Fedayeen bases were situated in Amman alone, changing its purpose from military 
hubs towards having a sense of social authority in the capital, providing arbitration, 
schooling, and shops in the areas they controlled in violation of their agreement with 
the King. The victory in the battle of Karameh became reason for Fedayeen troops to 
take advantage and control the territories of the bases, undermining the legitimacy of 
the government. This shift in the Fedayeen’s activities and their growing influence in 
the country threatened the regime. The King named the movement traitors of the 
regime and refused to uphold the previously signed agreements.142 
 The Fedayeen raised slogans such as ‘All authorities for resistance’ and 
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‘Amman is the Arabic Hanoi’, referring to Hanoi in Vietnam, which became known as 
a centre for resistance against The US. The Fedayeen went even further with one 
extreme slogan, declaring that ‘The downfall of Amman is the first step towards the 
fall of Tel Aviv.’ This meant for the King that their objective would naturally fall upon 
the monarch’s downfall, threatening both him, and the country.143   
 Al-Mashūkhī explained that the situation was heated between the army and 
Fedayeen after they extended their control in the refugees’ camps and the territories 
around the Fedayeen bases. He said:  
 
The people were complaining from [the Fedayeen] and their habits of drinking. I and 
others mediated in different occasions between [the people and Fedayeen] before the 
Jordanian army could get involved and cause a clash. Eventually [the Fedayeen] had to 
leave. 144 
 
 The King further accused the Fedayeen of trying to assassinate him twice in 
Zarqa in June 1970. Henceforth, King Hussein formed a military government that 
would limit the activities of the Fedayeen in Jordan, essentially creating a civil war, 
now known as Black September, in which the main Fedayeen leader, Salah Khalaf, 
refused to surrender.145 From then on, the Chief of the Royal Court, Wasfi al-Tal (later 
Prime Minister), who supported the idea of forming the military government, occupied 
a legendary position in Jordanian politics and became thought of as a national figure 
who prevented the Fedayeen from controlling Jordan. At the same time, his actions and 
involvement made him a target and enemy of the Fedayeen.146 For his justification of 
Black September, al-Tal claimed that: 
 
These groups that my government dealt with were not Fedayeen, or Palestinian 
fighters ... The accusation that we finished the resistance movement is wrong. Those 
are just militant movements who aim for political chaos and those who believe in the 
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Arab and Palestinian issue cannot count them as their representatives. As the King 
said, if there were no Fedayeen activities, it would be our responsibility to create the 
resistance ourselves because it is our right to fight the enemy who is taking our land.147  
 
 Al-Tal stripped the Fedayeen of its resistance distinction by stating that they 
did not participate in any action against Israel, and their disrespect for Jordan was 
reason enough for the government to reject them and justify their attack on the bases. 
The Brotherhood refused to join in this conflict, declaring on September 14, 1970 that 
the army and Fedayeen's main responsibility was to liberate Palestine, not to fight 
against each other. The statement distressed Arafat and the PLO,148 as it meant that the 
Brotherhood’s al-Shuyūkh bases, of which Fateh had been responsible for the last two 
years, refused to support the Fedayeen activities by rejecting its participation in the 
conflict. This meant that the Fedayeen lost the support of the Brotherhood, splitting the 
Palestinian front. As the Fedayeen no longer represented the Palestinians as a whole, 
the conflict between the regime and Fedayeen became a politically based conflict 
rather than identity-based.  
 The Muslim Brotherhood had taken the middle ground, previously issuing a 
statement on June 14, 1970, three months before the conflict occurred, entitled “This 
Blind Sedation [is] in the Interest of Whom?”149 which addressed both the Jordanian 
army and the Fedayeen. By blaming Israel for the conflict, the Brotherhood avoided 
any kind of involvement or criticism for not intervening in the war. The Brotherhood 
did not participate in the Fedayeen war and no other actions beside the previous 
declaration were taken to support King Hussein. Even so, the Brotherhood's statement 
gave the King a great advantage over the Fedayeen. The fact that the Brotherhood 
decided to stay neutral in the conflict eliminated the issue of religion from the war 
against the Fedayeen. The King considered the Brotherhood's declaration another 
proof of loyalty, emphasising their relationship, which was built on the previous 
elimination of Leftists and Nationalists from politics.150 
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 The timing of the statement can lead to many conclusions. On one hand, the 
Brotherhood’s non-intervention was not defined with a clear statement that they were 
supporting the Jordanian regime; rather they were avoiding aligning with either side of 
the conflict. Issuing the statement three months before the conflict occurred meant that 
even if the Fedayeen won, or the situation changed in Jordan, the Muslim Brotherhood 
would not be in confrontation with the Fedayeen, as they were not supporting the 
regime publically. Ultimately, however, their position on this conflict benefitted the 
regime more than the Fedayeen as their stance avoided an identity-based conflict.  
 The Fedayeen's defeat led to the creation of the Black September group, which 
aimed to take revenge on the regime. The Fedayeen were forced to retreat to Lebanon 
to reform their forces; the Black September group was created to differentiate militant 
activity from political issues that became the responsibility of Fateh led by Arafat. The 
group organised a series of attacks on important politicians in Jordan. They succeeded 
in assassinating Wasfi al-Tal in Cairo but failed in the attempted murder of the head of 
the Royal Court, Zaid al-Rifaᶜi, on a trip to London.151 This group thereafter became 
notorious worldwide, most notably with the Munich mission, when eleven Israeli 
athletes were kidnapped and killed during the 1972 Summer Olympics in Germany. 
 
 
2.3 Sectarianism and the Syrian Brotherhood 
The Brotherhood’s non-intervention empowered its position as an association rather 
than party, however, the regime alliance renewed during the clash with the Fedayeen 
was again challenged by the Syrian Brotherhood event that was started in Hamah city 
in 1980,152 marking the first instance of a sectarian conflict in the modern history of the 
Levant. 
 The Syrian Brotherhood’s crisis with the regime firstly appeared in 1975 when 
Ibrahim Youssef, with Marwān al-Ḥadīd and ʻAbd al-Sattār al-Zaʻīm, initiated the 
secret militia in affiliation with the Brotherhood, under the leadership of Marwān 
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Ḥadīd, called al-Talīᶜah al-Muqātilah [Fighting Vanguard],  to assassinate the ᶜAlawi 
leadership.153 Youssef, the leader of this group, was an officer within the Aleppo 
Artillery School,154 and led the attack against the school on June 16, 1979. 155 This 
sectarian group was motivated by their violent rejection of the ᶜAlawi and its control 
over Syria.  
 The Syrian Brotherhood, represented by the General Supervisor, ʻAdnān Saʻd 
al-Dīn, acknowledged that the attack was committed by Brotherhood members, but 
denied that the actions were endorsed by the Brotherhood, rather that they were purely 
independent.156 One can argue that the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria developed in this 
period an anti-ᶜAlawi perspective. Saʻd al-Dīn disowned the group as independent of 
the Brotherhood, but did not condemn their actions,157 similar to al-Banna when he 
discovered that the private militia had attempted to assassinate the judge Ahmad al-
Khazendar in March 1948. However, soon after there was a failed attempt to 
assassinate al-Assad on June 26, 1980 in Damascus. In response his brother, Refa’at al-
Assad, declared a campaign against the Brotherhood by attacking Hamah, the city in 
which the Syrian Brotherhood’s headquarter was located, with the intention of 
eliminating the Brotherhood after issuing Law Number 49,158 which sentenced anyone 
linked to the Brotherhood to death, thus legitimising the attack. 159 
 To justify the Syrian Brotherhood’s retaliation, Khalīfah stated that jihad was 
compulsory as a protective means against the regime. After the Jordanian 
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Brotherhood’s Shoura Council convened, the Brotherhood – al-Bannaist and Qutbist – 
united in the need to support the Syrian Brotherhood, providing limited support of 
armaments and training for Syrian fellows in Jordan. The main argument during this 
meeting had been if they should travel through Iraq to participate in Syria, if they 
should train the Syrians in Jordan, or if supporting them with arms alone was enough. 
In the end they decided to supply weaponry as well as training the Syrian Brotherhood 
in Jordan. This plan was reinforced by the Jordanian regime granting the exiled Syrian 
Brotherhood the right to reside in Jordan.160 
 The context of Jordan’s cooperation with the Brotherhood around the Syrian 
crisis is controversial, as some affirm that Jordan supported the creation of 
Brotherhood bases similar to the al-Shuyūkh bases within the Fedayeen war on the 
borders of Jordan. This argument can be found in James P. Piscatori’s and Khalīl ʻAlī 
Ḥaydar’s writings,161 while Bassām Amūsh claimed that these training bases were 
established in Iraq, not Jordan.162 Abū Fāris, in contrast, claimed that Jordanian support 
was limited to financial and militant aid, which actually harmed them since the 
Jordanian regime was already cautious of a repetition of recent events in Egypt.163    
 This accusation of the Jordanian Brotherhood intervening against the Syrian 
regime, especially after Jordan embraced the exiled Syrian Brothers, stressed the 
already tenuous relations between the two countries.164 This accusation found further 
ground when Hafez al-Assad said on December 8, 1980:  
 
The dens from which plotting against Syria sprang and from which the sabotage acts 
were carried out in Syria remained in Jordan, in Amman and other cities ... the 
Jordanian role has led to the treacherous murder of hundreds of people from all sectors 
of [the] Syrian population.165 
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 However, Jordan’s poor relationship with Syria actually originates from the 
1970 Civil War,166 when Syria supported the Fedayeen by sending troops to the north 
of Jordan’s borders, pushing back the Jordanian army.167 The head of the Popular Front 
for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Aḥmad Jibrīl, confirmed Syrian support in this 
intervention, saying “King Hussein feared from the Syrian intervention in the battle, 
therefore, he requested from the Israelis to help him push back the Syrian army.”168 
Israel sent its air force to do so, as their interest was to maintain the truce with Jordan 
and prevent Jordan from becoming a Fedayeen hub. In response to this action Syria cut 
its relations with Jordan on August 12, 1971.169 
 When the chance arose in the Iraqi-Iranian war of 1980, Syria supported the 
Iranian regime, while Jordan supported the Iraqi regime, but the conflict between the 
two countries deepened within the 1980s, where along with the Brotherhood issue, the 
exiled Syrian Judge, ʻAbd al-Wahhāb al-Bakrī, was assassinated,170 and the Syrian 
regime was accused of kidnapping Hisham Muheissen,171 a Jordanian diplomat in 
Beirut, as well as the attempt to assassinate Prime Minister Mudar Badran.172   
 However, with the Syrian Brotherhood’s flight to Jordan, the Brotherhood 
experienced a swell in popularity, particularly due to the distinct lack of competition, 
as the Brotherhood and regime had eliminated the Leftist parties, and Palestinian 
movements. This left the Brotherhood as the only active movement. However, this 
caused the King concern regarding the rising public support the Brotherhood gained 
after the Hamah event. Therefore, when there was Syrian militant activity on the 
                                                
166 Amūsh, Maḥaṭṭāt fī Tārīkh Jamāʻat al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn fī al-Urdun [Periods in the 
History of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan], 98. 
167 Manāṣīr “Ṣafḥah min al-Tārīkh al- Urdun” [Pages from the History of Jordan]. 
168 Manṣūr, “al-Qiyādah al-ʻāmmah al-Filasṭīnīyah Kamā yarāhā Aḥmad Jibrīl” [Palestine-
General Command as Seen by Aḥmad Jibrīl], part 5. 
169 On Providing All the Potential Support to the Palestinian Resistance Movement in Jordan: 
“Bayān al-Qiyādah al-Qawmīyah li-Ḥizb al-Baʻth al-ʻArabī al- Ishtirākī wa- Qiyādatuhu al-
Quṭrīyah fī al-Jumhūrīyah al-ʻArabīyah al-Sūrīyah” [Statement of the National Leadership of 
the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party in the Syrian Arab Republic], Mohamoon, Damascus, 
September 2, 1970, accessed December 2, 2014, 
http://www.mohamoon.net/Categories/ArabicConflicts/ArabicConflict.asp?ParentID=139&Typ
e=11&ArabicConflictID=37#2. 
170 ʻAbd al-Wahhāb al-Bakrī was involved in the trial of Hafez al-Assad, and was assassinated 
by three employees of the Syrian embassy in Jordan on July 30, 1980, before Hafez al-Assad 
became president on November 21, 1970. The culprits were arrested, and two were sentenced to 
death on October 26, 1980, while the third was the diplomat Ghayth al-Zabībī, and was 
released. 
171 “Lebanon Jordanian Diplomat Kidnapped,” AP Archive, September 2, 1981, accessed 
December 2, 2014, http://goo.gl/kQ0rYW. 
172 Barry M. Rubin, The Truth about Syria, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 95. 
68 
 
borders, the King revisited his position towards the Brotherhood. Saudi Arabia 
intervened to mediate this clash over Jordan hosting the Syrian Brotherhood and 
allowing their activities against Syria in Jordan. 173  
 To avoid the escalation of the situation between the two countries, Saudi 
Arabia’s Prince, later King, ᶜAbdallah Ibn ʻAbd al-ʻAzīz, met both King Hussein and 
Hafez al-Assad in December 1980, over the claim of Jordan hosting the Syrian 
Brotherhood.174 This happened simultaneously with the King changing his discourse 
towards the Brotherhood in Jordan, where he firstly discharged the Brotherhood's 
minister of Awqāf [Religious Endowments], Kamil al-Sharif, who had occupied the 
position from 1974.175  
 The Brotherhood did not intervene publically in order to keep its alliance with 
the regime and to maintain the safety of the Syrian Brotherhood in Jordan. However, 
the King then issued a public apology for being “deceived, along with a large section 
of the Jordanian people, by this criminal group [Syrian Brotherhood]” and warned, 
“this straying group, which abused our trust … no longer has a place among us.”176 
This marked an indisputable shift in the regime’s relation with the Jordanian 
Brotherhood. In response to the King’s speech, the intelligence service accordingly 
captured the Syrian Brotherhood members and sent them back to Damascus to 
eliminate the Syrian Brotherhood's existence in Jordan and to limit the Jordanian 
Brotherhood from becoming involved in Syrian affairs. The purpose of the King’s 
actions during this time was to quell the Brotherhood’s popularity, and repair relations 
with Syria.177 However, the Brotherhood had to rethink their alliances to the regime 
accordingly, and conversely, an increase was seen regarding the Brotherhood’s 
popularity. 
 Al-Mashūkhī was one of the main personalities to deal with the Syrian 
Brotherhood and their residence in Jordan. In his interview, he confirmed the King’s 
new attitude: 
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The intelligence department began calling me regularly to question me about the 
Syrian Brotherhood. They took my passport more than once due to my visits to Syria, 
to stop [the Muslim Brotherhood] from going there. We have been asked to inform 
them if something new happens [with the Syrian Brotherhood].178 
 
 The tense relationship between the two countries regarding the Brotherhood 
remained unstable until King Hussein's death in February 1999, when Hafez al-Assad 
participated in the royal funeral in Amman, giving the new King his blessings.179 The 
Syrian Brotherhood crisis damaged the good relations the Jordanian regime and 
Brotherhood engendered in the period after 1957, in which they allied against the 
Leftists and met in understanding towards the conflict with the Fedayeen. The Syrian 
Brotherhood’s exile from Jordan further impacted relations between the Brotherhood 
and regime, however, the Brotherhood left this crisis with popularity in the Jordanian 
street and the Jordanian universities. It was not until 1988 that they regained their 
alliances.  
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As explored within this chapter’s timeline, the Brotherhood and the regime’s 
relationship continued to fluctuate throughout the following two decades, with 1988 
appearing as a milestone in their relations due to the Habat Nisān [April Uprising], and 
its consequences on the re-establishment of parliament in Jordan. The effects of the 
uprising upon the Brotherhood and regime were felt in their full capacity a year later in 
1989, when the movement was encouraged to participate in politics and the 
government for the first time. This brief, yet palpable, camaraderie would mark the 
peak of the relationship between the regime and Brotherhood.  
 However, with the unprecedented popularity of the Brotherhood both within, 
and externally to, the parliament and government, the regime took action to minimise 
the movement’s role. An electoral law established in 1991 became another major 
turning point in their relations, as it, arguably, was designed to minimise the 
Brotherhood’s possible percentage in the following elections. This would allow the 
regime to pass a peace treaty with Israel that had been rejected by the movement 
following the Madrid conference in 1991.  
 Interviews conducted with the leader of the IAF, Zakī bin Arshīd, present 
insight into how this ‘one vote system’ caused the crisis between the Brotherhood and 
regime, and further interviews with key leaders present the Brotherhood’s structural 
changes within this period that safeguarded it against being outlawed. These interviews 
describe the structural organisation of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, and clarify 
the movement’s stances towards the peace treaty itself, and how specific leadership 
would manage the normalisation of relations with Israel if they were in a position of 
power.  
 
 
3.0  Habat Nisān [The April Uprising] 
 
The PLO had been acknowledged by the Arab League as the only legitimate 
representative for the Palestinian people, and at the Rabat Summit conference of 1974,1 
King Hussein seconded the Arab League on this matter. Therefore, if the West Bank 
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was to be governed by the PLO, then the unified parliament of the West and East Bank 
was no longer necessary. It was dissolved on April 18, 1974 to be replaced with al-
Majlis al-Waṭanī al-Istishārī [National Advisory Council]2 to govern and provide non-
obligatory consultation on general policy issues. The council stayed in place for ten 
years until 1984, when the King, by emergency law, asked the 1974 parliament to 
reconvene.3 As the West Bank was no longer part of Jordan, complementary elections 
were held in 1984 to replace the former representatives of the West Bank with 
Jordanian East Bankers.4 The same geographical areas as the April 27, 1967 elections 
were used to replace the West Bank parliamentarians. In 1984, two more members of 
the Brotherhood entered parliament, ᶜAbdallah al-ʻAkāyilah in Tafilah, and Ahmad al-
Kūfaḥī in Irbid, in addition to the two pre-existing seats the movement had.5  
 The King decreeing a law to disengage the West Bank from its territory in a 
speech on July 31, 1988 followed reconvening the parliament,6 and he abandoned the 
1.3 billion dollar plan to redevelop the West Bank, in order to place full responsibility 
upon the PLO for the Palestinian territories.7 This also led to the severance of all 
administrative and legal ties with the occupied West Bank.8 King Hussein permanently 
changed the electoral map,9 politically dividing the East and West Banks, which 
resulted in the total isolation of Palestinians from Jordan, wherein new official borders 
separated the two previously unified banks. It also meant that the Brotherhood could 
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no longer represent the West Bank and its attention became limited to Palestinians in 
Jordan, thus losing its main support. Therefore, the Brotherhood lay in wait for its first 
chance to re-legitimise itself within the new political context.  
 In the following year, upset over economic crisis and undemocratically 
appointed councillors caused an outcry by Jordanian citizens who were 
underrepresented by the National Advisory Council. The country thus experienced 
further challenges in 1989 due to a revolt, which had lasting ramifications for the 
Brotherhood and regime.10  The events of 1989 revealed significant oversights and a 
lack in policy-making, particularly with regard to the economy. The preconditions of 
the Maᶜan events can be found in the unbalanced Jordanian economy relying mostly on 
international financial support.11  
 From its establishment, Jordan has relied on foreign aid. At first this mostly 
came from the UK, until its influence over the Middle East passed on to the US in the 
1950s. During the Cold War, the US government provided large subsidies to the Arab 
countries exporting oil.12 In the 1980s, however, global levels of aid were subjected to 
general reductions. New geopolitical and global economic trends forced countries in 
the Middle East to adjust their reliance on donations and international help. This 
became even more crucial for Jordan, as the country did not have many means to 
attract further financial support since neighbouring countries had entered the Gulf 
War.13 The Jordanian government, in this changing global context, failed to build a 
self-sustaining economy, trying to solve economic problems merely by rent-seeking.14 
 Aside from international help, the Jordanian economy was highly dependent 
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on regional help from the Arab League.15 There were two major interests for the Gulf 
States to support Jordan. On the one hand, there were close ties between the countries 
based on Jordanian skilled labour working in the Gulf, which Jordan's economy 
benefited significantly from. On the other hand, the Gulf States were supporting Jordan 
financially due to its front-line position with Israel. This meant that for the Gulf States, 
Jordan was seen as the first line of defence against Israeli expansion.16 
 Since the end of the 1970s the regional situation has been reshaped 
significantly due to the Iranian revolution and changes in the oil market, which limited 
bilateral aid and skilled labour export to the Gulf States.17 This had a severe impact on 
Jordan’s economy. The government's strategy to replace the diminishing aid was to 
borrow, however, this led to a dramatic increase in public debt, reaching twice the level 
of the country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 1988.18 
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Image 1: Increase of foreign public debt in 1980s per one million USD19 
 
 To make matters worse, the country simultaneously experienced a chain of 
events generating internal instability, starting with the disengagement of the West 
Bank being contested.20 Also, however, Prime Minister Zaid al-Rifaᶜi was accused of 
favouritism and corruption, as seen with his implementation of policies that violated 
human rights and freedoms, such as the forced dissolution of the Jordanian Writers 
Association, which was replaced with a bureaucratic union controlled by the state in 
September, 1988.21 Violation of freedom of speech also occurred through the 
replacement of three newspapers’ executive boards with editors loyal to the 
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government.22 Furthermore, al-Rifaᶜi’s government (1985-1989) began to control 60% 
of the biggest newspapers in the country (al-Ray and al-Dustūr) by means of buying 
into companies who owned shares of them.23 Additionally, the government of Zaid al-
Rifaᶜi continued to restrict the activities of many organisations, associations, and 
student unions by forbidding their gatherings and preventing pro-Palestinian activities 
to support the Intifada in December 1987.24 
 The power that the Prime Minister had under the emergency laws allowed his 
government to oblige all entities, public or private, to report on their employees and 
workers based on what the government called a ‘Security Scan’.25  
 On March 9, 1989, the government officially requested financial assistance 
from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) within the framework of a sponsored 
economic adjustment and austerity plan to reorganise the country's debt. To fulfil the 
conditions of this contract, the government issued a new policy raising fuel prices in 
Jordan.26 This led to public protests all over the country: fifteen drivers of public 
transportation companies went on strike in Irbid and Maᶜan and were soon joined by 
thousands of individuals.  
 In direct response, the Ministry of Interior Affiars reverted the fuel prices to 
the previous figure before the information could be published in local newspapers. 
Strikes in the north, such as in Irbid, subsided, whereas in Maᶜan, the poorest city in 
Jordan, public protests grew, spreading to other regions of Jordan to create what has 
been called Habat Nisān.27 Riots erupted and spread, reaching Irbid and involving the 
public Yarmūk University, and the Jordan University of Science and Technology. 
 The Maᶜan events developed rapidly. When the police injured 17 protesters on 
April 18, 1989, the crisis spread to the south of the country. City after city became 
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26 Jane Harrigan, Hamed El-Said, and Chengang Wang, "The IMF and the World Bank in 
Jordan: a Case of Over Optimism and Elusive Growth." The Review of International 
Organizations 1, no. 3 (2006): 263-292; Knowles, Jordan since 1989 a Study in Political 
Economy, 9-143. 
27 Lamis Andoni, and Jillian Schwedler, “Bread Riots in Jordan”, Middle East Report (1996): 
40-42. 
77 
 
involved in the protest, including southern cities of Tafilah, Karak, and Madaba. In 
response to these events, the youth of central Jordan launched a series of meetings to 
support the south, which eventually caused the cities of Salt and the capital, Amman, 
to become involved.28 These events had outgrown local dimensions and become an 
issue of national importance.29 Soon the protesters’ demands, which previously had 
been confined to the economic sphere, expanded into claims of political failure. These 
grievances broadened the agenda of the Habat Nisān, concerning the failure of the 
regime to protect the West and East Banks’ unity.30 Therefore, the protester’s slogans 
not only called for the regulation of fuel prices, but also for the: 
 
• Resignation of the al-Rifaᶜi government and the imprisonment of state 
functionaries accused of corruption; 
• Creation of a government of national unity representing all political ideologies; 
• Organisation of free and fair elections; 
• Re-establishment of political life and cancellation of the emergency and 
temporary laws. 31 
 
 The (non)involvement of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Maᶜan events can be 
understood in light of the previous events with the Syrian Brotherhood in Jordan, 
wherein relations between the Brotherhood and regime reached crisis point. This 
vulnerable relationship can be seen in King Hussein’s letter to Zaid al-Rifaᶜi on 
November 12, 1985: 
 
But all of a sudden we discovered the truth about the whole affair and we realized 
what was happening. It emerged that some groups which have had to do with bloody 
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events in Syria were actually living in Jordan, hiding behind religious groups.32 
 
 As recorded by ʻAmūsh, the King claimed he was declaring this to “reveal the 
truth for all and let it be known that he [King Hussein] was deceived by the Muslim 
Brotherhood”, secondly, “to warn all and make them aware of the nature of this devil 
group”, and thirdly “to let this group, which broke our trust, know that it has no place 
in society”.33 This statement was a warning for the Brotherhood to keep a low profile 
during national or regional events, and therefore any participation in Habat Nisān could 
have resulted in the banning of the movement. 
 In the interviews conducted for this research, Brotherhood members generally 
avoided answering questions regarding the movement’s position towards, involvement 
in, or division due to, these events in 1989. However, the interviewees attested the 
legitimacy of the protests’ goals, and necessity at the time, and yet members also 
stressed that any Brotherhood involvement in the uprising was performed by 
individuals, independent from the Brotherhood itself, thus indicating members’ fear 
surrounding possible accusations of the Brotherhood initiating the protests.  
 However, ultimately the government did not take any action against the 
Brotherhood. The purpose of the King’s statement was to minimise the Jordanian 
Muslim Brotherhood and to announce that its actions would no longer be tolerated. 
The threats were clearly successful as the Brotherhood avoided officially intervening in 
the Maᶜan events for fear it would meet the same end as the Syrian Brotherhood. 
 With rare publications on Habat Nisān, the events remain debatable. Despite 
scholars not disagreeing on the reasons that caused the event, the scale of the protests 
are highly debated.  
 The government adopted a conspiracy theory, claiming that the events were 
influenced from external sources such as foreign actors.34 It is possible to justify the 
argument that there was foreign involvement in the protests by referring to the attempt 
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accessed May 25, 2015, http://ag.arizona.edu/oals/ALN/aln44/varady-milich1.html. 
33 Quoted from Bassām ʻAlī Salāmah ʻAmūsh, Maḥaṭṭāt fī Tārīkh Jamāʻat al-Ikhwān al-
Muslimīn fī al-Urdunn [Periods in the History of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan] (Amman: 
al-Akādīmīyūn lil-Nashr wa-al-Tawzīʻ, 2008), 123. 
34 Ryan, Curtis, "Jordan and the Rise and fall of the Arab Cooperation Council," Middle East 
Journal, 52 (1998): 386-401. 
79 
 
of some protesters in Maᶜan to raise the Saudi flag.35 There was also usage of some 
slogans that named King Fahd bin ᶜAbd al-ᶜAziz. The protesters even wrote the name 
of King Fahd on the walls of the city to challenge the Jordanian regime.36 Therefore, 
the Saudi presence in the protests presented a direct threat of self-autonomy against the 
Jordanian regime.   
 Those who found alternative reasons for the events, such as Rīmāwī,37 
Wardam,38 Kasāsibah,39 and Ḥaddādīn,40 argue that the events of 1989 were fully 
spontaneous, stemming from political frustration, and due to the serious accusations of 
corruption against the government of Zaid al-Rifaᶜi. In addition, the economic crisis 
that led to the collapse of the Jordanian currency in 1988 had affected the transport 
sector significantly: the city of Maᶜan, being the poorest city in the country, was the 
one to suffer the most from these factors. Defenders of the spontaneity argument say 
that the political parties and politically motivated groups, using existing economic 
problems, found a fertile ground to raise political slogans to re-establish political life 
and revive parliament after they were banned. 
 Another economic perspective, offered by, for example, Qarʻān,41 Curtis,42 and 
ʻĀyid,43 argues that the Maᶜan events happened purely due to the country’s economic 
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circumstances. The Jordanian Dinar in 1982 equalled 2.95 dollars, but the economic 
crisis led to a drop in its value making it equal less than 1.73 dollar in 1989. This 
meant that every Jordanian experienced a loss of 41% from his/her capital and 
income.44  
 However, even though this economic austerity and the collapse of the 
Jordanian Dinar had a high impact on the protests, if the protests had been influenced 
solely by economic factors,45 then the following years from 1990 to 1991 should have 
been marked with further protests when the Gulf War caused an influx of Jordanians to 
return. That, however, did not happen.46 
 Therefore, the 1989 Maᶜan riots, sparked by a volatile economic climate, were 
faced with an inadequate security service that then failed to implement preconceived 
riot control procedures, resulting in the escalation of aggression, the jailing of over 350 
protesters, and the death of twelve.47 
 That year also highlighted the mismanagement of Jordan's internal and 
external policies. Jordan refused to accept the invitation of US President Jimmy Carter 
to follow Egypt in the Camp David peace process.48 The significance of this was that 
internally Jordan demonstrated the absence of political life and the weakness of its 
parliament by discussing new policies, such as the price changes, without adequate 
transparency and elected representation, thus causing protests.  
 The King returned to Jordan after an official visit to the US on April 23, 1989, 
and accepted the resignation of al-Rifaᶜi’s government. Prince Zaid bin Shaker was 
appointed new prime minister and a call for parliamentary elections was issued. The 
decision allowed any political parties to enter the elections, which relieved the political 
tension and the protests subsided.49  
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The protests ended after an agreement between all political actors in Jordan to 
sign up to the ‘Jordanian National Charter’.50 The King agreed on 60 representatives 
from different political ideologies, including the Brotherhood, in April 1990. This 
document marked the historical conciliation between the regime and its political 
opposition. In its eight chapters, declarations from the constitution were listed, such as 
the country’s form of government (monarchy); the country's official language (Arabic); 
equality of the citizens before the law; respect for political plurality and the army; the 
state’s objective to free the economy from its dependency on foreign aid; and the 
commitment of the state to be gradually transformed into a democracy. However, the 
charter did not include any kind of strategy to achieve the goals. 
Taking into account these pitfalls, the importance of the National Charter, 
acknowledged to be the second most important document after the constitution (despite 
its numerous mandates), is based on two matters: firstly, this document became one of 
the first attempts to initiate agreement between the ruling groups and the opposition, 
and secondly, the Charter defined Jordan as a state of law and political plurality, 
declaring it obliged to protect its civility and democracy. Also, the need to exercise the 
political right of citizens through voting in elections and the legitimacy of the existence 
of political parties were declared; the latter were allowed to work freely after being 
banned in 1957.51 
 The Charter marked reconciliation between the regime and the Jordanian 
politicians, correcting the hostilities engdered during Habat Nisān. The main goal of 
this reconciliation was to democratise the country by creating a parliament that 
contained all opposition voices within the monarchy-ruled political system. Therefore, 
the King had the opportunity to rebrand the Brotherhood as a political alliance, 
drawing a line under the Syrian Brotherhood crisis.  
 Furthermore Maᶜan is a hub of traditionalist loyalty towards the regime. As a 
home and capital for King ᶜAbdallah I when he arrived from Mecca, the city is 
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symbolic of the country’s birth. This means that when the regime is in need of loyalty, 
bringing Maᶜan’s leadership and tribes to the parliament is a sure way to re-engage the 
loyalty that the country was built on. Therefore, the King’s main purpose was to 
democratise the parliament and thus empower the Brotherhood from a politically 
unofficial role to a legitimate one. It therefore had the blessing of the regime and the 
advantage to join the election of the following year. Ultimately, after being threatened 
with being banned, the Brotherhood was rewarded for its non-intervention during 
national upheaval and was qualified to reach the next state in Jordan’s history. 
 
  
3.1  Re-Democratising Jordan Post-1989 
 
The return of the Brotherhood to parliament in 1984, filling the gap of Palestinian 
representatives in the national legislative body coincided with the First Intifada, which 
carried a clear Islamic tone, echoed by the establishment of Harakat al-Muqawamah 
al-Islamiyyah [Islamic Resistance Movement / Hamas], the Palestinian branch of the 
Muslim Brotherhood.52 The Palestinian uprising was thus endorsed by the Jordanian 
Brotherhood, resulting in its increased popularity among Jordanian-Palestinians. 
Further support for the Palestinian cause was demonstrated through the Brotherhood 
taking a more significant role in public social activities within Jordan, such as 
protesting. Muslim Brotherhood members representing both the West Bank and East 
Bank unified their forces in general protests during the Intifada. The collaboration of 
the West and East Bankers from the first day of protests showed the integration of the 
movement with the public agenda as such, acknowledging the Brotherhood's claim to 
represent the Palestinians in exile.53 This solidarity further highlighted the recent 
failures of the Jordanian government to maintain unity. 
 In 1989, Zaid bin Shaker became Prime Minister, supervising political reform 
after the Maᶜan events, and managing the electoral process for the first elections since 
the 1967 war. Although political parties were still banned, in 1989 the candidates were 
allowed to form political blocks regardless of their ideological orientation.54 The King, 
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therefore, declared that the country should stop the usage of emergency laws and that a 
liberalisation process should be launched: “To continue Jordan’s liberalisation 
process… and to reiterate our deep commitment to defending the human rights and 
dignity of our citizens… we decree that martial laws are cancelled”.55 
 Following the King's call to re-establish political life in Jordan under the 
promise of free and fair election (which also incurred the limitation of the security 
departments’ influence on elections, which had been rife), the Brotherhood decided to 
join the elections.56 The movement agreed to offer 27 candidates whereas other 
political entities did not manage to unify their party lists, deciding to run elections on 
individual bases.57 As a result, the Brotherhood gained 22 seats from a total of 80 
alongside ten other successful individual Islamists. The Brotherhood also succeeded in 
promoting ʻAbd al-Laṭīf ʻArabīyāt as the speaker of the parliament.58 
 The electoral success of the Brotherhood in 1989 was ensured for a number of 
reasons.59 First of all, the Brotherhood entered the elections with a large number of 
candidates, maximising its chances to gain many seats in parliament. Secondly, in the 
1989 election a new voting system, ‘block voting’, was introduced. Block voting is a 
system used in multi-member constituencies where voters can elect more than one 
representative in each constituency.60 Voters can cast as many votes as there are 
available seats and the candidates with the most votes win, even if they have not 
managed to secure a majority of the votes. The third ensurance of electoral success was 
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the law that had banned political parties from taking part in the elections, not 
associations. Therefore, the Brotherhood entered as a block, non-political association, 
allowing it to use the charity centres to campaign for their representatives while 
distributing charity. In addition, the Brotherhood utilised Mosque prayers to encourage 
people to join the elections and vote.61 
 Finally, the engagement of the Brotherhood in the Palestinian issue and the 
strengthening of the connections between Jordan and Hamas through the Brotherhood 
members limited Fatah’s role among the Jordanian-Palestinians. In disagreement with 
this course of events, Fatah also boycotted these elections. As a consequence, the 
Muslim Brotherhood represented the majority of Jordanian-Palestinians. 
 These reasons, along with the Brotherhood’s role in the Intifada, contributed to 
its success in the 1989 elections.62 Following the elections, King Hussein appointed 
Mudar Badran, the former Director of Intelligence, as Prime Minister on December 1, 
1989, to form a new government two years later in 1991.63 Badran found himself 
obliged to meet with the Brotherhood, inviting them officially to join the government 
due to the movement’s success in the election.64 The Brotherhood agreed to join if 
Badran would offer it seven ministries of the Brotherhood’s own choice.65 The Prime 
Minister did not approve these conditions, but shortly after, Badran initiated another 
attempt to cooperate with the Brotherhood, in which they voiced new conditions for 
joining the cabinet, such as  
 
• Requesting that Badran would promise to apply Shariᶜah Law in education and 
economy 
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• Declaring that the government will support the resistance movements against 
colonisation anywhere  
• Establishing an Islamic University along with Sharia school in Yarmūk 
University 
• No negotiation on the Palestinian land and supporting Palestinians resistance.66 
 This was the first time in the Muslim Brotherhood’s history that a branch 
approved of joining a government, or even negotiated with a government. Bradran 
accepted the conditions and the Levant witnessed the first Islamists to enter 
government.67  
 The Brotherhood selected five ministries of their choice, four of Jordanian 
decent: Yusuf al-‘Azm of Ma'an (Social Development), ᶜAbdallah al-‘Akayila of 
Tafilah (Education), Ibrahim Zayd al-Kaylani of Salt (Awqāf), Majid Abd al-Raḥmān 
Khalīfah (Labour); and only one to Palestinian decent: ‘Adnan al-Jaljuli of Tira 
(Health). Two further ministries were allocated to independent Islamists, Muhammad 
Ibrahim al-‘Alawna, (Agriculture), and Jamal al-Sarayira (Transportation and 
Communication).68  
 The selection of these Brotherhood members was pragmatic as the members 
were mostly of Jordanian descent, thus demonstrating the Brotherhood’s Jordanian 
agenda. Ultimately, however, the Brotherhood’s parliamentary involvement turned out 
to be an intense period in Jordan’s history as when the movement came to power, the 
whole region became involved in the Gulf War in which the US led a coalition to force 
the Iraqi military to withdraw from Kuwaiti territories. 69  
 The 1989 events represent the second real democratic experience since the 
Leftists were empowered in 1956. The first time Jordanians had the right to vote, they 
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chose the Leftists, however, the second time around they favoured Islamists, thus 
demarking a notable shift from the left (Nationalist; Socialist; Communist) to the right 
(Muslim Brotherhood and Islamists).  
 The election produced two political strands: tribal, pro-regime members, and 
Islamists. These strands became the dominant two areas thereafter in every following 
election. Therefore, it can be understood that the King fulfilled his promises after 
Habat Nisān by bringing the two actors in that event to lead the country in the 
parliament and government.  
 
 
3.2 IAF vs. One Vote System 
 
The adherence to the democratic procedures that the country declared in 1989 came 
into conflict with the regime’s orders to change the electoral system from a block 
voting system into a one vote system.70 This marginalised the political parties and 
caused their gradual exclusion from the elections in the following years.   
 As a result of the 1989 elections, an 80-member legislature was elected using 
the block voting system. Eight seats were reserved for Christians and another three for 
Circassians or Chechens.71 For the 1989 elections, Jordan was divided into 20 
constituencies based on the block voting system in which voters cast as many votes as 
there were seats in the district. Each constituency or geographical election area had 
from two to nine seats. However, the distribution of seats was not fair, as it did not 
consider the population of each area. For example, the fifth district of the capital 
Amman, and the city of Maᶜan, both had five seats in the parliament, but the capital’s 
fifth district had double the number of voters than the city of Maᶜan.72   
 The block system favoured the Brotherhood. The representatives of the 
Muslim Brotherhood were competing with the pro-monarchist independents, whose 
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political affiliation was easy to identify.73 Analysis of Jordanians’ electoral behaviour 
shows that their voting behaviour was dependent on the type of voting system used. In 
the situation where each voter on average had three votes in the block-voting system, 
he would base his choice on the culture of his society. Thus, each voter has an ethical 
responsibility to vote firstly in favour of his tribe or family member candidate, who 
represented, for example, the pro-monarchist group.74 Secondly, he/she is obliged to 
vote according to his religion by giving a vote to a Muslim Brotherhood candidate or 
independent Islamist. Only with his/her third vote, a Jordanian citizen could exercise 
some freedom and willingly choose either a pro-monarchist or Islamist candidate.75  
 The Brotherhood won 30% of the seats with less than 20% of the votes, 
whereas the pro-monarchists won approximately 60% of the total votes but filled only 
40% of the seats.76 This result confirmed beliefs that the block vote system gave 
advantages to the Brotherhood over the other candidates of pro-monarchist orientation. 
The Brotherhood obtained 22 seats out of 80 becoming the largest block in parliament 
in addition to 14 seats gained by independent Islamists, giving the Islamists a total of 
36 seats out of 80. This large representation forced the Prime Minister to comply with 
their conditions to form a government.77 
 In this parliamentary period, the Brotherhood showed an effective participation 
in, and cooperation with, the government to pass important political and economic 
reforms in a number of areas, such as: 
 
• The ratification of the market reforms required by the IMF and World Bank, 
including austerity plans for government spending 
• New regulations for press and publications that ensured more freedom for 
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expression 
• Lobbying to repeal the ban on political parties 
• Passing laws against financial and administrate corruption.78 
 
 The advantage the Brotherhood gained in the 1989 elections was caused by the 
gaps in the block vote system. To prevent further enlargement of the Brotherhood’s 
significance in Jordan, another electoral reform was passed to introduce a one vote 
system for the 1993 elections.79 Along with this reform, political parties were legalised 
for these elections, after having been banned since 1957 to allow other ideologies to 
compete with the Brotherhood. Finally, campaigning in mosques, which had been 
widely used for the 1989 elections, was officially prohibited.80  
 One of the primary reasons for the regime to go to such lengths to minimise 
the Brotherhood's representation and influence in the national legislative authority was 
not due to its reluctance towards organised and strong political opposition, but new 
international inclinations of the Jordanian government: the King intended to engage in 
the peace process with Israel.81 The King, as well as each government official, realised 
that as long as the Muslim Brotherhood had significant representation in parliament, 
peace decisions would not be agreed on nor passed through parliament.82 According to 
Zakī bin Arshīd, 
 
The ‘one man, one vote system’ allowed each citizen to vote once, meaning the 
individual would vote according to his origin or tribe before voting for the 
Brotherhood or an independent (non-tribal) candidate. Therefore, the government 
emphasised a division among Jordanians based on origins and descent, where 
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Jordanians of Jordanian origin found the elections a place to define and defend their 
tribes while Jordanians of Palestinian origin defended their roots by voting for the 
Brotherhood due to the Palestinian roots of most of the Brotherhood’s members and its 
call for the return of Palestine.83 
 
 Therefore, taking into account the traditionalism of Jordanian society, which is 
reflected in electoral behaviour and the political incentives of the Jordanian 
government, the one vote system was introduced. Primarily, this change should have 
challenged the popularity of the Brotherhood among the Palestinian-Jordanians.84 
 In compliance with studies on the electoral behaviour of Jordanians, the 
introduction of the one vote system sought to make the population more responsible 
for its choices, which ought to be based on candidate agenda rather than tribal or 
religious affiliations.85 The events of the 1970 Civil War between representatives of 
Jordanian and Palestinian origins were still in the population’s memory, effecting the 
government’s management of the electoral geographic areas.86 As it was proved by the 
previous elections, small cities and rural areas with a majority population of Jordanian 
descendants were granted an equal number of seats to big cities with its predominant 
Palestinian-Jordanian majority. Following these methods, the government guaranteed 
more tribal pro-monarchy parliamentarians, allowing law and treaties to pass without 
being prevented.87 
 Due to this crucial turn in Jordan’s politics from a regional to international 
arena, a shift took place within the Brotherhood’s structure, reacting to the 
government’s challenging decisions by establishing a new political party called The 
Islamic Action Front (IAF) Trapped by its decision to legalise political parties, the 
government was forced to register and recognise the new party.88 The IAF became the 
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political embodiment of the Brotherhood, entering elections with the slogan “al-Islam 
huwa al-Hall” [Islam is the Solution].89 The slogan suggested that the Brotherhood’s 
program called for the replacement of current laws with more Islamic ones. Also, it 
suggested that Islamic values, ethics, and morality were the main points of its agenda 
and that with those values and ethical principles the Brotherhood would fight 
corruption.90 
 On September 7, 1993, when King Hussein called for new elections to 
continue the democratic path that had been established in 1989, the Brotherhood did 
not doubt its participation, despite their objections to the one vote system. This was 
mainly for two reasons; firstly, they had tasted the fruits of participation and wanted to 
continue down the same path, and secondly because having a political presence 
presented a legitimate way of interrupting any attempt to make peace with Israel.91  
 Furthermore, participation put them in contrast with the more extreme 
oppositions such as the Salafist movement, which was beginning to strengthen its roots 
in Jordan during this period, and by comparison, the Brotherhood was recognised as a 
loyal, non-violent political opposition. Therefore, the Brotherhood opposing the regime 
and yet still participating in the election with appropriate deference generated a sense 
of democracy in Jordan.92 
 In this 1993 election, the IAF obtained only 17 out of 80 seats, in addition to 
five seats won by independent Islamists. In other words, the IAF won 20% of the seats 
with 17% of the votes, while the pro-monarchists won 60% of the seats with 58% of 
the votes. The total number of votes in this election was 822,295. 93 
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Party Seats 
Independent 60 
IAF 17 
Jordan Democratic People’s Party 1 
ath Party 1 
Jordan Arab National Democratic Party 1 
Total 80 
 
Table 2: The 1993 Election Results94  
 
 With this result, the Brotherhood remained the largest block in parliament. 
However, as the movement lost three seats, it was not granted the same power it had 
had in previous parliaments. The movement had reservations regarding the purpose of 
the one vote system,95 however, they still participated in the 1993 elections. When the 
results came in they decided unanimously that it was a strategy implemented to limit 
their success.   
 However, the change in the regime and Brotherhood’s relationship may have 
also been related to the government’s shift in prioritising international affairs over 
internal affairs after losing Gulf aid. The Jordanian Government making a step towards 
peace with Israel in 1991 was at the expense of its relations with the Brotherhood,96 
and marked a new stage in their relationship, made public within parliament.97 
 
 
3.3 The Brotherhood and IAF’s Structural Differences 
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In light of the new one vote system, the Brotherhood became more critical of what the 
regime may do next. Within this context, the establishment of the IAF can be seen as a 
strategy for survival. For instance, if the regime decided for any future reason to 
dissolve the Brotherhood, the IAF would remain a contingency since it holds a political 
party licence and is headquartered away from the Brotherhood’s offices, and is 
therefore technically separate from the Brotherhood.  
 To most researchers studying the movement, the Jordanian Brotherhood’s 
structure is ambiguous. Despite many members of the Brotherhood also being 
members of the IAF, the IAF have a different and independent leadership to the 
Brotherhood. However, addressing leaders of the IAF as leaders simultaneously of the 
Brotherhood, and vice versa, is a common mistake.  
 Therefore, before entering into a discussion about the peace process, an 
understanding of the Brotherhood and IAF’s structures must be reached, especially in 
regards to the internal election processes, which are deciphered by tracing the 
progression of members who later became leaders.98  
 Zakī bin Arshīd describes the IAF leadership as having a: 
 
Very democratic standard, where the IAFs foundation votes for leadership, which 
assumes the right and ability to make decisions on their behalf … the IAF have many 
branches around the country and can be considered as constructing a primary 
foundation of field work, with an immediate, face to face relationship with the 
community.99  
  
 Therefore, the selection of the Brotherhood, or IAF’s, respective leadership 
begins in the bases of the Shu'b [Branches]. These branches of the Brotherhood, which 
Arshīd refers to, are located across the country.  
 Confusion surrounding the selection of leadership typically comes from 
similarities between the IAF and the Brotherhood as both branches elect their 
leadership in internal elections and follow mirrored governing procedures. For 
instance, the elected leadership of both branches become representative members of 
their respective Shoura Councils. The leaders of the branches meet and discuss the 
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policies of the IAF and Brotherhood respectively, however, the Shoura council’s main 
purpose is to choose the Maktab al-Tanfīdhī [the Executive Bureau] of members that 
work as respective governments. The two branches differ in that the IAF’s Shoura 
Council elects its own Secretary General, and the Brotherhood’s Shoura Council elects 
its al-Marāqib al-ʻāmm [General Supervisor]. 
 The Brotherhood and IAF operate under a similar system to the political 
parliamentarian system, in which the government is established from gaining majority 
in parliament. Within the Brotherhood, there are two main wings: the Doves, led by 
Raḥīl al-Gharāybah (among others), and the Hawks lead by Arshīd. As the same 
members of the Brotherhood happen to be members of the political IAF, any majority 
in the Brotherhood’s Shoura Council – either Doves or Hawks – will be mirrored 
within the IAF’s Shoura Council. This in turn means that the Brotherhood retains 
influence in the IAF’s policies regarding the regime, despite technically being separate. 
For instance, if the majority in the IAF’s Shoura Council were the Brotherhood’s 
Doves, decisions such as participation in the parliamentarian election would be more 
favourable than the Hawk’s boycott.  
 However, the main difference between the IAF and the Brotherhood is not 
within leadership structure, but how they accept new members. With the IAF, an 
individual can simply attend the headquarters and complete a membership application. 
In contrast, the Brotherhood carefully selects its members via networking and word of 
mouth, or through participation in its charity system.  
 When Raḥīl al-Gharāybah was asked for the reason of the Brotherhood’s 
meticulous selection process, and the impossibility of an individual approaching the 
movement independently, he said: 
 
The movement looks for specific abilities, energies, and forces. We search for these 
qualities and therefore it is not possible for just anybody to become a Muslim 
Brotherhood member. Individuals become members because the Brotherhood wants 
him/her. Not the contrast. Specifically, the qualities required are those that foster 
public concern, have strong faith in Islam, and share the Brotherhood’s values. In 
addition, s/he must be friendly and desirable.100 
 
 Therefore, the Brotherhood differs from the IAF in that it is selective, and 
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exclusively religious. The IAF’s more relaxed membership process means that non-
Muslims are able to join. However, this is not necessarily the IAF’s choice, but a legal 
obligation for political parties to practice a membership process devoid of religious 
discrimination.101 
 Furthermore, the IAF does not require any induction period to join the party: 
you are a full member from the first week after signing the membership application. 
The Brotherhood, on the other hand, requires an introductory period to assess the 
candidate before s/he becomes a member. Nevertheless, the IAF restrict their new 
members from running in any internal elections and must complete three years before 
joining the leadership, which can be understood as a replacement for the introduction 
period of the Brotherhood’s system.  
 The Brotherhood has a complex system for accepting new members, which 
can be ambiguous to outsiders. As previously mentioned, when the new member enters 
the Brotherhood, or is selected to enter the Brotherhood, he or she is put through an 
extensive program. Firstly the candidate enters the Usrah [educational family], which 
can be understood as a circle of members who meet weekly and educate each other on 
religion. A Nakib [captain] leading the Usrah provides tasks to develop its members’ 
skills. Once a month regional Usar [singular: Usrah] meet to form a Katībah [troop], 
in which they embark on trips and lectures to strengthen relations and extend skills 
among regional Usrah.102 
At this stage, the new members will be in a tutorial period or induction, in 
which they can establish themselves in the movement and meet other members. It is 
then that each new member will decide on which sector s/he is interested in, whether 
charity, politics, proselytisation or development. At the end of the course the new 
members are distributed among departments and entities that share similar concerns or 
have compatible interests.  
 Furthermore, there are no assigned responsibilities for the candidate at this 
stage, however, the Brotherhood directs missions to them via their Nakib in order to 
measure their committment, understanding of Brotherhood ideology, and ability to 
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continue in the movement and extend its values. The missions are diverse: candidates 
may be asked to volunteer in a social capacity, memorise a particular verse of the 
Qurᵓan, join in a protest, or plan a celebration.  
 After this stage, which can take up to three years, the candidate continues to 
the next step in which s/he can run for election to start their leadership plans in the 
movement. The member’s next stage is based on his/her interests or the area they are 
already working in. For example, if a member is working in the Islamic Centre School, 
a natural progression is to become a teacher or principle. 
 After this, if the individual thinks that s/he is qualified enough, and has created 
a successful network inside the movement, then s/he can join the internal elections to 
become a member with the Shoura Council. Once integrated therein, s/he can run for 
the highest positions in the Muslim Brotherhood, such as member of Maktab al-
Tanfīdhī [the Executive Bureau], or even the head of the Jordanian Brotherhood itself. 
 Overall, the Usar are located within the Brotherhood’s Shoura system, 
constituting Shuʻb [branches], in which new and old members convene and select local 
leadership. Each Shuʻbah [branch] elects a chief, deputy, secretary, and treasurer. The 
leadership of the Shu'bah then becomes members of the Shoura council.103 The Shoura 
Council, which consists of 45 members elected for four year terms, internally elects 
their Executive Bureau and General Supervisor for the Jordanian Brotherhood as a 
whole. Therefore, the system closely mirrors the parliamentarian system.  
 Despite not having an Usrah or Katībah, the members of the IAF elect their 
Shoura Council, who in turn elects the Secretary General (IAF’s version of General 
Supervisor) and Executive Bureau. Other than this difference, the Brotherhood and 
IAF run parallel in their organisational system. Regional branches of both Brotherhood 
and IAF still have a certain autonomy to act appropriately to their locations’ issues. As 
Arshīd stated,  
 
In political and sovereign issues, this system is centralised… decisions are made via 
central concerns only… there are regulations which determine the roles of these 
branches in order to compromise the branch’s polices with the central body. Therefore, 
the branches can be decentralised regarding many autonomous issues such as 
protesting, organising conferences, lecturing and charitable causes.104      
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Raḥīl al-Gharāybah specifically describes with Brotherhood by stating that: 
 
The Muslim Brotherhood is centralised movement in which the Amman headquarter 
has the ability to make decisions, and the branches and sub commissions follow in 
tow. Supervision from the government [on Muslim Brotherhood and IAF activities] is 
unnecessary because we supervise ourselves internally. But as I said earlier, the 
government tries its best to put obstacles in front of us, but our branches are still 
extending throughout the country.105  
 
 Despite the strong structure that the Brotherhood and IAF uphold, there is still 
a margin of disagreement between the leadership such as Raḥīl al-Gharāybah on how 
much the movement is centralised and how much the Branches have freedom to 
independently act politically or socially. However, despite this disagreement, members 
of the Brotherhood and IAF are ultimately unified by the strong organisational 
structure that engenders loyalty from the early stages of participation via its hierarchal 
system. This creates leaders from different descents, different wings inside the 
movement, and different theologies, as seen with the Hawks and the Doves, who are 
ultimately still unified within the movement.  
 
3.4 The Peace Process 
 
The peace process between Jordan and Israel had been attempted previously during 
King Hussein’s reign, when US President Richard Nixon visited the region in 1973 to 
initiate peace talks.106 The Brotherhood had been aware of Nixon’s intention of 
creating closer Jordanian-Israeli relations, and organised protests against his visit and 
any kind of normalisation of relations with Israel. These actions against King Hussein 
in front of the American President caused the regime to briefly arrest ᶜAbdu al-Rahman 
Khalifah (the General Supervisor) along with other leaders of the movement.107 
Nevertheless, Jordan’s general pro-peace approach changed in 1975, when the 
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government criticised temporary treaties between Egypt and Israel regarding the Sinai 
desert and subsequently the government accepted a position of opposition closer to that 
of the Brotherhood. As a result, the Brotherhood was endowed with more freedom, and 
recommenced protesting against Israel.108  Yet, the Brotherhood was cautious in its 
public protests. 
Due to the regime arresting Khalifah, the Brotherhood began to realise that its 
mutual understanding of the Palestinian question that it had built with the regime 
during the 1948, 1967, 1968, and Fedayeen war, had changed. This was proven in 
1977, when the Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat visited Jerusalem and appealed 
with the Knesset to initiate peace between Egypt and Israel,109 stating, “I come to you 
today on solid ground, to shape a new life, to establish peace.”110 With these words al-
Sadat, who was working independently of the Arab front, declared Egypt’s intention to 
initiate peace and end the hostility with Israel. The Jordanian regime adopted a 
moderate position in response, not clearly stating rejection of al-Sadat’s speech as 
other Arab countries did.111  
The Brotherhood may have reached premature conclusions, however, as 
Jordan did not accept the Camp David peace treaty between Egypt and Israel in 1978, 
arguing that it marginalised the Palestinian cause. Jordanian authorities considered the 
treaty as partial peace only, aiming to neutralise the role of Egypt in the Palestinian 
conflict, whereas Jordan looked for a coherent peace agreement between all the parties 
of the conflict.112 The 1978 treaty was concluded to neutralise the Egyptian military, 
whose intervention in war was the most probable compared to other Arab states 
bordering Israel.113 Paradoxically, this treaty did not remove the fear of a military 
solution of the conflict in the future – should Israel initiate a war with Jordan, Egypt 
would not engage itself on a military level due to the Camp David commitments. 
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Those commitments were thus considered a loss of support from Egypt, making the 
treaty a threat to Jordan.114 
Since the 1973 Nixon visit, Jordan began leaning towards making peace with 
Israel. King Hussein declared his acceptance of Resolution 242 on several occasions, 
however, many of Jordan's peace efforts were cautious and remained secret until 1980 
when Jordan openly declared its support for Resolution 242115 at the Arab League’s 
11th summit in Amman.116 The King emphasised his intentions in a speech in 
Strasbourg at the plenary of the European parliament the following year, declaring:  
 
Jordan's King, government, and people exerted all efforts contributing to making a 
number of peace initiatives a success … we have tried all paths, we saved no effort, 
and worked more than we can bare towards the friend and the enemy alike to see a 
permanent just peace and our region is still in turbulence.117  
 
 However, when the opportunity for peace arose in the Madrid Peace 
Conference, King Hussein knew that the Brotherhood, who was at that time not only a 
strong block in the parliament, and official party under the IAF, but also part of the 
government, would present substantial opposition. Therefore, the King dismissed the 
government of Mudar Badran, thus eliminating the Brotherhood’s representation, and 
appointed Taher al-Masri on June 19, 1991118 who led the Jordan-Palestine bilateral 
talks with Israel at the Madrid peace conference of 1991.119 
 The King was aware that his decision would likely initiate a crisis with the 
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Muslim Brotherhood, who perceived their governmental involvement as the pinnacle 
of their alliance with the regime, due to their positions in critical situations that the 
King faced during 1956, 1970, and 1989.120 The Brotherhood responded to the 
regime’s dissolution of the government by escalating radical rhetoric when addressing 
the internal, regional, and international relations of Jordan. This can be seen firstly by 
the Brotherhood’s objection to the 1991 Gulf War,121 which can be summarised with 
ᶜAbdu al-Rahman Khalifah issuing a statement declaring the US Army an imperialist 
body, trying to control the region and its natural resources, situating the 
Brotherhood.122 
 Despite both the Jordanian regime and Brotherhood favouring an Arab 
solution, the regime’s reasoning was based on its relationship with the former Iraqi 
regime, strengthened by intensive economic and trade relations between the two 
countries, whereas the Brotherhood’s view, in contrast, was based on opposing the 
intervention of non-Muslims in the affairs of Muslim countries.  
 Accordingly, the General Supervisor of the Muslim Brotherhood issued a 
statement calling for resistance against the domination of the ‘colonisers’ who were 
said to humiliate the people of the region, and called for their withdrawal from 
Kuwait.123  On January 17, 1991, the Brotherhood issued a communiqué entitled “Arab 
Leaders Exile America from our Pure Land”, stating: 
 
We believe that it is the obligation upon every Muslim in Jordan to stand against The 
American / Zionist aggression, and it is necessary that the believing public attack the 
invading forces and the American interest everywhere. We call the Arab and Muslim 
people to stand against regimes (who support the American invasion).124  
 
However, peace in the Middle East became a key issue for US foreign policy 
following the Gulf War, whose Iraqi occupation led to Kuwait’s declaration of 
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independence via coalition forces led by the US.125 Therefore, the US was eager to 
enforce UN Resolution 660 in order to oblige Iraq to withdraw its army from Kuwait 
by all possible means, even if that meant starting a new war. This put the US in a 
delicate situation on the other side of the Arabian Peninsula, as it was supposed to 
enforce previously discussed UN resolutions on the Palestinian issue.126 Having 
refused to apply Resolution 242 and 338 to maintain the 1967 status of Syria, Lebanon, 
and Jordan as occupied territories, Israel threatened the position of the US in the 
region. 
Therefore, the Gulf War obliged the US to pursue peace in the Middle East, 
benefiting from some popularity among the Gulf States' regimes for its military 
intervention.127 It was on this basis that the Madrid Conference took place to engage 
Arab countries and Israel in peace talks for the first time. However, the Madrid 
negotiations led to the signing of individual peace treaties instead, starting with the 
Oslo peace treaty in Norway, 1993, attended by Shimon Peres, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs (later President of Israel) and the PLO’s Secretary of the Executive Committee, 
Mahmud ᶜAbbas.128 
The Brotherhood rejected the Oslo Accords in the same way it rejected Camp 
David, but for many reasons the signing of the Oslo treaty was considered a bigger 
disappointment for the Brotherhood. Firstly, the treaty made the PLO renounce 
violence, preventing any kind of resistance to Israel,129 forcing it to delete from its 
charter all references related to military action against Israel as well as any slogans that 
called for the destruction of Israel.130 Given that the core ideology of the Brotherhood 
calls to spare no efforts in liberating Palestine (including military efforts) the Oslo 
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agreements also diminished this as a possibility for the Brotherhood, and furthermore 
the PLO was recognised by Israel as the only legitimate representative of the 
Palestinian people. This selective policy excluded Hamas and Jihad al-Islam, and any 
other organisation calling for resistance, from representing Palestine in the 
international stage, making the PLO sole representative of the Palestinian issue and the 
Palestinian people on the global scene.131 Therefore, the Brotherhood asserted their 
stance across the whole of Palestine, rejecting the entire concept of peace negotiations.  
 
 
3.4.1  Wadi Arabah 
 
The Brotherhood was not the only party to oppose peaceful solutions in regards to 
Israel. Other political actors shared similar stances, for example, Mudar Badran 
described the peace process as “Istislām lā salām” [Surrender, not peace]. He said that, 
“Since the economic crisis in 1989, Jordan was pressured to accept peace the American 
way. If it had been based on justness and fairness with a two state solution, I would 
have accepted it, but what was proposed was surrender.”132 
Badran explained that Jordan rejected US President Ronald Reagan's 1982 
peace offer, as its conditions were not fair. His statement provided another logical 
reason for the King to dissolve his parliament.133 The Brotherhood believed that the 
peace plan was predetermined, and that the Brotherhood itself had been the only 
obstacle barring the King from completing it. They used the King’s appointment of 
Taher al-Masri as Foreign Minister in the Badran government directly before 
dissolving it, and reappointing al-Masri as Prime Minister after its dissolution, as proof 
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that they had been ignorant of some larger long-term plan to facilitate peace.134 
In this sense, al-Masri's government was considered a peace-making 
authority.135 Therefore, the Islamist organisations within parliament combined their 
efforts to a vote of censure, including discharging al-Masri from his post less than five 
months after his appointment. This was possible as the constitution granted parliament 
the right to dissolve the government by a no-confidence vote. At the same time, the 
constitution assures the prime minister’s right to dissolve parliament. To everyone's 
surprise, al-Masri did not execute his right, but resigned in order to maintain the 
parliament. The parliament being able to intervene in the King’s power of appointment 
was the first real democratic achievement of the country since the 1989 events.136 
However, the King continued with his peace plan, and when US President Bill 
Clinton visited the Middle East on October 25, 1994, calling for the signing of the 
Wadi Arabah137 peace treaty between Israel and Jordan.138 When the treaty was 
realised, the IAF leader, Ḥamzah Manṣūr, gave a long speech in parliament publically 
recording the IAF and Brotherhood’s objections. The Brotherhood’s critical 
standpoints stated that the treaty considered the Jordanian right to land, water, and 
sovereignty without considering the Palestinian right, making this ‘partial’ peace. 
Furthermore, the Brotherhood argued that because Palestine was once part of Jordan, 
the latter is responsible for ensuring the same rights in Palestine.139  
Secondly, out of their concern of Ummah and unity, the Brotherhood 
suggested that instead of Jordan pursuing alliances with neighbouring Arabs, the 
regime was co-ordinating with the enemy, and that Jordan would not have a strong 
relation with any Arab state after signing the treaty and binding itself to Israel. Thirdly, 
it was pointed out that Israel did not fulfill any of its international commitments, 
causing doubt of the Israeli commitment to Jordan. The fourth point emphasised the 
                                                
134 Rawāshidah, “al Masri yakshifu Tafāṣīl Ghayr Muʻlanah‘an Tashkīlih” [al-Masri Reveals 
Details Undeclared about his Cabinet]. 
135 Brand, "The Effects of the Peace Process on Political Liberalization in Jordan," 52-67. 
136 Glenn E. Robinson, "Defensive Democratization in Jordan." International Journal of Middle 
East Studies 30, 03 (1998): 387-410.  
137 See Appendix 1: Glossary. 
138 King Hussein, “Treaty of Peace between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan And The State 
of Israel,” October 26, 1994, accessed May 25, 2014 
http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/peacetreaty.html; Based the Jordanian-Israeli treaty, a number 
of Jordanian laws against Israel were cancelled, such as law number 30 for the year 1973, 
which forbade selling property; law number 10 of 1958 which boycotted Israel; law number 66 
of 1953, forbidding all trade with Israel, to comply with law number 14 of 1994’s peace treaty. 
139 Ḥamzah Manṣūr, Kalimāt wa-Mawāqif [Words and Stances], (Amman: Dār al-Furqān, 
1998) 33-34 
103 
 
Brotherhood’s rejection of Resolutions 242 and 338 as they both concerned a land 
occupied since 1967, and the resolutions do not consider this land as occupied before 
that date.140  
Therefore, four fifths of Palestine is not included in these two resolutions. 
Furthermore, they also stated that the treaty was based on borders between Jordan and 
Palestine from the British Mandate Period. This meant that Palestine’s borders with 
Jordan became borders with Israel instead. The King points out that the treaty would 
end all hostility, and would marginalise the role of Jordan in any future conflict 
between the Arabs and Israelis. According to the Muslim Brotherhood, this treaty 
served the Zionist dream of security, and in this sense Jordan would be obligated to 
defend Israel against any threat. Furthermore, the Brotherhood presented an argument 
concerning the economy, pointing out the Jordanian boycott of Israeli products would 
end, disallowing any protectionist policies that Jordan had previously taken. Finally, 
the Brotherhood acknowledged the refugees and evacuees who reside in Jordan, and 
their right of return, which would be complicated after the application of this treaty.141  
 Following signing the treaty, King Hussein invited Clinton to give a speech in 
the Jordanian parliament,142 which was, however, boycotted by the Brotherhood which 
maintained a unified rejection of the treaty, and demonstrated that there was a strong, 
unrepresented opposition to it.143 
However, the Brotherhood went further, and a letter to President Clinton was 
sent on behalf of the IAF parliamentarians in which the US was accused of supporting 
dictatorship in the region.144 The letter to President Clinton was accompanied by 
another letter addressed to the American congress on May 14, 1996, stating that: 
 
It is the right of the oppressed, homeless Palestinian people who are sentenced to death 
and are imprisoned, to exercise their rights in order to defend their legitimate right to 
land, water, holy places and to live on their land and the land of their parents, the right 
to fight to regain their raped land from the rapists.145 
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These letters were intended to declare the Brothers' total rejection of the Wadi 
Arabah treaty and to declare their support of militant resistance against Israel. Their 
refusal to mention the name ‘Israel’ in the correspondence proved their rejection of its 
existence. The emphasis on the rights to the land was the Brotherhood’s declaration of 
jihad against the occupation of Muslim land. The King used the anger of the 
Brotherhood and its boycott of Clinton's speech to point out that democracy prevails in 
Jordan as it allows the liberty of political parties to boycott the President’s and King’s 
speeches following the 1989 events. In contrast, the Brotherhood understood the King 
inviting President Clinton to speak in parliament as ignorance to the Brotherhood’s 
standpoints and to the parliamentarian authorities. 
After all, events between 1988 and 1994 proved the regime’s ability to use all 
means to manipulate politics in Jordan. The one vote system was used to minimise the 
representation of the Brotherhood in parliament, which then allowed the passing of the 
Wadi Arabah peace treaty even while the Brotherhood was represented in parliament. 
This treaty is remembered historically as one that passed through parliament with the 
Brotherhood’s abstention. This secured the Jordanian regime from any future historical 
accountability on the matter since the opposition, even in discordance with those 
events, took part in the name of democracy. Thus, the treaty was acknowledged as a 
parliamentary treaty ratified through the voting system of elections.146 
The treaty itself achieved a comprehensive peace between Jordan and Israel, 
based on the UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Both sides recognised 
each other’s independence and sovereignty, as well as the shared borders, however, 
without recognition of the borders drawn under the Israeli military rule after the 1967 
war. Also, the treaty achieved the prevention of, indeed even the threat of, the use of 
armed violence, with both countries taking all necessary measures to stop terror and 
violence. 
In just one month's time, diplomatic relations were established, including 
opening embassies and exchanging ambassadors.147 Additionally, Jordan was granted 
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the right to supervise the holy places for Muslims and Christians in Jerusalem. 
Furthermore, the treaty regulated the sharing of water access and usage between both 
countries.148 This concerned the Jordan and Yarmūk Rivers, as well as the groundwater 
of Wadi Arabah. It was stated that both the Jordan River water and the groundwater of 
Wadi Arabah should be divided on an equal basis, despite three quarters of the Yarmūk 
River ultimately going to Israel. The treaty was respected in all its aspects except for 
the water division, creating an on-going problem and potential threat to the continuity 
of the peace treaty in the future. 149 
However, the treaty did not adequately address the problem of Palestinian 
refugees. Even though the issue of Palestinian refugees in Jordan was mentioned, the 
agreement did not stipulate the right to return or to receive compensation for their 
sufferings.150 This kept the door open for controversies over the continuity of the treaty 
with regard to about half the Jordanian citizens of Palestinian descent (the actual figure 
cannot be confirmed). These issues continue to provide space for potential conflicts 
between Jordan and Israel.151 
The King decided to appoint the Dove’s leader ᶜAbdu al-Taᵓif ᶜArabiyyat, who 
had been head of parliament three times, as a member of the Senate Council. This can 
be understood as the regime trying to break the movement from within by favouring 
leaders of the Doves for governmental positions, as ᶜArabiyyat could use his popularity 
within the movement to ease the radicalisation of the Hawks’ campaigns against the 
regime. This strategy has been seen previously with the appointment of Ishaq Farhan in 
1970 as Education Minister, and Kamil al-Sharif in 1974, to exacerbate divisions 
within the movement and encourage internal support for the regime against the 
Hawks.152 
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Discussion: The End of Alliance and the Question of Palestine 
 
The subject of loyalty has been integral to the issue of Palestine since the establishment 
of Jordan. Jordanian tribes and minorities believed that the new state of Jordan would 
only thrive in the hands of a strong – Jordanian – regime, and therefore it was within 
their best interests to empower the regime with their loyalty. However, King ᶜAbdallah 
I and King Hussein could not avoid the threat of the unresolved Palestinian issue, as it 
affected the dynamics of Jordanian domestic politics.  
 Since 1948, repeated waves of refugees have entered Jordan from the West 
Bank. This is also due to the annexation of the two Jordan River banks, in which new 
educated peoples entered Jordan without the same loyalties to the regime as the pre-
existing tribal and minority groups.153 Therefore, the loyalty and support that the 
Jordanian regime had created was faced with immediate opposition from a new 
proportion of the population, thus empowering the Leftist and Nationalist opposition. 
This integration of a new category of people led eventually to a clash between 
descendants of Jordanian and Palestinian origins in 1970, which concluded with the 
PLO leaving Jordan after a bloody conflict with the Jordanian army.154 
However, the Palestinian problem remained a threat even after the PLO and 
other Palestinian political actors left Jordan. This is because Israel’s right wing, 
endorsed by Prime Minister Arial Sharon, announced the ‘Jordanian Option’ or what is 
also known as the ‘Alternative State Solution’. This was suggested due to the belief 
that Palestinians have what Sharon dubbed, the ‘Artificial Kingdom’ of Jordan, as an 
alternative Palestinian homeland, already existing due to the number of Palestinians 
living in Jordan and holding the nationality.155 
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Furthermore, the ‘Jordanian Option’ also suggests a federation between 
Jordan, the West Bank and Gaza, which gradually pushes for the same idea of an 
Alternative State, as Palestinians would naturally become the majority in Jordan. This 
challenge makes the issue of Palestinians in Jordan a threat not only to the regime, but 
also to the very existence of the state of Jordan. Furthermore, Benjamin Netanyahu 
went further in his claims that Jordan is Palestine when he said:  
 
Most of the Palestinians now live in the area or territory of the Palestinian mandate 
[Jordan]. The majority of them prefer this situation, and the continuation of being ruled 
under the Hashemite family of Jordan - this is certainly what Israel wants. There is no 
need to transfer Jordan into a ‘Palestinian state’ because it already has been that since 
its birth … [The PLO] demand national rights, which means creating another Arabic 
state, another ruling Arabic regime, and another Arabic army. [The PLO] are not 
satisfied with their Palestinian state, which is already established in East Jordan and in 
which a majority of Palestinians control most of the Israeli territory. They do not want 
to accept that a Palestinian minority lives outside the borders of Jordan in an Israeli 
territory in which they have full individual freedoms.156 
 
The percentage of Jordanian vs. Palestinian descendants became a sensitive 
subject as any shift in this percentage may have become proof for the Israeli 
conviction. This also made the economic and political power of each descendant an 
issue of debate as Israel’s seed of doubt, teamed with memories of the 1970s clash, 
caused the two demographics to try and assert or determine their own right to Jordan. 
Palestinian descendants see that Jordanian descendants dominate governmental 
and security sectors (as initiated by King ᶜAbdallah I’s search for loyalty), while 
Jordanian descendants see that Palestinians control the market and trade in the 
country.157 Therefore, both do not feel that they have a complete citizenship in the 
country because each at some point has felt the threat of the other. For Jordanians, an 
increase in Palestinian descendants means losing the majority, and possibly a 
recurrence of actions taken against them as seen in the early 1970s. An increase in 
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Jordanian power results in the possibility of the Jordanians rescinding Palestinian 
descendants’ nationalities, and the facilities and privileges acquired therein, and/or 
asking them to leave Jordan – a country which has in fact embraced the Palestinians in 
a way unparalleled to any other country fostering these dislocated peoples.  
Therefore, although the Jordanian regime provides Palestinian descendants 
with full citizenship, they do not have the full political rights of citizens. For example, 
one seat representing the rural city of Tafilah, which has a majority of Jordanian 
descendants, requires 19,691 votes, while another seat in Amman, which has a 
majority of Palestinian descendants, needs 85,728 votes.158 This means that the country 
prioritises parliamentarians from marginalised cities of mostly Jordanian descent, over 
big cities, like the capital, where most of the Palestinian descendants reside, keeping 
the balance in favour of Jordanian descendants over Palestinians. This therefore retains 
the imbalance of Jordanian descendants ruling the state - the foundation of the regime’s 
loyalty. By giving Palestinian’s incomplete citizenships, Jordan ensures that the threat 
of becoming a Palestinian, or ‘Alternative,’ State remains an impossibility.  
The turning point of the Palestinian question happened when Jordan and Israel 
signed the Wadi Arabah peace treaty. The Brotherhood considered this treaty to be 
against everything it stood for, becoming the point of drastic divergence not only 
between the Brotherhood and regime, but also between Jordanians and Palestinian-
Jordanians. The treaty stabilised the country and throne, proving the power of the 
latter, and the Brotherhood saw the regime’s decision as a direct threat to any work 
towards a Palestinian solution, the right to return, and the movement’s understanding 
of Ummah.  
It was clear that the Brotherhood and regime were visualising two different 
Ummah’s. King ᶜAbdallah I and King Hussein emphasised a nation state, looking to 
Jordan’s interests when dealing with the question of Palestine, favouring a solution that 
prioritised Jordan’s security, safety, interests of borders, economy, and own people. In 
contrast, the Muslim Brotherhood understands the Ummah in a wider context, in which 
small nations belong to a bigger Islamic nation, and therefore prioritising Jordanian 
interests above Palestinians’ would betray this understanding of Ummah.  
Furthermore, in the Brotherhood’s opinion, it would be a betrayal to the 
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Palestinians who were considered Jordanian until the application of the Arab League 
Summit decision of 1974, in 1988, parted the East and West Bank. Indeed, the 
Palestinian issue represents a source of legitimacy for the Brotherhood, as well as the 
core of its ethos. However, the topic of providing support and facilitating Palestine’s 
liberation became a subject of argument once the Wadi Arabah treaty was enacted. 
Therefore, the Brotherhood’s understanding of the Ummah and Palestine alike became 
compromised in the conditions of defeat and failure against Israel, whom the regime 
was normalising relations with.   
Therefore, although peace with Israel is rejected on principle, the 
Brotherhood’s new leadership presented a different perspective to its forefathers’ 
mantra of jihad against Israel. For example, the dominant stance within the movement 
had been to liberate Palestine min al-Nahr ila al-Bahr [from the Jordan River to the 
Mediterranean Sea]; a mantra which can be traced back to statements made in October 
1968 which stated that accepting Resolution 242 would directly thwart the Islamic 
Ummah.159 
However, in contrast, when asked about the Brotherhood’s current reasons for 
rejecting peace with Israel, Zakī bin Arshīd said:  
 
The aim of Islam is peace not war. ‘We are Muslim’ means that we are peaceful; 
therefore, peace is our priority. But as our example, the Prophet teaches us that the 
condition for peace is to be equal partners in peace under fair conditions. The situation 
of the peace we made [Jordan-Israel treaty] is built on our weakness, and its conditions 
are not fair upon us, therefore, this peace is not acceptable for the Brotherhood and we 
do not recognise it.160 
 
The shift in the Brotherhood’s understanding for peace is clear in this 
statement: peace is not rejected fully, as with previous Brotherhood leaderships. This 
statement was therefore followed with the question: Hypothetically, if the Brotherhood 
found itself again in parliament, and was able to lead a parliamentarian government, 
would its rejection of peace with Israel result in tangible actions? Would the 
Brotherhood lead Jordan in a war against Israel? Arshīd responded with: 
 
                                                
159 This statement has been verified by the researcher at the Ummah Center for Studies on 
August 24, 2012. 
160 Interview with Zakī bin Arshīd, August 31, 2012, Amman, Jordan. 
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No, despite the unfair conditions for peace, we as Muslims are committed to respect 
our treaties following the example of Prophet Mohammed, therefore, will keep the 
promises that Jordan made.161 
   
In this sense, this leadership of the Brotherhood would be the ones to protect 
the treaty if they were in power, despite their vocal rejection of it. Arshīd’s statement 
demonstrates the liberal stance that the new Brotherhood leadership has adopted, and 
as this conversation progressed, further hypothetical questions emerged: If the 
Brotherhood was in parliament again, what framework would it apply to providing a 
solution to the Palestinian issue? Surprisingly, Arshīd announced that, “We are 
accepting all the international agreements and resolutions by the United Nations, 
including 242 and 338.”162 
This is to say that Arshīd accepts the two state solution and its consequences 
(i.e. sharing Jerusalem as corpus separatum), which can be understood as opposing the 
Brotherhood’s previous statements on this topic. However, his hostility towards Israel 
was made apparent when he continued that, “One day, when we unite the Ummah and 
conquer our weakness, we can prepare for taking back our right [Palestine]”.163 
Here, Arshīd is stating that war and hostility will always be relevant in regards 
to the Palestinian issue. Perhaps this conflated understanding of peace with Israel 
stems from the Brotherhood realising its inability to make real change towards the 
Palestinian issue, and that peace was forced upon Jordan due to its weak stance 
towards the issue. Therefore, Arshīd’s claim that the Brotherhood is ‘choosing’ a 
peaceful path is in fact revealed as a farce, in which there is no other option or scenario 
where the treaty does not become realised. 
 Ultimately, the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood has developed a pragmatic 
stance over time, balancing ideology with political reality. On the one hand, the 
Brotherhood does not accept or recognise the State of Israel, while it considers 
Palestine a land of, and for, Palestinians, as currently under occupation. And yet, it 
finds the two-state solution acceptable.  
On the other hand, the Jordanian Brotherhood state that all commitments made 
to treaties (and therefore promises) are subject to Islamic values: not respecting them 
would be considered an act of betrayal, something the Prophet himself proved never to 
                                                
161 Ibid. 
162 Ibid. 
163 Ibid. 
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do, especially in his relations with Jews. Therefore, even though the Brotherhood 
rejected the peace treaty when not in power, its leadership has learned to accept these 
agreements of the state and confirms that if in power, they would uphold, and ensure 
the execution of, peace with Israel. However, this cannot really be proven unless the 
Brotherhood is again in power.  
Despite being a charismatic leader of the Brotherhood and IAF, Arshīd’s 
position on Israel is not unanimous within the Brotherhood. For instance, when al-
Mashūkhī was asked if peace was possible, and what kind of peace he would accept, he 
responded that the Brotherhood would ‘accept any peace that Hamas accepts.’164 
 This statement can lead to many understandings. Firstly, not all of the 
movement’s leadership is on the same track as Arshīd, so if they were in power, the 
IAF accepting peace could exacerbate a pre-existing gap between the highest level of 
leadership within the movement. Secondly, al-Mashūkhī’s statement unifies Jordanian 
Brotherhood and Palestinian decisions, taking from the Brotherhood’s credibility as a 
Jordanian national movement which enjoys making independent decisions. The next 
chapter will present the devision between the Jordanian movement, and how this led to 
their boycotting the elections.  
  
                                                
164 Interview with Ibrahim al-Mashūkhī, August 6, 2014, Zarqa, Jordan. 
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The Muslim Brotherhood’s entrance into national political life became an example for 
the Islamists not only in Jordan, but also throughout the world, since the Jordanian 
Brotherhood was the first Islamist movement to enter a parliament and government and 
to influence national politics by official means.1 
 At the same time, the debates around the 1989 elections led to fractures within 
the movement and, consequently, to the formation of a branch with a more liberal 
agenda. Yet, as for the 1993 elections, the movement, weakened by the peace process 
and the introduction of the one vote system,2 faced another internal conflict: 
ideological differences overshadowed discussions on political participation and the 
organisation retreated to its al-Banna vs Qutb theology. Thus, the Muslim Brotherhood 
faced its first internal political crisis.3  
Understanding the underlying dilemmas and divisions within the Brotherhood 
regarding national and regional agendas is paramount to fully understanding the 
Brotherhood today, and how it functions. As regional occurrences such as the growth 
of Hamas caused the Hawks to return to the Palestinian issue with renewed fervour, 
differences between members regarding their national and regional stances regarding 
participation and boycott continued to grow.  
Therefore, this chapter’s timeline explores how the rise of Hamas, combined 
with Jordan’s internal issues regarding the peace treaty and normalisation of relations 
with Israel, pushed the Brotherhood towards its first boycott in the 1997 elections. 
However, during this period there was a shift in the regional situation, particularly after 
the 9/11 events in the US, in which the Brotherhood developed a fear of being 
compared with other religious groups that were considered extreme. Accordingly, the 
splintering divisions of the Brotherhood had to overcome their differences between 
themselves and the regime in order to participate in the 2003 election and thus avoid 
association with religious extremism. 
Furthermore, this chapter explores the period between 1995 and 2003, when 
the Brotherhood focused its efforts on establishing a new social wing for the 
movement, culminating with the Association of the Islamic Centre, which became a 
                                                
1 Robert S. Leiken and Steven Brooke, "The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood," Foreign Affairs, 
March 1, 2007, accessed May 28, 2014, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/62453/robert-s-
leiken-and-steven-brooke/the-moderate-muslim-brotherhood. 
2 Nathan J. Brown, “Jordan and its Islamic Movement: The limits of Inclusion?” Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, November 9, 2006, accessed July 20, 2014, 4-7, 
http://carnegieendowment.org/2006/11/09/jordan-and-its-islamic-movement-limits-of-inclusion 
3 Interview with Raḥīl al-Gharāybah, August 24, 2012, Amman, Jordan. 
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key component in the movement’s socio-religious positioning in Jordan, distancing it 
from extremist comparisons and crystallising the movement in Jordan’s daily life. In a 
personal interview, Raḥīl al-Gharāybah discusses the social growth of the Brotherhood 
in Jordan and its importance on election day, revealing how this social wing impacted 
citizens’ votes.  
 
4.0 Preconditions for Division  
 
There were different reasons for the feeling of political defeat to emerge within the 
movement after the Wadi Arabah treaty was signed. Firstly, through its parliamentary 
participation, the Brotherhood was involved in the peace process with Israel: their 
unwitting support contributed to a general feeling that the Brotherhood had 
relinquished the Holy Land. Furthermore, disregarding the significant share of seats in 
the parliament, the law to limit the Brotherhood’s activity had been promulgated. Such 
control over political life in the country executed by the government enabled real 
confrontation between the Brotherhood and the regime. 
With these developments as a backdrop, two mutually opposed groupings were 
formed, namely the al-Hamāᵓim [Doves] and the al-Suqūr [Hawks]. On the one hand, 
this division represented two distinct ways, one moderate and one conservative, to 
consider the movement’s relation to the state.  
The discordance of views regarding the social and political involvement of the 
movement occurred when al-Huḍaybī, the General Supervisor of the movement, 
departed from the teaching of Qutb.  
The Hawks’ argument stemmed from Qutb’s Milestones and thus included 
references to Takfīr [judging other Muslim’s faith].4 This group argued that it became 
obvious after the experience of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood that Islamic societies 
and their ruling regimes were infidel. However, the other faction did not consider the 
Egyptian experience as repeating in Jordan, just as this group did not proclaim the 
Jordanian political elite Kāfir.5 
The Doves group had a significant privilege in this opposition, since the Kufr 
                                                
4 Takfīr and Kufr: See Appendix 1: Glossary. 
5 “al-Ikhwān bayna Islahīn Muḥāfiẓīn” [The Brotherhood between Reformists and 
Conservatives], Al Arab, Vol. 9413, December 18, 2013, 13, accessed May 28, 2014, 
http://www.alarab.co.uk/?id=10893. 
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of the Jordanian regime could not be used as an argument in these debates. Firstly, the 
Jordanian Constitution declared the supremacy of Shariᶜah, that Islam was the religion 
of the State, and that the King must be Muslim.6 Secondly, the King descends from the 
family of the Prophet Muḥammad.7 Despite the fact that the King does not emphasise 
his descent in politics, the Brotherhood endorses it to accentuate an element of Islam 
within the regime. As a result, the division within the Brotherhood was not regarding 
the regime’s Islamic legitimacy, but rather was limited to the movement’s political 
participation and discussion of state laws adopted by the parliament.  
The division between the Doves and Hawks deepened during debates that took 
place on the applicability of democratic procedures in the country. The Hawks 
emphasised the need to apply Shariᶜah, rejecting the humanitarian laws of the country. 
Conversely, the Doves did not see any contradiction between the existing laws and 
Shariᶜah, but they wanted to see the laws made by man brought into conformity with 
Islamic principles. Furthermore, they encouraged more consideration for Shariᶜah 
while discussing the law bill, namely they appealed to lawmakers to be as close to 
‘god’s rules’ as possible. This debate entered the public domain with the first prime 
minster to be appointed in 1989 after the Habat Nisān events, Mudar Badran, inviting 
the Brotherhood’s members, to join the government in 1991. Despite the fact that the 
argument of participation in parliament first arose in 1956; the difference then was that 
the Brotherhood did not have the same popularity or organisation as the Leftists as 
Qutbist ideology had not yet crystallised, and therefore they did not have an option but 
to participate. However, after 1989 the Brotherhood emerged as a strong and popular 
political figure, whose (non)participation would create much larger ripples across 
Jordan. With the Brotherhood’s increasing definition among other political actors, the 
split between Qutbists and al-Bannaists also became more defined, exacerbating the 
internal debate regarding participation, however, in 1991, for the first time in the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s history, the movement gained the right to rule, joining the 
government and being responsible for the implementation of their program toward a 
more Islamic state. 
                                                
6 Jordan, The Constitution of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (Amman: Press & Publicity 
Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1952), Chapter 1, Article 2: “Islam is the religion of the State 
and Arabic is its official language”. 
7 The Constitution, Article 28, “The Throne of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is hereditary 
to the dynasty of King Abdullah Ibn al-Hussein in a direct line through his male heirs as 
provided hereinafter.” 
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This idea of entering the Jordanian government was unprecedented for the 
Muslim Brotherhood. Such decisions entailed the formation of the new Islamist 
generation called ᶜUlamāᵓ: the scholars.8 These rationalist scholars, led by 
internationally recognised Islamists, Rāshid Ghannūshī and Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī, called 
for reforms from within the state. This faction launched the promotion of the Islamic 
“civilian” state, in which the role of Islamists would be shaped through reform from 
within.9 The Brotherhood accepted this ideology and adopted the concept of ‘reform 
from within’ the democratic system, which encouraged entering politics through 
democratic procedures to make gradual Islamic change not just from a grass-roots 
level, but also from the government level. Nevertheless, their ideological partition was 
preserved and presented itself in any activity the Muslim Brotherhood took part in, 
both in Jordan itself and in dealing with other branches of the Brotherhood around the 
world. 
Commonly, Brothers of Palestinian origin, such as Muḥammad abū Fāris, 
Hammam Saīd, and Abd al-Munaym abū Zanat, represented the Hawks. At the same 
time, the Doves mainly consisted of Jordanian-descendants, for example Abd al-Laṭīf 
Arabīyāt, ʻAbd al-Ḥamīd Dhunaybāt and ʻAbd al-Raḥim ʻAkūr.10 In other words, this 
division in the movement occurred between the Hawks, representing the conservative 
wing with Palestinians whose concerns, for example, were the strengthening of the 
relationship with Hamas or boycotting elections. Alternatively, the Doves represented 
Jordanian tribal roots and, consequently, advocated for closer ties with the government 
and the regime. However, the implementation of the one vote system in effect caused 
voters to make their decision based on their Jordanian or Palestinian origin, 
emphasised this division within the Brotherhood around participation. 
Furthermore, during the 1993 elections, this division played a crucial role. 
Following the dissolvance of government and parliament between 1989 and 1991, the 
Brotherhood decided to enter the 1993 election. Despite the Hawks’ increasingly 
empowered call for boycott, the Hawks and the Doves agreed to enter the elections to 
avoid any possible complications with the regime, even though the new one vote 
system did not favour the movement. This election resulted in 17 seats out of 80 for the 
                                                
8 See Appendix 1 for the ‘Rationalists’. 
9 Muḥammad Abū Rummān, The Muslim Brotherhood in the 2007 Jordanian Parliamentary 
Elections: A Passing ‘Political Setback’ or Diminished Popularity? (Amman: Friedrich-Ebert-
Stiftung, 2007), 35-36. 
10 Ibid., 9-10. 
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Brotherhood.11 Compared to the 20 seats gained in 1989,12 the Brotherhood considered 
these results a defeat, caused mainly by the change of election law.13 
The Brotherhood faced yet another development. Instead of entering the 
election with one consolidated list of candidates, the Brotherhood was also represented 
by two independent candidates: Abd al-Majīd Muḥammad Aqṭash and ᶜAbdallah Dhīb. 
These candidates, who represented Brothers of Palestinian-descent,14 won the election 
in their districts. However, the movement did not endorse this participation and in turn 
suspended their memberships for a year. This situation attracted attention to the 
heterogeneity of the movement, since it was the first recorded example of Brotherhood 
members participating without the movement’s approval. This reflects the tension 
within the Brotherhood at this time, as the Brotherhood was balancing its internal 
disputes in the face of a major political turning point, in order to remain on good terms 
with the regime.  
Until this stage, the Brotherhood had become an example of a democratic 
Islamist movement. It had proved by its participation in the elections that democracy 
and parliamentarian participation can be used as a means to gradually Islamise the 
country in terms of laws and political action. However, the crisis with the regime led to 
an exacerbated internal dilemma, questioning whether there was any benefit in taking 
the democratic path and participating in the elections. 
At the same time, the IAF’s Shoura Council made efforts to ensure that 
changes from within the Islamist political party would avoid the overly radical rhetoric 
of some of its leaders in the Brotherhood. This was also meant to prevent the Jordanian 
regime from responding violently to the Brotherhood. For this reason, the IAF’s 
Shoura elected the pro-regime Doves leader, ʻAbd al-Majīd Dhunaybāt, as a new 
General Supervisor in 1994 in an attempt to soothe the destruction of the forty year 
                                                
11 Inter-Parliamentary Union, “Jordan Parliamentary Chamber: Majles al-Nuwaab Elections 
Held in 1993”, Inter- Parliamentary Union, accessed May 28, 2014, http://www.ipu.org/parline-
e/reports/arc/2163_93.htm.  
12 Inter-Parliamentary Union, “Jordan Parliamentary Chamber: Majles al-Nuwaab Elections 
Held in 1989.” 
13 “Qānūn al-Intikhābāt al-Mūʼaqqat fī al-Urdun Raqm (41) li-Sanat 2001” [The Temporary 
Election Law number 34 For the Year 2001], Alquds Center for Poltical Studies, July 29, 2001, 
accessed May 28, 2014, http://alqudscenter.org/uploads/AN.29.07.01.pdf 
14 Qāsim Jamīl Thubaytāt, al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn fī al-Urdun, 1945-1997: Dirāsat Hālah [The 
Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, 1945-199: Status Research], (Amman: Dār Kunūz al-Maʻrifah 
al-ʻIlmīyah lil-Nashr wa-al-Tawzīʻ, 2009), 185. 
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alliance. 15, 16  
Ultimately, however, the alliance was irretrievable in wake of the peace treaty, 
which had shown both parties that they no longer shared the same understanding of the 
Palestinian issue, which had been fundamental to their alliance.  
 
 
4.1 The Brotherhood’s First Boycott: 1993 – 1997 
 
In the period between 1993 and 1997, several governments replaced one another. In 
June 1991, Taher al-Masri was appointed Prime Minister but he subsequently resigned 
in November of the same year to avoid a no-confidence vote from the Brotherhood. 
The King re-appointed Zaid ibn Shaker, (November 21, 1991 - May 29, 1993) who 
was well known for having managed the crisis of 1989. However, the Brotherhood 
refused to join his government as it was associated with facilitating peace with Israel.17 
Similarly, the Brotherhood refused to support Abdelsalam al-Majali (May 29, 1993 - 
January 1, 1995); however, the share of the Brotherhood in the parliament was not 
enough to dismiss al-Majali or to influence the King’s decision to appoint him. The 
King, to avoid any complication after signing this treaty, reorganised the government 
and appointed Zaid ibn Shaker (January 8, 1995 - February 4, 1996) for the third time 
to insure the stability of the country. This turbulent period finished with the 
government of Abdul Karim al-Kabariti (February 4, 1996 - March 19, 1997).18 
Within this decade, none of the previously mentioned Prime Ministers 
prohibited the Brotherhood’s participation in their governments. During 1993-1997, 
the Brotherhood block in parliament refused to support these governments to prove 
their opposition to the regime and their rejection of peace negotiations. Therefore, the 
                                                
15 Abū Rummān. The Muslim Brotherhood in the Jordanian Parliamentary Elections of 2007: A 
Passing Political Setback or a Decrease in Popularity? (Amman: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 
2007), 27-33. 
16 Bar, The Muslim Brotherhood, 170. 
17 Muḥammad ʻAbd al-Qādir Abū Fāris, Ṣafaḥāt min al-Tārīkh al-Siyāsī lil-Ikhwān al-
Muslimīn fī al-Urdun [Pages from the Political History of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan], 
(Amman: Dār al-Furqān, 2000), 139.  
18 “Ruʼasāʼ al-Wizārāt fī al-Urdunn” [Prime Ministers of Jordan], Hukam, 2005, accessed June 
3, 2014, http://www.hukam.net/family.php?fam=476; Saʻd Abū Dīyah, al-Fikr al-Siyāsī al-
Urdunī: Namūdhaj fī Dirāsat al-Fikr al-Siyāsī al-Urdunī Khilāl Kutub al-Taklīf Allatī 
Wajjahahā al-Malik Ḥusayn ibn Ṭalāl ilá Ruʼasāʼ al-Wizārāt [Jordanian Political Thought: A 
Model in the Study of the Jordanian Political Though in King Hussein’s Designation Letters 
Sent to the Prime Minsters ], (Amman, Jordan: Dār al-Bashīr,1989) 15-60. 
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relatively short terms of these governments were caused by the lack of the 
Brotherhood’s percentage compared to the tribal and independent candidates. Over 50 
tribal parliamentarians won seats, compared to just 16 for the Brotherhood,19 meaning 
the amount of seats the Brotherhood held were not enough to stop the government’s 
trust, nor the signing of the Wadi Arabah treaty, but were enough to inhibit the 
government. 
Due to the continuous rejection of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Parliament, 
the Brotherhood began to feel that the government was surveilling them, and to state 
their position, the head of the Muslim Brotherhood’s parliament block, Ḥamzah 
Manṣūr, addressed the government of Abdul Karim al-Kabariti with an open letter on 
March 2, 1996.20 As specified, Jordan was facing a decline in public freedom since the 
government, through martial practices, put restrictions on the activity of 
parliamentarians, political parties, preachers, and journalists. Also, the Muslim 
Brotherhood addressed the State Security Court with proof that they were subjected to 
close surveillance.21 However, a body of Islamic fundamentalists who used violence 
marked this period. The Brotherhood’s appeal was to make a clear distinction between 
cases related to the legal activities of the Muslim Brotherhood and to other Islamist 
groups, such as the Salafists, Muḥammad’s Army,22 and abū Sayyāf’s group among 
others.23  
To bring their accusation of governmental surveillance to the public domain, 
the Brotherhood issued a communiqué on their press conference on July 6, 1996, 24 as 
                                                
19 Inter-Parliamentary Union, “Jordan Parliamentary Chamber: Majles al-Nuwaab Elections 
Held in 1993.” 
20 Ḥamzah Manṣūr, Kalimāt wa-Mawāqif [Words and Attitudes] (Amman, Jordan: Dār al-
Furqān, 1998), 10-16. 
21 The State Security Court was established in 1959, under the Emergency Law, as exceptional 
act. According to Martial Law, the State Security Court was established to deal with treason, 
drug matters, espionage, and terrorism. It consisted of three military judges and three civilian 
judges. The civilian judge’s role was, however, marginalised in the court. Despite the 
termination of the emergency laws in 1989, and the reestablishment of political and 
parliamentarian life, the court continued to operate. See: 
“Qānūn Maḥkamat Amn al-Dawlah raqm 17 li-sanat 1959” [State Security Court Law Number 
17 for the Year 1959], Dīwān al-Fatwá wa-al-Tashrīʻ [The Court of Fatwa and Legislation], 
accessed June 3, 2014, 
http://www.dft.gov.ps/index.php?option=com_dataentry&pid=12&leg_id=%20647. 
22 Muḥammad’s Army: The group, captured by the Jordanian intelligence in 1991, was accused 
of many terrorist acts, such as exploding the car of an intelligence officer, burning the French 
cultural centre. The group was released in 1992 due to King’s Amnesty. 
23 Abū Sayyāfis was accused of leading a terrorist group and was sentenced to death; however, 
Sayyāfis was also amnestied in 2007.  
24 See Appendix 2.4 for communiqué. 
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ordered by al-Kabariti. In this conference the Brotherhood addressed the ‘selective 
justice’ of the State Security Court, as a number of the Brotherhood’s members were 
condemned for criticising the royalty Iṭālat al-Lisān [Lengthening the Tongue] as a 
part of their activity in the parliament.25 The communique contained the following 
request: 
 
1. To grant amnesty to all convicted by the intelligence department 
2. To investigate all cases of psychological and physical violence toward 
prisoners in the intelligence service’s cells and to punish the people 
responsible for it 
3. To stop imprisoning innocent people and to stop instigating the internal 
crisis.26 
 
  
Despite the publicity the Brotherhood’s communiqué received, on March 19, 
1997 the King reappointed Abdelsalam al-Majali to supervise the election – the same 
Prime Minster who introduced the one vote system. Therefore, the Muslim 
Brotherhood officially boycotted the 1997 election declaring that the one vote system 
made it impossible for them to participate.  
The Brotherhood rejecting peace and the result of the one vote system, 
combined with the accusation of surveillance, caused them to boycott. This document, 
Bayān al-Muqāṭa [Communiqué of the Boycott], also listed guidelines that the 
Brotherhood developed for running the elections. The benefit of such an engagement 
(since the 1989 election, the Brotherhood influenced developments in various areas: 
human rights, charity, social, cultural, educational spheres, health care, etc.27) was 
doubted after the Brotherhood was faced with close surveillance of its members, 
infringement of public freedoms, implementation of the law on criticising the royalty, 
                                                
25 Itālat al-Lisān [Lengthening the Tongue]: This law can be understood as the prohibition of 
offensive speech against the King and the royal family, and the sentence is from one to three 
years; “Law number 16, mandate number 195 for the year 1960” Named Itālat al-Lisān 
[Lengthening the Tongue], Gender Clearing House, accessed May 28, 2014, 
http://www.genderclearinghouse.org/Fr/Fr/upload/Assets/Documents/pdf/code-penal-jordanie-
arab.pdf. 
26 Abū Fāris, Ṣafaḥāt min al-Tārīkh al-Siyāsī lil-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn [Pages from the Political 
History of the Muslim Brotherhood], 142. 
27 Bassām ʻAmūsh, Maḥaṭṭāt fī Tārīkh Jamāʻat al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn fī al-Urdun [Stations in 
the History of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan], (Amman: al-Akādīmīyūn lil-Nashr wa-al-
Tawzīʻ, 2008), 204-208. 
121 
 
and changes in the public policies toward closer relations with Israel. As for the 1997 
elections, despite being led by the Doves’ General Supervisor, ʻAbd al-Majīd 
Dhunayb,28 the Brotherhood still opted for the boycott. To address the regress of 
freedom in Jordan, its retreat from democratic perspectives after the 1989 events, the 
contentious peace process, and the implication of the one vote system, the Brotherhood 
added to their Boycott communiqué the following: 
 
Election is taking place without real participation of the citizens in decision-making or 
policy building. Thorough analysis of the current political situation confirms that both 
the development of freedoms and democracy, as well as the role of non-governmental 
organizations is moving backwards. Accordingly, whatever the result of the elections, 
the role of a parliamentarian will be limited; the opposition will have no power in the 
parliament and in the political structure, having no ability to exercise influence on 
decisions or legislation procedure within the parliament.29 
 
With this statement, the Muslim Brotherhood highlights the end of the era of 
mutual alliance with the regime. The Brotherhood started to represent opposition in the 
street, rather than inside the parliament. Both the regime and the Brotherhood suffered 
in this confrontation. The movement lost its ability to affect the political process at 
parliamentary and governmental levels, just as the regime lost an important factor of 
legitimising important controversial issues, such as the peace treaty. The 1997 
elections resulted in the establishment of a parliament loyal to the regime: 68 of 80 
seats belonged to party members loyal to the regime and 12 seats went to the 
independents.30 Both the regime and the movement reached a critical moment.31  
However, it also became clear to the Brotherhood that it was impossible to 
introduce change from within the system while boycotting the election. To lose the 
                                                
28 ʻAbd al-Majīd Dhunayb, leads the Doves wing of the Brotherhood, and was the General 
Guide of the Jordanian Brotherhood. He mediated between the regime and the Brotherhood 
frequently, for which he became a member of the Senate three times in his career.  
29 “Bayān al-Muqāṭa “ʻah li-Mādhā Nuqāṭiʻ al-Intikhābāt 1997” [Communiqué of the Boycott 
Why Do We Boycott 1997 Election?]; Abū Fāris, Ṣafaḥāt min al-Tārīkh al-Siyāsī lil-Ikhwān al-
Muslimīn fī al-Urdun [Pages from the Political History of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan], 
160. 
30 Inter-Parliamentary Union, Jordan Parliamentary Chamber: Majles al-Nuwaab Elections 
Held in 1997, Inter-Parliamentary Union, accessed May 28, 2014, http://www.ipu.org/parline-
e/reports/arc/2163_97.htm. 
31 Thubaytāt, al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn fī al-Urdun, 1945-1997 [The Muslim Brotherhood in 
Jordan, 1945-1997], 174-180. 
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possibility of implementing Islamic change, which had unified the Doves and Hawks 
in the Brotherhood’s political participation, would remove their reason for cooperation, 
empowering the Hawks and naturally leading the movement towards boycott. 
Therefore, the Doves pushed the Brotherhood to revisit the divisive question 
concerning their participation in government. Thus, the Muslim Brotherhood suggested 
a new, revised path to improve the situation, including the following steps: 
 
1. To bring about constitutional reform that would ensure the separation of 
authorities, and ascribe to the legislative branch a central role in legislating, 
accountability and supervision 
2. To replace the one vote system with a modern voting system, in order to assure 
fairness and justice, so as to enable people to vote for their representatives 
3. To improve the economic situation and to oppose corruption in its different 
forms. To stop all non-legal actions against political parties and non-
governmental organisations and to open up space for peaceful opposition 
4. To stop any and all attempts to limit the freedom of citizens to foster public 
participation in the making of decisions which will affect the rest of their lives 
5. To stop the normalisation of the Zionist enemy and to close all the doors for its 
penetration.32 
 
 Thus, for the first time, the Muslim Brotherhood mentioned the constitution 
and the separation of powers clearly in their statement. On one hand, this can be 
understood as a threat to the regime, since the constitution gives the King great powers, 
such as to appoint the prime minister, government cabinet members, the president of 
the Senate, and convene and adjourn the House of Representatives without any 
accountability. Therefore, any constitutional reform would take from the power of the 
King in favour of the parliament. On the other hand, the Brotherhood might take the 
demand for constitutional reform and the separation of powers further by demanding a 
constitutional monarchy, where the king reigns but does not rule. This statement 
grabbed the regime’s attention.  
 Despite the suggestions for constitutional reform, these conditions were raised by 
the Muslim Brotherhood not to readjust their relationship with the government or to 
                                                
32 Abū Fāris, Ṣafaḥāt min al-Tārīkh al-Siyāsī lil-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn [Pages from the Political 
History of the Muslim Brotherhood], 161. 
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close the door on discussion or cooperation, but in contrast, to gain attention and to 
face the government with the necessity of these crucial issues suggested in the 
communiqué. If the conditions were met, the Brotherhood would be able to go back to 
parliamentary work.  
 However, one of the Doves’ leaders, Isḥāq Farḥān,33 who was also head of the 
IAF’s Shoura Council, suggested that the government should temporarily extend the 
1993 parliament until a new election law could be agreed on.34 This would give the 
government a chance to return to mediation with the Brotherhood by involving them in 
changing the law. This shows the willingness (and desperation) of the Doves to 
participate in the political process, and find mutual ground with the government – but 
only if they could guarantee a benefit that would convince the Hawks to revisit their 
boycott decision. 
The period from 1993 to 1997 led to the radicalisation of the movement’s 
discourse, as per the boycott communiqué. In this situation, the ideological division 
inside the movement became visible: the Doves lost influence in favour of the Hawks. 
After the division the Doves once again entered the political scene with the 
participation of Muḥammad Azāyida, ᶜAbdallah ʻAkāyīlah, Muḥammad Raʼfat and 
Salāmah Ḥayyārī in the 1997 election as independent candidates against the 
movement’s decision to Boycott.35 Other Brotherhood members showed their distrust 
of the movement’s direction by voting in the election.36 In order to punish participants 
(candidate or voter) and return the control over Brotherhood members, the 
Brotherhood held an internal court to try the violators, and consequently expelled at 
least 15 Brothers from the movement.37 
                                                
33 Isḥāq Farḥān: A leader of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood; former mister of education, 
minster of Islamic affairs, and senator. He has been expelled from the movement due to his 
participation in the government in 1973, but returned as one of the most charismatic political 
leaders.  
34 Isḥāq Aḥmad Farḥān, Mawāqif wa-ārāʼ Siyāsīyah fī Qaḍāyā ʻ ḍāyā wa-Islāmīyah [Attitudes 
and Political Views: On National, Arabic and Islamic Issues], (Amman: Dār al-Furqān 1997), 
49-50. 
35 Ahmad Dlalū, “al-Ḥarakah al-Islāmīyah fī al-Urdun bayna al-Daʻwah wa-al-Dawlah” [The 
Islamic Movement in Jordan Between the Message and the State], Ikwanwiki, January 14, 2012, 
accessed May 30, 2014, 
http://goo.gl/DirURd.   
36 The movement’s decision to boycott the elections meant not participating in the election on 
all accounts, i.e, not participating as a candidate or as a voter or in the campaign of any other 
candidate.  
37 Thubaytāt, al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn fī al-Urdun, 1945-1997 [The Muslim Brotherhood in 
Jordan, 1945-1997], 179. 
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In its approach to undertake reforms from within, the Muslim Brotherhood aimed 
to gradually move the political system toward a more Islamic one, based on 
implementing Islamic law in different spheres, for example in education, family law, in 
the Penal Code, and in international treaties. The tactics corresponded with the al-
Banna path of gradual change. However, when the Brotherhood understood that it was 
impossible to reach the proposed Islamic reform due to the policies of the regime, both 
wings of the Brotherhood began to doubt the application of democracy in Jordan. 
When the Brotherhood agreed on the democratic conditions of participation, such as 
the election and parliament, they did not expect the government to minimise its role in 
favour of traditional tribal opposition. These factors created an atmosphere of distrust 
between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Jordanian regime. 
The deep impact of the 1997 boycott left the Brotherhood in danger of splitting 
into two groups, especially given that those leaders who were publicly expelled from 
the Brotherhood, like Bassām ʻAmūsh, issued statements against the decision to 
boycott.38  
Nevertheless, the Brotherhood proved its ability to survive as a political entity 
during the July 9, 1998 Shoura Council election, when the movement met once again 
to elect its leadership within the atmosphere of the boycott clash.39 The Doves entered 
the elections represented by ʻAbd al-Laṭīf ʻArabīyāt (former head of parliament), Jamīl 
abū Bakr (Speaker for the movement), and Isḥāq Farḥān; the Hawks were represented 
by Hammām ʻAbd al-Raḥīm Saʻīd and Muḥammad ʻAbd al-Qādir abū Fāris. The 
Shoura Council accepted the re-appointment of the Doves leader, ʻAbd al-Majīd 
Dhunaybāt, as General Supervisor.40 
This proved that despite the differences in identities and the various dissent of its 
members, what ideologically unifies the Brotherhood is their zeal to create a more 
Islamic state, along with their self-proclaimed duty to liberate Palestine, whether the 
members were born on the East or West Banks of the Jordan River. This internal 
election reflects the teachings of their founder in what they refer to as a ‘golden rule’: 
“We gather on what we agree upon, and we excuse each other on that we dispute 
                                                
38 “Raddī ʻalá Bayān al-Muqāṭaʻah” [My Response on the Boycott Communiqué] in: ʻAmūsh, 
Maḥaṭṭāt fī Tārīkh Jamāʻat al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn [Stations in the History of the Muslim 
Brotherhood], 205-209. 
39 Yasser Abū Hilālah, “Intikhābāt Majlis Shūrá al-Ikhwān fī al-Urdun” [Muslim Brotherhood 
Elctions in Jordan], Al Hayat, July 10, 1998, accessed May 30, 2014, http://goo.gl/r0WacG 
40 Thubaytāt, al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn fī al-Urdun, 1945-1997: Dirāsat Hālah [The Muslim 
Brotherhood in Jordan, 1945-1997: Statues Research], 184.  
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upon.”41 
 
 
4.2  King ᶜAbdallah II and Hamas 
 
Soon, a number of administrative decisions caused further divergence between the 
Brotherhood and regime. The most important point in the Brotherhood’s critique was 
the Law on Publication, enforced on September 1, 1998 by the second government of 
Abdessalam al-Majali.42 The Muslim Brotherhood considered this law to violate 
human rights, especially in its limitation of free speech by forbidding criticism of the 
government. In addition, small publishing houses were forced to close their 
newspapers, increasing the government’s control over national mass media. The 
Brotherhood argued that it was by these methods that the government attempted to 
close the door on public criticism of the Israeli peace treaty, and the activities of a 
parliament that was operating without adequate opposition.43 
 Although relations between the Brotherhood and the regime were tense after 
the 1997 elections, there was still room for negotiation, and both sides tried to meet at 
a compromise. Therefore, the coronation of King ᶜAbdallah II, after King Hussein’s 
death on February 7, 1999, represents a new page in Brotherhood-regime history. 
 At this stage of its development, the Jordanian Brotherhood became the central 
Islamist organisation in the Levant area. This title was possible, first, because the 
Brotherhoods in other countries (such as Syria) were illegal, and second, due to the 
merging of the Palestinian and Jordanian branches after the unification of the two 
Banks of the Jordan River in 1948. Hamas was formed as a branch of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in 1987 following the events of the Palestinian uprising in the occupied 
                                                
41 Jamal Khashoggi, “Brotherhood and Salafists: Finally One Islamic Movement?,” Al-Arabiya, 
October 14, 2012, accessed May 30, 2014, 
http://english.alarabiya.net/views/2012/10/14/243595.html. 
42 The main changes in the laws were in raising the capital of the weekly newspaper from 15 
thousand to 300 thousand Jordanian Dinars (JD), and raising the daily newspaper from 300 
thousand to 600 thousand JD. This was in addition to raising the fines from five JD to 30 JD, 
which limited the number of articles in the newspapers.  
Jordan. Qānūn al-Maṭbūʻāt wa-al-Nashr Raqm 8 li-Sanat 1998 wa-al-Taʻdīlāt Allatī ṭaraʼat 
ʻAlayh: Qānūn Muʻaddil li-Qānūn al-Maṭbūʻāt wa-al-Nashr Raqm 30 li-Ranat 1999 [The 
Publication and Press Law Number 8 for the Year 1998 and Its Changes Accured on the Law: 
Law Amending the Publication and Press Law Number 30 for the Year 1999], (Amman: Dāʼirat 
al-Maṭbūʻāt wa-al-Nashr, 1999), 10-50; 
43 Abū Fāris, Ṣafaḥāt min al-Tārīkh al-Siyāsī lil-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn [Pages from the Political 
History of the Muslim Brotherhood], 153-157. 
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territories of Israel (the First Intifada44). This status was officially stated in Hamas’ 
Charter of 1998.45 
 The Islamic resistance movement self-classifies as the jihadi wing of the 
Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine. Therefore, it is specifically representative of the 
Palestinian resistance the Brotherhood pronounced to take. For this, supporting Hamas’ 
jihadist activities gave the Jordanian Brotherhood, who claimed to prioritise the 
Palestinian issue, legitimacy among the Jordanian-Palestinian population. Abū Fāris 
confirms that: 
 
The Hamas Charter and some of its statements say that the Islamic Resistance 
Movement, Hamas, is part of the universal Muslim Brotherhood. This means that, 
regarding the Palestine question, Hamas abides by the Muslim Brotherhood’s ideology 
and views, especially since it is an Islamic issue and can therefore be solved through 
jihad. The Muslim Brotherhood must extend all kinds of material and moral aid, 
support and help it. … Hamas is a part of the Muslim Brotherhood … it is the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s strike wing.46 
 
 Hamas in Jordan strengthened essentially due to a ‘gentleman’s agreement’ 
between the government headed by Prince Zaid bin Shaker and the leadership of 
Hamas; negotiations resulted in an unwritten, verbal, and mutually recognised contract, 
according to which the Jordanian state allowed political and media activities of Hamas 
in the country in exchange for their non-interference with Jordanian matters, and a 
renunciation of any militant activities in Jordan.47 
 The establishment of Hamas’ offices in Jordan was due to an important 
political act of King Hussein. After the ratification of the peace treaty with Israel, the 
                                                
44 Intifada: A form of spontaneous popular protest. The first intifada of 1987 started in Gaza and 
flourished throughout Palestine. The protest began during the funeral of four Palestinians in 
Gaza and turned into clash with the Israeli army. Students of al-Shaykh Aḥmad Yāsīn organised 
to fight, naming themselves Hamas (Harakat [Movement], al-Muqawamah, [Resistance] al-
Islamiyah [Islamic]). 
45 “Mithāq Haarakat al-Muqawamah al-Islāmīyah (Ḥamās)” [Islamic Resistance Movement 
Charter (Hamas)], Al Jazeera, 1998. Chapter 1, Mandate 1, 2, and 7. August 18, accessed May 
30, 2014, http://www.aljazeera.net/specialfiles/pages/0b4f24e4-7c14-4f50-a831-ea2b6e73217d. 
46 Abū Fāris, al-Rayah al-Islamiyah News Pare, July 6, 1990 cited in: Sabah El-Said, Between 
Pragmatism and Ideology: The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, 1989-1994, (Washington, D.C.: 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1995), 22. 
47 Abū Rummān, Jordanian Policy and the Hamas Challenge, 23-29; Ibrāhīm Ghūshah, al-
Maʼdhanah al-Hamrāʼ: Sīrah dhātīyah [the Red Minaret], (Beirut, Lebanon: Markaz al-
Zaytūnah lil-Dirāsāt wa-al-Istishārāt, 2008) 156 -204.  
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King also tried, as a counterbalance, to support the Palestinian resistance movement. 
At the same time, the King tried to prove that the Palestinian issue and bilateral 
agreements with Israel are two distinct and separate issues for Jordanian policy. 
Therefore, official affirmation of Hamas’ presence in Jordan was considered a 
compromise for Palestinians. The Prime Minster of Jordan at the time of the crisis with 
Hamas, Abdelraouf al-Rawabdeh, (March 4, 1999 – June 18, 2000) referred to the 
decision of his predecessor, Zaid Ibn Shaker, to support Hamas activity in Jordan only 
if Hamas complied with certain requirements, namely refraining from military 
activity.48 
 Despite the Wadi Arabah treaty, this ‘gentleman’s agreement’ between the 
Jordanian regime and Hamas was honoured. However, it did put pressure on Jordan as 
for the activities of Hamas inside the Palestinian territories, which made Hamas a 
“burden” on the shoulder of the country. At that point, Jordan started to demand that 
the Hamas leaders leave Jordan, especially those not of Jordanian nationality, such as 
Mūsá abū Marzūq and Imād al-ʻAlami.49 
When King ᶜAbdallah II came to power not only amidst political crisis in terms 
of the regime’s relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood, but furthermore during 
1997, two years before ᶜAbdallah’s accession, Jordan’s relations with Israel also 
deteriorated. This was due to an attempt by the national intelligence agency of Israel, 
Mossad, to assassinate Khālid Mashᶜal,50 the head of the political bureau of Hamas, on 
September 25, 1997, two months after the Muslim Brotherhood declared its boycott.51 
This failed attempt challenged the relationship between the two countries for the first 
time after the ratification of the peace treaty. King ᶜAbdallah addresses this event in his 
autobiography, Our Last Best Chance, implying that when he ascended to the throne, 
                                                
48 ᶜAzzām Tamimi, “Murājaʻāt” [Revisions], Interviewing Abdel Raouf al-Rawabdeh, al-Hiwar 
Channel, July 19, 2010, accessed May, 30, 2014, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tc2udez0rSs.   
49 Abū Rummān, Jordanian Policy and the Hamas Challenge, 44-52; Nathan J. Brown, The 
Peace Process Has No Clothes: The Decay of the Palestinian Authority and the International 
Response, (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2007), 1-12. 
50 Ibrahim Mashᶜal is a Jordanian national with a Jordanian passport, same as many of Hamas 
and PLO leadership. He is also he head of the Branch Chief in Jordan and Political Office, and 
is a main media figure of Hamas; Alex Altman, “Hamas Leader Khaed Mashaal,” Time, 
January 4, 2009, accessed June 23, 2014, 
http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1869481,00.html  
51 Paul McGeough, “Kill Khalid: The Failed Mossad Assassination of Khalid Mishal and the 
Rise of Hamas,” Forigen Affairs, September/ October, 2009 Issue, accessed May 5, 2014, 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65384/paul-mcgeough/kill-khalid-the-failed-mossad-
assassination-of-khalid-mishal-and. 
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the internal problem with the Brotherhood collided with a new clash with Israel, in the 
form of this assassination attempt.52  
The Brotherhood issued a number of public statements on the assassination 
attempt through Hamas and the IAF. In the Communiqué of the Muslim Brotherhood 
of September 25, 1997, the IAF’s of September 27, and Hamas’ of October 7, the 
Jordanian regime was accused of concealing information from its citizens and trying to 
protect the Wadi Arabah treaty as priority over dealing with the assassination attempt.53 
Later, the conflict between Jordan and Israel was resolved: Mossad agents, condemned 
for attempting the assassination of Mashᶜal, were exchanged for the spiritual leader of 
Palestinian Islamists, the founder of Hamas, al-Shaykh Aḥmad Yāsīn, who was 
sentenced to life imprisonment in 1989.54  
 The exchange reflects the pragmatism of King Hussein in balancing the 
internal and external problems facing the country. He did not want the peace treaty to 
be threatened, and yet had to find a way to respond to Islamists inside the country after 
Mashᶜal was attacked within Jordanian territory. His negotiation, which led to freeing 
al-Shaykh Aḥmad Yāsīn, a symbol for Palestine and the Islamic resistance, had a 
positive effect on Brotherhood members. Even those who are considered to be the most 
cautious in dealing with the regime, such as Ibrahim al-Mashūkhī, said, “We will never 
forget King Hussein’s effort to save Mashᶜal, and freeing our Shaykh Aḥmad Yāsīn. 
He will be always remembered by the movement for that”.55 This statement 
demonstrates how the King’s acumen on this matter transferred the movement’s 
loyalties to the regime. One can therefore assume that if the assassination attempt had 
happened before 1997, the Brotherhood’s decision to boycott may have been different. 
 However, the death of King Hussein marked the end for the activity of Hamas 
in Jordan as well as a new shift in relations between the Brotherhood and the royalty. 
Six months after King ᶜAbdallah II took the throne, Jordanian security captured 16 
                                                
52 King ᶜAbdallah II, Our Last Best Chance: The Pursuit of Peace in a Time of Peril (New 
York: Viking, 2011), 130-136; Yasser Abū Hilālah, “Ighlāq Makātib Ḥamās fī al-Urdun fi 
ʻAmmān Khuṭwah Mufāji'ah” [The Surprising Closure of the Hamas Office in Amman], Al 
Hayat, September 3, 1999, accessed May 30, 2014, http://goo.gl/rmelaO. 
53 Abū Fāris, Ṣafaḥāt min al-Tārīkh al-Siyāsī lil-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn fī al-Urdun [Pages from 
the Political History of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan], 203-2011. 
54 Paul McGeough, “Kill Khalid: The Failed Mossad Assassination of Khalid Mishal and the 
Rise of Hamas,” Forigen Affairs, September/ October, 2009 Issue, accessed May 5, 2014, 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65384/paul-mcgeough/kill-khalid-the-failed-mossad-
assassination-of-khalid-mishal-and 
55 Interview with Ibrahim al-Mashūkhī, August 6, 2014, Zarqa, Jordan. 
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members of Hamas in Jordan, while its leadership was visiting Iran. They were 
accused of the illegal possession of weapons.56 Therefore, there was a threat of 
incarceration if Hamas leaders were to return to Jordan, and they were given the choice 
to not return to Jordan, encouraging the leaders to choose political exile.57 
 Based on the ‘gentleman’s agreement,’ Hamas was seen as a Jordanian 
movement with leaders of Jordanian nationality (holding Jordanian passports), serving 
firstly Jordanian, not Palestinian, interests. Nevertheless, the investigation led the 
government to the conclusion that Hamas in Jordan is not a Jordanian movement. This 
condition led to banning the movement within the country.58 
Thus, by deliberate confrontation with Hamas, King ᶜAbdallah II began a new 
stage in the relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist organisations. 
Clearly, he departed from the path of his father, King Hussein, who balanced the 
relations between Islamists of the East and the West Bank and managed to overcome 
the severity of the boycott by the exchange of Yāsīn.  
 Thus, Hamas embodied individual frustrations and the efforts of the resistance, 
offering an alternative choice, leading to the strengthening of the Hawks in the 
Brotherhood, who took a more lenient orientation towards Hamas in its right to resist 
the peace plans. Therein, the Jordanian Brotherhood witnessed the Hawks wing rise 
within the movement, as led by Zakī bin Arshīd, who was later internally elected as a 
general secretary for the IAF.59 Due to this, the Jordanian Brotherhood contained 
Hamas within Jordan. 
 
 
4.2.1  Jordan in the 9/11 era 
 
The events of September 11, 2001, with the four coordinated attacks by al-Qaeda60 in 
                                                
56 Abū Rummān, Jordanian Policy and the Hamas Challenge, 31-32. 
57 Matthew Levitt, Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad, (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2006) 45. 
58 Abū Rummān, Jordanian Policy and the Hamas Challenge, 33-36; King ᶜAbdallah II, Our 
Last Best Chance: The Pursuit of Peace in a Time of Peril (New York: Viking, 2011), 130-146. 
59 Gharāybah, “al-Tafāʻulāt, al-Dākhilīyah wa-al-Tanẓīmīyah fī Jamāʻat al-Ikhwān al-
Muslimīn” [Internal and Organisational Interactions inside the Muslim Brotherhood]. 
60 Al-Qaeda: Global Islamic fundamentalist organisation led by Osama bin Laden aimed at 
fighting the West and its influence on the Islamic world. Also works to re-establish the 
caliphate.  
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the US, highly affected the power balance not only on a regional scale, but also 
required every national government in the Middle East to reconsider its stance towards 
Islamist organisations and groups. To avoid the possible destabilisation of the state, the 
Jordanian government adopted a number of ways to empower the security departments 
run by the Ministry of Interior, the Intelligence Department and the army.61  
In this atmosphere, the Muslim Brotherhood found itself at the centre of 
attention due to its connection and influence on al-Qaeda both ideologically (Bin 
Laden was a follower of Qutb), and organisationally: the current leader of al-Qaeda, 
Ayman al-Ẓawāhiri, was a member of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Furthermore, 
members of the Jordanian Brotherhood occupied high positions in al-Qaeda, for 
example, ᶜAbdallah ᶜAzzām, the influential Palestinian from the West Bank, mentor of 
Osama Bin Laden, and co-founder of al-Qaeda was deemed a pioneering vanguard, the 
core of a new Islamic society. For these reasons, the Brotherhood became an 
appropriate candidate to be blamed for any possible future attack on Jordan or the 
region. 
The Brotherhood had a marginal position in Jordan after King ᶜAbdallah II 
took the throne. On the one hand, the King did not want a strong Islamist opposition to 
his authority within the country, whilst on the other hand, the King did not undertake 
any active steps to engage the Brotherhood in state governance, i.e., no traditional 
welcome meeting took place between the King and the Muslim Brotherhood.62 Further, 
in light of the new policy, the Brotherhood became a concern for state security, and the 
Ministry of Interior Affairs, led by Samir al-Habashneh, monitored their activity.63 
This surveillance was increased after Jordanian intelligence became a strategic partner 
for the US in the Middle East in their fight against terror.64 The 9/11 events shaped the 
way in which the regime dealt with the Brotherhood, and justified the most important 
decision affecting the Jordanian parliament – its suspension in 2001 on the last day of 
                                                
61 Abū Rummān, The Muslim Brotherhood in the 2007 Jordanian Parliamentary Elections, 4-6. 
62 Muḥammad al-Najjār, “Malik al-Urdun Yaltaqī Qiyādat al-Ikhwān” [The King of Jordan 
Meets the Muslim Brotherhood Leadership], Al Jazeera, February 2, 2011, accessed May 30, 
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the thirteenth convocation of the parliament on June 16, 2001.65  
The reason for this decision is debatable. According to the 1976 amendments 
to the Constitution, the King has the right to postpone parliamentary elections 
indefinitely in case of any national or regional instability. In the context of the Second 
Intifada (al-Aqsa), which broke out in 2000, and the immediate events proceeding 
9/11, the King found it necessary to defer elections to the House of Representatives. 
This decision also accounted for the peace process between Jordan and Israel, which 
could be threatened by potential Islamisation of the parliament, if parliament continued 
to function.66 
 Other political actors in the country criticised the position of the King in this 
aspect. According to the Constitution, a King of Jordan is endowed with powers to 
appoint a prime minister, Majlis al-Ayan [Senate Council], and the president of the 
Senate. The King can also dissolve parliament and dismiss the prime minister and the 
cabinet at his discretion.67 Therefore, the King is the head of the executive and 
legislative powers in Jordan, and he has the sole right to suspend parliament, as per 
July 24, 2001.68 However, even with such authority, other political actors and parties 
were questioning the applicability of King ᶜAbdallah’s decision in 2001, since Jordan, 
being adjacent with Iraq, Syria, Palestine and Israel, was never stable. A complicated 
regional situation was not sufficient reason to postpone the election. Yet, the King’s 
promises to change the electoral law in the meantime minimised the criticism of the 
opponents. 
Additionally, from an economic point of view another reason could be found 
for deferring the 2001 elections. It could be argued that postponing the elections 
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allowed the government to issue a temporary law69 to deal with the economic situation 
of the country during this period, with its 30% unemployment rate and 12% poverty 
rate.70 Extreme political actions were required to meet the International Monetary 
Fund’s condition for economic reform, regarding taxation and privatisation.71  Thus, 
King ᶜAbdallah II appointed ʻAlī abū al-Rāghib as Prime Minister to govern the 
country during a state of national emergency.72 Al-Rāghib’s government issued 213 
temporary laws in this period (June 19, 2000 – October 22, 2003)73 to make the al-
Rāghib government one of the longest and most controversial governments in the 
history of Jordan,74 as the amount of decisions and laws adopted by this government 
highly outnumbered any other Jordanian government or parliament. 
From the King’s point of view suspending the elections could be seen as the 
only way of countering the pro-Islamist orientation of the Jordanian population 
following the events of 9/11. For many Muslims, the confusion after the events in the 
US once again highlighted traditional colonised narratives, reviving the anti-West 
orientation in the Arab world.75 
                                                
69 Based on mandate 194 from the 1953 temporary law: When faced with urgent situations 
where expenses cannot be delayed, such as public disaster or war, and parliament is not in 
session or is dissolved, the government has the right (with the King’s approval) to issue 
temporary laws. 
70 Al-Taqrīr al-Sanawī li-Masḥ al-ʻAmālah wa al-Baṭālah [Annual Report for the Employment 
and Unemployment Survey], (Amman, Jordan: Mudīrīyat al-Musūḥ al-Usarīyah, 2001-2003). 
71 Ahsan S. Mansur, Jordan: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix, (Washington, D.C.: 
International Monetary Fund, 2004) 15-22; “IMF Approves US$20 Million Disbursement to 
Jordan,” International Monetary Fund, Brief No. 00/59, July 25, 2000, accessed December 2, 
2014, http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/nb/2000/nb0059.htm; “Jordan – Letter of Intent, 
Memorandum on Economic and Finanical Policies, and Technical Memorandum of 
Understanding,” International Monetary Fund, August 7, 2001, accessed December 2, 2014, 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/2001/jor/01/index.htm. 
72 King ᶜAbdallah I, “Kitāb al-Taklīf al-Sāmī al-Awwal li-Ḥukūmat Ali abū al-Ragheb” [The 
Royal Designation of ʻAlī abū Rāghib], June 19, 2000, accessed May 30, 2014, 
http://kingabdullah.jo/index.php/ar_JO/royalLetters/view/id/163.html.   
73 In the absence of the parliament his government issued 213 laws including the Public 
Gathering Law which requires the approval of the local authority before any protest or 
demonstrations and Election Law for the year 2001, among many others; Siyāsī ya-Tadhakkar: 
ʻAlī abū Rāghib, [A Politician Remember: ʻAlī abū Rāghib], Series 6, Hawa Jordan, accessed 
on June 6, 2014. 
http://hawajordan.net/jonews/jordan-news/4637.html#.U5HXlvldVqU; “al-Qwānīn al-
Muʼaqqatah,” [Temporary Laws], Al-Sijill, Vol. 11, May 1, 2010, accessed May 30, 2014, 
http://www.al-sijill.com/mag/sijill_items/sitem632.htm.  
74 The parliament may approve or modify these laws. If the parliament rejects the law then the 
government, with the approval of the King, immediately declares the nullity of the law, and its 
effect. However, due to the lack of opposition in the parliament most of these laws were 
approved by the next parliament in 2003.  
75 Fareed Zakaria, “Why Do They Hate Us? America in a New World”, News Week, 2002, 
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This mood corresponded acutely with the regional political environment in the 
aftermath of 9/11. Therefore, any elections to take place at this time could be 
significantly influenced by the anti-west opposition of Jordanians in terms of both 
international relations and the economic situation.76 The US intervention in Iraq may 
lead to the formation of a parliament with an opposition majority from Islamist and 
Leftist groups, including the Brotherhood. During a course of events in Iraq, a re-
appraisal of the 9/11 events took place in Jordan, however, the public opinion shifted 
once again against the US-led coalition occupation in Iraq. 
 
 
4.2.3 Iraq  
 
On March 20, 2003, US forces attacked Iraq as a continuation of the ‘War on Terror’. 
The official Jordanian position on this matter was non-intervention in Iraqi affairs, 
including revising the scope of the American-Jordanian treaty. The role of Jordan in 
this war was limited to facilitating medical help and undertaking refugee support.77 
However, the state’s position was widely criticised by Jordanians, mainly due to the 
different path King ᶜAbdallah II took form his father, King Hussein, as the new king’s 
attitude towards Iraq was considered by the opposition as pro-Western orientation. 
Throughout its history, Jordan preserved close ties with Iraq in political, 
cultural, and economic domains. Moreover, the popularity of Saddam Hussein was 
considerable in Jordan due to his pro-Palestinian position. Jordan also had strong 
economic connections with Iraq and enjoyed certain benefits in oil prices. The former 
King Hussein preserved good relations with Saddam Hussein, which also served to 
stabilise diplomatic relations between the countries, since Jordan remained the only 
state in the region to have diplomatic relations with Iraq after the international 
economic sanctions on Iraq were implemented in 1991. Therefore, Jordan played the 
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role of a mediator between the US and European countries and Iraq before the war, and 
implemented the ‘Oil for Food Programme’ in 2003.78 
The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan supported the mother movement in Egypt 
in its position towards the US intervention. The Egyptian Brotherhood’s Murshid 
[Supreme Guide] declared that Iraq was occupied Muslim land and it was an Islamic 
obligation to free it.79 A Brotherhood communiqué was issued on March 20, 2003 to 
address Americans as aggressors occupying Iraqi lands. Following this, the Muslim 
Brotherhood called for resistance. The Communiqué stated four important issues: 
 
• Any aggression against Muslim people is unacceptable and to be resisted, 
whoever the aggressor may be; 
• Defending Iraq does not mean defending the Iraqi regime, and it is for the 
regime to assume responsibility for the series of crises they caused when 
asserting power over their own people and their neighbouring countries. The 
unity of the Iraqi people and the Iraqi territories cannot be comprised; 
• The Iraqi people have the right to change their regime independently; 
• Supporting the Iraqi people is a Fard [obligation],80 with the need to consult 
with the people of Iraq themselves. 81  
 
Thus, the moderate Brotherhood movement in Jordan was pressured into the 
radicalisation of following the path of the mother movement, which declared that jihad 
had become a Fard due to the invasion of Islamic lands. Maʼmūn Huḍaybī (Murshid of 
the movement) explained the jihad that the movement calls for: 
 
                                                
78 Known as the ‘Oil for Food Programme’ (OFFP): when one oil barrel in 2000 cost 30 USD 
on the internal market, Iraq sold it to Jordan for 9.5 USD; the payment was not only in money 
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and Iraq], United State Institute for Peace, Special Report no.178, Dec 2006, accessed May 30, 
2014, http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr178_arabic.pdf.  
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Ikhwan Online, Communiqué of the Muslim Brotherhood March 20, 2003, accessed May 30, 
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In the case of aggression on an Islamic country, jihad becomes a Fard Ayn [compulsory 
obligation] … but jihad must be in the framework of authority … the Iraqi war will 
emphasise the religious feeling between Muslims and it will spread the Islamic 
movements.82 
 
Maʼmūn Huḍaybī refers here to the organisational work of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in the 1948 war, in which the Egyptian and Jordanian Brotherhoods were 
working in support and coordination of the Arab government to liberate Palestine by 
recruiting and training civilians to enter the war. Here, he is calling for a similar 
cooperation between the Brotherhood and government to recruit and organise the jihad 
to liberate Iraq from the US occupation.   
Even though the Jordanian Brothers did not participate in the conflict, they 
recognised and supported the effort of the resistance under the previously outlined 
conditions, and raised public awareness of the occupation and danger of US 
aggression.83 Due to the lack of representation in parliament, the Muslim Brotherhood 
used their influence in the mosques to raise such awareness.84  
Moreover, the path of King ᶜAbdallah II, firstly to expel Hamas from Jordan, 
then to suspend the parliament and postpone the elections, and finally to hold an 
ambivalent position towards the war in Iraq resulted in a deepening of disagreement 
between the Brotherhood and the King.85 
 
 
4.3 The 2003 Elections 
 
The 2003 election, however, did not suspend the anti-war appeals of the Muslim 
Brotherhood. Thereby, within the Brotherhood, a compromise was met to not make 
any public statements or communiqués regarding the Iraq war that could have 
complicated already fragile relations with the government before the 2003 election, in 
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which the Brotherhood decided to partake. The idea was to resume anti-war and anti-
Western sentiment in the mosques. Due to this, the responsibility of handling such a 
conflict of interests transferred from the higher, organisational level of the movement, 
to a more individual and personal level, helping the Brotherhood avoid official conflict 
with the government.  
 In the aftermath of the Iraq invasion, the Bush Administration pursued a new 
policy in the Middle East. It claimed that terrorism resulted from the lack of reform in 
the region and, therefore, in order to prevent any future attacks, affected countries 
should undertake democratic reforms.86 This shift in US foreign policy influenced 
political agendas in the region and encouraged election processes in countries such as 
Egypt, Iraq, and Palestine.87 Thus, it became essential for the Jordanian government to 
recommence the parliamentary life and reconcile with the Muslim Brotherhood along 
with further integration of Jordanians of Palestinian origin into Jordanian 
parliamentary life.88  
 In 2003, the Brotherhood found itself in a critical position, as it saw the King’s 
steps regarding the suspension of Hamas and parliament as a threat to Islamic activities 
in Jordan, reinforced and legitimised by 9/11, which provided the perfect opportunity 
for the regime to weaken the Brotherhood. Therefore, the Brotherhood’s decision to 
participate, despite Jordan’s peace with Israel, and seeing no critical changes in the 
election law, was due to the movement’s fear of further confrontation with the regime. 
The participation in 2003 sent the message that the Brotherhood is a national, 
Jordanian movement, firmly against radical Islam, and relevant to Jordan and its 
grievances, despite opposing the regime’s policy towards Israel and Iraq. Therefore, 
due to changes in attitude towards Islamic parties after 9/11, the movement had to 
move past its divisions, which may have harmed the movement if it appeared to be 
radical or against the elections. Thereby, rather than concerning itself over internal 
disagreements, the movement entered the 2003 elections to protect its reputation. 
The development of the election law later became the main official reason to 
suspend elections in 2011. The new law was based on temporary law number 34 of the 
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al-Rāghib government.89 Amendments were introduced to guarantee transparency of 
the election to the House of Representatives, such as:  
 
• Lowering the voting age from 19 to 18 
• Assigning judiciaries to supervise the electoral process 
• Assigning Civil Status departments to prepare information tables for voters 
• Increasing the parliament seats from 80 to 104 
• Quota of six seats for women to guarantee a minimum representation in 
parliament.90 
 
These changes in the election laws, however, could not influence the electoral 
behaviour itself. Assigning a judicial system to supervise the process did not change 
the way Jordanian citizens voted. The one vote system, which forces a voter to choose 
not between political candidates, but based on his/her own identity(ies), cannot 
guarantee representative results. Therefore, this new law would lead to an increase in 
differentiation among Jordanians based on their descent every time they are faced with 
the necessity to vote for their representative in the parliament. Thus, the election would 
not act as a stabiliser of the situation, nor would it bring voters together in choosing 
their best representative. On the contrary, the elections would differentiate people from 
each other, forcing them to vote for representatives of their roots, who would protect 
their identity before others. 
Furthermore, the government retained electoral districts based on geography, 
which had been discredited in past elections, while giving equal representation to small 
cities at the expense of larger cities (people in large cities are more likely to vote for 
ideology than in rural areas). More importantly, the population of large cities is mainly 
represented by Jordanians of Palestinian descent (mostly in Amman and Zarqa). 
Equality of seats based on geographical division will therefore minimise the 
an and Salt. The new law once again confirmed a situation where, for example Zarqa 
with a population of 764,650 people in 2004 had the same ten seats in the parliament 
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as Karak with a population of only 204,185. In total, 765 candidates participated in 
elections and 2.3 million citizens registered to vote to fill the 110 seats in the 
parliament.91 Moreover, the voter turnout in big cities was even lower: 43% (out of 
1,942,066) for Amman, and 48% in Zarqa. Whereas in small towns, with a majority of 
Jordanian-descent voters, the turnout was higher, for example, Karak had a turnout of 
82%, Mafraq, 81% (out of 244,188), and Jerash 82% (out of 153,602). As a result, only 
20 parliamentarians representing Jordanians of Palestinian origin were elected in 
2003.92 
This electoral reform did not address the core of the problem, which was the 
one vote system, and the geographical distribution of seats – it was a cosmetic 
procedure to bring the opposition back to the political process. However, broad 
participation in this election was highly important for the regime as well, because in 
the former election of 1997, only 47.45% of the registered voters took part after the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s boycott, putting the credibility of that election process in 
doubt.93 Therefore, this election needed to present Jordan as a modern democratic state 
in the Middle East after 9/11 and the occupation of neighbouring Iraq.  
In 2003, due to the Brotherhood’s participation in the election, the traditional 
division of the Hawks and Doves was renewed. However, this discrepancy did not 
become public as in 1997. Consequently, the IAF made a decision for the 2003 
elections to participate with a separate list of candidates, and not through the 
movement.94 This was a strategic move to show a certain independence from the 
Muslim Brotherhood, even though most of the Brotherhood’s members were also 
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members of the IAF party. 
At this point, the Brotherhood created a new strategy in dealing with the 
regime and the differences inside the movement. The movement decided to appoint 
Brothers who were of Jordanian tribal origins for the leading positions in the 
movement. There are several different reasons for this. Firstly, it is possible to argue 
that this strategic shift in leadership was devised to advertise the IAF as representative 
of both Jordanian- and Palestinian-descent citizens rather than solely Palestinian. 
Secondly, Jordanian descent members are less likely to be persecuted. Also, Jordanian 
descent members better facilitate negotiations and mediation with either government or 
state security departments if such persecution should be realised. Thirdly, and most 
importantly for election purposes, it may influence the chances of a candidate being 
elected if a voter is deciding between his tribal and religious affiliation. This is 
especially true for voters of specific geographical areas, and tribes, which the Muslim 
Brotherhood cannot access with their Palestinian predominance. 
The result of the 2003 elections was unexpected for the Muslim Brotherhood.95 
In 2003, the movement succeeded in taking 17 of 110 seats, one more than in 1993, at 
which time there were just 80 seats.96 This meant that in 1993 the Muslim Brotherhood 
was represented by 20% of parliament while in 2003, only by 15% (a 5% decrease of 
seats and, therefore, of their role in parliament; or 10% less seats than in 1989 when 
the Brotherhood gained 25%: 29 out of 80 seats).  
Also, the impact of the one vote system became noticeable regarding the 
Leftists, who entered the election in one unified block of seven leftist parties led by al-
Ḥizb al-Shuyūᶜī al-Urdunnī [The Jordanian Communist Party] and Ḥizb al-Shaᶜb al-
Dimūqraṭī al-Urdunnī [The Jordanian People's Democratic Party], but left with no 
seats. 
The reasons for the drop in popularity of the Muslim Brotherhood in 2003 can 
be explained by the exclusion of the Brotherhood from the national political scene due 
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to their boycott of the 1997 elections.97 It can be argued that the Brotherhood 
undertook a deliberate move not to challenge the regime through dropping the number 
of their candidates to 30 despite the increase of parliamentary seats.98 This diplomatic 
approach of the Brotherhood suggested that the movement was looking for ways to 
reconcile with the regime and for their participation in politics to not threaten the 
legitimacy of the current government. The regime acknowledged the Brotherhood’s 
olive branch and in response dismissed the Minister of Interior who had been 
appointed in 2001 to supervise security inspections against the Brotherhood. This was 
a message from the state that relations with the Brotherhood would be more 
normalised as would their political acceptance.99 
 
 
4.3.2 The Social Wing  
 
The most notable feature in the 2003 election was the use of the Brotherhood’s social 
system (schools, university, hospitals, and charities) in the election to support the IAF. 
Despite the claim of separation, the IAF uses the same structure as the movement, 
relying on the same voters and network that the Brotherhood has built over time. 
Thereby, the issue of linking the Brotherhood’s social activities and charitable causes 
to vote collecting is a common accusation for the movement, and is often heard during 
election time. Indeed, accusations that the Brotherhood advertises for IAF members 
through its social wing need to be answered by the Brotherhood itself. While 
Zakī bin Arshīd recognises that other parties can exploit the social activities of the 
Brotherhood in the lead up to elections, he said:  
 
The Islamic movement is ideological, political, and idealistic because of its Islamic 
rules. It aims to improve, and peacefully change the society through social work … 
The movement’s social work is objective and may therefore present unforeseen 
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benefits. We reach out to people and communicate with them without expecting 
anything in return. But if they do wish to return the goodwill, which is usually the 
case, it will be a tool to empower our political purposes. [Italics added for verbal 
emphasis]100  
 
 Arshīd then quoted a verse of Qurᵓan: “is the reward for good [anything] but 
good?” to give this usage of the movement’s social activities a religious backing.101 On 
the other hand, al-Gharāybah firmly denies this claim stating: 
 
It is an accusation against the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Jordan that we try to 
use social channels to reach political objectives. Our response to this comes from our 
message that is ‘social work for social change’; this message has been followed from 
the early 1950s until the current day. It has been a message for the Jordanian people, 
without any consideration of political agenda, since before the existence of 
parliamentarian representation in this country… We maintain the same ideas, and we 
do not impose any ideologies or new methods for living upon the Jordanian people. 
Therefore, we don’t think about our social work and its effects on the Election Day.102 
 
 However, whether or not the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood recognise or 
deny the direct influence of the social wing, no one can deny the indirect influence it 
has had on the voting process. Since the 1970 Civil War, the Brotherhood has built a 
strong system, enjoying the freedoms it gained upon the exile of the Fedayeen, and 
reaching places that the government cannot reach, such as refugee camps. As testament 
to al-Gharāybah’s statement, the Islamic Centre takes care of thirteen thousand orphans 
in Jordan, whilst the development ministry cannot care for more than four thousand.103 
 When entering the Islamic Center in Zarqa, or the Islamic Hospital in Amman, 
one realises immediately that it is run by the preachers of the movement, and there is 
no governmental presence involved. Similarly this is seen in refugee camps such as 
Baqa'a and Wihdat, where most inhabitants study or receive treatment from either 
UNRWA, or the Muslim Brotherhood’s schools and clinics.104 The Brotherhood argue 
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that government bureaucracy makes it impossible for the latter to reach and change 
these places. Additionally, it is argued that the government lacks the power to make 
real changes in society, since the King appoints it, and therefore works within the 
framework that he sets. In regards to the Jordanian Prime Minister, who had neither a 
plan nor agenda of his own to develop the country, al-Gharāybah said: 
 
Jordan has many entities and departments representing the community but it cannot do 
what it should due to the governmental power over these entities. While the 
governments that come to power do not perform their constitutional role, and 
representatives become just high-class employers without any governmental 
responsibilities.105 
 
 The lack of a plan and strategy to deal with societal problems come from the 
political system the regime created based on the one vote system. Further, al-
Gharāybah’s claims of governmental beurocracy has a hidden tone, implying that the 
central government is unable to make descisions towards the governmental 
departments and entities around the country due to either unwillingness to help, or 
because of a lack of understanding of the needs of those areas. 
 The website of the Islamic Centre claims to care for 33,000 orphans, 7,000 
poor families, and teach 1,500 students at its own expense.106 Furthermore, the charity 
wing, which is run through the Islamic Center, runs 55 schools, a large hospital with 
thirty health centres and clinics around the country, with a total of 3,500 employees. 
The Islamic Center steps in when the government fails, creating the need for 
Brotherhood services in all corners of the country. The political influence, and loyalty, 
gained from those who have benefitted from their services – be they employees, those 
in need, or the student body – is quantified on Election Day. 
 Some newspapers estimate that the Islamic Center alone was worth $1.5–2 
billion in 2006, however, these figures remain unverified by authors Ḥilmī Asmar, and 
Marwān Shaḥādah,107 and may be exaggerated unless they include accounts held with 
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the Islamic Bank, of which the Muslim Brotherhood is the largest shareholder.108 
Whether or not these figures are verified, a general idea of the enormity of the 
Brotherhood’s internal economy, in such a small country as Jordan, is revealed. 
 
 
Image 1: Branches and Activities of the Social Wing of the Brotherhood, through the 
Islamic Center Around Jordan109 
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Brotherhood, through the Islamic Center Around Jordan], English translation and ajustments, 
2012, accessed December 12, 2014, http://islamicc.org/ar/ 
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 The 2003 election was of great significance for Jordanian political history not 
only because the King had delayed this election since 2001, but also because the 
Brotherhood decided to return to the parliament after the 1997 boycott. Even though 
the Brotherhood gained only 17 seats (15% compared to 21% in 1991 and 25% in 
1989), their participation was a sign to prove the important role of the parliament and 
the need to promote political democratisation despite the events the region experienced 
(Iraqi war, 9/11). Thus, entering the parliament even with the lowest percentage was a 
success for the Brotherhood, and indicated the rationalisation from both the regime and 
the Brotherhood in accepting each other. However, beyond parliamentarian relations 
there was another kind of clash with King ᶜAbdallah II. A rise of Islamist radicalism in 
the country, the Iraqi War, and the growth of Jihadist Salafism in Jordan, which led to 
the Amman Bombing in 2005 and the association between the Brotherhood and 
Islamic violence in Jordan, put the movement’s existence at risk again. 
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In this chapter’s timeline, the two parallel lines that emerged in Jordan during the post-
9/11 period will be explored. The first line embodied the Salafist movement’s growth, 
and the development of radical understandings of Islam. The Salafist movement used 
violence to achieve Islamic objectives such as creating an Islamic state, and in the 
1990s fragmented, creating the Jihadist Salafist movement, which furthered these 
violent understandings of Islam. The second line moving parallel to the Salafists was 
the Brotherhood and its modernisation. The Salafists influenced the Brotherhood 
insofar as causing the Brotherhood to participate in political life due to fear of 
association with radicalism after 9/11. This either-or discourse resulted in the 
stratification of the Islamic movements, causing the Brotherhood to develop a 
modernist behaviour. Therein, as this chapter explores, the Brotherhood participated in 
the 2003 election after six years of boycott, despite their reasons for boycott remaining 
the same. The two Islamist movements came head to head in a battle of ideology and 
necessity, modernism and radicalism, however the regime’s purported fear of the 
Brotherhood juxtaposed these parallel lines in the 2007 election, pushing for the 
Brotherhood’s 2010 final boycott. 
 In order to understand the Brotherhood’s decision to boycott, the chapter 
progresses in its timeline by presenting the reasons for why the movement participated 
in the 2007 election. Using Zarqa city as a case study to track the Salafist movement’s 
growth in Jordan and its consequences on the Brotherhood, this chapter presents 
Hamas’ success in the 2006 election and its effect on the Doves and the Hawks of the 
movement to choose a new leadership and to enter the 2007 election.  
 The results of the election, however, were unexpectedly low for the 
Brotherhood, who subsequently accused the regime of committing electoral fraud 
against them. Doubting the benefits of being part of the political process, the 
Brotherhood were forced to retreat from participation, thus developing a stance similar 
to that of the Salafists towards politics and participation. Although these similarities 
are general, a splinter group of the Hawks have developed a stronger association with 
the Salafists, resulting in the ‘Salafist Brotherhood’, who pit political reform and the 
Palestinian issue as driving incentives. In personal interviews with three key leaders, 
these internal transformations can be clarified, particularly in the case of the new 
Hawks’ leader, Ibrahim al-Mashūkhī.  
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5.0 The Salafist Movement vs. the Muslim Brotherhood in Zarqa 
 
Zarqa is the second biggest city of Jordan, located to the east of Amman. After the 
1948 and 1967 wars with Israel, it was an obvious retreat for refugees due to its 
available space and proximity to the Zarqa and Jordan Rivers. Also during this time, 
Jordan was undergoing a series of economic, political, and social challenges. Due to 
these events converging with an influx of Palestinian refugees who later were granted 
citizenship,1 Zarqa became an incubator for Islamic movements such as the 
Brotherhood and the Salafist movements. To further this trend, the city also became a 
destination for Iraqi refugees from 2003 onwards. The influx of refugees resulted in 
poverty,2 and a high rate of unemployment compared to other cites in Jordan.3 Social 
and economic instability instigated a radicalisation of attitudes. Soon, the city became 
well known as a centre of fundamentalism. 
 The rise of Islamism in the region can be traced back to 1968, when the Israeli 
army attacked Fatah and the Brotherhood in Jordan. The consolidated forces of Fatah 
and the Brotherhood via the Shuyūkh bases, with the help of the Jordanian army, won 
the Karameh Battle in 1968. This victory promoted Islamist representation in the 
region. It was believed that success over Israel was due to the strong religious faith of 
the Brotherhood, in comparison with the Six Day War in which the Arab Armies were 
faithless and led by a secular state, and thus defeated.4 Furthermore, after the 
withdrawal of the Fedayeen from the region, an ideological gap inside the refugee 
camps occurred. In the 1960s, the Brotherhood managed to assert more control over 
the poorest territories and camps by organising charity and financial aid.5  
 Thus, after clashes between the PLO and the Jordanian regime in the 1970s, 
                                                
1 “Mukhayyam al-Zarqa” [Refugee Camps in Zarqa], United Nations Relief and Works Agency 
for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), accessed June 3, 2014, 
http://goo.gl/y0qbHy 
2 In 1997, the poverty rate was recorded at 16 per cent in United Nations Development 
Programme UNDP: “Localization of the MDGs in the Governorate of Zarqa," UNDP, 2013, 
accessed June 3, 2014, 
http://www.jo.undp.org/content/jordan/en/home/operations/projects/poverty_reduction/MDGs.h
tml; Ibrahim M Hejoj,"A Profile of Poverty for Palestinian Refugees in Jordan: The Case of 
Zarqa and the Sukhneh Camps," Journal of Refugee Studies, 20 (2007), Issue 1, 120-145. 
3 Benjamin R. Banta, "Just War Theory and the 2003 Iraq War Forced Displacement”, Journal 
of Refugee Studies, 21 (2008), Issue 3, 261-284. 
4 A. Boukhars, “The Challenge of Terrorism and Religious Extremism,” Jordan Strategic 
Insights, Volume 5(2006), Issue 4. 
5 Dilip Hiro, Holy Wars: The Rise of Islamic Fundamentalism, (New York: Routledge, 1989) 5-
142. 
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there was a rise of radical Islam in the area. Besides the popularity of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in the refugee camps, the Salafist movement started to take root in the 
region.6  
 In general, Salafism can be defined as a social and religious movement, calling 
for social reforms, opposing ethical and religious corruption, emphasising close 
adherence to the model of the Salaf or 'predecessors' (the first generation of Muslims, 
the Prophet’s companions and followers).7 The Salafists, like other Islamist groups in 
the area, call for the return to the Qurᵓan and the Sunnah as the only guidance for social 
and private life. Yet, the Salafists, unlike other ideological Islamist movements, reject 
any possible adaptations of Islam in current political developments. They do not accept 
theoretical and practical adjustments of Islam, including politically, such as seen with 
the Brotherhood’s practices of forming political parties, running for elections, and 
opposing a regime or participating in government, altering Islam to fit their agenda. To 
this end, traditional Salafists refer to the Qurᵓanic verse that refers all political matters 
to the ruler: 
 
O you who have believed, obey God and obey the Messanger and those in authority 
among you. And if you disagree over anything, refer it to God and the Messenger, if 
you should believe in God and the Last Day. This is the best [way] and best in result.8  
 
 In this sense the Salafists understand that the ruler of the state monopolises 
politics, and obeying the ruler is to obey God. Therefore, the main difference between 
the Salafist movement and other Islamic movements, the Muslim Brotherhood in 
particular, is political, referring to the issue of participation in political processes both 
in establishing political parties (and participating in the elections) or forming an 
opposition to a regime.9 In addition, despite Qutb’s opinion toward changes of the 
society, the Brotherhood generally defends gradual social changes through 
participation in national politics that would eventually empower the movement to 
                                                
6 Mark Durie, “Salafis and the Muslim Brotherhood: What is the Difference?” Middle East 
Forum, June 6, (2013), accessed June 3, 2014, http://www.meforum.org/3541/salafis-muslim-
brotherhood. 
7 See Appendix 1: Glossary. 
8 The Qur'ān: English Meanings and Notes by Ṣaḥeeh International, (London: al-Muntada al-
Islami Trust, 2012), al-Rūm, al-Nisa’, Surat 4:59 
9 Quintan Wiktorowicz, "Anatomy of the Salafi Movement,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 
Vol. 29 (2003) 207-239.  
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introduce more Islamic legislation and therefore to develop society within norms of the 
Qurᵓan. The Salafist movement, conversely, orientates towards a strict application of 
the Qurᵓan and the Sunnah, and rejects any law that is not derived from the Islamic 
sources of legislation.10 
 Furthermore, Salafism rejects all kinds of modern or fashionable practices, 
such as visiting tombs, graves of holy people in order to get closer to God or celebrate 
the Prophet’s birth, or any other practices that are not mentioned in the Qurᵓan and the 
Sunnah.11 Despite common convictions, the Salafist movement does not have a unified 
theology. Their ideological standpoints are being constantly transformed and adapted 
by Sheikhs and Imams in accordance with historical events the Salafists experienced. 
This lack of ideological consistency results in diversity within the movement. 
Historically, the following patterns can be distinguished: 
 
• Tarikhiyya Salafīyah: An historical development of Salafism, going back to 
Aḥmad bin Muḥammad bin Ḥanbal in the third century AH and bin 
Taymiyyah.12 At that time, Salafiyyah’s main focus laid in the interpretation of 
Qurᵓan and Sunnah: idiomatic interpretation vs. literal interpretation; 
• Wahhabi Salafiyyah: associated with bin Abd al-Wahhab,13 who in the 18th 
century established a state ruled exclusively by Shariᶜah (state is responsible 
for enforcing ethical and social purity); 
                                                
10 Marc Lynch, “Islam Divided Between Salafi-Jihad and the Ikhwan,” Studies in Conflict & 
Terrorism, (2010) 33:6, 467-487. 
11 Henri Lauzière, “The Construction of Salafiyyah: Reconsidering Salafism from the 
Perspective of Conceptual History,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, 42 (2010), 
369-389; T. Stanley, “Understanding the Origins of Wahhabism and Salafism,” Terrorism 
Monitor, (2005) 3:14, 8-10. 
12 Bin Taymiyyah is one of the leading Islamist political thinkers; who laid down the main 
principles of political Islam (al-Hisbah) and Salafism. All Islamic schools of the four Imams, 
al-Shafiᶜi, al-Hanbali, al-Maliki, and al-Hanafi, accepted bin Taymiyyah’s theory and followed 
his path and teachings. Bin Taymiyyah claimed that the Qurᵓan and Shariᶜah should rule the 
Islamic state as the sole sources of legislation for the Ummah. 
13 Abd al-Wahhab’s first rule for society stresses the main Islamic prohibitions such as alcohol, 
premarital sex, and gambling. He then prohibited what he thought un-Islamic in his time such as 
tobacco, magic, and any proximity of men and women in public spaces. Bin abd al-Wahhab’s 
theory could not be published without power and authority in the Arab Bedouin society, 
therefore he allied himself to the al-Saud tribe of warriors. This cooperation between bin Abd 
al-Wahhab and bin Saud produced the first Wahhabi entity in 1744. 
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• Nationalist Salafiyyah: an attempt launched in North African Arab countries, 
mainly Morocco, to reconcile between a reformist understanding of Salafiyyah 
and a calling for jihad, for political liberation of the Islamic states; 
• Jihadi Salafiyyah (Jihadist Salafism): radical Islamist groupings inspired by 
Qutb (Ṣāliḥ Sarīyah’s group,14 Jamāʻat al-Takfīr wa-al-Hijrah,15 and Abdu 
Asalam Faraj’s group);16  
• Conservative Salafiyyah: rooted in Saudi Arabia (Hayʼat kibār al-ʻUlamāʼ / 
Council of Senior Scholars), is a mixture of historical and Wahhabist 
Salafiyyah: Salafiyyah theology occupies significant religious part in society 
and justifies the state’s attempt to oppose common threats for conservative 
regimes.17 
 
 The Salafist movement in the Middle East in its historical development went 
through similar phases in constructing its theology. Yet, recently the dominant 
tendency is the Conservative Salafiyyah, influenced by the Saudi Arabian 
understanding and organisation of Islam within the state.18 Despite this ideological 
domination, in certain areas, due to different experiences and the strong personal 
influence of some Imams, other currents of Salafism can be distinguished. Despite a 
general tendency in the Zarqa region, due to its particular historical and political 
situation, Jihadist Salafism became the main approach to understanding Salaf, and to 
applying Islam. 
                                                
14 Ṣāliḥ Sarīyah in his message Risalt al-Ayman [The Message of Belief] argued that the leaders 
of the Muslim world are infidels and the first step to create the Islamic state is by obliging them 
to step aside.  
15 The Jma’at al-Takfīr wal-Hijra’ [The Group of Infidel and Emigration] mission is in the 
group’s name: ‘Takfīr’ [the right to judge Muslims based on behaviour which deviates from the 
Islamic path as they see it] ‘Hijra’ [emigration] means that they left or emigrated from society, 
which itself is already infidelic from their perspective. Therefore, they label themselves as ‘al-
Jma’a al-Islamiah’ [The Muslim Group] as the only existing Muslims. For this reason they 
emigrate from society to prepare for establishment of their mission of re-giving Islam to the 
people.  
16 Faraj was one of the true believers of bin Taymmyah’s fatwas and theory about jihad with his 
confirmation of the need for the application of jihad against the leaders of the Ummah [nation] 
to end colonisation. In his book “Al-Faridah al-Gaa’aibah” [The Absence of Obligation], he 
presents his opinion that the domination of the West over the Islamic lands is a result of the 
current Islamic leaders. Therefore, he issued a fatwa stating that jihad is Fardayn. 
17 Hassan Abu Hanieh Muḥammad Sulaymān Abū Rummān, Jordanian Salafism: A Strategy for 
the “Islamization of Society” and an Ambiguous Relationship with the State, (Amman: 
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung December, 2010), 21-39. 
18 David Commins, The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia, No. 50, (IB Tauris, 2006) 104-
205. 
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 Zarqa is the centre of the Salafist movement in Jordan. The city occupied this 
position after Sheikh Nasser Eddin al-Albani19 fled from Syria to Zarqa after the 
confrontation between Islamists and the regime.20 It was due to the significance of his 
personality for the development of the movement that Salafism in Zarqa became 
conventionally known as al-Salafiyyah al-Albāniyyah. From the beginning of the 
1980s, al-Albani declared that his movement would not join with Jordanian politics in 
accordance with Salafism’s basic concept of refusing to partake in political 
partisanship. This standpoint minimised the confrontation in mosques over the 
recruitment of new members between the Brotherhood and the Salafists. Their 
ideological differences made a clear boundary between the two movements based on 
their understanding of political participation. Thereby, al-Salafiyyah al-Albāniyyah can 
be considered as a conservative traditional version of Salafism to call for the 
application of the Qurᵓan and the Sunnah without any involvement in power or 
opposing the regime.21 
 As al-Albani became popular in Jordan, his preaching inspired many within 
the Brotherhood’s leadership, such as ᶜAbdallah ᶜAzzām.22 However, ᶜAzzām took his 
own path in his understanding and preaching for Islam. In the 1970s, through his 
activity in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, ᶜAzzām opposed the non-interference ideology 
of al-Albani. The most famous fatwa23 of the former stated24 that jihad became Fard 
Ayn.25 Having taken the path of jihadism, in 1984, ᶜAzzām established the bureau of 
services for the Arab Afghans to recruit Arabs to the Afghani war. For this purpose, he 
published numerous books and pamphlets to motivate and to mobilise youth in joining 
                                                
19 Sheikh Nasser Eddin al-Albani: Islamic Scholar, one of the most influential Salafiyyah 
references, because of his known work on Hadith, such as Kunūz al-Sunnah: Rasāʼil Arbaʻ 
[Treasures of Sunnah: Four Masses], (Demascus: Al-Maṭbaʻah al-ʻUmūmīyah, 1965.  
20 Quintan Wiktorowicz, The Management of Islamic Activism: Salafis, the Muslim 
Brotherhood, and State Power in Jordan (New York: State University of New York Press, 
2001) 111-120.  
21 Abū Rummān, Jordanian Salafism, 39-49; Ryan C, Curtis, "Islamist Political Activism in 
Jordan: Moderation, Militancy, and Democracy," Middle East Review of International Affairs, 
12 (2008), No. 21. 
22 ᶜAbdallah ᶜAzzām: a leader of the Brotherhood in the al-Shuyūkh bases during the Karameh 
battle of 1968 
23 See Appendix 1: Glossary. 
24 ᶜAbdallah ᶜAzzām, Defence of the Muslim Lands: The First Obligation after Iman, 
Religioscope, Fribourg 1980, accessed June 3, 2014, 
http://www.religioscope.com/info/doc/jihad/azzam_defence_1_table.htm.  
25 See Appendix 1: Glossary. 
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the war in Afghanistan.26 Originating from Zarqa, ᶜAzzām’s call gained wide 
acceptance by radical youth supporting the idea of jihad to free the Islamic lands.27 
 Besides ᶜAzzām’s charisma and encouragement, there were other factors for 
the radicalisation of Islam in the region. At the end of the 1980s, readings of Islam 
began to be used as justification for change through violent means. This was caused by 
the significance of Qutb’s Milestones. Another factor was the Iranian revolution and 
the assassination in 1981 of Anwar al-Sadat, the Egyptian President. These 
developments empowered the jihadists in the Salafist region.28 The first attempt of 
jihadism to enter the political scene took place in the al-Shuyūkh bases, when 
representatives of the Hawks left the organisation. This was in order to create a 
Qutbist, jihadist movement that would create changes to the regime in Jordan and 
establish the Islamic State under the leadership of Muḥammad Rifᶜat Saᶜīd Ṣāliḥ.29  
 However, there were important internal developments in Jordan, specifically in 
Zarqa, which contributed to the rise of Jihadist Salafism in the area. At the end of the 
Afghanistan war in 1989, numerous Arab Mujāhidūn [soldiers]30 returned to Jordan, as 
did others who took part in the Gulf war. Those returnees had significant influence on 
the ideological map of the area. 
 According to Sameh Khrys,31 the Arab Afghans were considered Mujāhidūn 
and heroes in Afghanistan, but were not welcomed in Jordan on their return, and were 
not granted the respect they believed they deserved being the Arab fighters and 
liberators of Afghanistan from the Soviet occupation. When they returned, the lifestyle 
of the country had already been significantly changed by the introduction of a new, 
                                                
26 ᶜAbdallah ᶜAzzām, and Ǧābir Rizq, Āyāt al-Raḥmân fī Gihād al-Afġān [The Allah Verses in 
the Afghan Jihad], (Alexandria, Egypt: Dār al-Daʻwaẗ, 1985), 131-184; ᶜAbdallah ᶜAzzām, 
Ilhak bl-Qāfilahf [Join the Convoy], (London: Azzam Publications, 2001). 
27 ᶜAbdallah Anas, Wilādat al-Afghān al-ʻArab: Sīrat ᶜAbdallah Anas bayna Masʻūd wa-ʻ 
ᶜAbdallah ᶜAzzām [The Birth of the Afghan Arab: Biography of ᶜAbdallah Anas bayna Masʻūd 
and ᶜAbdallah ᶜAzzām], (Beirut, Lebanon: Dār al-Sāqī, 2002), 10-147. 
28 Muḥammad Abū Rummān, The Muslim Brotherhood in the 2007 Jordanian Parliamentary 
Elections: A Passing ‘Political Setback’ or Diminished Popularity? (Amman: Friedrich-Ebert-
Stiftung, 2007), 11-13.  
29 Muḥammad Raʼfat Saʻīd Ṣāliḥ retreated from his jihadist ideas after debates with al-Albani, 
and participated in the 1997 election, succeeding in accessing the parliament; Abū Rummān, 
Jordanian Salafism: A Strategy for the Islamization of Society and an Ambiguous Relationship 
with the State, (Amman: Friedrich Ebert Sitftung, 2010), 43-44. 
30 Mujāhid, plural: Mujāhidūn: a person who chooses jihad to defend the Islamic land or apply 
Islamic rules.  
31 Sameh Khrys interview with the International Crisis Group. “Jordan's 9/11: Dealing with 
Jihadi Islamism,” Amman: International Crisis Group, April 30, 2005, 4.  
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Westernised lifestyle, identified primarily by a more liberal way of dressing and 
increasingly consumerist behaviour. The Afghan Arabs rejected these social changes 
on the grounds that they had been fighting the West in Afghanistan, while Jordan 
seemed to have been indulging in its influences. It was those returnees who contributed 
mostly to the radicalisation of the attitudes in the area and who promoted further 
fundamentalism. 
 Secondly, a few years later, masses of Jordanians were expelled from the Gulf 
States following the defeat of Saddam Hussein. For Islamists, the war in Iraq meant a 
war of the West against Muslims, even if they did not approve of Saddam Hussein’s 
regime. At the time, more than 160,000 people, mostly of Palestinian descent,32 settled 
in Zarqa, joining the ranks of the poorest in the area.33  
 Furthermore, the Islamists from the Brotherhood itself or Jordanians who 
supported the Brotherhood disapproved of the initiation of the peace process, which led 
to the Wadi Arabah treaty and its ratification while the Muslim Brotherhood was in 
parliament. This issue questioned once again the value of Islamist movements’ 
participation in national political life and presented Salafism as an alternative Islamic 
way of dealing with aggression against Muslims, Palestine, and the regime.34 
 Yet, it was the influence of Isam Muḥammad Tahir al-Barqawi (al-Maqdisi), 
who crystallised Jihadist Salafism in Zarqa.35 In Democracy is Religion, al-Maqdisi 
criticised the political decisions of the regime, stating that governmental actions, such 
as approaching peace with Israel, were against Islam.36 In his round-trip of Jordan, al-
Maqdisi met Mahmud abū Omar abū Katada, a famous Salafist leader.37 Al-Maqdisi 
                                                
32 Philip Robins, A History of Jordan, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 176-
184; N. Van Hear, "The Impact of this Involuntary Mass ‘Return’ to Jordan in the Wake of the 
Gulf Crisis”, The International Migration Review. (1995) 29 (2): 352-74; J. Addleton, "The 
Impact of the Gulf War on Migration and Remittances in Asia and the Middle East," 
International Migration. (1991) 29 (4): 509-526.  
33 “Jordan’s 9/11: Dealing with Jihadi Islamism,” 4; Stanley Reed, “Jordan and the Gulf Crisis”, 
Foreign Affairs, (1990) 21-35; N. Van Hear, “Displaced People after the Gulf Crisis,” The 
Cambridge Survey of World Migration, 1995, 424-30.  
34 Abū Rummān, Hassan abū Hanieh, al-Hall al-Islāmī fī al-Urdun: al-Islāmīyūn wal-Dawlah 
Rihānāt al-Dīmuqrāṭīyahwa- al-Amn [The Islamic Solution in Jordan: The Islamist and the 
State, the Challenges of Democracy and Security], (Amman: Friedrich Ebert Sitftung, 2012), 
222-230; Yann Le Troquer, and Rozenn Hommery al-Oudat, “From Kuwait to Jordan: the 
Palestinians' Third Exodus,” Journal of Palestine Studies: A Quarterly on Palestinian Affairs 
and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, (1999) 28 (3): 37-51. 
35  Abū Rummān, Jordanian Salafism: A Strategy for the Islamization of Society, 49. 
36 Issam al-Barqawi (al Maqdisi), al-Dīmuqrāṭīyah Dīn [Democracy is a Religion], Tawhed, 
accessed June 3, 2014, https://archive.org/details/Democracy_201307.  
37 Mahmud abū Omar abū Kutada had popularity with Islamists in Jordan, however he did not 
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and abū Katada, who consider themselves Jihadist Salafists, argued that Salafism is 
not confined to the strict application of Islam as ascribed to the followers of the 
Prophet’s Companions. In addition, based on their interpretation of Qutb’s Jāhilīyah 
and al-Ḥākimīyyah,38 they began to criticise and discredit the Jordanian political 
regime, labelling its members as infidels as in other Arab countries. Due to this, al-
Maqdisi and abū Katada called for a political upheaval based on military action.  
 Abū Musab al-Zarqawi, future leader of Jordanian radical Islamists, belonged 
to the school of al-Maqdisi. Inspired by ᶜAzzām, he followed Mujahidin Arabs in 1989 
to Afghanistan, however, he did not participate in the war against the Soviet army. 
Nevertheless, after his return, he joined the al-Maqdisi group in Jordan.39 Al-Zarqawi 
and his teacher were arrested by the Jordanian government in 1993, both being accused 
of forming the terrorist group Bayᶜat al-Imām [Pledge of Allegiance to the Imam].40 In 
1996, al-Zarqawi and al-Maqdisi were sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment; 
however, in 1999 they were released on general amnesty by the new King ᶜAbdallah 
II.41  
 After being released, al-Zarqawi engaged in different activities in Pakistan and 
Iran, before finally settling in Iraq.42 In the early years of the Iraqi war, he established 
the terrorist group al-Tawhid wal-Jihad [Unity and Jihad], which became known as the 
                                                                                                                             
stay to create his own organisation or network, despite being accused of having links to 
terrorism and subsequently being sentenced to death in 2000, at which point he sought asylum 
in the UK. Abū Katada became the main jihadist personality when he was mentioned in the UN 
Resolution 1267, where the names of the individuals and institutions related to al-Qaeda were 
listed. Abū Katada still has a controversial personality in the British media and was extradited 
to Jordan in December, 2013; “Security Council Committee Pursuant to Resolutions 1267 
(1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning al Qaida,” United Nation, June 2, 2014 accessed June 3, 
2014, http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/aq_sanctions_list.shtml.  
38 See Appendix 1: Glossary. 
39 Loretta Napoleoni, Insurgent Iraq: Al Zarqawi and the New Generation (New York: Seven 
Stories Press, 2005), 109-135; Ryo Ragland, “Fighting Passions: A Developmental 
Examination of the Salafi Jihadi Movement in Jordan and the Roots of Extremism,” 
Independent Study Project (ISP) Collection Paper 429, 2005. 
40 Abū Rummān, and Hassan abū Hanieh, The Jihadi Salafist Movement in Jordan after 
Zarqawi: Identity, Leadership Crisis and Obscured Vision, (Amman: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung), 
13-39, accessed June 3, 2014, 
http://edoc.bibliothek.uni-halle.de/receive/HALCoRe_document_00007403  
41 Abū Rummān, abū Hanieh, al-Hall al-Islāmī fī al-Urdun [The Islamic Solution in Jordan], 
281-362.  
42 G. Michael, “The Legend and Legacy of abū Musab al-Zarqawi”, Defence Studies, 2007, 7 
(3), 338-357; “Jamīʻ Kalimāt al-Shuykh Abū Muṣʻab al-Zarqāwī“ [All of al-Zarqāwī’s 
Speeches], Archive Internet, accessed June 3, 2014, https://archive.org/details/All-talks-by-
shiekh-abo-mosaab-zarkawee. 
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‘al-Qaeda of Iraq’ after its alliance with al-Qaeda in 2004. It was in Iraq that al-
Zarqawi received worldwide attention: Colin Powell, the US Secretary of State in the 
Bush administration, mentioned his name in the UN as a leader of a terrorist 
organisation and the extension for al-Qaeda.43 
 Al-Zarqawi also managed to extend the jihad to secular countries neighbouring 
Iraq such as Jordan.44 His organisation is thought to be responsible for bombing three 
hotels in Amman, leaving 57 dead and 115 injured.45 The events of November 9, 2005 
became known as Black Wednesday or the Amman Bombing. Al-Zarqawi also 
attempted several terrorist attacks in Jordan against the regime, as with the attack on 
the intelligence department in Amman.46 
 Al-Zarqawi was not the only one to threaten Jordan from the inside. Since the 
beginning of the 1990s, Jordan became a centre of Muslim radicalism with individuals 
and groups using interpretations of Islam to justify violent acts. As stated above, the 
Jihadist Salafism developed two focuses for their activity: to fight Israel and to oppose 
the infidel Jordanian regime.47 Besides al-Zarqawi, a number of terrorist groups 
established themselves around the country:48 
 
                                                
43 “Transcript of Powell's U.N. Presentation,” Part 9: Ties to al Qaeda, CNN, Thursday, 
February 6, 2003 accessed June 3, 2014, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2003/US/02/05/sprj.irq.powell.transcript.09/index.html?iref=mpstoryvie
w.  
44 This was the third stage of his mission as a al-Qaeda leader in Iraq, mentioned in: “Letter 
from al-Zawahiri to al-Zarqawi,” Tri Collage Digital Repository, July 9, 2005, accessed June 3, 
2014, 
http://triceratops.brynmawr.edu:8080/dspace/bitstream/handle/10066/4798/ZAW20050709.pdf?
sequence=3; Christopher M. Lanchard, al Qaeda Statements and Evolving Ideology, 
(Washington: Congressional Information Service, Library of Congress, 2006), 4-15.  
45 “Al-Qaida Claims Responsibility for Jordan Attack Security Lockdown in Amman after 
Suicide Bombs at Hotels Kill at Least 56, MSNBC, November 10, 2005, accessed June 3, 2014, 
http://www.standeyo.com/NEWS/05_Terror/051110.Jordan.attacks.html. 
46 “Jordan Says Major al-Qaeda Plot Disrupted,” CNN, April 26, 2004, accessed June 3, 2014, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/04/26/jordan.terror/ 
47 G. E. Robinson, “Can Islamists be Democrats? The Case of Jordan,” The Middle East 
Journal, 1997, 373-387; Michael Robbins, and Lawrence Rubin, "The Rise of Official Islam in 
Jordan,” Politics, Religion & Ideology 14, 1 (2013): 59-74. 
48 Ibrāhīm Gharāyibah, “Maqtal al-Diblumāsī al-Amrīkī fi ʻUmān,” [The Assassination of 
American Diplomat in Amman], Aljazeera, October 3, 2004 accessed June 3, 2014, 
http://aljazeera.net/home/print/6c87b8ad-70ec-47d5-b7c4-3aa56fb899e2/dd91a489-c9cc-4d99-
9fe8-479d3eb5bd83  
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Year Cell / Movement Action 
1991 Jaysh Muḥammad 
[Muḥammad’s Army] 
Arson attacks against the French Cultural Council 
and British bank49 
1992 al-Nafīr al-Islami [Islamic 
Mobilisation] 
Failed attacks on two parliamentarians, Layth 
Shubaylāt and Yaʻqūb Qirsh50 
1993 Talāmīdh Jāmiʻat Muʼtah 
[Mu’tah University Students] 
Accused of attempting to assassinate King Hussein 
1993 Bayᶜ at al-Imām [Pledge of 
Allegiance to Imam] 
No action to date 
1994 
Jordanian Afghan 
Fought Westernisation including the bombing of 
cinemas (e.g., Slwa in Zarqa, Ravioli in Amman), 
and was also accused of attempting to assassinate 
Abdelsalam al-Majali51 
2000 
Millennium Plot 
Failed series of terrorist attacks called the 
Millennium Plot, taking place on the first day of the 
new millennium in many countries around the world, 
including the US, Canada, and Jordan. 
 
Table 1: Cells Formulated to Counter Jordanian Regime in 1990s 
 
 Most of these groups were not fully-fledged terrorist organisations or 
networks. They were mostly individuals or small groups acting according to their 
limited resources. They failed in achieving their goals and were all exposed by the 
Jordanian Security.  
 The most organised group, however, was Bayᶜat al-Imām [Pledge of 
Allegiance to the Imam].52 Its activity threatened the regime and al-Zarqawi was later 
                                                
49 Abū Rummān, abū Hanieh, The Jihadi Salafist Movement in Jordan after Zarqawi, 13-17. 
50 King Hussein became involved personally and granted them amnesty: Layth Shubaylāt 
became one of the leading oppositional personalities later, and Yaʻqūb Qirsh withdrew his 
nationality and left for the West bank; Abū Rummān, abū Hanieh, The Jihadi Salafist 
Movement in Jordan after Zarqawi, 121-123. 
51 Mostly the group were young Jordanians who had never been to Afghanistan. They were 
individually granted amnesty with time; Joas Wagemakers, "A Terrorist Organization that 
Never Was: The Jordanian “Bay'at al-Imam” Group," The Middle East Journal 68, no. 1 
(2014): 59-75. 
52 Abū Rummān, abū Hanieh, The Jihadi Salafist Movement in Jordan after Zarqawi, 13-39. 
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recognised as the number one threat to the country due to the Amman Bombing in 
2005. Al-Zarqawi accused his enemies of being infidels in order to justify his actions. 
Relying on the Jāhilīyyah concept, they legitimised the killing of other Muslims from 
their own Ummah [nation] and religion. In turn, al-Maqdisi was linked to a set of 
terrorist attacks called the Millennium Plot, which was a failed series of terrorist 
attacks planned to take place on the first day of the new millennium in many countries 
around the world, including the US, Canada, and Jordan.53  
 Nevertheless, it was not al-Zarqawi who made Zarqa important for media, but 
the strong Salafist movement, to whom al-Zarqawi belonged. The movement, in 
addition to other jihadist organisations and radical networks, for example, the Afghan 
Arab, made Zarqa the centre for radicalism in Jordan.  
  Jordan’s main tribune for struggling between theologies and clashes between 
al-Albanism and Jihadist Salafism influenced the country as a whole and the Muslim 
Brotherhood in particular. In the outset of al-Albani, the Jordanian Salafist movement, 
although not being recognised by the Jordanian regime, did not challenge the state 
publically and, moreover, did not use religion as a means of violence or oppression 
over other Muslims. However, in the course of these events, the movement 
transformed itself drastically. 
 The Jordanian Salafists were influenced in their ideological development by a 
variety of factors. New ideological currents established in the region affected the 
Jordanian Islamists, such as the legacy of Qutb’s preaching, the Islamic Revolution’s 
influence, and the experience of the Egyptian Islamists in general. At the same time, 
internal social changes instigated the radicalisation of Islamists in the country, i.e, the 
Gulf War and its numerous returners influenced the traditional al-Albani Salafiyyah.  
 All this gave rise to a new generation of Salafists who believed in the global 
jihad. It also gave rise to more radical leaders, such as al-Maqdisi, despite their 
different interpretations of al-Albani. Al-Maqdisi’s calls to jihad as Fard Ayn lead to 
the development of a strong jihadist orientation within Jordan. As an outcome, 
stronger, more developed networks were established, issuing a call for violence against 
the regime by Bayʻat al-Imām. Later in 2000, this network was linked to al-Qaeda’s 
Millennium Plot. All these developments transformed the jihad mission of Salafists 
into more extreme and organised forms, enabling al-Zarqawi’s activities and the 
                                                
53 Dennis Piszkiewicz, Terrorism's War with America a History (Westport, Conn: Praeger, 
2003), 121-131; Ragland, “Fighting Passions,” 35-46.  
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transformation of the movement from operating underground into being officially 
recognised in Jordan.  
 The events of the so-called 11/9 attacks (Black Wednesday) left Jordanians 
with the same identity dilemma that US citizens faced after 9/11. Citizens were faced 
with both an increase in violent understandings of Islam, and yet conversely, a 
seemingly more pro-West leaning of the government. For example, on the one hand, 
Jihadist Salafists were using Islam to justify their use of violence. On the other hand, 
the state declared an entirely different position via the Amman Message,54 according to 
which enforcing Takfīr was forbidden, selectively only eight Islamic schools were 
recognised and fatwas were organised. Generally Jordanians did not agree with the 
pro-western foreign policy of the government, which pushed for peace and 
normalisation of relations with Israel. King Hussein’s unpopular decision to negotiate 
with Israel was continued by King ᶜAbdallah. Moreover, the King moved Jordan’s 
alliance with the Iraqi regime over to co-operating with the US.  
 A 2006 research study by the Centre for Strategic Studies (CSS) sought to 
measure Jordanian public opinion in the post 9/11 era by taking a national sample 
consisting of 1,104 interviews from all demographics of the Jordanian community.55 
According to the CSS poll, the Amman explosions changed Jordanians’ perspectives of 
Islamist movements, which use violence as a means of their activity. For example, in 
2004, 67% of Jordanians described bin Laden’s al-Qaeda as a “legitimate resistance 
organisation”.56 After 11/9 this dropped to 20%. Further, the percentage of people who 
regarded al-Qaeda as a terrorist organisation increased from 10.6% to 48%. This 
dramatic increase, as shown in the table below, also relates to Islamist organisations 
using Islam as a means to justify violent acts. Overall, it can be described as a new 
understanding of resistance among Jordanians. 
 
                                                
54 Amman Message: a statement calling for moderation and tolerance in the understanding of 
Islam issued in November 9, 2004 by 200 scholars from over 50 countries. The statement 
focuses on excluding and renouncing violence and Takfīr. The Amman Message Official 
Website: http://www.ammanmessage.com/. 
55 Fāris Burayzat, “Mā Baʻda Tafjīrāt ʻAmmān, 5. 
56 Burayzat, “Mā Baʻda Tafjīrāt ʻAmmān al-Raʼy al-ʻĀmm al-Urdunīrwa-al-Irhāb” [In the 
Aftermath of Amman Bombing, the Jordanian Public Opinion and Terror], 6. 
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Year 
Legitimate 
resistance 
organisation 
Terrorist 
organisation 
I have not 
heard of it 
I do not 
know 
Refused 
to 
answer 
2004 66.8 10.6 3.2 16.8 2.6 
2006 20 48.9 1.4 24.3 5.4 
Total 46.8- 38.3+ 1.8- 7.5+ 2.8+ 
 
 Table 2: Jordanians’ Opinion on al-Qaeda in 200657 
  
 The results of the CSS report indicate that Jordanians had re-evaluated the 
possible use of violence after it was used in their own territory (only 6.2% regarded 
violent actions as legitimate resistance). According to the CSS report, Hamas and 
Hezbollah gained unprecedented popularity before gradually decreasing. Whilst 
individuals’ views on the attacks on the World Trade Centre progressed towards 
recognising it as a terrorist attack from 2004 to 2006,58 views on attacks against US 
troops in Iraq did not receive the same supportive response. Even so, there was an 
increase in the recognition of 9/11 as a terrorist attack.59 
 The activity of the Jihadist Salafist movement in Jordan resulted in the 
transformation of the country into a security state, considered as a threat to any Islamist 
organisation in the country. To prevent possible terrorist attacks based on Takfīr, 
mosques with Imams linked to the Brotherhood or Salafists were closed across the 
country. Furthermore, in 2004 the government arrested 30 Imams for preaching 
without governmental license in violation of the Seventh Preaching and Guidance Law 
for the 1986 instructions, including people from the Brotherhood’s Shoura Council 
such as Ibrāhīm Zayd Kīlānī, Ahmad Kūfaḥī, and Jamīl abū Bakr, who were accused of 
preaching. According to these instructions, a license for any preaching in mosques 
                                                
57 Based on:  Burayzat, “Mā Baʻda Tafjīrāt ʻAmmān al-Raʼy al-ʻĀmm al-Urdunīrwa-al-Irhāb” 
[In the Aftermath of Amman Bombing, the Jordanian Public Opinion and Terror]. 
58 In 2004, 34.6 per cent addressed al-Qaeda’s attack on the World Trade Centre as a terrorist 
attack; in 2005, 61.4 per cent addressed it as a terrorist attack.  
59 Fāris Burayzat, “Mā Baʻda Tafjīrāt ʻAmmān al-Raʼy al-ʻĀmm al-Urdunīrwa-al-Irhāb” [In the 
Aftermath of Amman Bombing, the Jordanian Public Opinion and Terror], Center for Strategic 
Studies University of Jordan, 2006, http://www.jcss.org/Photos/634755268746485353.pdf 
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issued by the Awqāf [Religious Endowment] Ministry was required.60 Therefore, the 
freedom of preaching was infringed upon, and the government made a step towards 
recruiting Imams to preach a governmentally permitted kind of Islam, which excluded 
alternative opinions or views of the Brotherhood and the Salafists. 
 This governmental decision interfered with the basic freedoms of Jordanians. 
Freedom House acknowledged the shift in Jordan’s democracy rankings, as Jordan’s 
‘freedom score’ had risen from a 4.5 freedom rating in 1998, 61 to a 5.5 in 200362 (1 = 
best, 7 = worst) before the 11/9 explosions of 2005.63  
 Furthermore, on March 6, 2005, the government issued the law of limiting 
professional associations’ participation in politics. These associations were not allowed 
to convene in meetings without permission from the Ministry of Interior. This affected 
all kinds of non-governmental organisations through which the Muslim Brotherhood 
could influence their adherents. For example, professional associations, such as the 
Doctor and Engineers’ Union, were a platform for Islamists – mainly the Brotherhood 
– to gather and mobilise the public in political matters such as protesting or striking on 
social matters or in the name of Palestinian liberation.64 This new legislation 
complemented the 1997 Law on Publications according to which freedoms of 
journalists and political parties were significantly limited. These actions were taken to 
support the one vote election law in Jordan, which emphasised tribal and identity-
based votes over ideological.65 
 Officially, those laws were not intended to foil any particular social groups. 
Every citizen was subjected to limitations on their political freedoms and 
representations, either in the one vote system, or in the law of Professional 
                                                
60 Rashīd Suwaydī, Iʻtiqāl al-Ikhwān al-Urdun: al-Asbāb wa-al-Tadāʻiyāt” [The Muslim 
Brotherhood Arrests in Jordan: Reasons and Results], Ikwan Online, September 12, 2004, 
accessed May 30, 2014, 
http://www.ikhwanonline.com/new/v3/Article.aspx?ArtID=8521&SecID=211; Juan Jose 
Escobar Stemmann, “Islamic Activism in Jordan,” Athena Intelligence Journal, Vol. 3, 2008, 7-
18. 
61 In 1998: Five = civil liberties and four = political rights. 
62 In 2003: Five = civil liberties and six = political rights. 
63 “Jordan, Freedom in the World 1998-2003,” Freedom House, accessed June 3, 2014, 
 http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/1998/jordan#.UwTfRfl_tqV. 
64 Sarah Leah Whitson, “Human Right Watch Regarding Jordan’s Draft Law on Professional 
Associations,” April 6, 2005, accessed June 3, 2014, 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2005/04/05/hrw-concerns-regarding-jordans-draft-law-professional-
associations; Amal ʻAbd al-Majīd Raḍwān, “Al-Niqābat al-Mihnīyah al-Urdunīyah: al-Nashʼah 
wal-Judhūr” [Jordanian Professional Associations: The Beginnings and the Roots], Department 
of Press and Publications, accessed June 3, 2014, http://www.dpp.gov.jo/2012/9.html.  
65 “Jordan’s 9/11: Dealing with Jihadi Islamism,” 18-20. 
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Associations, which limited the freedom of political gatherings. Generally, these 
provisional laws were issued for Jordan’s transitory state caused by regional events, 
such as the Iraq war, and internal events, such as the terrorist activity of the al-Zarqawi 
group or the Jihadist Salafists’ attempts to clash with the regime. However, in practice 
these laws were passed to smother the activity, influence, and most probably the 
political representation, of the Muslim Brotherhood in parliament and government. 
 Despite the common ideological background of all the Islamic groups in 
Jordan, each presents itself as a true version of Islam, inadvertently discrediting other 
movements as infidels. For example, in their understanding of infidel, the Salafists 
oppose every other political movement in Jordan, in particular the Muslim 
Brotherhood, which deliberately chose to accept the existing regime and work as a 
legal opposition in the Parliament under the IAF party. Nevertheless, the decision to 
exclude the Brotherhood from policy making, taken by King ᶜAbdallah II, contravened 
the previous approach of King Hussein who addressed the Brotherhood or other legally 
active Islamists during every legitimacy crisis, as seen with the Leftist threat in 1956, 
the 1970 clash, or even in the wars with Israel in 1948, 1967, or 1968. By this, King 
ᶜAbdallah II once again emphasised the different path he was taking in Jordan, which 
required the normalisation of crisis between them. 
 The rise of Jihadist Salafism in Jordan was combined with the success of 
another Islamist group in the Levant at this time – Hamas, which changed the 
Brotherhood’s perception of participation. 
 
 
5.1 The Dilemma of Hamas and the 2006 Success 
 
Members of the Brotherhood who have Palestinian origins occupy a dominant position 
within the movement, and would hold the majority if their numbers in leading 
positions were taken into account. For example, between 2003 and 2007, 14 out of 17 
parliamentarians elected as representatives of the Brotherhood were of Palestinian 
descent. Furthermore, Palestinian origin is generally acknowledged to be a reason for 
the radicalisation of the movement, since their origin defines their political stance and 
162 
 
compels them to foster a Palestinian-oriented direction in their agenda.66 
 This traditional opinion was challenged by the emergence of a new generation 
of Brotherhood members among the movement’s leadership, who were of Jordanian 
descent. Those such as Zakī bin Arshīd and ʻAlī ʻAtūm, allied with the new Palestinian 
leadership who were known to be closer to Hamas, such as Saʻūd Abū Maḥfūẓ, Yāsir 
Zaʻātirah, and Muʻīn Qaddūmī.67 Although the origin of the Brotherhood’s members 
remains a valid ground to differentiate between the two wings of Hawks and Doves 
within the Brotherhood, the political stance and position towards the regime’s political 
agenda and towards Hamas’ organisation is a bone of contention within the 
movement.68 Since the government’s decision to close the Hamas office in Jordan in 
1999, the movement was placed in a grey area as for its priorities towards a Jordanian 
or Palestinian direction. 69  
 Hamas acted as an alternative to Fatah and the PLO after the failure of the 
Oslo and Camp David accords in order to find a solution for the Palestinian people in 
the path of resistance by rejecting Fatah’s peace plans, which failed to be implemented 
by the Palestinian authority. Hamas’ path broke the status quo that had been reached 
with the Palestinian issue after individual states, international communities, and 
international organisations’ failed attempts at offering a solution. 
 On January 25, 2006, Hamas participated for the first time in a Palestinian 
parliamentarian election, winning 42.9% of the vote (74 out of 132 seats) with a 
turnout of 77% of voters. Therefore, they won a majority of seats enabling them to 
formulate the government, and the Jordanian regime faced the reality of a return of 
Islamists in their backyard.70 
 Hamas’ success affected the Hawks almost directly. Less than two months 
after the election on March 3, 2006, the Brotherhood’s Shoura Council placed its trust 
                                                
66 Abū Rummān, Jordanian Policy and the Hamas Challenge: Exploring Grey Areas and 
Bridging the Gap in Mutual Interests (Amman: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2009), 33-117. 
67 Ibrāhīm Gharāyibah, “al-Tafāʻulāt al-Dākhilīyah wa-al-Tanẓīmīyah fī Jamāʻat al-Ikhwān al-
Muslimīn” [Internal and Organisational Interactions Inside the Muslim Brotherhood], Carnegie 
Endowment, 2008, August 12, accessed June 23, 2014, 
http://m.ceip.org/sada/?fa=20558&lang=ar.  
68 Abū Rummān, The Muslim Brotherhood in the 2007 Jordanian Parliamentary Elections, 31- 
57. 
69 Interview with Ibrahim al-Mashūkhī, August 6, 2014, Zarqa, Jordan. 
70 “Halqat Niqāsh: Tadāʻiyāt Fawz Hamas fi al-Intikhābāt al-Filīstīniyah” [Panel of Discussion: 
The Implications of Hamas Wining the Palestinian Elections], (Amman: Markaz Dirāsāt al-
Sharq al-Awsat, January, 2006), accessed July 7, 2014, http://www.palestine-
info.com/arabic/books/2006/5_2_06/5_2_06.htm; Abū Rummān, Jordanian Policy and the 
Hamas Challenge, 33-117. 
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in Sālim Falāḥāt, who, despite being counted as a Doves member, strongly supports 
Hamas. The number of Brothers who rejected the Brotherhood’s nearly ten-year 
partiality of the Doves spiked in the wake of the regime’s treatment of Hamas, causing 
the Brotherhood to favour Falāḥāt’s pro-Hamas agenda over that of the Doves’ former 
supervisor and pro-regime candidate, ʻAbd al-Majīd Dhunaybāt, and Hawks leader 
Hammām ʻAbd al-Raḥīm Saʻīd.71  
 They chose Falāḥāt to balance their relation with the regime on one hand, as 
they had had a Doves Brother as General Supervisor since 1994, re-electing Dhunaybāt 
for 12 years to make the position that of a mediator with the regime. On the other hand, 
bringing a Hamas element to the Supervisor position corrected the role of Hamas in 
Jordan by legitimising it in front of the regime. Therefore, their reason for trusting 
Falāḥāt was in their desire to create a third path, combining the Palestinian case and 
Hamas with a pro-regime Brother.  
However, soon after the election, it was announced that military rockets and 
explosive materials belonging to Hamas were detected in the North of Jordan. This was 
used to accuse Hamas of attempting to use Jordan’s territories to launch terrorist 
attacks,72 leading the government to cut all relations with Hamas and to avoid any 
communication with the new Islamist government in Palestine. 
 From the Brotherhood’s point of view, Hamas was a representative of the 
Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine; thus, any governmental or regime policies 
to break this relation were not accepted, and were considered an attack on the 
Brotherhood, and any pro-Hamas leadership, such as the General Supervisor himself. 
However, this connection was endangered when the government officially declared 
that Hamas was planning a terrorist act on Jordanian territory.  
 The Brotherhood defended Hamas and accused the government of attempting 
to fabricate such an incident as to set Jordanian society against it - which they failed 
                                                
71 Ṭāriq Dīlwāni, “Sālim Falāḥāt Murāqib ʻāmm li-Jamāʻat al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn” [Sālim 
Falāḥāt, the General Supervisor of the Muslim Brotherhood], Al-Asr, March 5, 2006, accessed 
on December 2, 2014, http://alasr.me/articles/view/7530/ 
72 David Schenkler, “Hamas Weapons in Jordan: Implications for Islamists on the East Bank,” 
Washington Institute. Policy #1098, May 5, 2006, accessed July 7, 2014, 
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/hamas-weapons-in-jordan-
implications-for-islamists-on-the-east-bank; Also in: W. A Terrill, “Jordanian National Security 
and the Future of Middle East Stability,” Ft. Belvoir: Defence Technical Information Centre, 
2006, accessed July 7, 2014, http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA475795; Muḥammad Najjār, “al-
ʼUrdun wa-Hamas” [Jordan and Hamas], Aljazeera, January 29, 2012, accessed July 7, 2014, 
http://www.aljazeera.net/news/pages/78ef37b4-5661-4d17-b0ce-8d12c728a11a.  
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to.73 A report by the University of Jordan’s CSS showed that during this public anti-
Hamas campaign, 69.1% of people considered Hamas a legitimate resistance 
organisation in Jordan, and only 7.8 regarded it as a terrorist organisation.74 
 The Brotherhood’s split regarding Hamas and their actions became obvious 
when several Brotherhood members showed their support for resistance movements in 
Iraq. For example, four parliamentarians from the Brotherhood, claiming to represent 
themselves not the movement, participated in the funeral of abū Musa’ab al-Zarqawi 
on June 10, 2006. 
 Nevertheless, Jordanians discuss the killing of al-Zarqawi, which is commonly 
seen as a part of an anti-terrorist campaign, differently. The CSS report also showed 
that during that time more than 45% of people had a positive view to the killing of this 
leader because he is considered a terrorist who killed innocents in the Amman 
Bombing of 2005 and more than 30% of the people had a negative view of his death, 
considering him a martyr.75 This demonstrates that al-Zarqawi had unprecedented 
support for his activities in Jordan. 
 Yet, the government arrested two of the parliamentarians as a consequence of 
their participation in the funeral. One of those was Ibrahim al-Mashūkhī. Publically, al-
Mashūkhī has refused to answer questions relating to his reasons for attending the 
funeral, however, during a personal interview he responded for the first time with:  
 
The funeral is for the family of the dead not the dead himself, and when I visited him I 
was visiting his family, not blessing his actions. I am considered the chief of the area 
[Jabel al-Amir Hassan] therefore I was performing a societal responsibility by visiting 
one of the funerals which happened in my area, not visiting the people who vote for 
me.76 
 
 In other words, al-Mashūkhī is saying that he was not presenting himself as a 
                                                
73 Ibrāhīm ʻAllūsh, “al-Tawattur bayna Hamas wa-al Sulṭah al-Urdunīyah ila Ayn?”[The 
Tension between Hamas and the Jordanian Authorities to Where?] Free Arab Voice, 2007, 
accessed July 7, 2014, http://www.freearabvoice.org/arabi/maqalat/7amasAndJordan.htm; Abū 
Rummān, The Muslim Brotherhood in the 2007 Jordanian Parliamentary Elections, 68-71. 
74 Fares Braizat, “Istiṭlāʻ lil-raʼy al-Irhāb Baʻda MaqtalAAl Zarkawi” [Public Opinion Poll on 
Terrorism after the Killing of al-Zarkawi], Center for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan, 5-
15, July, 2006, accessed July 7, 2014, http://www.css-
jordan.org/Photos/634755263519136718.pdf. 
75 Braizat, “Istiṭlāʻ lil-raʼy al-Irhāb Baʻda Maqtal l Zarkawit” [Public Opinion Poll on Terrorism 
after the Killing of al-Zarkawi], 9.  
76 Interview with Ibrahim al-Mashūkhī, August 6, 2014, Zarqa, Jordan. 
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parliamentarian acting on behalf of the movement, but rather he was presenting himself 
independently as a chief of the area. He claimed that when arrested by the military 
court (and subsequently found not guilty), the regime wanted to imprison him and 
associate the Brotherhood with terrorists. Al-Mashūkhī claims that the military judge 
and prison guards were receiving frequent phone calls to keep him detained, and he 
uses this as evidence for his claim.77 
 Despite al-Mashūkhī’s claims in this interview that his status as chief of the 
area is prioritised above his political presence, he drops in the fact that prior to his visit 
to the funeral, there was a speech in al-Manarah Mosque presented by abū Fāris 
describing al-Zarqawi as a martyr.78 This contradicts al-Mashūkhī’s statement and 
suggests that despite the Muslim Brotherhood rejecting the Amman Bombing, they still 
believe in the Iraqi resistance movements. This belief has a strong presence inside the 
Hawks of the movement, including al-Mashūkhī and abū Fāris. Taking a step based on 
this belief, and visiting the funeral is also a message to their followers within the 
Brotherhood that they stand with the resistance. Furthermore, one can argue that this 
support is compatible with the previously discussed statement in Chapter Four, which, 
issued on March 20, 2003, stated “Supporting the Iraqi people is a Fard [obligation]” 
making this visit conducive to their support of the Iraqi resistance.79  
 However, in response to those arrests, Zakī bin Arshīd resigned.80 The 
government responded by taking control of the Islamic Society Centre, the financial 
wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, accusing it of corruption. This was considered a big 
move since under the Islamic Society Centre there are 550 branches for the movement 
including hospitals, schools, and charities in 64 areas around the country.  
 Over the following two years, relations between the government and 
Brotherhood remained stable. However, the 2006 elections in Palestine changed the 
                                                
77 Ibid.; 16 non-Brotherhood parliamentarians attended the funeral of al-Zarkawi. Most of them 
are from the Bani Hassan tribe that al-Zarkawi is also part of, but none of them have been 
accused of disturbing Jordan’s stability as the Brotherhood members have.  
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scene and proposed a scenario of fear and destabilisation again. Hamas winning the 
elections posed the question inside the Jordanian Government: What if they win in 
Jordan? In regards to the next election, this notion was distressing for the regime, 
especially after the Brotherhood had changed its partiality towards Hamas.81 If the 
Brotherhood were to implement the Hamas model of 2006 in the 2007 Jordanian 
election, the regime ran the risk of an Islamist parliamentarian majority forming an 
opposition government against the regime’s policies.  
 
 
5.2 The 2007 Elections 
 
Following the electoral victory of Hamas in Palestine and the success of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Egypt (gaining 88 out of 454 seats), the Jordanian Brotherhood 
expected to repeat this trend in the 2007 elections. However, the Jordanian regime had 
its own way of dealing with the growth of political Islam in the area. 
 King ᶜAbdallah II launched a campaign aimed to engage Jordan in the 
international arena. Aside close cooperation with the US, the King began 
communications with the European Union having introduced the national reform plan 
mission supported by the EU (EU-Jordan Action Plan), which was adopted in 2005. 
This cooperation resulted in the introduction of various initiatives such as “We are all 
Jordan”, aiming to mobilise the country for political reforms in order to encourage its 
development.82 Agreements with the EU and other international organisations 
compelled the regime to abide by international laws and regulations, namely to further 
the democratisation of the country.  
 Thus, in 2007 Jordan experienced two contradictory developments: on the one 
hand, the rise of the popular support for radical Islamist parties in the region made it 
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necessary for the regime to smother the activity of the Muslim Brotherhood and the 
IAF; on the other hand, encouraged by the agreements with the EU and other 
international players, the government had to ensure freedom of political life and 
participation. The main question of 2007 was, therefore, if the regime would manage to 
balance its international commitments with the Islamists within the parliament.  
 In an interview with the German magazine Der Spiegel in June 2006, King 
ᶜAbdallah II, in response to a question about the Muslim Brotherhood’s participation in 
the elections, explained:  
 
They have to redefine their relationship with us. They have been working in a grey area 
in recent decades. I think society throughout the world now has to decide what is good 
and what is evil. I believe that the majority of the Brotherhood wants a good future for 
this country, and a good future for their children. I think that we can all work as a team. 
But there are some principles. Takfîr [declaring other Muslim’s infidels] is not one of 
them.83 
 
 The King’s statement was seconded by public confirmation from the 
government to ensure free and fair elections. Therefore, the Brotherhood decided to 
enter the elections of 2007, despite their previous disagreement on the electoral law 
and the legislation restricting general freedoms of Jordanians, such as the Law on 
Publication, Law on Professional associations, and laws regulating preaching.  
 The IAF publicised the list of candidates who were to run for the elections. 
Surprisingly, the list consisted of only 22 candidates competing for 110 parliamentary 
seats. This number was significantly lower, as shown in the table below, than any 
previous list of candidates.  
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Year Candidates Winners Number of Seats 
1954  4 40 
1957  4 40 
1963  2 40 
1967  2 60 
1984 (by-election)  3 8 seats to be filled 
1989 29 22 80 
1993 (IAF established) 36 16 80 
1997 Boycott 80 
2003 30 17 110 
2007 22 6 110 
 
 Table 3: Number of Brotherhood Candidates and the Elections Results 1954-200784 
 
 The IAF’s decision to enter the elections with such a small number of 
candidates has two explanations. The Brotherhood, after boycotting the previous 1997 
election, did not want to deepen confrontation with the regime by gaining many seats 
in parliament. This tactical decision aimed to gradually permeate the political arena 
with Brotherhood members, and receive approval from the regime after sustained poor 
relations with King ᶜAbdallah II. As a result, the Muslim Brotherhood limited its list to 
22 candidates, which could be considered the smallest in the history of electoral 
participations for this movement. For example, in the 1989 elections – the first 
elections the Brotherhood participated in – the candidate list consisted of 29 nominees 
competing for 80 seats in the parliament, whereas in 2007 it was 22 candidates for 110 
places. Overall, in November 20, 2007, the new parliamentary elections consisted of 
885 candidates contesting for 110 seats. However, limiting the number of candidates 
from the Brotherhood was an attempt by the new leadership to correct relations with 
the regime by demonstrating that they were not shadowing Hamas or looking to 
participate in the government.  
 On the other hand this can be interpreted as a weakness of the Brotherhood’s 
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Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 9, 2006, accessed July 20, 2014, 4-7, 
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political presence due to their unstable participation and dilemmas during every 
election. The candidate list presented by the IAF could corroborate the hypothesis of 
an internal weakness of the IAF before the 2007 elections. Therefore, the 
Brotherhood’s previous boycott combined with the poor result in 2003 caused them to 
enter with a small list so as not to risk a large number of Muslim Brotherhood 
candidates failing. 
 Nevertheless, the results were unexpected. The Brotherhood gained only six 
seats, two of them coming from Amman and only one from al-Balqaa,85 where the 
biggest refugees’ camp in the country is located, representing their largest voting-base. 
Likewise, the IAF did not gain any seats from Zarqa, which historically presented the 
largest support for the Brotherhood.86  
 Due to this, the Muslim Brotherhood lost twelve seats compared to seventeen 
seats gained in the previous 2003 elections. As shown in Table 4 below, the tribal 
candidates gained the major share of seats along with some independents.87 To explain 
these results, the Brotherhood declared fraud had been committed. Informal evidence 
of various falsifications was collected, such as vote buying, bussing, ballot-stuffing, or 
changing voters’ registered districts.88 Furthermore, the Brotherhood leadership 
accused the government of using the army to prevent supporters of the Brotherhood 
voting.89  
 The National Centre for Human rights in Jordan, which has provided evidence 
of widespread fraud by buying votes all around the country, has made similar 
statements.90 However, the government, via the Interior Affairs Minister, rejected the 
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accusations. The ministry claimed the elections to be free and fair and that the results 
represented the real weight of the Brotherhood on society, thus dismissing the 
allegations.91 
 
 
House of Deputies, general 
legislative elections 
Percentage of 
votes 
Seats in 
2007 
Increase or 
decrease of seats 
from 2003 
Independent / tribal 
representatives 
89 98 +12 
Islamic Action Front (IAF) 5.5 6 -12 
Total 100 110  
  
Table 4: The 2003 Elections Compared to 2007 Elections92 
 
 Despite all the attempts to accuse the government of defrauding the election, 
no legitimate evidence was provided. However, the Brotherhood’s accusation of the 
regime’s intention to control free expression of popular will might be proven by its 
deliberate restrictions on international electoral observation and monitoring by local 
NGOs. This fact was also highlighted in an EU report, which confirmed that the 
elections were organised and controlled solely through the Ministry of Interior, which 
opened the door for doubt of the government’s supervision of the electoral process.93 
 Following the elections, King ᶜAbdallah dismissed the government of Marouf 
al-Bakhit who supervised the stabilisation period after the Amman Bombing, and 
                                                                                                                             
[Report of The National Human Rights Center about the Parliamentarian Election of 2007], 
(Amman: al-Markaz al-Waṭanī li-Ḥuqūq al-Insān, 2007) 8-13, accessed July 7, 2014, 
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Group, 2009), 12. 
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appointed Nader Dahabi to lead a new government.94  
 The 2007 parliament endured until 2009, despite debates over its legitimacy, 
however, it did not recieve approval from the people of Jordan, as shown in Image 1. 
In 2009, the International Republican Institute (IRI) undertook a survey with 1000 
individuals over 18 years old, questioning, “If the parliament could accomplish 
anything worth recognition.”95 Due to its lack of credibility, the majority of those asked 
declared that the parliament was not serving people’s interests.  The same question was 
asked about the government and only 41% offered support to it. 
 
Did the current parliament accomplish anything worthy of recognition? 
  
 Image 1: Parliament Approval Rating96 
                                                
94 Nader Dahabi: The CEO of Royal Jordanian Airlines and Aqaba Special Economic Zone 
Authority before he became a Prime Minister of Jordan. His brother, Muḥammad Dahabi, at the 
same time occupied the post of the head of Jordanian Intelligence. King ᶜAbdallah II, “To 
Marouf al-Bakhit from King Abdullah, Letter of Designation”, 25 November 2005, accessed 
July 7, 2014, http://kingabdullah.jo/index.php/en_US/royalLetters/view/id/150.html;  
King ᶜAbdallah II, “To Nader Dahabi from King Abdullah, Letter of Designation”, November 
22, 2007, accessed July 7, 2014, 
http://www.kingabdullah.jo/index.php/en_US/royalLetters/view/id/149.html.   
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Reform in Jordan, National Public Poll”, The International Republican Institute, 2009, accessed 
August 11, 2014, 
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Opinion,August-8-11,2009.pdf  
96 The International Republican Institute (IRI), “National Priorities, Governance and Political 
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 Therefore, in 2009, for the second time since 1999, the King and his royal 
edict dissolved the parliament,97 and proceeded to call for new elections in the 
following year.98 
 Sālim Falāḥāt, who became Supervisor in 2006 with the promise of improving 
Jordan’s relations with Hamas, had completely failed in implementing his agenda. 
With his understanding, participating in the 2007 election and providing minimum 
candidates might restore relations with the regime and salvage the Brotherhood’s 
position in Jordanian politics. However, the election result caused him to resign with 
this Executive Bureau, and an internal Shoura Council election was called for on April 
30, 2008. Again, Falāḥāt proposed himself for the Supervisor position, but did not 
succeed.99 In this election the Brotherhood developed a new stance, electing Hawks 
leader, Hammām ʻAbd al-Raḥīm Saʻīd, of Palestinian descent.100  
 
Supervisor  Date  
ʻAbd al-Laṭīf abū Qūrah 1945 - 1953 
Muḥammad Abd al-Raḥmān Khalīfah 1953 - 1994 
ʻAbd al-Majīd Dhunaybāt 1994 - 2006 
Sālim Falāḥāt 2006 - 2008 
Hammām ʻAbd al-Raḥīm Saʻīd 2008 - Present 
 
Table 5: Muslim Brotherhood General Supervisors from Establishment until Present 
 
The Brotherhood’s transition from pro-regime Doves leader, Dhunaybāt, to pro-Hamas 
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Doves leader Falāḥāt, and finally to the Hawks’ Hammām Saʻīd, demonstrates the 
deep impact of the 2007 Palestinian election, and the Brotherhood’s re-evaluation of its 
relationship with the regime.  
 
 
5.3 The 2010 Elections  
 
From 1999 to 2003, Jordan experienced a decline in economic, social, and political 
stability. During this time, King ᶜAbdallah attempted to wipe the West’s perception of 
a non-democratic Jordan, which was gained due to involvement in the Iraqi war, and 
the parliament’s suspension. Additionally, the anti-terrorist campaign after the Amman 
Bombing in 2005 had controversial outcomes in regards to Islamist relations and 
public freedoms.101 The general situation was worsened by the mistrust of the 
government due to the 2007 elections.  
 Observers from Freedom House and Democracy Web marked the situation in 
the country. Both organisations’ reports on the country’s development confirmed that 
between 2007 and 2010 Jordan has lost two points for political rights and two points 
for civil liberties. It was a significant drop down the one to seven scale, where one is 
free and democratic.102 The 2007 elections had a large impact on Jordan, shifting it 
from the most democratically promising country in the Middle East, as stated in 2006, 
to a restricted country in 2010, with a score of six in political rights and five in civil 
liberties. On a political rights scale, Jordan matched Afghanistan, and on civil rights – 
Yemen.103  
 Being internationally recognised as not having parliamentary opposition, 
teamed with the mobilization of European plans,104 pushed the authority to rethink the 
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election process in order to provide more assurances for both Jordanian citizens and 
international observers of the transparency and freedom of the expression of popular 
will.  
 Taking all of this into account, the 2010 elections were highly encouraged by 
the regime, and the government tried to raise awareness of the importance of these 
elections in order to increase participation. The intensive use of social networking sites 
such as Facebook and Twitter were promoted for the elections in general and for every 
candidate. Special websites addressed Jordanian youth alongside popular singers 
highlighting the need for the elections in national advertisements.105 As part of a 
national campaign to encourage citizens to vote, the government declared the Election 
Day a holiday.106 
 New electoral law was introduced for the 2010 election,107 and the number of 
seats in the parliament increased from 110 to 120. Ten new seats were assigned for big 
cities, such as Amman, Zarqa, and Irbid, with a higher percentage of Jordanians of 
Palestinian origin taking seats. Furthermore, the government increased the 
transparency of the elections by introducing public lists of candidates for each 
geographic circle.108 
 One of the pre-election reforms was the introduction of electoral circles. The 
territory of the country was divided into circles based on the population with the 
number of seats allocated proportionately. This invention, called afterwards 
‘illusionary districts’, complicated the electoral law. Those ‘virtual circles’ inside the 
election’s geographical circles delimited each area with smaller numbers of candidates 
and known numbers of voters.109 Therefore, previously formed districts created a zone 
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divided into multiple sub-districts. This partition emphasised the one vote system 
problem and encouraged tribalism, thus leading to an identity crisis for Jordanians, 
pushing voters to support family relatives or tribal leaders, and undermining political 
ideology.110  
 A new electoral law was introduced in 2007.111 According to the law, a 
political party must have 500 members from five different cities to be registered for 
elections. Based on this law, 24 out of 36 political parties in place during 2007 were 
dissolved; by 2008 Jordan had a total of 12 political parties, including the IAF.112 The 
application of this law weakened the already feeble political ideological competition in 
the 2010 election. 
 In King ᶜAbdallah’s call for elections, it was stated that the 2010 elections 
were to be “a model of integrity, impartiality and transparency.”113 Despite this 
encouraging statement, the main obstacle foiling free expression for Jordanians 
remained in place: the main demands to reform the one vote system had been ignored 
since 1993. Another disregarded issue was that the elections were solely organised by 
the government, rather than a third-party electoral body, which, as remarked by a 
report by the National Democratic Institute, led to “significant voter scepticism and 
apathy.”114 Due to this, changes undertaken by the government could be considered a 
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‘cover’ for its desire to preserve the status quo in the country. 
 Partial electoral reforms became the main reason for the Hawks to pass the 
statement on boycotting the parliamentary election. This decision was supported by 
52% of the movement’s Shoura Council, but the division within the movement 
deepened when five of the Brotherhood’s members were expelled for their decision to 
run in the elections as independents.115 
 Every national election was seen by the Brotherhood as a chance to introduce 
Islamic reforms. However, their continuous participation in parliament since 1989 had 
not provided any noticeable changes, and choosing to boycott the 2010 elections 
brought the country back to a 1997 situation.116 The 2010 electoral law continued to 
minimise the role of the Brotherhood in Jordanian politics.117 
 By insisting on the one vote system, the regime forced the Brotherhood to 
rethink its approach of parliamentary participation. It became clear for the Brotherhood 
that their engagement in political life was no longer viable, and participation in 
elections or parliament became discredited as a means of introducing social change.118 
 On July 30, 2010, the Muslim Brotherhood announced, via the IAF, that it 
would boycott the election. Nevertheless, the government encouraged voters to 
participate, with a turnout of 53% out of the 2.37 million eligible voters.119 
Participation in rural areas was higher than in the bigger cities - only 34% of voters in 
Amman and 34% in Zarqa voted – indicating the effect of the boycott, since these were 
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the main cities of Brotherhood supporters.120 
 The National Democratic Institute noted that there had been a clear 
improvement after the previous election in 2007 and recommended further 
improvements in the way elections were administered.121 Such reports could be 
grounded on the fact that, having eliminated the threat of the Brotherhood in the 
elections, the regime had no reasons to intervene in the voting. The pro-government 
parties or independent tribal candidates supporting the regime’s agenda won most of 
the seats. 
 To justify the boycott, 306 notables signed a communiqué,  putting forward 
their concerns about the way Jordan was governed.122 Firstly, it was acknowledged that 
the country was amidst deep demographic, social, and economic crises, which could be 
seen in a spread of poverty, unemployment, high prices, wage depreciation and the 
dramatic rise in the state’s debts. Also, the growing ambitions of the “Zionist entity” in 
Jordan were mentioned along with the impact of “the anarchical peace negotiations” in 
which Arabs and Palestinians were involved.123  
 As for the 2010 elections, the communiqué claimed that the government issued 
the election law without any kind of consultation with political parties or NGOs. 
Therefore, the law “was constructed behind closed doors,”124 without paying attention 
to the important proposals made by the national institutions, especially those that came 
from the oppositional political parties (e.g., mixed votes, local areas, and national 
votes). The government, instead, insisted on imposing the election law (one vote 
system), which would confirm again the absence of the political side of the elections 
                                                
120 Abū Rummān, al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn Mā baʻda Muqāṭaʻat al-Intikhābāt Iʻādat Tarsīm al-
Dawr al-Siyāsī lil-Harakah [The Muslim Brotherhood after 2010 Election Boycott: Redrawing 
the Political Role of the Movement], 13-15. 
121 National Democratic Institute, “Preliminary Statement of NDI Elections Observer 
Delegations to Jordan 2010 Parliamentary Elections,” National Democratic Institute, 2010, 
accessed August 11, 2014, 
https://www.ndi.org/files/Jordan_2010_Election_Delegation_Statement-Arabic.pdf 
122 “Bayān 306 Shakhṣiah Waṭanīyah Muqāṭiʻ al-Intikhābāt al-Urdunīyah” [The Statement of 
306 Personality for Boycotting the Election], Fact International 2010, accessed August 11, 
2014, http://www.factjo.com/pages/fullnews.aspx?id=19913; Muḥammad al-Najjār, “300 
Shakhṣiah Urdunīyah Tuqāṭiʻ al-Intikhābāt” [300 Jordanian Personality Boycott the Elections], 
Al Jazeera, September 16, 2013, accessed August 11, 2014, 
http://www.aljazeera.net/news/pages/f356792f-6650-42c0-9df4-95152a9d8e1a  
123 “Bayān 306 Shakhṣiah Waṭanīyah Muqāṭiʻ al-Intikhābāt al-Urdunīyah” [The Statement of 
306 Personality for Boycotting the Election]. 
124 The IAF website on August 2, 2010, Communiqué of the Boycott, has since been closed. 
Alternative link: “al-Islāmīyūn yashraḥun Mubarrirāt Muqāṭaʻathum il-Intikhābāt” [Islamists 
Explain their Justification for Boycotting Elections], Ammon News, August 2, 2010, accessed 
May 25, 2014, http://mobile.ammonnews.net/article.aspx?articleNO=66340. 
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qualifying only individuals with the agenda to improve public services, rather than 
political parties’ lists of nominations. Therefore, the government re-produced the 
dissolved parliament with members fully loyal to itself and the regime, rather than 
creating a parliament that supervised the government objectively and independently.  
 The communiqué declared that the government was fully responsible for the 
crisis in the country. The various parties, activists, and national personalities’ stances 
showed their commitment to freedom, justice, and equity, and their devotion to build 
authentic democracy based on institutional rule of law, highlighting that ‘the nation’ is 
the prime source of authority.  
 To summarise, due to the failure of the 2007 election, the 2010 elections 
resulted in introducing a common platform for opposition leaders to disregard their 
religious or tribal background. For the first time, the regime was opposed not only by 
the Islamists in the country, but also from other political parties, who found themselves 
excluded from political life and unable to voice their criticisms due to the regime’s 
trajectory of creating a one-colour parliament. 
 The significance of the 2007 election is that it was the last one that the 
Brotherhood participated in. It is hard to measure the implications of the 2010 boycott 
on the Brotherhood’s popularity and public support, as its size and popularity remains 
unquantified since its last participation in 2003; however, it is obvious that the regime 
and Brotherhood reached a peak in their crisis during these elections, and that the battle 
over electoral law changed the rules of politics in Jordan: It is no longer a power game 
occupied with parliament seats passing Westernised or Islamised laws.  
 After 2010, the crisis touched on the issue of monarchal legitimacy. In other 
words, claims for electoral reform extended to questioning the extent of the King’s 
power and the essence of the constitutional monarchy.125 
 Three key questions emerge from the concentration of this study: the role of 
Palestine in Jordan, the struggle of King ᶜAbdallah II to balance between economic and 
political reform to establish a democratic Jordan, and perhaps most importantly: the 
issue of the Salafist Brotherhood. During the 1990s, and especially after 9/11, the 
Muslim Brotherhood has tried to distance itself from Salafist ideology, to show the 
                                                
125 Abū Rummān, al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn Mā baʻda Muqāṭaʻat al-Intikhābāt Iʻādat Tarsīm al-
Dawr al-Siyāsī lil-Harakah [The Muslim Brotherhood after 2010 Election Boycott: Redrawing 
the Political Role of the Movement], 19-20; R. Ryan Curtis, “Jordan’s New Electoral Law: 
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movement as modern compared to them, and able to work with the regime despite 
historical disagreements. However, despite the Brotherhood’s endeavours to protect 
themselves from radicalisation, the shadow of Salafism has continued to follow the 
Brotherhood, and what they try to oppose lurks within their own membership.  
 
Discussion: Internal Transformations  
 
Jordan’s struggle with the question of Palestine and reform has become a central 
antagonist between the regime and Brotherhood. The period between 1997 and 2010 
saw increasing marginalisation of the Brotherhood, alienating it from the political 
game, and leading it towards an agenda increasingly focused on Palestine and reform, 
which in turn could increase their own influence. Simultaneously, the regime would 
not fully address these issues for fear of harming itself, thus resulting in a power 
struggle that would affect the whole country.  
 As explored throughout this research, the Muslim Brotherhood is internally 
experiencing a number of structural and ideological changes. Generally, distinctions 
between the Hawks and Doves can be seen through three levels of analysis: firstly, 
members’ interests are influenced by their origins, whether of Palestinian or Jordanian 
descent. This element is crucial to the Jordanian Brotherhood as the Palestinian issue is 
at the core of its ideology. However, the Jordanian Brotherhood members are divided 
regarding this centrality of the Palestinian issue, as individual origin determines the 
choice between two distinct agendas: the Palestinian agenda or the national Jordanian 
agenda. 
 Secondly, the Brotherhood’s conflict over participation, whilst having its 
demands for changes in electoral law overlooked by the regime, caused critical 
changes within the new Brotherhood generation. This generation did not experience 
the alliance period with the regime, and thus its understanding of participation is 
limited to the crisis period of 1991 onward. This means that the Hawks, who 
emphasise the question of Palestine, became popular among the second generation who 
brought a new understanding of participation. These two generations’ differences in 
experience and agenda have caused further division since 2007, regarding the 
Brotherhood’s relations with the regime, and understandings of reform in Jordan.  
However, the third and most important element in distinguishing differences 
between members’ ideologies is to look to their understanding and acceptance of 
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Hamas’ concepts and activities, including its role in Jordan, where a substantial divide 
emerges with the Hawks who traditionally advocate an increased Hamas presence 
within the Brotherhood. When dividing the movement’s history into stages, three 
distinct phases appear. The first stage, from the establishment of the movement to the 
late 1980s, was oriented purely towards the Doves and focused on building alliances 
with the regime. These alliances helped both the Brotherhood and the regime survive 
in a densely conflicted era. Due to these empowering results, the Muslim Brotherhood 
made political continuation a priority. Simultaneously during these years, the Salafist 
movement emerged due to personal relations between some Brotherhood members and 
Salafist personalities such as al-Albani, who influenced and taught many leaders of the 
Muslim Brotherhood, including Ibrahim al-Mashūkhī and ᶜAbdallah ᶜAzzām. 
The second stage is when the relations between the Brotherhood and the 
regime peaked with the Brotherhood’s participation in government. However, on one 
hand, disagreements surrounding the value of participation grew as the tributary of 
Qutb theology, which forbade involvement with regimes that do not apply Shariᶜah 
fully, was still strong inside the Brotherhood, and on the other hand, the involvement 
of the Palestinian component inside the Brotherhood continued to cause conflict. The 
division within the Brotherhood widened, finally creating the Hawks and Doves. 
Nevertheless, the Doves’ decision to participate politically was increasingly popular, 
strengthening the Doves’ agenda over the Hawks. 
The third stage took place after the Western orientation of the country had 
been established, and the government had enacted an election law against the 
Brotherhood enabling it to sign the peace treaty with Israel without hindrance. Another 
factor was a new king taking the throne with a liberal national agenda considered by 
Islamists to be hostile. This led to the rise of the Salafist movement in Jordan, 
including the Jihadist Salafists and consequently the Amman Bombing. 
The internal organisation of the Brotherhood has been discussed 
comprehensively throughout this research, however, further differences have since 
occurred within the movement, deviating in various ways from original Brotherhood 
ethos and ideology. This can be recognised within the details of the following 
interviews with Brotherhood leaders Raḥīl al-Gharāybah, Zakī bin Arshīd, and Ibrahim 
al-Mashūkhī.  
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Personal Differences: The Interviews 
 
Raḥīl al-Gharāybah is the former head of the Brotherhood’s political bureau, member 
of the Executive Office, scholar of Ummah studies, and head of the Doves, known by 
his good relations with the Jordanian regime. Zakī bin Arshīd is one of the most 
charismatic personalities within the movement, and is often looked at as an informal 
primary leader. As a former head of the IAF, Arshīd is now known as a leader of the 
Hawks, retaining close ties to Hamas. Ibrahim al-Mashūkhī is Jordanian of Palestinian 
origins, a parliamentarian, and was a lieutenant in an al-Shuyūkh base during the 1968 
war. Al-Mashūkhī also represents the Hawks. 
At an individual level, differences can be easily identified between members of 
the Hawks and Doves. For example, when I interviewed al-Gharāybah, who is of 
Jordanian origin, his approval of the regime was as clear as his criticisms of the 
government, who he accused of opposing the Brotherhood at every available occasion. 
He explained a common source of conflict as being the government obstructing the 
Brotherhood from obtaining busses: 
 
Every time the Muslim Brotherhood tries to collaborate with any community around 
Jordan they face a war from the Government to stop them, even if it’s to buy a bus … 
obtaining a license appears to be impossible sometimes and it becomes a reason for 
altercation with the government. The government creates or plays with the regulations 
and laws to prevent the Muslim Brotherhood from owning that bus.126 
 
Al-Gharāybah also elaborated on the domestic and external pressures placed 
on the government to resist the Muslim Brotherhood: 
 
Indeed there are two kinds of pressure on the Government: Internal, which comes from 
weak competitors - I do not want to mention names – then international. The 
international pressure is extremely dangerous in that it keeps trying to ruin the 
reputation of the Muslim Brotherhood through the propaganda of terrorism and 
extremism for the sake of drying out the spring of Islamism.127  
 
                                                
126 Interview with Raḥīl al-Gharāybah, August 24, 2012, Amman, Jordan. 
127 Ibid. 
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The ‘internal’ factors al-Gharāybah refuses to name insinuate the Royal Court 
and security entities, restricting his criticism to the government without explicitly 
identifying the regime. At the same time, al-Gharāybah demonstrates his loyalty to the 
throne throughout the interview, which he suggests represents a balance and meeting 
point between all political groups and minorities in the country. In reference to the 
throne he deliberately names the regime and undoubtedly accepts the position and role 
of the King in politics. Al-Gharāybah does not resent the King’s political involvement 
but he demands changes and political reforms in the country, including changes in the 
King’s constitutional powers, whilst still recognising King ᶜAbdallah II as the head of 
the State.   
Al-Gharāybah mainly focuses on governmental policies, in accordance with 
the Doves’ agenda. Generally, the Doves differentiate between the King and the 
government by not holding the King responsible for governmental policies. 
Furthermore, they call upon the King to intervene in internal politics to change the 
government’s path regarding key issues such as the election laws and the 
marginalisation of the Brotherhood. In this regard, the Doves, as led by al-Gharāybah, 
focus on the reconciliation between the Brotherhood and the regime to avoid 
confrontation, isolating their issues with the country’s managment purely to the 
government, considering the King beyond criticism, thus deeming the government 
directly responsible for the issues in place that the Brotherhood rejects. Therefore, he 
leads those of the Brotherhood who believe in political participation as a way of 
sustaining the prioritisation of the Jordanian agenda, with an overall objective loyal to 
the internal affairs of Jordan. 
While on the Hawks’ side, the Zakī bin Arshīd interview highlights different 
issues such as the problems between the IAF and the government. He explicitly claims 
that the government works systematically to marginalise the movement and displace it 
from society due to fears that its influence and power may overtake the regime’s. He 
explains,  
 
The government stands against any Islamic or non-Islamic influences [of the 
Brotherhood] in order to retain and empower its authority on Jordanian society. 
Therefore, the government does not allow the movement to compete, or establish any 
kind of rights for the population, in order to keep its absolute powers over the weak 
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and controlled society.128 
 
In contrast with the Doves, Arshīd considers the relationship between the 
Brotherhood and the Jordanian government as confrontational. He suggests that the 
government utilises all political powers in initiating laws and regulations to stop 
actions by the movement: “The government raised the heat on the conflict with Islamic 
groups through many new laws such as the Preaching and Guidance law and the State 
Security Court.”129 Arshīd referred to NGOs’ reports to support his arguments, proving 
that the government employs all the tools of the state in its confrontation with the 
Brotherhood:   
 
Many organisations and NGOs reported the negative impact of these laws. Human 
Rights Watch, for example, reported the growing numbers of Islamic prisoners and the 
inhumane living conditions coupled with torture specifically towards Islamists. 
Furthermore, the Centre of Strategic Studies at the Jordanian University [CSS] 
concluded through surveys that 80% of Jordanians fear to declare their opinions about 
the Jordanian government’s actions or its political practices.130 
 
Arshīd represents a generation of Jordanian-origin Brotherhood members who 
were pushed into leadership positions by the movement after the 1990s due to the one 
vote system’s inescapable incline towards those of tribal backgrounds, therefore 
forcing the Brotherhood to prove that the movement was Jordanian more than 
Palestinian, as is often accused. 
Arshīd’s popularity was gained due to his full support of Hamas, qualifying 
him as the Secretary General of the IAF party, and later, the Deputy General 
Supervisor of the Brotherhood. He claims “Jordan lived in a freer atmosphere between 
1954 and 2004, when the laws enforced guaranteed and offered more of freedom and 
rights for the people and parties.”131 
In his reference to the period before King ᶜAbdallah II’s accession to the 
throne, he implied that King Hussein was more serious in his democratic intentions 
than the current King. Due to the nature of this criticism, he does not mention King 
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129 Ibid. 
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ᶜAbdallah II as explicitly as the Hawks typically do, yet does openly blame him for the 
shift in the country’s political agenda against the Brotherhood. Though he is 
considered to be a leader of the Hawks in Jordan, he is in fact conservative in his 
criticism of the royal family and uses the concept of the state vs. Brotherhood to avoid 
mentioning the regime. Such a position is more extreme than that of the Doves, but 
still it accepts the King and sets him above criticism to avoid any direct confrontation 
with the monarch himself.  
The main difference in their approaches to the King’s role is that Hawks take 
their accusations further. Arshīd claims that the government, lawmakers, security 
departments, and King make one unit, and that political reform can only take place 
once the constitution and King’s powers have also been reformed. Soon after the 
interview, Arshīd published a paper in which he claims that the monarchy becoming 
fully constitutional and the re-organisation of the King’s authority is of popular 
demand.132 In this paper, Arshīd focuses on the reform of the state, not the King 
himself. The Hawks demand more than the Doves: they are not willing to accept partial 
change, such as changing the election law or the government policies. This position 
has remained dominant with the Hawks since the Israel peace treaty was signed.  
At present, variations in members’ opinions have grown increasingly disparate, 
and the Brotherhood’s views towards numerous issues are varying further based on 
these differences, which are increasing beyond traditional differences of the Hawks 
and Doves. These changes can be understood through the details of al-Mashūkhī 
interview, who, unlike al-Gharāybah or Arshīd, did not only criticise the government 
and the state, but went further to criticise the regime itself, naming King ᶜAbdallah II 
as the reason and source for the problems of the country. 
Al-Mashūkhī represents a well-respected, popular leadership, not only within 
the Brotherhood, but also on the ground, where he collected most of his votes into 
parliament from younger Brotherhood members and those from refugee camps, 
particularly in Zarqa. Due to his more challenging experiences with the Jordanian 
regime, he became known as one of the leaders of the Hawks. Al-Mashūkhī claims 
                                                
132 Zakī bin Arshīd, “Furas Harakāt al-Islām al-Siyāsī al-Mustaqbalīyah fī Dawʼ al-Wāqiʻ al-
ʻArabī al-Iṣlāḥī/ al-Namūdhaj al-Urdunī” [The Chances of Future Political Islamic Movements 
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11, 2013 accessed November 20, 2014, http://goo.gl/w4BE7T 
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“King ᶜAbdallah jailed me twice.”133 Evidently, al-Mashūkhī directly blames King 
ᶜAbdallah II for his arrest after visiting al-Zarqawi’s family in 2006.134 Al-Mashūkhī is 
not just a popular leader, but also represents a generation of the Brotherhood who 
joined an al-Shuyūkh base in Jordan and fought in the Karameh battle, asserting him as 
a strong believer in the Palestinian cause.  
Al-Mashūkhī’s respect in the movement is not due to his position as former 
parliamentarian only, but also to his contributions to society, such as his effort in the 
distribution of charities, and his work with the Islamic Charity Centre in the Zarqa 
refugee camp. He also influenced Islamists in his area when he convinced al-Albani, 
along with other Brotherhood members, to leave Damascus and move to Zarqa in the 
1980s. In explaining why he opposes King ᶜAbdallah II, al-Mashūkhī makes a 
comparison between King ᶜAbdallah II and his father King Hussein, arguing that the 
new King opposed the policies of his father and changed the path of the state towards 
confrontation with the Brotherhood directly. He said, “King Hussein assimilated the 
Muslim Brotherhood, and kept an open line [of communication] with us personally,” in 
contrast to King ᶜAbdallah II who cut all lines with the movement once empowered. 
He continues, suggesting that King ᶜAbdallah II fights Islamists under the guise of 
fighting terrorism, with:  
 
When [King ᶜAbdallah II] fights terrorism, he actually fights Islamists, and he does not 
appoint anyone who is religious for high positions in the state, despite their 
qualifications. He confirms that [the regime] stole the Islamic Charity Center to break 
[Muslim Brotherhood’s] relations with the society. 135  
  
He stresses that the King works constantly to secularise the country. In this he 
is convinced that King ᶜAbdallah II utilises all tools targeting the ‘nationalisation’ of 
the Muslim Brotherhood properties such as the Islamic Centre, and introducing 
changes to the country’s laws to guarantee the limitation of the movement’s activities 
by all means in order to keep it under control.136 By doing so, there is no space or 
                                                
133 Interview with Ibrahim al-Mashūkhī, August 6, 2014, Zarqa, Jordan. 
134 This controversial event refers to al-Mashūkhī visiting the funeral of al-Zarqawi in 2006. 
135 Interview with Ibrahim al-Mashūkhī, August 6, 2014, Zarqa, Jordan. 
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the Islamic Center. 
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opportunity for the Brotherhood to be part of any union with the Jordanian regime. 
However, one of al-Mashūkhī’s main points of comparison between the late King and 
his son is the lack of meetings offered to the Brotherhood since King ᶜAbdallah II’s 
accession. For example, when asked about the effort made by the Brotherhood to meet 
the succeeding King, al-Mashūkhī mentioned an attempt in 2008 to reconcile with 
King ᶜAbdallah II when the movement requested a meeting with the Royal Hashemite 
Court Chief, Basem Awadallah. The answer received from Awadallah was “As long as 
I exist in this post, this meeting will not happen.”137 This sent a clear message to the 
Brotherhood that they are unwelcome in the Royal Court, emphasising the 
Brotherhood’s feelings of alienation. 
He also added that there are no Islamist personalities in King ᶜAbdallah’s 
counsel to offer advice on the movement or Islamic matters. Through this he 
understands the King is not interested in an Islamist opinion. When asked about a 
possibility or chance of reconciliation with the King, al-Mashūkhī said “It’s too late; 
the gap between the Brotherhood and the regime is too big.” He continued with, “King 
ᶜAbdallah is not assimilating the Muslim Brotherhood … We are in need now of a 
regime which respects the rights of humans”.138 Therefore, al-Mashūkhī cuts any kind 
of future reconciliation with the regime and is no longer willing to participate in 
politics. I suggested reforms such as changes in the election law, government, and even 
constitutional changes which may affect the King’s powers, in order to introduce the 
possibility of good intentions between the regime and the Brotherhood, and yet his 
answer was repeated, “It’s too late, the gap is too big.” This position reflects a deep 
frustration and disappointment that he may share with many members of the Hawks, 
resulting in the severance of all kinds of communication with state politics. 
Al-Mashūkhī believes the regime can no longer respond to the country’s 
problems, arguing that the King is the sole reason for the current political and 
economic situation in Jordan. Dangerously, he adds that he does not see any value in 
the continuation of King ᶜAbdallah’s power, stating that: 
 
King ᶜAbdallah is not prepared and he has never prepared for ruling Jordan. He was 
                                                                                                                             
Society, the charitable and social arm of the Brotherhood, in 2007, calling the decision 
‘nationalisation.’  
137 Interview with Ibrahim al-Mashūkhī, August 6, 2014, Zarqa, Jordan. 
138 Ibid. 
187 
 
brought up outside and was suddenly put in power, he is not of us, and he was not 
brought up to be a King. On the contrary, Prince Hamzah was the one who was 
brought up in our culture and our tradition, which qualifies him as the most worthy to 
become a King.139 
 
Despite carrying these views against King ᶜAbdallah II and his powers, he still 
has high regard for the Hashemite royalty and speaks of Prince al-Hassan with great 
respect, describing him as an ideal model for King, as well as Prince Hamzah. 
These shocking statements addressing the regime as a cause for state 
fragmentation forms a new narrative for analysing the Brotherhood. The case of al-
Mashūkhī is an alarm for a new division within the Brotherhood and indicates the 
growth of a new kind of Brotherhood. These same opinions can be found among those 
who do not value political participation after what they claimed to be a fraudulent 
election controlled by the state; those who consider themselves victims of state policies 
and regime confrontation; and those who considered the normalisation of relations 
with Israel to be a betrayal against the Jordanian people. Both the Hawks and Doves 
have reached the conclusion that they are in direct conflict with the government or 
regime, but neither demands the severance of connection with the regime despite the 
Hawks’ attempt to boycott the elections and demanding constitutional changes. 
However, the Hawks’ boycott is a tactical move, as part of a strategy led by Zakī bin 
Arshīd, to loudly express dissatisfaction with the current situation and to apply 
pressure for political reform in the country. Leaders on the other side of the divided 
Hawks, such as al-Mashūkhī, directly call for the Brotherhood’s renouncement from 
politics, and to continue the boycott indefinitely.  
 
                                                
139 Ibid; Prince Hamzah bin al Hussein was Crown Prince 1999-2004, and half-brother of King 
ᶜAbdallah II. 
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Conflicting 
Issues 
Doves Hawks New Hawks 
The King / 
regime 
Do not criticise or mention  Mention with reservation Criticise freely 
• Retain loyalty • Retain diplomacy • Declare war 
Government 
Problems / confrontation in 
procedural matters 
State confrontation: 
alternative to address regime 
indirectly 
Royal family to find 
new king 
Reform Government is not interested 
in current reform. The King 
is necessary for reform. 
Change constitutional 
powers: power to parliament. 
Then participate in election 
Impossible with current 
King 
Participation Pro-participation. 
Involvement with parliament 
allows Brotherhood to 
contribute 
Conditional: reforms in 
political process, 
constitution, and election 
laws 
Never 
 
Table 6:  Conflicting Issues within the Brotherhood 
 
The above statements made by Hawks leaders realise the formation of a new 
group led by popular leaders such as al-Mashūkhī. This new sub-group can be 
associated more with the Salafist movement than the Brotherhood. As explained 
earlier, the Salafists are similar to the Brotherhood in that they both call for the return 
to the Qurᵓan and Sunnah as the only possible social and private guidance yet the 
Salafists, unlike the Brotherhood, reject any possible adaptations of Islam into current 
politics. Therefore, the Salafists do not accept the Brotherhood’s practices in forming 
political parties, running for elections, and participating in government. The main 
difference between the Salafist movement and the Muslim Brotherhood is 
fundamentally political. Due to this, the new Hawks are more likely to be associated 
with the Salafists than the Brotherhood. However, there are also significant differences 
between the two in that the new Hawks’ preserved attachment to al-Banna theology 
and teachings, conversely to Salafism. This unique mix of Salafist and Brotherhood 
beliefs appears to create a new, extremist wing within the Hawks: the ‘new’ Hawks, or, 
the ‘Salafist Brotherhood’.   
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Salafist Brotherhood 
 
Despite following the teachings of al-Banna, the Salafist Brotherhood differ further 
from the Muslim Brotherhood, as they do not believe in the gradual change al-Banna 
preached, and they are not willing to participate in politics, nor in government, as they 
do not believe slow development is viable to create an Islamic State in Jordan. 
Disagreement and division within the Muslim Brotherhood regarding the previously 
mentioned transitions of the movement led to a rise in Salafist orientation.  
The issue of a new wing within the movement mirroring Salafism is not 
dangerous in itself, as the Salafist movement in general is peaceful, calling for social 
reforms, opposing ethical and religious corruption, and emphasising close adherence to 
the model of the Salaf. In contrast, the peaceful Salafist can be more supportive to the 
regime, because if Salafists believe that the regime is Islamic and applying Shariᶜah, 
then the rule forbids opposition to it and enforces acceptance of the monarch’s orders. 
However, the issue in Jordan is that the current Salafist movements are mostly 
condemning the regime for its Western orientation and relations with Israel, and 
furthermore they do not see any actual application of Islam. On that basis, and with 
recent events such as the war in Iraq, and the continued occupation of Palestine, the 
Salafist movement has turned into Jihadist Salafists, with the belief that Islamic 
changes come through jihad and violence. Jordan is one of the countries that incubates 
Jihadist Salafists in the region and world through a generation of Jordanians such as al-
Maqdisi, abū Kutada, and al-Zarqawi, who are the main references for Jihadist 
Salafists.140  
As long as Salafists remained free from jihadist encouragement they were of 
benefit to the regime. However, the case in Jordan has developed into the Salafists 
opposing the regime’s Western polices. Harbouring this extreme version of Salafism 
within the country, and there being a new, frustrated, wing within the Brotherhood, 
which could potentially become jihadist, we may see an impact on the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s whole politics, especially when popular leaders such as al-Mashūkhī are 
involved and gaining more popularity amongst the youth. 
This transformation in the Jordanian Brotherhood’s ideology implies the 
                                                
140 David Schenker, “Salafi Jihadists on the Rise in Jordan,” Washington Institute, May 5, 2014, 
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importance of maintaining moderation in both sects of the Brotherhood through 
political participation, as both the Doves and Hawks had generally shared a belief in 
political participation and cooperation with the regime. If this had been maintained by 
the regime, the leaders of the Brotherhood could have influenced the movement’s 
fundamental beliefs with the possibility of gradual Islamic change by working from 
within the state system and through formal political channels, thus encouraging 
mediation, understanding, and democracy rather than pushing members of the 
Brotherhood into an increasingly extreme position. If that route had appeared to be 
successful, then a peaceful change may have gradually taken place and the Salafist 
movement could have been inspired to approach the Brotherhood with a Brotherhood 
Salafist rather than Salafist Brotherhood.   
The engagement of Islamists in a time of rising jihadist fundamentalism could 
have been an opportunity and an efficient tool in the hands of the state to fight 
radicalisation and the call for extreme change. If the regime had not marginalised the 
Islamists, especially the Brotherhood, through lack of effort in integrating them into 
political life, they could have influenced into acceptance of the regime and political 
participation.  
Within Brotherhood ideology, Qutb’s ideas are still used and viable, despite 
many efforts to limit his influence, as seen in Ḥasan Huḍaybī’s book Doah Duʻāh Lā 
Quḍāh [Preachers not Judges], the ideas of al-Ḥākimīyah, Jahiliyyah and al-ʻAṣabah 
al-Muʼminah which are still alive among the Salafists, Jihadist Salafists, and the 
Brotherhood themselves.  
These ideas are still used to mobilise and recruit new members for extreme 
methods of change, and to judge Takfīr individuals and regimes as infidels, for the 
purpose of creating the Islamic state. Therefore, with many attempts to reinterpret Qutb 
and many arguments about the misinterpretation of Qutb’s thoughts, he is still present 
in the mind of the Islamist. Although the Muslim Brotherhood has prioritised 
participation over confrontation with the Jordanian regime in some eras, this is clearly 
not sustainable. In the situation today, in which both wings of the Brotherhood 
consider themselves to be in confrontation with the regime, Qutbian ideology could be 
revived and utilised by more extremist Brotherhood members such as al-Mashūkhī, in 
order to mobilise further extremism against the regime. 
Al-Mashūkhī said, “I am not a fan of the Brotherhood’s ideology. I am a fan of 
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its way of achieving change and reform.”141 Therefore, when the Brotherhood and its 
ideology become insufficient in responding to vital changes, and when the 
Brotherhood’s alternative, Salafism, is not enough to make changes in Jordan, Jihadist 
Salafism proves to have a stronger presence and be more attractive to the Islamists who 
do not believe in participation anymore, as seen with the situation in Zarqa city. The 
Doves leader, al-Gharāybah, said:  
 
Fighting the internal powers inside any country in the third world is a Western policy. 
It is based on creating an internal enemy and drives the public to worry and make their 
internal enemy a priority of internal affairs. There is nothing weaker than a society that 
is fighting itself.142 
 
This means communication between the Brotherhood and the regime is a 
necessity now in order to stop further radicalisation, and only with the Brotherhood’s 
participation can the regime limit fundamentalism in Jordan and guarantee further 
stability in the country. The reasons that led to a crisis with the Brotherhood are the 
same reasons creating a clearing for the developing Salafist movement in Jordan. 
Failing to answer the question of Palestine or deal with political freedom violations 
and the Brotherhood’s participation has led to the growth of an alternative body of 
Islamists creating another path in a situation where they feel attacked or undermined by 
the regime.  
The debate over the King and Brotherhood’s relationship turned from being an 
issue between the Hawks and Doves, to a debate among the Hawks themselves, who 
reached radicalised conclusions of how to address the regime within a revolutionary 
rhetoric. The development of which has raised the alarm that what went wrong 
between the Brotherhood and regime could result in a national disaster. Addressing the 
developing Salafist phenomenon within the Brotherhood, and working towards 
reconciliation rather than the perpetuation of conflict, would protect the country from 
potential backlash from this radical sub-wing.   
                                                
141 Interview with Ibrahim al-Mashūkhī, August 6, 2014, Zarqa, Jordan. 
142 Interview with Raḥīl al-Gharāybah, August 24, 2012, Amman, Jordan. 
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Since its establishment seventy years ago by the first General Supervisor, ʻAbd al-Laṭīf 
Abū Qūrah, the Muslim Brotherhood has been searching for a way to apply an agenda 
of political Islam in Jordanian politics, but without success. By evaluating the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s experience in Jordan, and its application of political Islam within the 
political system, it is clear that the question of whether the Brotherhood is compatible 
with parliamentary politics cannot be answered with a simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’. Rather, the 
answer balances on a myriad of variations caused by the Brotherhood’s disparate 
ideologies that are both compatible and incompatible with the parliamentary system 
due to differing backgrounds, beliefs, and experiences of Brotherhood members.  
The main division of the Brotherhood historically occurs between the 
ideologies of Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb, realised in the respective Hawks and 
Doves divisions, which do not share the same understandings of political participation. 
Al-Banna sought political participation as a means to develop an Islamic state, whereas 
Qutb had different ideas for applying Islam that assumed a non-participation stance. 
These disparities have caused a clear point of division between a moderate, politically 
active Brotherhood, and one that is more radical. 
Although al-Banna’s methods of gradual societal reform were historically 
standardised in the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, this research argues that there are 
more Brotherhood groups steadily turning against al-Banna’s approach, and towards 
alternative, even radical ideologies in light of the Brotherhood’s political alienation in 
Jordan. This transition in the Brotherhood’s trajectory has shifted it from its adaptable 
and compatible position towards the Jordanian parliamentary system to working 
against it outside of political accountability.  
An important element in understanding the Jordanian Brotherhood is in 
acknowledging why its original trajectory positioned the movement as loyal to al-
Banna’s methods and loyal to the Jordanian regime. The Brotherhood adapted to 
Jordan’s political environment using al-Banna’s practice of political participation only 
because the regime was ready to accept the movement wholly. This is to say that if the 
Jordanian Brotherhood had faced a regime such as Nasser’s in Egypt, it would most 
likely have adopted Qutb’s ideology, which throws into question the credibility and 
motivation of the Brotherhood’s adaptation to democracy in Jordan, and how they 
would manage democracy if they came to power.  
Therefore, despite the fact that the movement may have appeared democratic 
in its former political participation in Jordan, and its application of democratic 
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elements within its internal Shoura Council elections, the Brotherhood has latently 
fostered scholarly and ideological backings that do not accept democracy and could 
easily drive them into dictatorship, as indicated with ‘new’ Hawks, which this study 
has called the ‘Salafist Brotherhood.’ 
The failure of the Brotherhood to implement a recognisable Islamic agenda in 
Jordan is linked to a general failure of the application of political Islam across the 
Islamic world today. As there is not a unanimous international, or even national, 
understanding of political Islam, how it should interact with concepts such as 
democracy and parliament is still contentious and contradictory of al-Hākimīya and 
Shoura.766 This means that the compatibility of Islamic movements to parliament or 
democracy will remain at the discretion of Islamic personalities, scholars, and the 
leaders of the movements’ internal wings as to whether they are imposing reform and 
modern understandings of political Islam, or whether they reject the modern state 
system and democracy as contradictions of Islam.  
 
Findings 
 
This study presented a history and analysis of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood 
contextualised within five main chapters, beginning with its establishment period from 
1921 to 1954, followed by the Brotherhood’s entrance into political life and the peak in 
Brotherhood-regime relations from 1955 to 1988; both periods are seen as an era of 
alliance between the Brotherhood and the regime. The second stage in this relationship 
is demarked as a crisis period from 1989 to 1997, followed by the Brotherhood’s first 
boycott and its internal divisions that occurred between 1997 and 2003, concluding 
with a radicalisation period of 2004 – 2010 and the movement’s concluding political 
boycott.  
Building on these five chronological divisions, the research sought to answer 
five corresponding sub-questions in order to ascertain if the Muslim Brotherhood is 
compatible with Jordan’s modern political system. Juxtaposing specific questions 
against the outlined alliance and crisis periods enabled the researcher to deduce the 
behaviours and patterns regarding the Brotherhood’s participation in politics, and with 
the regime.  
The first question this study posited was how the Brotherhood’s relationship 
                                                
766 See Appendix 1: Glossary. 
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with the regime evolved parallel to Jordan’s transformation from an emirate in 1921 to 
an independent monarchy in 1946. This good relationship between the Jordanian 
Brotherhood and regime was formed largely because King ᶜAbdallah I claimed that the 
Hashemite family directly descends from the Prophet Muḥammad, which drew a line 
of common interest with the Brotherhood. In 1945, King ᶜAbdallah I opened the 
Muslim Brotherhood Headquarter in Amman, marking the beginning of a forty-year 
alliance with the Hashemite monarchy. 
During this time each found in the other a source of legitimacy, and 
communalities in religion and Palestine, where they were both using Jordan as a 
platform for Palestine’s liberation, initiating mergers with the West Bank, and entering 
the 1948 war together as an alliance.   
The events surrounding the Baghdad Pact, and the Arabisation of the Arab 
Army moved the Brotherhood into a wider role in politics in 1956, driven by 
confrontation with the UK in Jordan. This presented the second question of what the 
conditions of the Brotherhood’s re-entrance into political life were within the period of 
1955 – 1988.  
The two deciding factors that brought the Brotherhood into politics was the 
Brotherhood’s loyalty to King Hussein, who was facing confrontation with the Leftists 
and Nationalists, and the Brotherhood’s own distrust of these emerging parties. The 
secularist trend of the Leftist movement, which contradicted the Brotherhood’s goal of 
implying Islamic reform in Jordan, was the main reason for the Brotherhood to ally 
with King ᶜAbdallah I, who they viewed as an Islamic personality, habitually 
supporting the Brotherhood’s bids to imply Islamic reforms. This caused both the 
Qutbist and al-Bannaist divisions within the Brotherhood to support the regime’s 
mission to oust the Leftists, who, if they reached power, would be in direct 
confrontation with the Brotherhood anyway, as they would not imply any Islamic 
agenda.  
Furthermore, the Leftists ran the risk of copying Nasser, who was in the 
process of crystallising his ideology of pan-Arabism, which in its own view, was 
against the Brotherhood. Therefore, fearing the Brotherhood’s destiny in Egypt, and 
the demise of their goal of Islamic reform, the Brotherhood chose the regime over the 
Leftists and Nationalists due to their communalities in understanding the Palestinian 
issue and Islam.  
Although the Jordanian Brotherhood entered politics pragmatically to protect 
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the interests of the movement, its ties with the regime were significantly strengthened, 
and the Brotherhood was later seen as loyalist, working to avert national crises such as 
the incident with the Fedayeen. Therefore, during this period, the Brotherhood utilised 
al-Banna’s model to avoid the Egyptian Brotherhood experience, countering 
alternative ideologies in Jordan, and monopolising the political environment so they 
were the only movement implementing tangible changes. During this alliance period 
the Brotherhood and regime’s unity towards Palestine and the implementation of 
Islamic values fortified them against conflict, laying the foundations of their alliance 
on their common enemies.  
Soon after this thriving era of alliance the two fell into their own crisis, 
demarked from 1989 to 1997, giving rise to the third question of why the crisis 
occurred, and why the Brotherhood then decided to boycott the political process in 
1997. The 1989 Habat Nisān event is elemental to this question, marking a turning 
point in their relations. The uprising began in the south of Jordan, where tribes are 
typically located, and thus is a traditional source of loyalty to the monarchy. As this 
loyalty was vital to the King’s success and continuation, he quietened the South’s 
criticisms against him by recommencing political life in Jordan, calling for elections in 
1989. The Brotherhood did not participate in this uprising as involvement would have 
given the spontaneous event an air of organisation, with the Brotherhood positioned 
against the regime. Furthermore, during this time there were not reasons enough to 
enter an uprising that would escalate with the Brotherhood’s involvement, as if it 
failed, it could later harm the movement and its alliance with the regime.  
The regime responded to this as if it were a personal favour, by facilitating the 
Brotherhood’s successful entrance into the first parliament since 1967, where it also 
participated in government. However, the success of the Brotherhood threatened the 
King’s agenda, as he was moving towards implementing peace with Israel and 
strengthening Jordan’s ties with the West. To counter his miscalculation of fully 
supporting the Brotherhood, King Hussein then made a series of measures to limit the 
Brotherhood, including the formation of the one vote system, and signing the peace 
treaty under the noses of the parliamentary Brotherhood members.  
Therefore, this era marks a deviation from the path that the Kingdom was built 
on in 1946, empowering Qutb’s ideology within the movement, which pushed for 
boycott and successfully gained it in 1997, in response to the sudden changes in the 
Brotherhood’s relationship with the regime.  
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The period from 1998 to 2003 then escalated this crisis, and the Brotherhood’s 
boycott affected the internal dynamics of the movement. However, the Brotherhood 
did return to politics at the end of this period, thus posing the fourth question of what 
the issues were for the Brotherhood to re-participate after its strong statement in 1997, 
and despite the growing divisions within the movement.   
Although the conflict between Palestinian/Jordanian descendants within the 
movement has always been present, returning the Qutbist element to the movement in 
the form of boycott created recognisable divisions between members. The conflict was 
then established in two opposing wings, with the Jordanian al-Bannaist Doves against 
the Palestinian Qutbist Hawks. In this sense, the Muslim Brotherhood reflected societal 
divisions as well as ideological differences, which could then be transferred onto a 
public platform, due to King Hussein reneging on the understanding he had built with 
the Brotherhood over the Palestinian issue by pursuing peace with Israel. 
The transition in the Jordanian regime’s attitude towards Palestine was 
furthered when King ᶜAbdallah II came to power, as he immediately exiled a strong 
Palestinian element from Jordan – Hamas – placing the movement and regime in 
another confrontation. Furthermore, the new King’s economic vision and complacency 
over political reform was demonstrated in the suspension of the 2001 parliament 
during the hostile environment of 9/11. The General Supervisor, ʻAbd al-Majīd 
Dhunaybāt, of the Doves wing, led the Brotherhood back into parliament in 2003 
despite internal disagreements, to demonstrate its modernity and continued 
prioritisation in al-Banna’s model rather than Qutb’s, and to bar the King from using 
the movement’s non-participation against them in this new environment.  
Therefore, similar to their 1956 participation, when the Brotherhood was led 
by the Doves’ ʻAbd al-Laṭīf Abū Qūrah the Brotherhood participated in politics in 
2003 not because they accepted or believed in Jordan’s political system or the new 
King, but rather as a necessity to protect their own survival, and in this case, to protect 
them against negative associations of political Islam in the 9/11 era since participation 
became the standard to differentiate between moderate and non-moderate Islamic 
movements in the post 9/11 era. 
Therein, the final era from 2004 to 2010 accounts for the breakdown of this 
tepid attempt at re-integrating into a political system that the Brotherhood had 
renounced. This period posits the fifth and final question of how the Salafist movement 
affected the Brotherhood-regime relationship, and the Brotherhood’s political 
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participation. 
The study utilised the city of Zarqa as a case model to refer to the growth of 
Islamist ideologies in Jordan competing with the Muslim Brotherhood, especially since 
the Brotherhood’s al-Banna model has failed to achieve tangible changes towards a 
more Islamic Jordan, or towards a Palestinian solution. Due to this failure, Jordan since 
1989 has developed a body of radical Islamists who use Islam and violence to initiate 
change, as seen with ᶜAbdallah ᶜAzzām, and abū Musab al-Zarqawi, who was 
responsible for the Amman Bombing in 2005, and the exportation of the ideology into 
Iraq. 
Therefore, the modernity of the movement became central to differentiate 
between it and the Salafists. The Brotherhood participated in the 2007 election to make 
these differences clearer, however, winning just six seats caused the Brotherhood to 
claim the election was fraudulent. Whether true or not, by not achieving seats in that 
parliament, the Qutbists of the movement were empowered, obtaining leadership 
within the Shoura Council and initiating a new stage in the movement’s history by 
declaring an indefinite boycott of elections thereafter.  
However, further than this account of an increasingly Qutbist Brotherhood, the 
study presented a stronger influence for the Salafists within the movement, who have 
created a third wing – the Salafist Brotherhood – which opposes not only the 
parliamentary system and democratic procedures in Jordan, but also the monarch’s 
power and legitimacy. This has caused the Brotherhood to lose any ‘modernity’, as 
well as its compatibility with Jordan’s parliamentary system. As merely a sum of its 
parts, the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood has thus become one of the most radical 
movements in the country today, capriciously opposing the regime whilst not being 
accountable.  
 
The Dynamics of the Crisis 
 
The precarious dynamics of the Brotherhood-regime relationship is the main reason for 
the Brotherhood’s transformation, empowering a Qutbist ideology that calls for 
boycott and resolute stances against the parliamentary system. Within the context of a 
changing relationship with the regime, and with close analysis of the two monarchs of 
the crisis era, this study identified three respective points of crisis.  
The three moments of crisis during King Hussein’s rule, initially coercing the 
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Brotherhood into its radicalised position, consisted firstly of the King’s intention to 
enter peace with Israel by dissolving the government that the Muslim Brotherhood was 
part of in order to attend the Madrid Peace Conference; secondly the introduction of 
the one vote system that the Brotherhood considered a tactic to limit the movement; 
and finally, signing the Wadi Arabah peace treaty whilst the Brotherhood was in 
parliament.  
The Brotherhood responded to King Hussein’s changes by adapting a stronger 
agenda towards Palestine, strengthening its ties with Hamas, and pushing leaders 
supporting Hamas into higher positions, such as Zakī bin Arshīd and Sālim Falāḥāt, 
and finally, by boycotting the 1997 election. 
King ᶜAbdallah II furthered the confrontation through an additional three 
decisions. He firstly denied all communication with the movement at the outset of his 
reign, and secondly adopted an anti-Hamas agenda, which accelerated its crisis with 
the Brotherhood. The final event was the supposed ‘fraudulent’ election, which 
epitomised this crisis. The regime’s extreme path in dealing with the Brotherhood was 
mirrored in the radicalisation of the movement to boycott, turning the movement from 
a moderate participant into a negative, and even radical, alienated opposition.  
The Brotherhood therefore lost their political footing within King ᶜAbdallah 
II’s reign, and so focussed their reaction in protests by joining the Palestinian Intifada 
in 2000 to declare their rejection of the King’s policies towards Israel and Hamas, 
finally declaring an indefinite boycott in 2010.  
Although these six developments are easily identifiable as turning points for 
the Brotherhood, further latent contexts within these monarchs’ rule cannot be 
overlooked. Whilst these issues are not the sole actions of the monarchs, they occurred 
due to a deviation in the understandings of the communalities on which the 
Brotherhood built its alliance with the regime, such as the Palestinian issue and societal 
reform, giving way to the Salafist Brotherhood.   
The Palestinian issue is central to the Brotherhood’s driving ethos, particularly 
as the West Bank was once part of Jordan and thus the Palestinian identity is very 
much merged with the Jordanian identity, causing a sense of strong responsibility and 
loyalty to the Palestinian issue among members of the Brotherhood. This relationship 
can, however, be terse, as Jordanian descendants typically fear an increased Palestinian 
majority in parliament, while the Palestinian descendants fear that their citizenship 
could be undermined or even revoked by a nationalistic agenda. The Palestinians’ fear 
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has pushed them towards the Muslim Brotherhood, which is identified as a well-
established organisational body positing Palestinian rights as central to its ideology, 
supporting resistance as an ethos, and claiming that Palestine is an Islamic issue rather 
than an independent nation’s, whilst condemning the Israeli occupation and 
settlements.  
These attributes resulted in the Brotherhood’s popularity on the Jordanian 
streets, bonding them to the Palestinian identity, refugee camps, and Jordanian 
descendants. Prior to the Madrid Peace Conference, the regime and Brotherhood were 
united in understanding the Palestinian issue, which engendered cooperation and 
alliance between the two when faced with wars with Israel or the Fedayeen. Since the 
Madrid Peace Conference, however, their understandings changed, leaving the 
previous alliance with no mutual ground or understanding, and significant distrust due 
to the normalisation of relations with Israel, and the regime’s exile of Hamas.  
Therefore, the clash of descent denies Jordan a fully representational parliament, as the 
regime protects Jordanian descendants by laws that guarantee their majority, and the 
Palestinians vote for the Islamists, as they are the only option representing Palestinian 
rights in Jordan and keeping the question of Palestine alive. 
The second issue of political reform in Jordan is subject to the Palestinian–
Jordanian dilemma, as it could lead to an identity imbalance between Jordanian 
descendants and Palestinian descendants, which has deterred reform from ever taking 
place. Thus, the Brotherhood’s demands of political reform are not going to be met by 
the regime whilst the issue of descent is maintained. This will also maintain the 
Brotherhood-regime crisis, as the question of Palestine is a concern for both parties, 
eventually resulting in further radicalisation of the Brotherhood’s dealing of the 
political process, turning the boycott from a strategy into a status quo.  
Therefore, the struggle of reform also stems from the bifurcation of the 
Brotherhood pushing for political reform, and the King pushing for economic reform. 
Although the movement’s objectives were organically political, such as reversing the 
one vote system, and encouraging freedom of expression and freedom for political 
parties to function without hindrance, King ᶜAbdallah II’s agenda naturally eclipsed 
that of the Muslim Brothers.  
The failure to address political reform and Palestinians in Jordan gave rise to 
radical voices and the return of Qutbists in the Brotherhood, who share many 
understandings with the Salafists. The attraction of this movement to Brotherhood 
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members is that the burgeoning Salafists represent an alternative way of dealing with 
the regime closer to that of Qutb’s ideology, where the application of Islam is 
paramount, and members do not compromise Islam with the regime. 
The Salafist Brotherhood phenomenon that the study highlights is 
symptomatic of the crisis of the Brotherhood-regime relationship, and a reflection of 
the Brotherhood lacking a unified understanding of the state, the application of Islam, 
the Palestinian issue, or reform. Therefore the study argued that in these unstable 
conditions, other Islamic movements in Jordan, such as the emerging Salafists, easily 
inspire Brotherhood members to shift from the al-Banna path to extreme alternatives. 
This is seen in the outcomes of the interviewees of this research, whose 
experiences have since reflected the Brotherhood’s internal crisis. After the interviews 
were conducted, the leader of the Doves, Raḥīl al-Gharāybah, was exiled by the 
movement due to his leniency towards the regime, while Zakī bin Arshīd, the head of 
the Hawks, is on trial due to his criticism of the country’s foreign affairs and relations 
with neighbouring countries. This means the Brotherhood will be led into a new stage 
in Jordan by emerging Salafist Brotherhood personalities such as Ibrahim al-Mashūkhī. 
This emphasises the findings of this study that a further division within the 
Brotherhood is becoming empowered, and that al-Mashūkhī will lead the movement 
into a new stage in Jordan with an increasingly radicalised agenda towards the regime.  
 
What if the Muslim Brotherhood came to Power in Jordan?  
 
Up until 2010, studies of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan have centred on the 
uniqueness of the movement’s relationship with the regime, in stark contrast with the 
Egyptian Brotherhood and other Islamic groups in the region such as Hezbollah, 
Hamas, or the Salafists, who have poor relations with their governments and regimes. 
The unique case of the Jordanian Brotherhood demonstrates Jordan’s ability to 
integrate Islamist movements in modern state politics.  
However, the current situation has revealed the Brotherhood to be radical and 
unstable, and combined with the events that the Arab World is experiencing, the 
perception that reconciliation between the Brotherhood and regime is even possible has 
been challenged. Attempts by the regime in Jordan to marginalise the Muslim 
Brotherhood through election violations, laws against the Brotherhood, limiting its 
participation in political life, and neglecting its reasons for boycott broke the balance 
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that King ᶜAbdallah I and King Hussein had maintained, resulting in the Jordanian 
Brotherhood now being considered one of the most radical groups in Jordan.  
King ᶜAbdallah II forced the movement into the streets after closing the door 
on political reform, and now wings within the movement are calling for constitutional 
reforms that touch even the King’s powers. Yet the recent security approach that the 
government has begun to use against the protesters has caused them to retreat into 
more conservative and potentially radical positions as demonstrated by abū Fāris’ 
Fatwa encouraging protests against the government, claiming that “if any of [the 
protesters] die he or she will go to heaven and [the security forces] to hell.”767 
This reveals that the Brotherhood-regime relations had been more than 
unstable – that they were built on the foundations of the Brotherhood’s fear from the 
regime’s ability to prohibit it, and when this fear was realised, the underlying crisis 
within the Brotherhood became public. Therefore, the Brotherhood’s apparent 
modernisation in accepting the regime was not a choice, nor a unique collaboration 
between a regime and Islamic movement, but in fact an obligation for the 
Brotherhood’s survival, inspiring the question, ‘What if the Muslim Brotherhood came 
to power, and what would Jordan look like under the Brotherhood’s rule?’  
Because King ᶜAbdallah I and King Hussein embraced the Brotherhood during 
the early stages of Jordan’s formation, the Brotherhood prioritised the ideology and 
methods of al-Banna rather than Qutb. Therefore, its alliance with the regime was the 
only factor moving the Brotherhood away from initiating drastic change that Qutb 
advocated. Therefore, as established, the Brotherhood prioritised the ideology of its 
liberal wing for the sake of pragmatism only, whilst still holding from within Qutbist 
ideology that rejects democracy. 
The Brotherhood’s division into three wings – Doves, Hawks, and Salafist 
Brotherhood – that this study presented, demonstrates that the Brotherhood is split 
between three separate leaderships who control the actions of the Brotherhood 
separately, based on each leaders’ interests and personal understandings/relationship to 
the regime, rather than a comprehensive decision-making process. Therefore, if the 
                                                
767 “Al-Shaykh ʻAlī al-Ḥalabī: Fatwá Abū Fāris Daʻwah Sarīḥah lil-Fitnah wa-Bāb Maftūḥ lil-
Qatl” [al-Shaykh ʻAlī al-Ḥalabī: Fatwa Abū Fāris is Open Invitation for Incitement and 
Killing], Ammon, July 14, 2011, accessed December 2, 2014, 
http://www.ammonnews.net/article.aspx?articleNO=92325;  “Fatwá Urdunīyah Tuʼayyid al-
Taẓāhur Didda al-Zulm” [Jordanian Fatwa Supports Demonstrate against Injustice], Aljazeera, 
February 21, 2011, accessed December 2, 2014, http://goo.gl/VUjwcW.  
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Brotherhood came to power within the existing parliamentary system in Jordan, the 
King would have to appoint one of the leadership of the movement as a Prime 
Minister. Since these three wings are different in the applications of the Muslim 
Brotherhood ideology, power would be subject to the views and interests of the leader 
of the wing that would be selected.  
To clarify, if the majority in the Shoura Council consisted of the Doves, it is 
likely that Raḥīl al-Gharāybah would be chosen as Prime Minister, and if the majority 
were with the Hawks, Zakī bin Arshīd would be chosen. Al-Gharāybah and Arshīd’s 
agendas would differ in issues regarding the constitution, charity and education, 
economy, security, foreign affairs, and Hamas.  
Al-Gharāybah, for example, would maintain the constitutional power of the 
King, due to his loyalty and the Doves’ belief in a Jordanian trajectory for the 
movement. Conversely, Arshīd would push for a constitutional monarchy, challenging 
the power of the King to create a stronger parliament to maintain it as a stepping-stone 
for creating change. 
Furthermore, al-Gharāybah would empower Islamic change and charity 
distribution through state institutions such as the Awqāf and development ministries, 
and would focus on education to present Islamic changes through the state curriculum, 
creating a generation of Jordanians whose education is more adaptable to the 
Brotherhood. The Hawks, as led by Arshīd, would also invest in education, however, 
they would also push for the distribution of charity to be increasingly independent 
from the state by empowering Islamic NGOs and associations such as the 
Brotherhood’s Islamic Centre, which arguably has more experience and scope than the 
government. This means that independent institutions would work with the state in 
order to reach wider demographics, rather than the state monopolising limited charity 
distribution through the Awqāf or development ministries.  
The Muslim Brotherhood in general has no economic plans or solutions to 
Jordan’s problems, meaning that the Doves’ al-Gharāybah would maintain King 
ᶜAbdallah II’s economic agenda and initiatives, whilst pushing for further integration 
of Islamic economic institutions such as Islamic banks and schools. Arshīd, on the 
other hand, would try to implement the Muslim Brotherhood’s economic management, 
which showed success in individual Brotherhood projects, such as the Islamic Bank, 
Islamic Hospital, and the Islamic Centre, to use the Brotherhood’s skills within his 
government to create change. 
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Furthermore, security (police, army, intelligence, etc.) and foreign affairs 
traditionally fall under the King’s jurisdiction, therefore the Doves would not attempt 
to change the security situation, keeping this issue in the sole custody of the monarch. 
However, the Hawks would call for a constitutional monarchy, which would empower 
the Prime Minister in matters of security and foreign affairs; therefore, the Hawks 
would change the security department leadership to civilian leadership to ensure that it 
does not challenge the movement or its authority on security decisions. 
In regards to foreign affairs, the key issue would be the peace treaty with 
Israel, and as explained, while the Hawks and Doves currently oppose the treaty from 
their external position, the Brotherhood would respect the treaty if they came to power. 
However, in a situation, for example, where Gaza was attacked by Israel, the Hawks’ 
support for Hamas would not stop at public speeches and condemnations of Israel, but 
the hypothetical leadership would facilitate Hamas as much as possible whilst 
outwardly respecting the treaty to avoid confrontation with Israel. 
Therefore, while the Doves stay true to al-Banna’s theory of gradual Islamic 
change, and wish to maintain Jordan’s democratic process and the King’s powers as 
they stand today, the Hawks’ perceive obtaining power as a transitional act. If they 
were to reach government, the Hawks would keep Jordan’s democratic entities, but 
would adjust them according to their objectives. This maintains the possibility that the 
Hawks would create dictatorship and theocracy in the name of democracy if they were 
to achieve total power, and eventually abandon democracy to establish the Islamic state 
based on Qutb’s ideology.  
However, differences within the Brotherhood become more extreme when 
addressing the Salafist Brotherhood, who, like the Hawks, push for a constitutional 
monarchy and control over the security department, but also push for constitutional 
changes to a stronger application of Islam, trying to make the Qurᵓan and Sunnah the 
sole reference for state legislation. Furthermore, while the Doves and Hawks might 
allow alliances and power share with other political parties – liberals or leftists – the 
Salafist Brotherhood would only ally with other Islamic movements. In this sense, it 
would not be surprising if the Salafist Brotherhood would obligate Zakat as a form of 
tax upon Jordanians, and making Jordan theocratic rather than parliamentary.  
The Salafist Brotherhood would also compromise the stability of the country, 
as they would publically reject the peace treaty with Israel. Therefore, the question of 
what the Muslim Brotherhood would do if they came to power is problematic, and 
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more associated with the decisions of the individual leaders and wings, and how they 
view the Islamic state in Jordan; since they are divided in their opinions there is not an 
absolute answer, which maintains the Brotherhood as an unstable political force within 
the Jordanian political system. 
Therefore, to avoid a possible scenario where the Hawks and the Salafist 
Brotherhood obtain power, King ᶜAbdallah II must acknowledge this threat of an 
unstable Brotherhood, rather than marginalising it. By allowing limited participation, 
and empowering leaders such as al-Gharāybah, the regime would be able to encourage 
modernisation and political participation within the movement. By engaging loyal 
leaders, such as the Doves, within the system, the King would calm voices such as al-
Mashūkhī’s, which call for extreme changes in his authority.  
 
What Should the Regime Do? 
 
The research conducted in this thesis suggests that there are two imperative ways in 
which the regime can forestall further radicalism of the Brotherhood in Jordan. The 
first suggestion is to implement internal reforms on the laws the Brotherhood opposes, 
i.e. the election law, the distribution of seats in each constituency, and the assurance of 
free, immunised, political expression of party members. Secondly, regional reform of 
the relationship with Hamas, whose acceptance in Jordan would result in support for 
the regime from the Brotherhood, Islamists, and their followers. Although Hamas is 
considered a terrorist organisation by the US, re-opening its media office in Jordan 
would facilitate minimal, controlled, relations with the movement, reconciling the 
regime’s pro-Western policy with internal demands.  
By involving the Brotherhood in politics, they would be implicated in the 
running of the country, and the inevitable problems governments experience therein. 
This means that the Brotherhood would not be able to place sole blame on the regime 
for every problem encountered, as they would also be responsible for the country and 
people. By giving this responsibility, the ‘holy’ image is also removed from the 
movement’s actors, rendering them accountable politicians. This is to say that when in 
power, if one fails to provide answers for the people’s needs and the political problems 
one faces, then that actor will be responsible for his/her actions and decisions as an 
accountable human, rather than an elusive representative of Islam, and politically 
empowered Brothers would be viewed differently at the grass roots.  
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The contrast is that exclusion from politics and decision-making results in 
empowered popularity as he/she can argue that those in power are not Islamic, their 
solutions fail as they are not built on Islamic ground, and that they therefore do not 
represent the people’s faith. To summarise, exclusion from politics results in the 
religious empowerment of the Brotherhood outside of governance, who can hide 
behind religious screens, whilst inclusion results in the accountability of its members. 
This study has demonstrated that the Brotherhood’s fragmentation was caused 
by its crisis in relations with the regime, and losing its officiated footing within Jordan. 
Although there are demonstrable reasons for the regime to continue its disregard of the 
Brotherhood, particularly since there has been a rise in Salafist voices within the 
Brotherhood, its stance towards the movement is clearly unsustainable as it is 
increasingly alienating the Brotherhood and pushing it towards extreme rhetoric. 
Therefore, a level of diplomacy adopted by the regime may calm the dissenting voices, 
and bring the Brotherhood back under control, as seen successfully during King 
ᶜAbdallah I’s reign, and the early years of King Hussein’s. The proposition is that in 
highly religious countries such as Jordan, there must be the opportunity and reason for 
Islamist groups to participate in politics, only achievable after tangible changes in the 
regime’s attitude towards the Islamists have been demonstrated. Therefore, the primary 
step in repairing the political environment in the country is to re-open channels of 
communication with the Brotherhood, and an impartial acknowledgement of it. 
Dealing with the movement should be on the basis that they are Jordanian first, 
and with a meaningful message to reform state politics. Furthermore, integration and 
empowerment of the Doves could be used as a tangible tool against Takfīr, or any 
groups that justify violence for change. Therefore, the movement works with its 
ideology as Islamic, and its agenda as reform – politically and religiously – to prove 
the existence of the state of Jordan and the continuation of its regime.  
 
What Should the Muslim Brotherhood do? 
 
Despite the criticism it receives, and its current situation with the regime, the Jordanian 
Muslim Brotherhood’s path into politics and communications with the regime became 
a positive example for Brotherhoods internationally, which copy the model of the 
Jordanian Brotherhood when initiating political involvement. In tracing the 
Brotherhood’s steps, they establish a political wing of their group, as seen with the 
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Egyptian Brotherhood’s Ḥizb al-Hurrīyah wa-al-ʻAdālah [Freedom and Justice Party], 
followed by establishing a social wing, which focuses on charity, education, and aid. 
Finally, they participate in political elections to join the parliament, and thus represent 
the people and Islamic reform, through a civil democratic system.  
The Brotherhood’s main contribution is in changing the meaning of political 
Islam, declaring that it participates for the sake of politics rather than chasing power. 
Although it claims to have the ability to win more seats, it limits its presence in 
parliament by proposing fewer candidates so as to not intimidate the government, 
demonstrating that having a valued voice is prioritised over obtaining a majority, or 
pursuing power.  
However, despite the Brotherhood’s attempts at assuring their Jordanian 
agenda, they have further to go in successfully proving it. The threat of an Alternative 
State is real, and occupies a space in the minds of Jordanian people and the regime. 
Therefore, professing a heavily Palestinian-orientated agenda in Jordan may harm the 
Brotherhood more than benefit it as of late. However, electing Jordanian descendants 
as leaders of the Brotherhood is not enough to reassure Jordanian citizens. A gradual 
but evident transition of charitable work towards more Jordanian locations, such as 
establishing health centres in villages and cities with higher Jordanian-descent 
populations, is one way to reassure Jordanians, and therefore reconnect Jordanian and 
Palestinian descendants who are looking increasingly divided. Moreover, assurance 
that the Jordanian Brotherhood exerts full structural and managerial independence 
from the Egyptian mother movement and Palestinian Hamas would regain the people’s 
confidence in the Brotherhood as a fully ‘Jordanian’ movement. 
The slow response of the regime to the Brotherhood’s needs may in turn harm 
the regime in the near future. The Brotherhood’s demands will accelerate, inevitably 
calling for a new leadership to implement real political reform, as already seen with the 
Salafist Brotherhood who were formed from the Brotherhood’s alienation. Partial 
reform of the election process – not the election law itself – indicates a half-hearted, or 
even false, reform, serving the interests of the regime’s image as a Westernised, 
reformist regime. This false image can be best highlighted in the contrast between the 
country’s economic liberation and political limitations. State policy should be directed 
towards meeting people’s expectations of political reform for the sake of the survival 
and continuation of the Hashemite regime.  
Jordan is at the brink of a crisis. The identity division between Jordanian and 
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Palestinian descendants, combined with the rise of Jihadist Salafist groups, ought to be 
acknowledged as serious and palpable threats to the country. The crises in refugee 
camps, which are mostly occupied by Palestinian descendants, should no longer be 
thought of as only developmental and economic, but also should be recognised as a 
breeding ground for Qutbian ideology, where the seeds of extremism are thriving. 
Reform is necessary to extinguish this fire before it consumes the country, but such 
reform is only possible with full cooperation between the regime and the Brotherhood. 
However, their relationship exists in an undistinguished, grey area. By not 
asserting a clear stance of either opposition or alliance to and with one another, they 
create confusion and an unstable environment for Jordan. The persistent dilemma of 
the regime and Brotherhood prioritising their own separate survivals is unsustainable. 
In order to survive each must direct attention away from itself, and prioritise Jordan 
and its people’s survival as of paramount importance. Ultimately, this study showed 
that the consequences for the regime’s stance against political Islam, reform, and the 
Muslim Brotherhood, is leading to the further destabilisation of Jordan, mirrored in the 
Brotherhood’s boycott of the national political system. 
 
Limitations and Further Study  
 
Through an historical approach, this study utilises a timeline that divides the history of 
the Brotherhood in Jordan into five periods. Firstly, from 1941 to 1953, the study deals 
with the establishment of the movement and its ideological development. Secondly, the 
period of 1954 to 1987 is explored, crystallising the role of the Brotherhood within 
politics and its ‘marriage of convenience’ with the regime. Thirdly, the study looks to 
the subsequent crisis between the Brotherhood and regime between 1988 and 1995, 
and fourthly, the participation, boycott, and internal divisions within the movement 
that occurred between 1996 and 2003. The final fifth section in the study’s timeline 
deals with the period between 2004 and 2010, presenting the effects of the Salafist 
movement upon the Jordanian Brotherhood, and how the movement developed its 
stances into a final and indefinite boycott. Through this historical approach, the study 
was able to investigate the Brotherhood and explore how this dynamic informed the 
political survival of the Brotherhood in Jordan.   
Furthermore, the methodology of this study also relies upon personal 
interviews to reach an understanding of members’ key historical stances that have 
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effected the Brotherhood’s current situation in relation to the regime. However, during 
the field-work for this study in 2012, it became apparent that the Arab Spring’s volatile 
and unpredictable environment may have resulted in limitations for the study, causing 
Brotherhood members to be reluctant to answer questions pertaining to their position in 
Jordan, and regionally, at that time.  
 The 2011 Arab Spring saw the sudden rise of regional branches of the 
Brotherhood, as in Egypt and Tunisia, only to fall just as suddenly soon after. 
Jordanians had taken to the streets in protest of the regime and its reforms, sister 
movements of the movement had been banned, and members executed. In 2012, during 
this highly chaotic period with the regime, asking Jordanian Brotherhood members 
what their personal views of the regime and Jordanian politics were would have called 
for direct confrontation, potentially asking them to incriminate themselves either with 
their own movement, or with the regime. Any response would have been conditional, 
biased, or shackled by the situation, and thus unreliable for use in this paper. 
Furthermore, the chances of actually securing interviews with an angle on the current 
situation would have proven unlikely, and the researcher may have risked blacklisting 
himself as intelligence. Therefore, the sensitivity of this period directly affected the 
possibility of obtaining valuable interviews. Personalities such as Abū Bakr, the 
speaker of the Brotherhood, and Kūfaḥī, withdrew from the study and other leaders 
cancelled their appointments before beginning the interview process.  
 However, as the main purpose of this research was to gain understanding of 
the Brotherhood’s relationship with the regime, the researcher had to find an 
alternative route around this markedly unpredictable period. By stopping the study in 
2010, the researcher was able to freely interview Brotherhood members on historical 
events, using an historical analysis to project current and future actions, whilst 
fulfilling the study’s purpose of pin-pointing the regime and Brotherhood’s conflicting 
relations. Using 2010 as a natural end point, the researcher was able to circumvent the 
regional chaos and create a clear timeline of how the Brotherhood reached its 2010 
crisis, revealing the movement’s patterns of attitudes, stances, and ideologies, and thus 
predict its next moves.  
 Further limitations of this study derive from the lack of written materials by 
the Brotherhood itself regarding its politics, stances, and actions generally and during 
key events. Although some leaders, such as Ḥamzah Manṣūr and Isḥāq Aḥmad Farḥān 
issued books regarding the Brotherhood’s political experience in the parliament in 
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1988, these are not comprehensive, nor reliable, enough to determine an answer to 
specific questions regarding the Brotherhood’s development. However, interviews 
from leaders and decision-makers of the movement were crutial in understanding the 
Brotherhood's actions.  
There are further limitations pertaining to written materials in Jordan, as 
records of the 1970 war and the 1988 Habat Nisān event do not exist. For example, the 
Jordanian University archive, which is considered to be the oldest archive in Jordan, 
has no records for the 1988 events, and the main newspapers, al-Rai and al-Dostor, do 
not have any records in their archives that report these events at the time of their 
occurrences. Due to this lack of written materials, it is a necessity that any researcher 
of this movement must contact the Brotherhood directly for interviews and 
information, whilst also relying on secondary sources for the history of key events in 
Jordan.  
 Despite these limitations, with primary and secondary sources and rich 
interviews, this study provides a new understanding of how and why the relationship 
between the Jordanian Brotherhood and the regime has transformed. The originality of 
this thesis comes from the methodological framework that it employs, following the 
role of the Brotherhood in main political events that the country experienced, looking 
to the transformation of the Brotherhood in each stage of its development, and the 
subsequent development of its pragmatic approaches to deal with each event and crisis. 
This study provides an original lens through which to understand and analyse the 
Brotherhood in Jordan, which penetrates the movement as a whole and focuses on the 
inner organisation of the two wings of the Hawks and Doves. The study thus makes an 
original contribution by identifying a specific strand of radicalism that is rising within 
the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, the Salafist Brotherhood, thus predicting further 
future fragmentation of the movement. Furthermore, this study is unique in that it 
provides policy-makers, decision-makers, and academics alike, with a comprehensive 
analysis and informed prediction of how each Brotherhood division could affect Jordan 
as a whole if it rose to power in the Brotherhood, or independently.  
The study presented the conditions that pushed the Jordanian Muslim 
Brotherhood towards radicalism prior to the Arab Spring - mainly consisting of its 
internal relations with the regime. However, the Arab Spring, combined with the 
growing Jihadist Salafism, attacks against Gaza, and most of all the failure of the 
Brotherhood in Egypt to maintain power, has pressured the Jordanian Brotherhood 
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regionally, potentially making a space for Qutbist ideology to inform reactions against 
these regional events. Therefore, the Arab Spring’s regional impact on the Jordanian 
Muslim Brotherhood may be a key question building on this study’s findings. 
Furthermore, key future research may address the new developments of the 
Salafist movement within the era of the Arab Spring, as the Salafist movement in 
Egypt shadowed the Brotherhood’s political participation by establishing a political 
party and joining the 2012 election, presenting an interesting study into the possibility 
of the Jordanian Salafist movement joining the political process. These are areas with 
considerable potential for further research.  
However, there are three specific areas of further study that should be looked 
at in depth. Firstly, comparing the two riots in 1955 and 1989 against the backdrop of 
the democratisation process incurred by the Arab Spring in 2010, evaluating the results 
and the reform’s implications on the regime and Brotherhood. The 1955 riots were 
politically motivated and led by political actors, whilst the 1989 riots were originally 
motivated by economic concerns, only to become political later, but without the same 
amount of political actors involved due to the political parties ban. Studying these two 
parties and the acceleration of the citizens’ demands can provide understanding for the 
ways in which Jordanians protest in terms of why and how quickly they can turn 
against the regime. By making a pattern of analysis for these protests, they can be 
compared to the Arab Spring phenomenon of protesting in Jordan, and give further 
understanding to how it began in Jordan and hot it will grow, since the Arab Spring 
merged the two reasons of the 1989 and 1955 protests – politics and economics.  These 
two years can also be compared within the context of the democratisation process 
incurred by the Arab Spring in 2010, evaluating the results and the reform’s 
implications on the regime and Brotherhood. 
The second suggested area for further research asks how the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood’s participation in the Arab Spring affect the Jordanian branch, and its 
participation in the reform protest of 2011. In answering this question, the study would 
also ask how the empowerment of the Egyptian Brotherhood in 2012 empower the 
Jordanian Brotherhood and its stances towards the continuation of boycott, as well as 
questioning the failure of the Egyptian Brotherhood to contain the Jordanian branch, 
and to retain its political influence in Egypt. The Arab Spring presents a unique 
scenario in which the Muslim Brotherhood mother movement in Egypt, and one of its 
branches, the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, can be compared and contrasting, 
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following the mother movement’s effects upon one of its branches in a very linear and 
obvious way, thus presenting further understanding of the international organisation of 
the Brotherhood.  
The final area for further research is a continuation of this study’s main 
findings regarding the Salafists of Jordan. This is particularly relevant after the 
transformation of the Egyptian Salafist movement, where the ideology was given more 
moderate stances, such as those associated with the Brotherhood, when they formed 
the political party Hizb al Nur [Al Nur Party], and participated in the 2011 
parliamentarian election. This significant transformation of the Salafists’ role opens up 
a possible discourse or comparison with the Jordanian Salafist movement which is 
mainly prevalent in the cities of Zarqa and Ma’an. Furthermore, the same ideological 
transformation and moderate stance towards politics is important to be studied, 
particularly with the possibility of the Salafists of Jordan participating in politics, and 
how it could change the share of Brotherhood seats in parliament due to sharing the 
same agenda. This could be an important step in analysing the possible future of a 
representative regime and moderate political Islam against extremism.   
These areas of potential future study, drawn from 2010 and the Arab Spring in 
light of the Brotherhood’s final political participation, can be built on this study to 
provide further understanding for the Muslim Brotherhood and its interaction with the 
regime. This serves in providing policy-makers with an understanding of Islamic 
movements in Jordan and how to involve them in the political system, empowering 
them in a moderated arena, and thus decreasing the possibility for extremism.  
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Appendices 
 
 
Appendix 1: Glossary 
 
 
The transliteration in this study is based on the Oxford Transliteration System. The researcher has cross-
referenced sources in the Stanford Online Library system and WorldCat organisation to ensure correct 
Arabic to English transliteration, which did not previously exist. Words already existing in English are 
not transliterated, but for clarification the researcher has supplied fresh translations.  
 
§ Jihad  
Jihad is a noun, meaning ‘struggle’ and derives 
from juhd, the verb for ‘effort.’ 
 
§ Sunnah 
Representing the actions and words of the 
Prophet Mohammed. Sunnah is a source of 
legislation created to complete Qurᵓanic ruling, 
and to explain that which is not in the Qurᵓan.  
 
§ Shariᶜah 
Direct translation is ‘way’ or ‘road’ and is the 
divine law for Muslims, building its rules from 
the Qurᵓan and Sunnah. 
 
§ Shoura 
Literally translates as ‘consultation’. Associated 
with Majlis al-Shourah [The Consultation 
Council]. In Jordan, ‘Shourah Council’ refers to 
the Parliament, and its legislative powers. The 
Shourah Council within the Muslim 
Brotherhood refers to the council of elected 
Brotherhood from branches of the movement. 
The Executive Council and the General 
Supervisor of the movement is elected through 
the Shourah Council, and vote for general 
polices of the movement.  
§ Ummah  
Ummah literally means Islamic ‘nation’ or 
community of believers under Islamic rule.   
 
§ Majlis al-Ummah 
In Jordan the Ummah is referred to in terms of 
the House of Representatives, as Majlis al-
Ummah [the Nation’s Council], which consists 
of the Majlis al-ᵓAᶜyān [Senate Council] in the 
upper chamber of parliament, and Majlis al-
Nuwāb [Council of Representatives] in the lower 
chamber. The upper council members are 
appointed by the King and are half the number 
of Majlis al-Nuwāb. The electorate elects the 
lower chamber for four-year terms, in which 
they practice legislative power.  
 
§ Sufism  
Sufism is thought of as an Islamic path for 
Muslims to reach Haqīqah [ultimate truth], 
which is God himself. There are many different 
scholars of Sufism, providing different 
understandings of how to reach God by 
following his rules in varying degrees of 
austerity regarding acts of worship, fasting, 
nocturnal isolation prayer, and in how one thinks 
of God. These differences in understandings 
resulted in different Turuq [paths] (plural: 
Tarīqah) of Sufi worship, such as al-Shādhilīyah. 
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Most Sufists practice Dhiker, which is a form of 
repeated prayers glorifying god.  
 
§ Al-Tarīqah al-Shādhilīyah 
Named after its scholar, Abū al-Ḥasan al-
Shādhilīy. al-Shādhilīyah, a path of Sufism, 
focuses particularly on the human soul and 
intention of worshipping. Al-Shādhilīyah is also 
considered to be one of the most popular Turuq 
in the Arab World, especially in Egypt, where a 
generation of Sufi scholars reside, such as ᶜAbd 
al-Wahhab al-Ḥasafī, whose application of al-
Shādhilīyah’s Sufism became known as al-
Hasafiyya- al-Shādhilīyah. Abd al-Wahhab al-
Ḥasafī is considered to be a great influence on 
Hassan al-Banna, and his Shādhilīyah teaching 
became part of the general theology of al-Banna 
and the Muslim Brotherhood. 
 
§ Fard 
An compulsory act for Muslims, such as prayer, 
if ignored, will result in punishment on the Day 
of Judgment. Fard has two branches 1) Kefayh: 
if some Muslims performed the act or 
obligation, others are not obligated to do it, 
however if none do it, it becomes Fard Ayn. 2) 
Ayn: every able Muslim is required to do it. For 
example, jihad is Fard Kefayh as it is not an 
obligation upon all Muslims; however, if Islamic 
land was under threat, jihad becomes Fard Ayn. 
 
§ ᶜUlamāᵓ  
Plural of ʿĀlim, which is an Islamic scholar and 
philosopher. The ᶜUlamāᵓ represents Islamic 
theology and is a source of Fatwa [Islamic 
Rule].  
 
 
 
 
§ Fiqh 
Translating as religious ‘jurisprudence.’ The 
ᶜUlamāᵓ’s (fuquhāᵓ) interpretation of the Qurᵓan 
and Sunnah to make laws and Fatwas.  
 
§ Fatwa 
Islamic ruling: a scholarly opinion on a matter of 
Islamic law. Fatwa is a law on how to practice 
or to judge based on Islamic references of the 
Qurᵓan, Sunnah, or the Prophet’s Companions, 
which are used as examples of how to deal with 
present-day situations. 
 
§ Salafism (Salafiyyah) 
 A social and religious movement calling for 
social reforms, opposing ethical and religious 
corruption, and emphasising close adherence to 
the model of the Salaf [Predecessors]. The 
Salafiyyah, like other Islamist groups in the area, 
calls for the return to the Qurᵓan and Sunnah as 
the only guidance for social and private life. 
 
§ Salaf 
The ‘predecessors’ were the first generation of 
Muslims, and the Prophet’s companions, whose 
actions represent model behaviour for Muslims 
to follow.  
 
§ Takfīr 
Commonly the word is translated as ‘infidel’, 
and derives from Kufr. To proclaim someone a 
Kāfir is to say he/she is an infidel, an unbeliever. 
The act of Takfīr, therefore, is to charge 
someone with Kāfir, which traditional Islam 
rejects. However, Qutb’s concept of jāhilīyah 
[ignorance of pre-Islam], opened the door to 
Takfīr being used by Muslims against Muslims, 
which was previously unprecedented. This 
means passing judgment on other Muslims’ faith 
and loyalty to Islam. Which is prohibited in 
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traditional Islam as this would be a personal 
relationship between an individual Muslim and 
God.  
 
§ Al-Jāhilīyah 
An era of ‘ignorance’ in polytheistic religions 
before Islam. Modern Islamists have re-invented 
this concept to refer to the current political 
situation in the Islamic world, which they claim 
is Jāhilīyah due to poor adherence to ‘true’ 
Islam.  Derives from jāhil [ignorance], which 
represents Arabs’ ethical deviation, and 
worshipping other deities before Islam, which is 
not accepted under Islamic laws. Therefore, 
when entering Islam, one must cut all 
attachments to his/her previous life. Qutb 
implied this concept on the present day, 
claiming that Muslims are lacking the 
application of Islamic laws and Islamic values in 
their daily lives.  
 
§ Al-Hākimīyah 
 ‘The Principle of Divine Governance’ was first 
brought to attention by al-Mawdūdī and was 
further developed by Qutb. God is the only ruler 
and source of legislation and governance of the 
Islamic state, as outlined in the Qurᵓan, and to 
deviate from his teaching is un-Islamic. For 
instance, Qutb rejected all laws but god’s laws, 
calling for the rejection of man-made 
governance in order to allow divine law to rule.  
 
§ Itālat al-Lisān  
A Jordanian law enacted in 1960 literally 
translating as ‘Lengthening the Tongue,’ which 
can be understood as a prohibition of offensive 
speech against the King and Royal Family. The 
sentence for breaking this law is from one to 
three years prison sentence.   
 
§ Caliph & Caliphate 
Caliph directly translates as ‘successor’, 
referring to the successor of the Islamic state 
after the death of the Prophet Muhammed in 632 
AD. Caliphate is the ruling system of the Caliph.  
 
§ Jamʻīyat al-Markaz al-Islāmī  
The Association of the Islamic Center, 
established in 1965, is the Jordanian Muslim 
Brotherhood’s social wing. The Center runs 
hospitals, schools, orphanages and poverty care, 
clinics, mosques etc., which are open to the 
general public.  
 
§ Al-Marāqib al-ʻāmm  
Translates as ‘General Supervisor’ of the 
Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood. Every branch in 
every country has a Marāqib al-ʻāmm to 
supervise the branches’ activities. The Muslim 
Brotherhood as a transnational movement has a 
Murshid [Supreme Guide], who is also the 
leader of the Egyptian Brotherhood.  
 
§ Maktab al-Tanfīdhī  
The ‘Executive Bureau’ of the Jordanian 
Muslim Brotherhood. The IAF’s Executive 
Bureau has nine members, and the Brotherhood, 
six, all of which are appointed through internal 
Shoura elections.  
 
§ Awqāf  
Plural of Waqf. Directly translates as ‘religious 
endowments,’ and is the name of ministries that 
manage religious endowments such as mosques, 
charities, or other assets that may aid the 
community.  
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§ Al-Ḥizb al-Waṭanī al-Ishtirākī  
The ‘National Socialist Party’ was established 
on July 7, 1954, and was led by its Secretary-
General Sulaymān al-Nābulusī. The party led the 
coalition government of 1956 for the first and 
last time in the Jordan’s history.  
 
§ Hizb al-Wafd [The Delegation Party]  
This party was resultant of the nationalist 
movement in Egypt that rose up at the end of the 
First World War. Headed by Saad Zaghloul, the 
group led the delegation with Reginald Wingate, 
the British governor of Egypt, to terminate the 
British occupation. Therefore, the name of the 
party, al-Wafd, represents the delegations for 
freedom. However, the ultimate failure of the 
delegations, and the exile of Zaghloul, led to the 
1919 revolt. Thereafter it became the most 
popular and influential party in Egypt until 
1952, when Nasser dissolved all political parties. 
 
§ Al-Majlis al-Waṭanī al-Istishārī   
The National Advisory Council: Due to the 
recognition of the PLO by the Arab league, and 
the subsequent suspension of parliament in 
1974, there was a gap in legislation, in which 
there was no entity to make new laws. Jordan 
issued Temporary Law in 1978 in order to 
establish The National Advisory Council, which 
would create legislature in the absence of 
another entity. The council consisted of 61 
personalities who were appointed, not elected. 
The council was unable to question the 
government, nor minsters. Within this period 
there were three councils, each occupying two 
years: April 15, 1978 – January 11, 1984. 
 
§ Habat Nisān  
Translates as ‘April Uprising’ in reference to the 
1989 riots in Jordan, which began in Maᶜan city 
on April 15, due to changes in fuel prices, and 
spread throughout the whole country. In 
response to civilians’ demands, the King 
dissolved the government responsible and 
declared the democratisation of the country and 
return of the parliamentarian life. 
 
§ Mujāhidīn   
Translating as ‘Fighters,’ Mujāhidīn is plural of 
Mujāhid: the person who acts out jihad. Mujāhid 
is a person who chooses jihad to defend Islamic 
land or apply Islamic rules. 
 
§ Intifada 
Intifada, or ‘Uprising’, is a form of spontaneous 
popular protest. The First Intifada of 1987 
started in Gaza and flourished throughout 
Palestine. The protest began during the funeral 
of four dead Palestinians in Gaza and turned into 
clash with the Israeli army. Students of Shaykh 
Aḥmad Yāsīn organised themselves to fight, 
naming themselves Hamas. 
 
§ Harakat al-Muqāwamah al-Islāmīyah 
Hamas is the commonly used acronym of 
Harakat al-Muqāwamah al-Islāmīyah [Islamic 
Resistance Movement]. It is the Palestinian 
branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, established 
on December 6, 1987, during the first Intifada, 
by Shaykh Aḥmad Yāsīn and uses resistance as 
an alternative to negotiations. Hamas entered the 
2006 Palestinian election for the first time and 
gained 76 seats out 132. However, Fateh refused 
to participate in Hamas’ coalition government. 
Consequently, this led to the Fateh government 
in the West bank and Hamas in Gaza.   
 
§ Shuᵓb  
The Shu’b are Branches of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, each of which constitutes a 
collection of Usar [circles]. Each Usrah 
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[singular of Usar] is a group of four to five 
members, one of which is a Nakib [Captain] who 
leads the Usrah and speaks on its behalf at 
Branch meetings. A collective Usar creates the 
Branch, and the collective Branches create 
regional Branches and these regional Branches 
elect internal leaders to run and represent them 
at the Shoura Council.  
 
§ Wadi Arabah  
Wadi Arabah is the name of the Jordan-Israel 
Peace treaty, signed on October 26, 1994. The 
treaty was signed in Wadi Arabah, which is 
located on the southern borders between Jordan 
and Israel.  
 
§ Al-Islam huwa al-Hall  
This slogan, ‘Islam is the Solution’, derives from 
al-Banna’s understanding of Islam, in which he 
called for the return to Islam as a solution to the 
ills that had befallen Muslim societies. 
Independent Egyptian Brotherhood members 
publicly used the slogan in the election after the 
administrative court accepted its use on October 
17, 2000. The Jordanian Brotherhood entered 
the elections as independents under the 
emergency law, but identified themselves by 
campaigning under unified slogans such as 
'Islam is the Solution.' The slogan calls for the 
refusal of foreign, imported ideologies, and the 
perseverance with Islam as the only way for 
Muslims to escape the poverty and 
backwardness they had reached. 
 
§ The Fedayeen 
Consisting of Leftists and Nationalist Palestinian 
fighters from Fateh, jihad, and other militarised 
Palestinian groups under the PLO’s leadership 
 
 
§ Shuyūkh Bases 
Shaykh is singular of Shuyūkh, which, in the 
Jordanian dialect, refers to leadership of 
religious background. Al-Shuyūkh resistance 
bases were formed in Jordan during the 1967 
war. These bases consisted of three Brotherhood 
brigades and operated in Jordan under the 
leadership of Fateh and Fedayeen. A main 
brigade representing the Brotherhood in this war 
was Bayt al-Maqdis led by ᶜAbdallah ᶜAzzām, 
which camped in the village Rufaydah. 
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Appendix 2: Statements of the Muslim Brotherhood 
 
1. To Whom it Interests, this Blind Sedation, June 14, 1970: 
There is a hypothesis that all the soldiers of the Jordanian army, true believers and brave, and 
the guerrilla fighters, honest and brave, agree on a unified goal, which is to liberate the 
occupied land [of Palestine] by defeating the Zionist enemy. The guerrilla and the army men 
are all our brothers and sons, same as the Palestinians and the Jordanians, who represent one 
people and share the same blood and belief. 
Why do they fight? Over what do you quarrel? For the sake of whom are they shedding blood 
and killing? 
How, you Muslims, do you tolerate your sons and brothers killing each other? Why good 
people are not coming forward to fight the sneaky hands, moving in the dark promoting hatred 
and sedition. 
The guerrillas and the army are fighting each other according to the plans of Jews and their 
agents. These bloody fights must be stopped and we should not return to it. 
The weapon, used to kill each other, is paid by the Ummah, which later on will accuse both 
parties for wasting this money. This weapon should be preserved to kill the enemy: Israel and 
its allies, America and all others on their horizon. 
The fights are triggered by the tribal poor norms and this sedation was provoked by dubious 
people, whom we are about to point at. 
 
• Cited in: Abū Fāris, Ṣafaḥāt min al-Tārīkh al-Siyāsī lil-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn fī al-
Urdun [Pages from the History of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan], 49. This 
statement has been verified by the researcher at the Ummah Center for Studies on the 
August 24, 2012. 
 
2. IAF Letter to US President Bill Clinton, October 26, 2994: 
 
 Freedom is a sacred basis in your country, and democracy is a way of life in your country and 
you call on people all over the world to believe in and implement these principles. These are 
excellent principles, but your actions towards nations and people around the world are in 
contradiction with these principles: they are totally against freedom and democracy. The CIA 
and Pentagon will destroy nations and spare no effort in an unbelievable manner, even if it 
takes all forms of military action, for the sake of keeping countries implementing and 
following US policies which would only protect American interests… True believers of 
freedom and democracy would never accept what has happened to the Palestinian people. 
Your country, the UK, France and others have supported the Zionists to conquer Palestine and 
drive 4 million Palestinians out of their homeland for the purpose of settling Jewish groups 
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from different origins and countries in Palestine. Nowadays, your country is blessing the 
leaders of countries in the Arab region to sign peace treaties against the will of their people. 
This kind of peace which is patronised by the USA would only be temporary due to the fact 
that it is not accepted by the people or goes against their will since it is an unjust and unfair 
peace.  
 
• Cited in: “Risālah Maftūḥah ilā al-Raʼīs al-Amrīkī” [Open Letter to the American 
President], October 26, 1994, The Parliamentarians of the Islamic Action Front, 
quoted in ʻAmūsh, Maḥaṭṭāt fī Tārīkh Jamāʻat al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn fī al-Urdun 
[Periods in the History of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan], 173-178. 
 
 
3. “Bayān al-Muqāṭaʻah li-Mādhā Nuqāṭiʻ al-Intikhābāt 1997” [Communiqué of the 
Boycott Why Do We Boycott 1997 Election?], July 3, 1997: 
 
The limitations and the distortions, which were introduced by law to the Shoura process over 
time, led to the formation of a parliament that represents neither the citizens’ demands, nor the 
different social segments of the Jordanian society. Shoura councils are fully administered by 
the government and they are adopting all the laws and decisions required by the regime. 
Despite the fact that the one vote system being rejected by various popular and social 
movements, it was enforced as a permanent law. This demonstrates extreme lack of respect, 
with no weight given to the social, non-governmental organizations and political movements. 
 
• “Bayān al-Muqāṭa “ʻah li-Mādhā Nuqāṭiʻ al-Intikhābāt 1997” [Communiqué of the 
Boycott Why Do We Boycott 1997 Election?], Issued on July 3, 1997 accessed May 
28, 2014, http://goo.gl/v2Si2S; Abū Fāris, Ṣafaḥāt min al-Tārīkh al-Siyāsī lil-Ikhwān 
al-Muslimīn fī al-Urdun [Pages from the Political History of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Jordan], 158. 
 
4. Official Statement in Al-Kifāh: “No to the call for Obscurity”, February 8, 1957: 
The Muslim Brotherhood rejected to participate in the government when the position was 
offered, and the existing [al-Nābulusī] government is best suited to explain this rejection.  
The Muslim Brotherhood said openly and loudly that we would watch the government 
closely, supporting the good and liberating steps, and oppose every time the government 
deviates from righteousness. 
We repeat clearly today, for those who are spreading their poisons amongst our diligent and 
aware people, that we are not seeking positions or to be assigned as ministers rather we seek 
freedom and the rights of the people, is this understood, you astray [Leftist] people? 
 
 261 
• Abū Fāris, Ṣafaḥāt min al-Tārīkh al-Siyāsī lil-Ikhwān [Pages from the Political 
History of the Brotherhood], 95. This statement has been verified by the researcher at 
the Ummah Center for Studies on the August 24, 2012. 
 
5. IAF Letter Addressed to the American Head of Congress, May 14, 1996: 
 
The Middle East is a crucial area for the world due to its resources, and it was for this reason 
that colonisers continued to intervene in order to control its fortunes. It was stated that the last 
colonisation took the form of Jewish migration to Palestine, who claimed it was their 
historical right from thousands of years ago. The letter continued to suggest that if the Israeli 
claim is to be taken into account, the US should consider claims of the indigenous Native 
American, whose right to American soil is comparatively only four hundred years old. 
 
• Risāla ila Raʼīs Majlis al-Nuwwab al-Amrīkī “[Letter for the President of the 
American Congress], May 14, 1996, The Parliamentarians of the Islamic Action 
Front.  In: ʻAmūsh, Maḥaṭṭāt fī Tārīkh Jamāʻat al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn fī al-Urdun 
[Periods in the History of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan], 173-178.
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Appendix 3: Other Statements  
 
 
1. King Hussein, “Address the Nation”, July 31, 1988: 
 
Citizens, Palestinian brothers in the occupied Palestinian lands, to display any doubts that may arise out of 
our measures, we assure you that these measures do not mean the abandonment of our national duty, either 
towards the Arab-Israeli conflict, or towards the Palestinian cause. Nor do they mean a relinquishing our 
faith in Arab unity. As I have stated, these steps were taken only in response to the wish of the Palestine 
Liberation Organization, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, and the prevailing 
Arab conviction that such measures will contribute to the struggle of the Palestinian people and their 
glorious uprising. Jordan will continue its support for the steadfastness of the Palestinian people, and their 
courageous uprising in the occupied Palestinian land, within its capabilities. I have to mention, that when 
we decided to cancel the Jordanian development plan in the occupied territories, we contacted, at the same 
time, various friendly governments and international institutions, which had expressed their wish to 
contribute to the plan, urging them to continue financing development projects in the occupied Palestinian 
lands, through the relevant Palestinian quarters. 
 
• King Hussein, “Address the Nation,” July 31, 1988, accessed on December 2, 2014, 
http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/88_july31.html. 
 
2. Jordan Times, “King: Subversive Elements Plotted and Caused Jordanian-Syrian Rift”: 
 
But all of a sudden we discovered the truth about the whole affair and we realized what was happening. It 
emerged that some groups which have had to do with the bloody events in Syria were actually living in 
Jordan, hiding behind religious groups and pretending to be adhering to religion. This group has been 
connected with international organizations based in foreign and Arab and Islamic capitals hatching plots 
against the Arabs. The group's members were in reality outlaws committing crimes and sowing seeds of 
dissension among people. I hereby announce that I was quite deceived along with a large section of the 
Jordanian people by this criminal group. I am pained by what had happened because I am not in the habit of 
denying the truth or condoning deception. I warn all citizens against the evil designs of this rotten group 
and urge all citizens to prevent them from implementing their evil plans that aim at causing divisions 
among Arab ranks and sowing seeds of dissension in our midst through concealing themselves behind 
religious pretences and through using our religion to achieve their goals. I am confident that the vigilant 
Jordanian family is capable of exposing the evildoers, deceivers and conjurors and preventing them from 
achieving their goals. I warn this group which went astray and which abused our trust that it has no room 
amongst us anymore. We cannot harbor conspirators or deceivers or those who mean to do harm to our 
nation and we will not allow anybody to sow seeds of dissension between Jordan and any other Arab 
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country. Anyone who causes harm to our brothers is an enemy of ours. 
 
§ The Jordan Times was contacted and confirmed the content of the article in the December 2, 2014, but no 
copies were available. However, the full speech can be found in Satloff, “They Cannot Stop Our Tongues: 
Islamic Activism in Jordan,” 19-20, and Bar, The Muslim Brotherhood, 38. The statement has also been 
verified by the researcher at the Ummah Center for Studies on August 24, 2012. 
 
 
3. King Hussein, “Uneasy Lies the Head”: 
 
Infiltration by Soviet or U.A.R. influence was directed at several key men in Army and the government. 
We learned that [abū Nuwar and Rusheidat] were making regular visits to Damascus and holding meetings 
with the Soviet military attaché there … Rimawi was a member of the then Neo-Communist Baᶜath Party. 
He and the other Ministers drove regularly to Damascus, especially after important cabinet meetings. They 
returned the following morning. These three all received money … Altogether these traitors brought well 
over $300,000 in Jordanian money into the country, some for themselves, some to be used for bribery. 
 
• King Hussein, Uneasy Lies the Head; the Autobiography of His Majesty King Hussein I of the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, (New York: B. Geis Associates; distributed by Random House, 
1965), 159-160. 
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